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The stories we tell give meaning and coherence to our political situation; they 
reproduce, interrogate, and, at times, challenge the discourse of authority.  Thus, when 
the political situation changes so do our narratives.  In the thirteenth century, responding 
to a majestic rhetoric of vis et voluntas (force and will), the barons strengthened the 
community of the realm by turning it into a powerful collective identity that fostered 
political alliances with the gentry.  By The Will of the King demonstrates how Ricardian 
poetry was shaped by and responded to the conflict between majestic and political 
rhetoric that crystallized in the politically turbulent years culminating in the Second 
Barons’ War (1258-1265). By placing Gower’s Confessio Amantis and Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales in dialogue with this political tradition, I demonstrate how narrative 
became a site of conflict between vertical, cosmic descriptions of power and horizontal 
realities of power, a conflict from which the contours of a civic habit of mind began to 
emerge.   
Over the past twenty years, scholars have begun to investigate the evolution of 
this habit of mind in the late Middle Ages.  By looking at the narrative practice of Gower 
and Chaucer through the lens of thirteenth-century political innovation, I extend and fill 
in this depiction of a nascent political imaginary.  Each poet responds to the new political 
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circumstances in their own way.  Gower, placing the political community at the center of 
Book VII of the Confessio, rigorously reworks the mirror for princes genre into a 
schematic analysis of political power.  For Chaucer, political rhetoric becomes visible at 
the moment that the traditional majestic rhetoric of kingship collapses.  The Canterbury 
Tales, as such, restages the conflict of the thirteenth century in aesthetic terms—giving 
form to the crisis of authority.  Ultimately, Ricardian poetry exposes and works through 
an anxiety of sovereignty; it registers the limits of a majestic paradigm of kingship; and 
reshaping narrative, aesthetic, and hermeneutic practice, it conjures a new political 
imaginary capable of speaking to and for a community which had emerged during the 
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INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL REALISM AND THE COSMIC FRAMEWORK 
The dotage of Edward III, the 1381 Uprising, the Wonderful Parliament, the 
Merciless Parliament, the deposition of Richard II, and finally the accession of the 
Lancastrian dynasty—it can be said, with little hyperbole, that the years between 1377-
1399 constitute one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of English authority.  
Much of this turmoil was caused or exacerbated by Richard II’s failure to adopt a rhetoric 
of kingship that could maintain the king-nobility networks necessary for the stability of 
sovereign authority.  Richard projected an image of kingship, which, emphasizing royal 
dignitas and prerogative, “recall[ed] the Angevin world of vis and voluntas”(Saul, 
“Kingship” 37)—a vision that exasperated the nobility. Rather than drawing his baronage 
into his inner circle, he excluded them and surrounded himself with courtiers that shared 
his vision.1   
Frustrated by the diminishment of the role of the baronage, Arundel at the 
Salisbury parliament in 1384 openly denounced the king’s governance: 
You are aware, my lords, that any kingdom in which prudent government is 
lacking stands in peril of destruction; and the fact is now being illustrated before 
your eyes . . . Unless remedies are promptly applied for its relief . . . there is 
reason to fear it will very soon suffer enormous setbacks and crippling losses, 
leading to its total collapse.  (Westminster Chronicle 68-9) 
 
Arundel’s open critique of English governance does not simply describe a threat to the 
English community of the realm;2 it demonstrates the “collapse” of those “complex lines 
of interdependence within the hierarchy [that] supplied the crucial social cement,” a 
                                                
1 The Westminster Chronicle describes one parliament in which the lords openly complained that he “excluded the 
wholesome guidance” from his lords and “clung to unsound policies” (54). 
 
2 Nigel Saul Richard II reads this speech as a response to the diminishment of the barons’ role in governance (Richard 
II 129-131).     
 2 
cement necessary to hold “the medieval political order together” (Hanson 73).  That is, 
Arundel’s rhetoric should not be taken at face value.  It is not meant only as 
condemnation of the king’s governance, but it is also a call to arms.  In this short speech, 
we see Arundel begin to create a coalition capable of challenging or, at least pressuring, 
the king’s authority.  The discourse of sovereignty was dominated by conflict rather than 
the kind of unity that “held the medieval political order together” (Hanson 73), and by the 
end of the fourteenth century, “the very identity of authority—and consequently 
community—was not clearly defined” (Staley, Languages 100).  One may reasonably 
suggest that the outline for the 1399 revolution, which would lead to the deposition of 
Richard II, was emerging before he had reached his full majority.   
Given these conditions, it is no accident that Ricardian poets frequently told 
stories exploring the nature and problems surrounding kingship and lordship.  There was, 
as Lynn Staley suggests, a “perceived need to develop a language that could define the 
nature of royal power or describe the regal image” an image that was “inevitably bound 
up with the construction of community (75-6).” I do not mean to suggest that their poetry 
announced some kind of “worked out” idea of kingship but rather, by depicting 
sovereignty as responding to various exigencies, their poetry is a ‘working out’ of the 
hermeneutic strategies, perspective, and language necessary to address the anxiety of 
sovereignty.  Like Arundel’s speech in front of the Salisbury parliament, there is a sense 
of urgency in their poetry, a sense that they are writing in the face of “collapse.”  
However, the quarrel between the magnates and Richard II was largely a clash between 
royal superioritas and dignity accorded to lordship.  The poetry of Chaucer and Gower, 
on the other hand, registers an anxiety of authority that goes well beyond the egos of 
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kings and barons and demonstrates how the regal image is “bound up with the 
construction of community.” 
The concept of a meaningful political community was a rather novel one.  The 
dominant image of society was still one of king and subjects; it was still a society 
founded on the submission to hierarchical authority. Unlike Dante or Boccaccio whose 
poetry was born out of the great civic tradition of Florentine Piazzas, the poetry of Gower 
and Chaucer manifests and shapes a political consciousness that had descended from the 
king-comitatus power structure.3  However, the political conflicts of the thirteenth 
century led to the development of a political, quasi-constitutionalist, rhetoric that 
challenged the “Angevin world of vis and voluntas” (Saul, “Kingship 37). By establishing 
a meaningful communitas regni (community of the realm) that was seen as both a source 
and restraint of regal power, the barons expanded the political class in order to gain 
leverage against the king. To understand the nascent political consciousness in Ricardian 
poetry, then, scholars need to look beyond the quarrel over insulted majesty between 
Richard and his baronage, and towards the rupture in the discourse of sovereignty caused 
by an emergent political constitutionalism in the thirteenth century.4 
While the community-building and civic commitment play a largely insignificant 
role in the plotting of their tales, I will argue that Ricardian poetry registers a civic habit 
of mind rising out of the political innovations of the thirteenth century, particularly the 
                                                
3As Warren Ginsberg points out, Gower lacks the “civic habit of mind” fostered in the public piazzas of Florence 
nourished by the municipal chronicle and Roman political philosophy). As a result, Gower “generates an erotics rather 
than a discourse of politics” (233).  Ginsberg’s observations point to the formidable constraints foisted onto the English 
political consciousness in fourteenth-century England.  In this dissertation, I examine how Chaucer and Gower began to 
push against these constraints.   
 
4 Political constitutionalism should not be confused with constitutionalism.  Political constitutionalism is a line of 
thought that all rights and laws are grounded in political alliances capable of creating coercive force to ensure their 
authority such that the law was “a statement about a power relation” (Griffith 19).     
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development of a more robust community of the realm.  On a conceptual level, one 
encounters this nascent rhetoric in those tales in which prudence assumes a more political 
dimension, where the conventions of tyranny or the Fürstenspiegel-prince are finely 
tuned to explore the limits of particular sovereign actions, or those tales that focus on 
kingship being underwritten by the trouthe bond rather than cosmology.  Since the source 
of sovereign authority is bound to ideas of time, language, and cosmology, the author’s 
attitude towards kingship inevitably shapes the aspects of his or her narrative (and vice 
versa).  As a result, the emerging rhetoric manifests not only in the content of poetry but 
also in the narrative architecture of the tales.  As the political imaginary begins to shift 
from theocratic explanations of power to social ones, historical time and contingent 
circumstances assume a more important role.5  Similarly, language, instead of referring to 
some “ontological truth,” must serve an increasingly social, provisional, and performative 
function. Language does not tell truths; it creates peace. It is this privileging of historical 
time and contingent circumstances as well as the development of a social hermeneutic 
that I refer to as political realism. 6 
Like most “realisms,” political realism is best understood by contrasting it with 
the idealistic tendencies that appear commonly in the dominant narrative model.  In this 
case, Gower and Chaucer are responding to what Ad Putter has described as Ciceronian 
idealism. Putter uses the popular philosophical work Moralium dogma philosophorum, 
which draws heavily from De officiis, to provide a working definition of Ciceronian 
idealism.  According to the Moralium the good deed is paid back in kind such that 
                                                
5 For discussion of this shift in terms of historiography, see Patterson, Chaucer 84-99. 
 
6 What I refer to as political realism draws from Burrow’s suggestion “that the prevailing modus sigificandi of 
Ricardian narrative is not allegorical but literal” (Ricardian, 82).  I call it political realism, however, because the “literal 
level” manifests as a disruption of the allegorical mode—what Andrzej Wicher calls “disconcerted allegory” (59). 
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even though the beginning seemed dangerous, the end was good.  Thus you may 
see that an honest thing, however it appears in the beginning, is always profitable 
in the end and that a dishonest thing will never be profitable either in the 
beginning or the end.  (qtd. in Putter 154) 
 
This philosophical stance was particularly popular among twelfth-century humanists 
because it established a universe in which “moral and religious obligations” could be 
worked out without “denouncing the ways of the world” (Putter 152).  However, Chaucer 
and Gower would not have to be steeped in twelfth-century humanist philosophy to 
respond to this philosophical tradition.  This philosophy thoroughly permeated medieval 
literary production. It was fundamental to chansons gestes, works of clerus-miles 
tradition, and advice books.  It was part of the English romances tradition and it was 
perfected in the romances of Chretien.  
Putter’s reading of The Knight and the Cart provides a clear illustration of how 
Ciceronian idealism manifests in both the narrative content (i.e. its plot points) and 
narrative architecture.  Lancelot must cross a bridge as sharp as a sword in order to save 
Queen Guinevere from Meleagant.  When Lancelot looks across the sword bridge and 
sees two lions, he bravely asserts, “I have such faith and trust in God that He will protect 
me everywhere.  This bridge and this water are no more terrifying to me than this solid 
land.”  When he crosses the bridge, the sensorial world, the world of lions, turns out to be 
an illusion: “He looked around and saw nothing to harm him, not even a lizard” (Chretien 
208).  The sword bridge and the lions only seemed dangerous and “any conflict between 
the morally right and the expedient is in the final analysis only chimerical” (Putter 154).  
If the suffering is not purely chimerical, it is, at the very least, transitory.  Good heroes 
and heroines may cross the sharp Sword Bridge, but their hands will heal. 
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By the twelfth century, the balance between the “power of human drama” and the 
“power of the philosophical solution” had become a significant literary expectation 
(Salter 180).  Barbara Nolan similarly argues that “aventures” are not only products of 
“fortune and destiny but also of individual responsibility and divine vengeance” (249).  
Chaucer acknowledges the narrative pressure in Prudence’s citation of the Decretals: 
“Seelden, or with greet peyne, been causes ybroughte to good ende whanne they had been 
badely biggonne” (VII.1404).  Indeed, if we look at bare bone plot-lines (the actions and 
outcomes), we see how moral actions in these idealized political fictions tend to yield 
expedient results; and yet, when we read something like the Clerk’s Tale, we cannot help 
but feel that the good turn is not quite paid back, that “the honest thing . . . is [not] always 
[quite] profitable.”  
By using this word “quite,” I want to stress how these tales leave us with 
considerable psychological discomfort.  In the Clerk’s Tale, for example, Walter, the 
Marquis of Saluzzo, marries Griselda, a peasant, to satisfy his subjects’ need for a stable 
lineage. Walter then pretends to kill her children and after ten years of tormenting this 
hapless wife sends her back into poverty with the pretense of marrying someone of more 
noble blood.  She accepts the king’s judgment saying: “My child and I . . . /Been youres 
al . . . /werketh after youre wille” (IV. 502-504).  The king drops the pretense, accepts the 
Griselda as his wife again, and they live “happily ever after?”  It is true that Griselda’s 
patient resistance to her husband’s tyranny eventually concludes with her family reunited 
and her social elevation, but the lengthy descriptions of her humiliations and sufferings 
make the “happy” narrative resolution ring false.  Walter’s crimes bother the reader, 
Griselda’s patience bothers the reader, but most importantly the narrative logic disturbs 
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us; we are bothered, that this ending is supposed to “resolve” the initial injustices.  We 
can, through our panoply of ingenious hermeneutic strategies, ‘explain away’ the anxiety, 
but we must acknowledge, as the Clerk does himself, that there is anxiety that needs 
explaining.7  
Broadly speaking, I examine this generative anxiety within the discourse of 
sovereignty, not in order to reduce the Ricardian aesthetic “in the last resort” to politics or 
ideology, but rather to emphasize the creative and aesthetic work necessary to foster a 
public space, a civic habit of mind, and a commonwealth.  As such, I conceive of 
Ricardian poetry not as a particular reaction to topical events or, even as part of a broader 
history of ideas (e.g. identifying Chaucer’s political philosophy), but rather as 
“ideological ensembles” that register the disentangling of an emergent political 
consciousness from the more ancient, yet still dominant, majestic image of the king who 
was recognized in law books as the “Vicar of God” through which all power was derived 
(Bracton 2:33). Ciceronian idealism, as described by Putter, had been shaped in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries to support majestic models of kingship.  However, the 
development of a robust communitas regni made inroads on the royal superioritas of the 
king, and similarly the narrative structure became more grounded in the actual conditions 
of power rather than its cosmic justifications of power.  
Ricardian poetry reproduces the anxiety of sovereignty—i.e. the conflict between 
a dominant majestic model of kingship and an emergent political model.  In order to 
examine how these texts embody this anxiety, without reducing them to a particular 
                                                
7 One might object, as Charlotte Morse has, that this reading is “presentist” and a kind of affective fallacy; however, the 
“discomfort” is not just the readers’, but something the Clerk repeatedly acknowledges, a point I will discuss at length 
in Chapter IV. 
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ideological expression, I will draw upon Macherey’s concept of the symptomatic reading 
in which 
the concealed order of the work is . . . less significant than its real determinate 
disorder (its disarray).  The order which it professes is merely an imagined order, 
projected on to disorder, the fictive resolution of ideological conflicts, a resolution 
so precarious that it is obvious in the very letter of the text where incoherence and 
incompleteness burst forth.  (155) 
 
The text not only embodies its projected order but also, through conflicting themes and 
narratives, it exposes the anxieties (the ideological conflicts) that shape the text (i.e. the 
“incoherence and incompleteness” of the fictive order that is “obvious in the very letter of 
the text”).  I examine how Ricardian literature mediates and refracts (in its particular 
way) the incoherence within the historical discourse of sovereignty.8  Generally, the 
disorder could be described as part of an unsettled question of profound historical 
importance, namely: what authorizes authority?  The conflicting answers to this question, 
“fictive resolutions” (i.e. cosmic framework, the ancient constitution, the common profit) 
all point to a more unsettling, but more likely possibility, that there is no absolute ground 
for authority.  In Macherey’s terms, the absence, or non-said (le non-dit), conjures 
“fictional resolutions;” thus, in practice, the disorder is not experienced as absence of 
meaning but rather as the competing projections of meaning.9   
The determinate disorder—what I call the embarrassment of authority—produces 
the need to consistently generate authority rhetorically; that is to generate authority by 
                                                
8 As Terry Eagleton notes, one of the weaknesses of Macherey’s approach to the highly “autonomous” text is that he 
tends to create too much separation between the text and history (Eagleton 141-3).  I have tried to address this 
weakness without producing a reductive account of the epistemic limits of a particular age.  Instead, using the critical 
vocabulary of Raymond Williams, I have tried to simply depict the discourse of sovereignty itself as comprising 
emergent and dominant answers to the question:“what authorizes authority” (Williams 121-127)?    
 
9 One can only experience absence in relation to presence; thus, “the work’s significance lies in its relation to what is 
not, and so, paradoxically is at once interior and absent simultaneously” (Eagleton 138).  For afull  discussion of the 
non-dit (“not said”), see Pieters 210-214. 
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inducing cooperation around a particular image of kingship.  This brings me to a crucial 
question raised by Georges Duby’s Les trois ordres: ou l’imaginaire de féodalisme: how 
is the political imaginary “connected with the concrete relationships within society” 
(Duby 8)?  In order to answer this, I examine the rhetorical aspect of these models of 
kingship: that is to say, I conceive of “fictive resolutions” not as truth-claims, but rather 
as a means of organizing, building or reinforcing the coalitions necessary to maintain 
sovereign authority.   
Ultimately, I will contend that the poetry of Chaucer and Gower registers the 
emergence and intensification of a political rhetoric.  In order to understand the political 
dimension of narrative structures, one must situate these texts firmly within their own 
context.  Since Chapter I will fully describe these political tensions, I will keep my 
remarks here rather general.  Perhaps the most important thing to emphasize is that “the 
Middle Ages,” as S.B. Chrimes argues, “were by far the most creative of all ages in the 
art of government; for they created the basis of modern government” (ECH 67-8).  This 
fact can be, and often is, glossed over, because the crystallization of medieval political 
innovation into institutions largely occurs in the Early Modern period. 
I have, until now been deliberately cagey, and somewhat loose, in the way that I 
have used the word “political,” precisely because this dissertation examines how 
particular narrative moments are freighted with an anxiety that manifests and arises from 
a nascent, and thus not fully formed, awareness of politics as a distinct science.  The 
political anxiety present in Ricardian narratives are, in part, the birthing pains through 
which the autonomous field of politics is born.  As Gerald Harriss points out, “politics” 
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was not a “rationally and morally autonomous” field or mode of thinking, but rather it 
was treated as part of  
the cosmic framework, whose raison d’etre was the fulfillment of God’s purpose 
for mankind.  Authority was instituted for this end and political action (policy) 
evaluated in these terms . . . The king was the pivot of this relationship in secular 
matters, at once God’s viceregent and the officer of the people . . . There was no 
awareness of the science of politics, of where power was located, whence it was 
derived, how it was apportioned, through whom it was channeled.  (12-13) 
 
While Harriss acknowledges the development of a “political consciousness” between 
1370 and 1470, a development evidenced by the number of manuscripts dealing with 
governance, he simultaneously suggests that this consciousness was hemmed in by, what 
Foucault might call, the epistemic boundaries of political discourse.  In fact, Harriss 
concludes that the literary political imagination was “stereotyped and blinkered” such 
that the medieval political imagination had not, because it could not have, separated 
political aims from the “cosmic framework.”  The distinction that Harriss is alluding to is 
not new.10 Scholars from Burckhardt to Greenblatt have relied upon the assertion that an 
autonomous “science of politics,” and the questions that inhere to this science (i.e. 
“where power was located, whence it was derived, how it was apportioned, through 
whom it was channeled”) were largely inventions of the Early Modern era.11 This line of 
reasoning emphasizes how the “cosmic framework” elided the ways in which sovereign 
power was embedded in a field of social forces—forces that, in reality, often created real 
political power. To this end, crises of governance were attributed to moral, rather than 
political failings and thus, as Elizabeth Porter describes it, “politics was an extension of 
ethics” (154).   
                                                
10 Foucault describes this development in his essay “Governmentality,” see 97. 
 
11 Lee Patterson in Chaucer and the Subject of History, provides perhaps the most developed explanation, see 18.   
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The development of overtly political tensions, which had accelerated since the 
beginning of Second Barons’ War, created a demand for a rhetoric that spoke more aptly 
to the political situation.  The attempts to apprehend and perhaps resolve the conflicts and 
anxieties inherent in the political atmosphere force an encounter and negotiation of the 
terms of traditional modes of thought.  The old narratives of power no longer sufficed.  
The discourse of sovereignty does not represent a unified mode of thought but rather a 
plurality of such modes. 
The underlying principle of this dissertation is that sovereignty, itself, is a product 
of rhetorical operations, a product of what Kenneth Burke described figuratively as an 
unending historical conversation.12 That is, sovereignty is essentially the threat or 
application of coercive force, which being embedded in a historical conversation of 
conflicting ideologies, political conventions, histories and so forth, assumes an air of 
legitimacy; and equally, it is the construction of coercive force through a sense of 
legitimacy founded upon the same historical conversation of conflicting ideologies, etc.  
The former can be seen in the deposition of Richard II, the latter in the accession of 
Henry IV.  If sovereignty were a thing, like a rock, a tree, or a dirty windowpane such a 
definition could be accused of circularity, but since sovereignty exists conversationally, 
circularity is its function.  
                                                
12 In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Kenneth Burke imagines discourse as an unending conversation: 
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they 
are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is 
about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is 
qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you 
have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another 
comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of 
your opponent. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do 
depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.” (110-11) 
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More importantly, unlike Augustine who suggests that earthly sovereignty is little 
more than banditry, I am not proposing a cynical view of sovereignty; the dialectical 
production of sovereignty ensures that legitimacy not only generates coercive force, but 
that coercive force generates legitimacy. While the failure to employ an effective rhetoric 
of legitimacy can induce violence, it can equally (and perhaps more frequently) restrain 
people from acting violently in the first place. Penelope weaves and unweaves, waiting 
for the ideal king to return home, but permanent equilibrium is always in the offing. 
Nonetheless, the potential volatility inherent within the discursivity of sovereignty should 
not be confused with actual volatility.  The fundamental propositions and institutions that 
shape sovereignty precede the actors on the historical stage at any given moment and thus 
the conversation shapes the speaker and stabilizes the discursivity of sovereign authority.  
Within this broader and agonistic discourse of sovereignty, I differentiate between 
two competing rhetorics (i.e. two modes of inducing cooperation) that are salient to the 
analysis of Ricardian literature, namely majestic and political rhetoric.  My distinction 
between these rhetorics is not particularly novel; indeed, my terms share many features in 
common with the terminology deployed by other scholars invested in the political 
analysis of literary texts—for example, Foucault’s Foucauldianism (discourse of 
sovereignté/ gouvernmentalité), Strohm’s political structuralism (horizontal/vertical), or 
Kendall’s use of gift theory (reciprocalism/magnificence).  The common ground between 
these terminologies suggests that there is a recognizable difference between the way that 
political relationships were constructed, and I will suggest, more importantly, the way 
they were represented.   
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Broadly, majestic and political rhetoric are two different modes of inducing 
cooperation.  Majesty, an idea entwined with royal dignitas, imagines reflected authority 
that attains its ideal (though rarely truly accepted) form in the sacral kingship.  On a 
grand scale we find Richard’s own declaration on a royal charter that the barons, like 
jewels on a crown, reflect his light.  On a more domestic level, this “reflected authority” 
influences the development of medieval law.  “Politics,” on the other hand, as Bernard 
Crick observes, “arise from a recognition of restraints.  The character of this recognition 
may be moral, but more often is simply prudential, a recognition of the true power of 
social groups and interests, a product of being unable, without more violence than one 
can risk, and stomach to rule alone” (Crick 16).  Political rhetoric emphasizes that 
sovereign authority derives from the communitas regni, which in the ideal (though rarely 
desired or expressed) form establishes sovereignty on the ground of popular consent. The 
distinction between the two rhetorics can be summed up by the question: what authorizes 
authority? 
The discourse of sovereignty cannot be reduced to an either/or; at any given point 
both rhetorics coexist—at times peacefully, at times antagonistically.  For lack of a better 
metaphor, imagine these rhetorics as a small sphere within a larger one.  When majestic 
rhetoric was dominant (i.e. the larger sphere), political rhetoric existed (silenced, effaced) 
within the sphere of majesty.  The kings had to accommodate baronial power (which is a 
political act) but they did so in a way that effaced the political act.  When Richard II 
grants land to his barons in a charter, he declares that the nobility are like gems reflecting 
his own luster.  Of course, the land grants created the alliances necessary for luster.  
When kings failed to accommodate the power brokers, political rhetoric was unleashed 
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and resulted in civil wars and sometimes depositions.  Thus, when political rhetoric was 
dominant, it likewise contained majestic rhetoric—a rhetoric of obedience to power that 
is necessary to ensure that the machinery of power works.  In both cases, the dominant 
rhetoric does not eliminate the lesser rhetoric but rather silences or effaces it.  Indeed, one 
can still see this same power relationship today in England's parliamentary democracy 
that has repeatedly employed royal prerogative to establish some form of executive 
authority within a parliamentary system.  This terminology, though abstract and 
schematic, provides a starting point for articulating the relationship between literature of 
the fourteenth century and the emergence of political consciousness.  
While I agree that a fully developed “science of politics” matured in the Early 
Modern period, I will suggest that narrative moments from late medieval texts recognize 
the political condition of power and, as such, anticipate a modern political view of the 
world.  To deny the epistemic limitations of medieval political thought, particularly as it 
had been articulated in contemporary authoritative sources regarding political philosophy 
(i.e. De regimine principum or Policraticus), would actually diminish the truly innovative 
political dimension of these poems; that is, these poems achieve their political aesthetic 
by brushing up against the limitations of political thought.  These limitations provide the 
fundamental tension of the poetry; they are the cause of the political aesthetic that 
attempts to transcend the conditions that constrain its point of origin.  The anxiety and 
improvisation that erupts at the moments of narrative crises demonstrate a kind of feeling 
one’s way forward towards a largely buried mode of thinking, a mode of thinking 
obscured by the epistemic pressure of the “cosmic framework.”  Nonetheless, these 
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moments demonstrate attempts to negotiate this older framework while at the same time 
sensing its very outmodedness.   
Several scholars have shown the ways in which, Chaucer and Gower in particular, 
have both critiqued Richard's majestic discourse, or deployed a more political rhetoric.  
In the past, critics have tended to attribute one of these opposed rhetorics to a poet or a 
text—i.e. Chaucer employs either majestic or political rhetoric in his handling of the 
Clerk’s Walter.  I want to suggest that these narrative moments are not merely political 
statements, but rather that they make visible the generative paradox at the center of the 
discourse of sovereignty, and make visible a political thinking that both brushes violently 
against the cosmic framework, and reaches towards something just beyond its purview.  
Indeed, this is the way that J.C. Holt describes the arduous creation of the most famous 
document of English political history, Magna Carta:  
Many of its provisions had no precise meaning.  It was not an exact statement of 
law . . . but a political document produced in a crisis.  It was a product of 
intermittent negotiations . . . It was the culmination of hard bargaining and skilful 
manoeuvering.  Perhaps it registered too the weariness of the negotiators in the 
face of the intractable character of the king, the intransigence of some of his 
opponents and the hard facts of English administration (6). 
 
Likewise what we encounter in Ricardian poets are not polished rhetorics, but deeply 
conflicted ones. 
Chapter II explores the relationship between representative political documents 
and events from that crucial period between 1258 and 1265 when many English barons, 
led by Montfort, rebelled against and even momentarily seized power from Henry III—a 
period of time that historians often refer to as the genesis of English political 
consciousness.  By analyzing a discreet moment during which the rhetorics of majesty 
and politics were, quite literally, at war, I can provide and expand upon two observations 
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about the complex relationship between majestic and political rhetoric and the 
relationship between these rhetorics and the “material” conditions of power (Duby 9).  
That is, while political rhetoric had slowly developed since Magna Carta, majesty had 
already established powerful coalitions necessary to maintain a stable sovereign 
authority. Political rhetoric was a rhetoric of resistance that had to overcome vast 
structural disadvantages—namely, those coalitions of power reinforced by convention, 
tenurial obligation, and family history.13  In Chapter II, I examine how an alternative 
rhetoric was forged to overcome these limitations through political alliances: How did 
Montfort’s rhetoric acknowledge, appeal to, and reinforce the “power of social groups 
and interests” outside the traditional sphere of majestic authority? What kind of power 
base did this rhetoric try to establish and how? Chapters III and IV examine how 
Ricardian poetry is a site replete with the contradictions and conflicts arising from the 
development of these two rhetorical traditions.    
By analyzing political realism in Ricardian narratives, I am less interested in the 
statement of the poet, the statement that resolves a crisis of authority, and more interested 
in the poem as a site of conflict: how do these works negotiate and maneuver in the face 
of an intransigent and dominant model of the “cosmic framework?” In particular, Chapter 
III examines how Gower extends the ideas of Ciceronian idealism to their logical 
conclusion (indeed moving closer to what Cicero himself would have envisioned).  By 
focusing on the political mechanisms through which a moral universe is maintained, his 
poetry becomes increasingly engaged with the power of the law and limits of kingship.  
                                                
13 Power is at the center of the matrix of shared ideas and beliefs: that is, it generates and is generated by ideas, words 
and utterances, which establish the social bonds that hold together cultural institutions. The tautological principle that 
power “generates and is generated by” language is the motor of socio-political change.  André Burguière describes 
Fustel’s belief that institutions “rest on utterances, beliefs, or principles by which members of a group come to an 
agreement and commit themselves to one another” (72).  
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Political expedience is no longer part of a transcendent machinery, that, making the lions 
disappear, imagines peace through pure submission to hierarchy.  Instead, desublimating 
the language of kingship, Gower’s tales examine, more closely, organic mutual 
obligations between the different levels of hierarchy, demonstrating how legitimate 
sovereign actions bring about good results through political means. 
In Chapter IV, I argue that Chaucer, unlike Gower who is willing to accept that 
ethical and political overlap, comes closer to Boethian worldview where moral actions do 
not necessarily produce politically expedient results.  The relationship between 
Providence and history must be understood in terms of the health of “the inner spiritual 
life of man” not the political community. Richard II ruled and was deposed by 
providential mechanisms.  However, the language of Providence is not, as it is in Gower, 
interpretable.  Creation is God’s poem, but man cannot read it.14 Thus, unable to write in 
God’s language, Chaucer, in Knight’s Tale, Clerk’s Tale, and Melibee, grounds language 
in its socio-political function—its ability to create peace.  Chaucer’s poetry separates the 
Christian function of poetry (i.e. the establishment of peace) and the majestic model of 
sovereignty; indeed, in the poems studied in this dissertation, the embarrassment of 
majestic authority is exposed.  Ricardian "political" philosophy (here in the broader sense 
of the word) depends upon its ability to disentangle itself from the cosmic framework and 
imagine a political community. 
Ricardian literature achieves new heights of narrative complexity precisely 
because it reveals the contradictions at the margins of political thought in the late Middle 
                                                
14 Lee Patterson describes how Augustine thought that the “historical life bears a meaning that remains resolutely 
unavailable to them and for whom the translation of secular history articulates a meaningless pattern of ceaseless rise 
and fall” (Chaucer 97). 
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Ages, contradictions that themselves presage (but do not establish) a third term in which 
these contradictions will be dissolved; that is these contradictions anticipate the 
development of politics as a separate discipline or knowledge. Thus, in order to 
understand this relationship between majesty and politics in Ricardian literature, we must 
avoid reducing it: majesty or politics are not simply rhetorics that the poet consciously 
employs in a particular situation.  Instead we must examine how particular narrative 
moments operate between these poles within the discourse of sovereignty.   
Ultimately, this is not an attempt to write a political history, nor even to revise 
Harriss's concept of a "literary political point of view;" such attempts at periodization 
around a particular political ideology are, I would suggest, bound to fail, precisely 
because the Ricardian "period," if we can call it that, represents a moment of profound 
political confusion, or better a confusion from which the political is emergent.  If we are 
to construct a period, then we must discover the ways that the literature expresses an 
anxiety surrounding the discourse of sovereignty—we must find the ways that the 
literature remains deeply troubled and attempts to apprehend and resolve what Chrimes 




THE SECOND BARONS’ WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY 
Ricardian poetry was shaped by the conflict between majestic and political 
rhetoric that crystallized in the politically turbulent years leading up to and culminating in 
the Second Barons’ War (1258-1265).  This chapter examines the historical development 
of these rhetorics in the thirteenth century: how they were used to expand or restrict the 
political class, how they generated power by establishing lines of cooperation, and how 
the tension between these rhetorical systems created an anxiety of sovereignty that would 
eventually shape late medieval literature. In particular, I will examine that period between 
the Provisions of Oxford (1258) and the Mise d’Amiens (1264).  During this period the 
barons led by Simon Montfort entered into a political alliance with vavasour class (i.e. 
knights and lesser tenants). In a common effort (popularly called the Common 
Enterprise), they sought to limit the authority of the king and create a robust and 
meaningful community of the realm (communitas regni).  I will look at this moment both 
in itself and as an intersection of rhetorical strands—from Neoplatonism to Roman law.   
In December of 1263, the barons and the king appealed to Louis IX for arbitration 
of differences that precipitated the Second Barons’ War. Both the king and the barons 
gave a list of grievances, or gravamina, to Louis.  Louis IX issued the settlement or the 
Mise d’Amiens on January 23, 1264.  The Mise, alongside the written grievances of both 
the king and barons, depict the clash of Henry III’s majestic rhetoric with the political 
rhetoric of the barons.  They document the story of a nascent political philosophy, which, 
although limited in both theory and vocabulary, challenged the “cosmic framework,” a 
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framework so pervasive that it has often been treated as the medieval “world-view.”1  
The Barons’ Gravamina, their written grievances to Louis IX, exemplifies the rhetorical 
struggle to establish the authority of the communitas regni as the source of kingship by 
creating political mechanisms to safeguard the rights of the community of the realm and a 
coalition devoted to maintaining those safeguards.  
 
A Working Framework: Rhetorical Analysis of the Discourse of Sovereignty in 
Thirteenth-Century England 
 
While this study has elements of history and political science, it is more 
accurately described as a rhetorical analysis of the discourse of sovereignty.  I should 
probably begin with a few remarks about “rhetoric” since my use of this term is very 
particular.  By “rhetoric” I do not mean “flowers and colours of speech” nor do I mean 
the kind of deceitful speech that landed in Brunetto Latini in Dante’s seventh circle of 
hell.  I use the word rhetoric in the comprehensive sense described by Kenneth Burke in 
Rhetoric of Motive as “rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is 
wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means 
of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols"(43).  In particular, I 
examine how certain representations of sovereignty challenged or reproduced the lines of 
cooperation necessary to maintain sovereign authority (i.e. how these representations 
implied certain audiences which included some and excluded others).  Majestic or 
political rhetoric describe the kind of “social cohesion” induced by a particular system of 
symbols.    
                                                
1 The dominant image of medieval worldview is what Walter Ullmann describes as the “descending theme of 
government” (see Individual, lecture I; particularly 25-31).  This was the view reproduced by the “rather thin upper 
crust of society” (53).   
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These rhetorical representations existed simultaneously and I use the term 
discourse of sovereignty (much like sociolinguistists’ use of “linguistic marketplace”) to 
signify the aggregate of competing rhetorical strategies used to legitimize or challenge 
sovereign authority.  This discourse is not uniform and in order to describe its “internal 
dynamics” I borrow Raymond Williams’ idea that any cultural system consists of 
dominant, residual and emergent rhetorics.2  Specifically, this chapter describes how 
political rhetoric emerged from the dominant rhetoric of majesty based on nobilitas.  
Through this process the notional idea of the community of the realm became 
increasingly important to descriptions of political authority.  The Mise and its immediate 
context offer a lens through which we can see how members of the political class 
deployed the discourse of sovereignty to vie for power.  By looking at the same moment 
in history, we see how the king deploys a rhetoric aimed at consolidating his authority 
while the barons’ representation of kingship fostered new lines of cooperation necessary 
to reinforce or challenge sovereign authority.  
The events and documents surrounding the Mise d’Amiens demonstrate the 
relationship between rhetoric (particularly the discourse of legitimacy) and the realities of 
power on the ground. As Immanuel Wallerstein argues:  
sovereignty is more than anything else a matter of legitimacy . . . requiring 
reciprocal recognition.  Sovereignty is a hypothetical trade, in which two 
potentially (or really) conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of power, 
exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy.  (44) 
   
Wallerstein’s definition of sovereignty as “a matter of legitimacy” allows us to see how 
Burkean rhetoric (as a system of cooperation-inducing symbols) plays a crucial role in 
                                                
2 Since Williams is interested in more than the symbolic systems, he uses the word hegemonies.  By focusing on 
“rhetorics,” I am looking particularly at the way language articulates certain groups and individuals within a social 
formation.  For discussion of “emergent” and “dominant” hegemonies, see Williams 120-7. 
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the discourse of sovereignty.  The “reciprocal recognition” and the production of 
legitimacy necessary for a stable sovereign authority are rhetorical.  For example, in 
times of stability, majestic rhetoric provided barons a language to curry favor with the 
king, who in exchange gained the barons’ loyalty.  The rhetoric masked a system of 
material exhange and created a united front between kings and barons that stabilized 
sovereignty.  This material exchange provided the “least costly strategy” for both sides to 
maintain their authority.  Moreover, the solidarity between kings and barons discouraged 
the development of a rhetoric of resistance.  The king-magnate coalitions diminished the 
effectiveness of resistance and thus impeded the development of a resistance rhetoric.  
 At the end of the thirteenth century, the barons began demanding increased 
control over the administrative machine and when the king balked, the “reciprocal 
recognitions” necessary to maintain sovereignty were disrupted and a new language of 
legitimacy, with new “hypothetical trades,” was formed.  When one or both parties fail to 
recognize the tacit expectations established in these subtle negotiations (i.e. the 
conventions of legitimacy), it results in a weakened authority which encourages local 
powers (i.e. barons, gentry) to form new political alliances and to assert their own 
authority. The new language of legitimacy creates coalitions capable of either seizing 
control over the regime (as Montfort does briefly in 1261) or redefining the powers and 
limits of authority.  Before proceeding to a rhetorical analysis of the discourse of 
sovereignty in the thirteenth century, I must point toward the relationship between these 
languages of legitimacy (political and majestic rhetoric) and the “de facto realities of 
power.” 
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Majestic rhetoric, the dominant rhetoric of the thirteenth century, evolved out of 
the Germanic chieftain-comitatus relationships that sprung up amidst the ruins of the 
Roman Empire.3  According to Hanson, the “contraction of Roman military power 
opened up endless opportunities . . . for large scale settlement on the lands of the Empire” 
which allowed for the Germanic duces,” to become kings; thus:  
from the beginning of the history of [Western] successor kingdoms . . . we are 
confronted with a society structured in terms of personal allegiance; one which 
was markedly aristocratic and severely hierarchical.  (Hanson 50) 
 
People needed protection and the price was obedience.  Nonetheless, this “hierarchical” 
and “aristocratic” authority had no actual ground for its own power—what I have called 
the embarrassment of authority.4 As a result, the nobility adopted theocratic justifications 
of their power.  These theocratic models are frequently identified as the “descending” 
model of kingship.5 Majestic rhetoric, particularly its theological myths, reproduced and 
consolidated power in the hands of the elite few.  These ideological fictions worked, not 
because the people were superstitious (as they are frequently caricatured), but because 
                                                
3 For Hanson the seeds of double majesty are in the earliest relationship between the leading men (i.e. comitatus) and 
the chieftain of the Germanic tribes. The chieftain retained power precisely because his leading men supported him and 
vice versa.  In the time of the Roman Empire several of these chieftains were conscripted as duces in the outer 
provinces.  The ‘government’ by these duces “amounted to the institutionalization of the forms and values of the 
comitatus; it was a government by princeps and comites.” (50).  E.A. Thompson argues in many cases the native 
nobility had stronger ties to the Roman government than to their own people (108).  These Germanic duces, alongside 
their comitatus began to seize Roman lands.  For a discussion of how a severe hierarchical model developed out of this 
chieftain-comitatus relationship, see Hanson 42-50; Thompson 106-108; Wallace-Hadrill 25-48; and Whitelock 29-38. 
 
4 Jolliffe describes the actual conditions of power and the limited role of "custom" in Angevin England: “the holders of 
certain lordships were the sole effective voice within the curia and if they were disposed to act by will without the 
court's judgment there was nothing but rebellion that might restrain them.  There was nothing but custom to govern the 
King and nothing but what influence his own court could exert to enforce custom.” (5). 
 
5 The church provided the theological doctrine necessary to transfigure the “martial values of the aristocratic warrior” 
(Hanson 43) into a theocratic regime. For example, Georges Duby’s account of the development of tripartite ideology 
(oratores, bellatores, laboratores) reveals how clerics organically developed hierarchical ideologies to protect the “the 
good society,” a society that was “authoritarian, hierarchized, firmly established on the necessary basis of inequality” 
(36).  For a discussion of the organic development of theocratic ideology, see Duby 21-43; for a useful précis of Duby’s 
argument, see Burguière 238-239.  
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those fictions reproduced coalitions that could secure a relative degree of civil order.6  
While Henry III uses this hierocratic rhetoric against insurgent members of his baronage, 
it is not inherently royalist, or absolutist; indeed, during stable periods of governance, 
majestic rhetoric created an elitist vision of power that reinforced the majesty of both 
king and barons.   
Political rhetoric, on the other hand, created authority through alliances.7  The 
word “political” has many meanings.  I use it to refer to discursive practices that exhibit a 
nascent understanding of sovereignty and law similar to what we now call political 
constitutionalist thought.8 That is, the emergent political rhetoric of the thirteenth century 
contributes to the demystification of power in which laws increasingly become "a 
statement about a power relation” (Griffith 19).  J.A.G. Griffith describes how an 
individual claim assumes authority in such a political society: 
As an individual I make claims on the authorities who control the society in which 
I live.  If I am strong enough—and I shall have to join others to be so—my claim 
may be recognised within certain limits.  It may even be given legal status.  There 
                                                
6 Larry Scanlon argues that “the force of common opinion assures the arbitrary association it [this “ideological fiction”] 
makes between riches and the right to rule becomes an actuality” (112); J.G.A. Pocock describes this process of 
becoming an actuality as “presumptive reasoning” (Pocock, Machiavellian 24)—a phrase he draws from Edmund 
Burke’s political philosophy.  Burke posits that one ought to favor institutional continuity over innovation: "It is a 
presumption in favor of any settled scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has long existed 
and flourished under it.  It is a better presumption even of the choice of a nation, far better than any sudden and 
temporary arrangement by actual election. Because a nation is not an idea of local extent, and individual momentary 
aggregation, but it is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers and space" (E. Burke Works v.5 
405). The continuity functions precisely because it is over time that a people foster the institutions and procedures 
necessary for stability. 
 
7 I have used the terms “consolidation” and “alliance” in reference to majestic and political rhetoric, respectively, in 
order to echo Bourdieu’s analysis of matrimonial strategies for social reproduction in Outline to a Theory of Practice.  
Bourdieu’s analysis allows us to differentiate two modes of generating power and authority.  Those families who can 
afford it attempt to marry within the family as a means of consolidating their power; while families with less resources 
(most families) use marriage to create exogamous political alliances.  This language aligns with majestic rhetoric that 
aims to consolidate power in the hands of the elite members of the aristocracy created new networks of power; see 
Bourdieu 58-71. 
 
8 Obviously, the rhetoric of the thirteenth century does not reflect the ideas of twentieth-century political 
constitutionalism predicated on notions of expanded franchise, a separation of Church and State and a free press.  
However, the vocabulary of political constitutionalism allows us to imagine how conventions and laws as rhetoric 
aimed at creating coalitions capable of reproducing or challenging sovereign authority.     
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is a continuous struggle between the rulers and the ruled about the size and shape 
of these claims.  (17) 
 
Political rhetoric, then, is a rhetoric of articulation (in the sense of joining together), not 
simple reproduction.  One needs to make a claim and “join others” to give the claim the 
strength to be “recognised” or gain legal status.  Simply put, what is legal must be 
enforceable.  The “claim” has political power insofar as it articulates individuals into 
coalitions.  Under the aegis of the community of the realm, the barons leveraged the 
claims of the vavasour class (and to a much lesser extent all classes) to reinforce their 
own power in national matters.    
Read in this light, the articles of Magna Carta, for example, are not just ideas of 
what is right (i.e. a kind of natural law), they are not just the terms of peace between the 
king and baronage (i.e. legal constitution), rather they are also the means of creating a 
coalition between the barons and the gentry necessary to assert the document’s authority, 
its legal status.  Unlike majestic rhetoric—which consolidated power by closing down the 
political class—political rhetoric expanded this class in order to create coalitions to 
protect baronial power from royal encroachment.  Despite their willingness to address the 
aspirations of the vavasour class, the barons’ political rhetoric did not endorse an 
ascending or bottom up model of government.  The nobles did not treat the gentry as 
equals; rather they secured their aristocratic privilege from royal encroachment by 
imagining themselves as the protectors of the gentry's interest.9 Their rhetoric can hardly 
be called anti-hierarchical, and it is not at all representative, populist, or democratic.  In 
                                                
9 The barons sought to control the expansion of the political class so that they would not lose their power.  Throughout 
history those who deploy political rhetoric attempt to constrain its potential.  Holt's description of Magna Carta 
captures the magnate position later in the century: "The barons did not talk of free men out of loftiness of purpose, or 
make concessions to knights and burgesses out of generosity.  They did so because the political situation required it and 
the structure of English society and government could allow them to do no other" (295).  
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fact, the community of the realm might best be understood as an imagined community 
that articulated baronial ambition and gentry interest to create a new foundation of 
aristocratic authority, a foundation of a new hierarchy.   
Moreover, political rhetoric, developing out of and alongside majestic rhetoric, 
shared a semantic space with it.  Majestic rhetoric was the dominant rhetoric of kingship; 
nonetheless, from at least the Conquest to the thirteenth century, there was always (no 
matter how marginalized or limited) a countercurrent of communitas-rhetoric within the 
discourse of sovereignty that emphasized that the king’s power was constrained by his 
legal obligation to the community.10 German thinkers, such as Rufinus of Sorrent, 
argued: “when the king is instituted, he enters into a tacit agreement [pactio quaedam 
tacita] with the people, with a view to ruling the people in the humane manner” (De bono 
pacis ii.9; trans. Ullmann, Principles 82).11 The idea that the king ought to rule the people 
in a “humane manner” was largely seen as an ethical obligation of the king—one heavily 
represented in mirrors for princes and chivalric romances.  
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these wooly ethical obligations 
hardened into specific laws and liberties constraining the Crown, the “conventions of the 
Constitution” that through “usage” had become “more or less a rule” (Chrimes, ECH 8-
                                                
10 The “coronation had been widely thought of as sacramental up until the twelfth century” (Miller 68); see also 
Kantorowicz 44-45. In terms of governance, Chrimes argues that until the majority of Henry III, almost all power and 
administrative machinery could be understood as an “expansion of and within the Curia Regis itself” (Introduction 33).  
J.C. Holt traces the political strains of “thought which emphasized the responsibilities of the prince” into the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries (89).  For example, Ranulf Glanvill argued “the lord king neither wished nor dared to attack or 
alter such ancient and just customs” established in the charter for the monastery at Abingdon (Chron. Monasterii de 
Abingdon II.298, (trans. in Ullman, Individual 82).  The legal idea of placing custom above royal will predates the 
thirteenth century; however, this idea of custom applies to specific parties who purchased these liberties.  In the 
thirteenth century, “consuetudines” became a broader term protecting the rights of the community of the realm rather 
than a specific lord or monastery. 
 
11 Manegold of Lautenbach makes the case for cession suggesting that a people can “free itself from the rule and 
subjection of the king . . . who had first broken the contract (pactum) by which he was made king” (qtd. in Ullmann, 
Individual 82).  
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9).12 The barons’ explicit demands in Magna Carta, the Provisions of Oxford, the Good 
and the Merciless parliaments (not to mention the depositions and threats of deposition) 
began to institutionalize the previously notional pactio tacita between the king and the 
community of the realm.  The tacit agreement resembles what historians have called “the 
ancient constitution” that emphasized the legal obligations of kingship, restrained royal 
power, and treated the prerogative as “politically” (not just morally) bound to the needs 
of the community.  The overlap between majestic and political rhetoric (between the 
king’s moral and political obligation to the community, respectively) would complicate 
my argument, if I were writing a rigid taxonomic description of these languages of 
legitimacy.  However, my argument depends upon how ideas like the tacita pactio 
represent the fertile tension between these two rhetorics, a tension that has a profound 
effect on medieval narrative and hermeneutics.    
There is one caveat about discussing historical documents in relation to political 
and majestic rhetoric: namely, no one thought of political rhetoric as an alternative model 
of kingship.  While there were different factions among the baronage, these factions did 
not think of themselves, or at least represent themselves, as supporting different models 
of sovereignty.  I introduce the terms “political” and “majestic rhetoric” in order to 
differentiate elements within a discourse that rarely admitted to having any differences. 
As Matthew Giancarlo, in his description of parliament, points out: 
division was at best a fault, at worst an evil. Unanimity was the surest defense  
against accusations that one was speaking or acting for private or singular 
interests. It was also an implicit index that the assembly as a whole was operating 
with the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and that its decisions were divinely 
sanctioned.  (56)  
                                                
12 From ths point forward, the abbrevation ECH refers to S.B. Chrimes, Constitutional History. 
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Even though kings, lords, and gentry had different ideas about the nature of kingship—
indeed two civil wars were fought over these differences—they did not portray their 
visions of kingship as different because unity and unanimity were crucial to the medieval 
concept of “divinely sanctioned” authority.13 Even when political and majestic models of 
kingship erupted into civil war: the magnates did not argue that they had a different idea 
of kingship from Henry III, but only that the king (deceived by wicked counselors) failed 
to accept the unanimously understood principles of kingship. Closely examining the 
rhetoric of both the insurgent barons and the king during this period, however, reveals 
that they did, indeed, have two different operative theories of kingship.14  
The conflict between majestic and political rhetoric can be detected in varying 
degrees throughout English history perhaps most famously in Magna Carta (1215); 
however, in this study, I primarily examine the tension between these two rhetorics in 
light of the Mise d’Amiens (1264) because in this document, the barons transformed the 
practical articles of Magna Carta into principles through which they could reimagine 
royal authority as legally bound to the community. In this we see the development of 
political rhetoric in which sovereign legitimacy was founded on community rather than 
cosmology; the study of this development lays groundwork for chapters III and IV in 
                                                
13 The importance of unity is emphasized in the legal code.  For example, Leges Henrici Primi stresses that “an 
agreement supersedes the law and amicable settlement a court judgment” (49, 5a); Even after a court judgment has 
been made, “the parties concerned may proceed by way of friendly agreement, if they wish to have complete freedom 
of friends to come and go” (76, 5b).  Clanchy argues that “freedom and security” could only be maintained through 
agreement (Law and Love, 47-51.)  As Richard Firth Green shows this unity was necessary for survival of early English 
society.  This society depended upon arriving at compromises that reinforced communal bonds rather than establishing 
more rigid statutes and writ-systems (Green, Crisis 82-87); see also Clanchy, “Law and Love 47-51”; and Giancarlo 
46-56. 
 
14 One should not conflate baronial and political rhetoric; majestic rhetoric after all is a baronial rhetoric as well.  I use 
the word ‘insurgent’ to indicate the baronial circle of Montfort who aimed to expand the political class. Unlike the 
Ricardian barons whose resistance to Richard was predicated largely on increasing “the power of the leading magnates” 
(171), the resistance led by Simon Montfort showed a deep “commitment to counsel, law, and their right to defend 
them” (Valente 68); see also 78-90 and 177-87. 
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which I examine how literature, gravitated toward a kind of political realism—a realism 
that registers the evolution of the pactio tacita into commonwealth.15   
After a brief summary of the events and conditions surrounding the Mise, the bulk 
of this chapter will be divided into two sections.  In the first section, I will look at the 
Mise as a culmination of Angevin majestic thought and its sign-system.  The second 
section examines how the insurgent barons, led by Simon Montfort transformed an 
emergent, and thus institutionally weaker, political tradition into a rhetoric that could 
effectively challenge the dominance of majestic rhetoric.  The Mise will be the 
centerpiece of this chapter; nonetheless, I will situate the rhetoric of the Mise-documents 
within the wider context of events, ceremonies, political texts and personal ambitions that 
surrounded them—i.e. how do the Mise-documents fit in with legal theory or the 
coronation ceremony?  How do these things speak the same language? 
 
The Road to The Mise d’Amiens: Majesty and Politics Go to War 
In 1264, the barons and King Henry III were on the precipice of civil war; and, 
just as in the tumultuous reign of Richard II, conflicting rhetorics of legitimacy assumed 
center stage. Historians most commonly interpret the Mise d’Amiens as a last ditch effort 
to arrive at a political resolution for the quickly deteriorating situation, but it must also be 
read as a final attempt to draw up the lines of the rhetorical battlefield, an attempt to build 
                                                
15 Political realism shares much in common with the increased intellectual investigations into “practical wisdom” or 
“prudence” as “a kind of knowledge upon which actions are based” (Burnley 53); for full discussion of prudential 
knowledge, see 52-7. 
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the coalitions for the real war on the horizon.16 Broadly, the historical circumstances at 
the beginning of the thirteenth century kindled baronial ambition in England. During the 
ten years of Henry’s minority, the nobility had considerable influence over the regency, 
which was reinforced by the fact that his minority began in the throes of a civil war that 
compromised the administrative networks (sheriffs, bailiffs, and castellans) necessary for 
the king to exert royal force locally. 
Henry III gained his majority in January of 1227.  Between 1231 and 1234, he 
made a concerted effort to regain control over the administrative machinery in what was 
popularly called the palace revolution.  According to R.F. Treharne, having “found his 
aims thwarted by the great officers of state, justiciar and chancellor, and by baronial 
officials.  . . . [Henry III] aided by Peter des Roches and Peter des Riveaux . . . directed 
his attention to the removal of these obstacles” (Treharne, Simon 6).  Perhaps the biggest 
obstacle was the chief justiciar, Hubert de Burgh.  Since the time of Henry II, the chief 
justiciar was the most powerful minister of the king and often provided a strong check on 
royal power.  During his time in this position, de Burgh gained strong support from the 
barons, which afforded him considerable independence from the king.  More importantly, 
de Burgh, who was a justiciar under King John and reappointed by the rebels at 
Runnymede, carefully balanced the rights of the king (iura regis) with the limits of 
kingship established in Magna Carta.17 Pushing back against this moderating influence, 
Henry, in 1232, dismissed de Burgh and many of the curiales who had supported him.  
                                                
16 While both the barons and king were hoping for a favorable ruling, neither seemed particularly inclined to accept an 
unfavorable ruling, and both were prepared to fight the ruling; see Powicke, King Henry III ii.450-55; and Jobson 101-
5.   
 
17 For discussion of de Burgh’s role in regard to Magna Carta and his moderating influence on the kingship of Henry 
III, see Denholm-Young 5-20. 
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The dismissal of those members of the court, who were most beholden to the 
principles of Magna Carta, was crucial because “the exercise of political power at a 
national level remained essentially with those who were closest to the king” (Givens-
Wilson 17).  The removal of de Burgh signified a shift promoted by Peter des Roches 
toward a majestic model of kingship that would characterize the reign of Henry III and 
his conflict with his baronage.18 De Burgh’s moderation was replaced by the politics of 
des Roches, a man who  “proclaimed contempt for English custom and [had] a 
dangerously exalted view of royal power,” a contempt that would manifest in a “spate of 
disseisins per voluntatem regis from which Hubert de Burgh and Marshall ally, Gilbert 
Basset, suffered” (Carpenter 58). The act of stripping nobles of their land by the will of 
the king, which was the most dangerous use of the prerogative, anticipated the struggle 
between Henry III and the community of the realm (Carpenter 58).19 
Instead of building political alliances with a broad swath of barons by making 
concessions, Henry III sought to consolidate power—a point made clear in the Parliament 
of 1248.20 After incurring considerable debt, the king was forced to convene a parliament 
                                                
18 At the time of the palace revolution, powerful magnates controlled many local offices because of the First Barons’ 
War.  Henry III, according to Powicke, felt that “he was being defrauded of his rights—rights in lordship, rights in 
forests, rights in dues, and other customary payments” (45).  The removal of de Burgh and rise of des Roches was part 
of the larger effort to restore Angevin majesty.  Much of my account of the palace revolution comes from Carpenter 45-
60 and Powicke, King Henry III i.42-83.  Chrimes argues that the fall of Hugh de Burgh actually hastened the end of 
the development of an administrative machinery firmly entrenched in the Curia Regis.  Peter des Roches’s attempt to 
reestablish the Angevin ideal of the prerogative met heavy resistance from the barons from which arose an 
administration more independent of the royal household (An Introduction 33).  
 
19 In fact, the disseisin of Gilbert Basset “provoked Richard Marshal’s rebellion, and enabled him to stand as the 
upholder of the rights and customs of the realm” (Carpenter 58).   
 
20 The king having incurred heavy debts from Pope Innocent IV as part of a plan to seize the Sicilian crown—what is 
known as the Sicilian Affair—for his son Edmund, held a parliament in London at the beginning of the year.  In 1258, 
Pope Alexander IV issued an ultimatum demanding that Henry III fulfill his promise regarding the Sicilian or suffer 
excommunication this seems to have driven Henry to accept the barons’ demands; see Treharne, Simon 94-107. 
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in order to “seek pecuniary aid” (255).21 Originally convened in February, the parliament 
was prorogued until June of the same year because of a conflict between Henry and his 
baronage.  The parliament reprimanded the king for a whole list of offenses ranging from 
“indiscreet expenditure” to “seizing wax and silk stuffs.”  Two baronial complaints, in 
particular, reveal the stakes of this parliament.  First they complained that the king had 
“scattered the property of the kingdom;” and second, he had refused to seek the “advice 
of the kingdom in general” preferring to listen to his appointees who “obeyed his pleasure 
in everything” and favored personal gain over “the advancement of the common weal” 
(Paris 255).  The king’s response to these complaints, when parliament reconvened in 
June, demonstrated the practical claims of majestic authority: 
All you, the chief men of England, have endeavoured to bend your lord and king 
to your will . . . and to impose on him a very servile condition . . . every father of 
a family [paterfamilias] is allowed to appoint any one soever to this or that office 
in his house, or to suspend or even to depose them; but this liberty, forsooth, you 
rashly presume to deny your king, especially as servants ought not to judge and 
bind their master to their conditions, nor ought vassals their prince, but those are 
considered as inferior ought rather to be ruled and governed at the will and 
pleasure of their lord.  For the servant is not above his lord, nor is the pupil above 
his master; and your king therefore, would be no longer so, but would be, as it 
were, a slave, if he were thus to incline to your will.  Wherefore he will not 
dismiss either chancellor, justiciary, or treasurer, as you propose arranging it, nor 
will he appoint others in their stead. (Paris v.2: 266-67) 
 
In this speech to parliament, the king’s metaphors stress a one-way power relationship 
between the king and the magnates.22  Ignoring all the barons’ concerns, he set his rights 
as paterfamilias above all the concerns of the realm.  Moreover, his aggressive response 
                                                
21 All translations from Matthew Paris’s Chronica Maiora are from Matthew Paris's English History. From the Year 
1235 to 1273. Trans. J.A. Giles.  
 
22 This speech aligns with what Michael Clanchy saw as Henry III’s “insistence that the magnates were as much 
Henry’s subjects as anybody else in the kingdom” an idea, he argues is “confirmed by his speech in the exchequer in 
1250” (“Did Henry” 208); see also The Constitutional History of England Wilkinson 16-17. I would suggest that Henry 
III projects a majestic image of kingship described by Clanchy and Wilkinson, with one caveat: his policies, as 
Carpenter argues, are far from absolutist (Carpenter 76).   
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suggests that Henry III recognized, and pushed back against “the notion of a public 
interest . . . recognized, defended and represented by parliament” (231).  He pushed back 
against an institution that “could be convincingly identified with the community of the 
realm” (Maddicott, Simon 232).   
Henry imagines the king as a father, a master, and a teacher.  As such he does not 
need to respond to the presumption of the lords to “bind their master;” indeed, the king 
argues that if he inclined to the will of lords he would become a slave. 23  Henry III subtly 
weaves this one-way power relationship into the cosmic framework by incorporating 
scripture: “a disciple is not above his teacher, nor a servant above his master” (Matt. 
10:24). After this line, which alludes to the relationship between Jesus and his disciples, 
the king’s ‘therefore’ places his authority in the same sacred context—as the student to 
the pupil, disciple to Jesus, so is the magnate to the king.  This rhetoric is not simply a 
matter of honor—though it would have been perceived as that too—but it was also a 
matter of practical power.  The king’s majestic rhetoric (patriarchal, biblical, and 
cosmological) creates a mythic description of the king’s personal will (voluntas) 
synonymous with his authority to alienate land and make his own appointees.  While this 
rhetoric limits the king’s economic power (i.e. the barons refuse Henry’s request for 
“pecuniary aid”), it nonetheless consolidates official power in the court and protects the 
king from magnate encroachment.  The king’s mythic description pushes back on 
political attempts by the magnates to imagine royal authority embodied more by an 
                                                
23 The metaphor of the king being reduced to a slave is a crucial metaphor.  The barons will take it up and suggest the 
opposite: that the king can become a slave not only to external lords, but worse to his own perverse will. I discuss this 
at length in my discussion of the Song of Lewes below.  
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impersonal crown (i.e. inalienable demesne and a court appointed by lords) than a flesh 
and blood king.24   
What made Henry’s appointments so galling was that he elevated and surrounded 
himself both with his wife’s kinsmen, the Savoyards, and with his own notoriously 
troublesome half-brothers, the Lusignans, whose lawlessness often required the 
protection of the king.25  For example, Henry had pressured the clergy to elect his 
foreign-born half brother Aymer de Lusignan to the position of Bishop of Winchester 
against strong baronial opposition.  Henry got his wishes, but Bishop Aymer, like most of 
Henry’s Lusignan half-brothers, frequently found himself at odds with the English 
aristocracy.  Most notably on April 1, 1258, in an event that may have catalyzed the 
Common Enterprise, the Bishop’s men attacked some of the servants of John Fitz 
Geoffrey, one of whom died. The attack seemed motivated by a dispute over an 
advowson in Shere.  When the matter came before the king, Henry “wholly denied him 
justice” (qtd. in Carpenter 192-93).26  
The barons had repeatedly demanded increased control over the administrative 
machine.  In 1258 the king’s coalition had finally frayed to the point where the barons 
                                                
24 The barons suggest that the king does not have the right to alienate those lands belonging to the royal demesne, the 
lands which are meant to maintain the king’s own household.  The idea of an impersonal Crown developed, in part, out 
of the ideas of inalienability.  Inalienability, as Kantorowicz points out, may have been part of Henry III’s coronation 
oath; at the very least, Pope Gregory IX alluded to this part of the oath on two occasions (Kantorowicz 347).  By the 
thirteenth century, the ideas of non-alienation were thoroughly ingrained in the church and got its strongest 
representation in the decretals of Honorius III.  During the reign of Richard II, secular jurists promoted the ideas of 
non-alienability that were popular among thirteenth-century canonists; see Kantorowicz 356-57.  
 
25 Matthew of Paris notes that the barons accused the king of violating Magna Carta, in part, by exalting his uterine 
brothers and protecting them from “any process issued against them from the court of Chancery” (2:279).  For a fuller 
discussion of Henry III’s impartiality and the Lusignans violence, see Maddicott Origins 17 and Carpenter 190-2.  
 
26 The quoted material comes from the Hugh Bigod Eyre Rolls June 1258 - February 1259 (Just/1/1187, m1).  The 
anxiety over Henry III’s partiality was a central concern of the barons.  In a letter to the Pope Alexander IV in 1258, the 
barons protested that “if anyone brought a complaint and sought judgment against [the Lusignans] . . . the king turned 
against the complainant in a most extraordinary manner, and he who should have been a propitious judge . . . became a 
terrible enemy” (Annales de Burton 459; trans. by Carpenter 193). 
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could overtly challenge the king’s claims to authority.27  Alongside insulted lordship, a 
number of contributing factors such as the famine of 1258, a failed Welsh military 
campaign, the Sicilian affair, increased taxation, increments on farms and general 
mismanagement of the royal demesne created an environment suited for radical reform.28  
In 1258, about a week after the violent dispute between Bishop Aymer and John fitz 
Geoffrey, the Parliament of Westminster was summoned;  during this parliament King 
Henry III asked for one of the heaviest taxes to fund his efforts to secure the Sicilian 
throne for his son Edmund, an effort that the barons of England regarded as deluded 
ambition of a imprudent king (Carpenter 187). The baronage, assuming a threatening 
posture, came to the Parliament at Westminster “most fortified with arms and prepared 
with swords.”29  Facing the thinly guised threat of armed insurrection, King Henry III, on 
May 2, 1258 issued a proclamation agreeing to submit to all of the recommendations to 
be proposed by the council of twenty-four at the Parliament of Oxford in June of that 
                                                
27 The demands for increased control had been discussed at parliaments in 1244, 1248, 1249 and 1255 (Carpenter 183).  
The barons frequently link the king’s promise to obey Magna Carta to a demand for control of the administrative 
apparatus (i.e. “the permission to choose for themselves, by the general opinion of the kingdom, a justiciary, chancellor, 
and treasurer”), see for example Matthew of Paris 119-20. 
 
28 My argument focuses on the broad outlines of political rhetoric.  However, the general downturn in England’s 
domestic and international affairs made this rhetoric particularly suasive in 1257-8. As Maddicott points out, “the 
military successes of the Welsh and new papal demands for men and money for Sicily, with the possibility of 
excommunication and interdict in the event of non-payment, created a threatening background which again reflected 
unfavourably on the king.  But the misdeeds of the Lusignans transcended these other issues (Simon 152-4).  In 1258 
the barons rebuked Henry III openly for his foolish plan to conquer Sicily at the pope’s request, pointing out the 
impossibility of fighting a kingdom that was separated from England by “so many kingdoms using various languages, 
by so many principalities, by so many cities well provided with soldiers and arms, by seas and mountains and by an 
extent of country” too toilsome to traverse (Matthew of Paris 271-72).  For a discussion on how Henry III’s failure to 
secure the marches further alienated Marcher barons, like Earl of Gloucester, Gilbert Clare, who were instrumental to 
the early successes, see “Henry III (1207–1272), king of England and lord of Ireland, and duke of Aquitaine” in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography. Alongside the failed Welsh campaigns and the Sicilian Affair, the harsh winter of 
1257 led to a deadly famine killing thousands across the countryside, which caused widespread unrest (Matthew of 
Paris 283-84).  This unrest made it easier for the barons to call attention to the plight of the villeins as part of their 
political agenda.  
 
29 Translation mine. The full Latin context from the Tewksbury Chronicle is as follows: “Die vero tertia illucescente, 
horaque diei tertia appropinquante, accesserunt ad curiam, scilicet apud Westmonasterium, viri nobiles ac strenui, 
comites, barones, et milites, armis peroptime muniti et gladiis praecincti, ad introitum tamen aulae regiae gladios 
deponentes, et coram domino rege apparentes, ipsum ut dominum regemque honore debito devote salutantes” (Ann. 
Mon. i, 163-64). 
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year.  Those recommendations were called the Provisions of Oxford.  In short, the old 
terms of kingship had collapsed and the Provisions formalized the new arrangement of 
power, the new “mutual recognitions” necessary to maintain sovereignty.  The Provisions 
were at the center of the conflict that led to Mise d’Amiens.   
By itself, this timeworn power-struggle between magnates and the crown would, 
by no means, offer a unique illustration of conflicting rhetorical models of kingship.  The 
conflict between king and magnates over feudal politics (escheats, marriages etc.) had 
occurred for centuries (most violently during the anarchy of Stephen) often with very 
little impact on the constitution of authority.  In these disputes, lords and kings were 
fighting over majestic rights they possessed as the paterfamilias of their estate.  Many 
clauses in the Provisions of Oxford did focus on aristocratic frustration over fair 
distribution of feudal rewards: they reversed patronage bestowed upon the Lusignans, 
established controls over feudal reliefs (i.e. escheats and advowsons), regulated royal 
influence in local politics (i.e. shrieval regulation) and gave the barons an unprecedented 
degree of formalized authority; and these reforms were most important to the 
conservative element in the reform movement.  What made the provisions unique from 
these king-lord conflicts was the way that lords established and protected liberties granted 
to the entire realm—liberties that offered protections from both kings and lords.  Indeed, 
Montfort’s relationship with many of the conservative barons began to fray in 1259 when 
the Common Enterprise sought to protect vavasours from aristocratic abuses as barons 
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like Hugh Bigod and Richard Clare of Gloucester were less interested in creating 
protections for the vavasour class.30 
Simon Montfort broadened a conflict of aristocratic ambition and patronage into a 
social revolution that addressed “grievances coming explicitly from the small and 
middling men of localities” by attempting “to reform both local government and 
seigniorial administration in their interests” (Maddicott, Simon 242-3).  This 
responsiveness to “middling men of localities” established a political authority based on a 
meaningful (rather than just notional) community of the realm.  In the opening sentence, 
the Provisions announce that the “the lord king and the Lord Edward his son . . . 
submitted themselves, for correction and reform both of their own affairs and of the state 
of the realm” (DBM 99).31  This rhetoric is not empty.  The king’s submission establishes 
the power relation between the king and parliament—a relation that made the king 
beholden to the “state of the realm.”  The Provisions articulated the complaints of the 
magnates with “the concerns of knights and lesser landholder.32 They opened the king’s 
courts to tenants who had serious complaints about trespasses and injuries caused by 
regal officers such as sheriffs and bailiffs.33 They sought to reduce bribery by requiring 
                                                
30 The loosely connected legislative reforms, referred to as the Provisions of Westminster dealing with local abuses by 
the barons themselves marked the “zenith of the reforming movement” (Maddicott, Simon 184-85).  The extent of the 
reforms were strongly opposed by, perhaps the most powerful member of the coalition—Richard of Clare, Earl of 
Gloucester and Hereford.  Thus, while the Provisions were adopted by the October Parliament of 1259, the “unanimity 
of the baronage had been shattered beyond repair” (Treharne, Simon 107); see also Carpenter 221-2.  
  
31 From ths point forward, the abbrevation DBM refers to Documents of the Baronal Movement of Reform and 
Rebellion, ed. R.F. Treharne. 
 
32 Adrian Jobson likewise points out that "it was this shared sense of grievance, uniting both magnates and the lesser 
landowners, which formed the bedrock whereon the reformist programme was constructed” (23). Carpenter explains 
how Montfort’s affinity and Church connections allowed him “to recognize popular issues and turn them to his 
advantage” (230); for full discussion of this affinity, see Carpenter 219-239.   
 
33 Although the wandering eyre of Chief Justiciar Hugh Bigod “had created expectations which they could not satisfy,” 
the eyre had addressed many local concerns and demonstrated the potential of the barons’ legal reforms (Maddicott, 
Simon 164-5).  
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sheriffs to be  “a vavasour of the same county” where they worked and by limiting their 
appointment to no more than “one year at a time” (DBM 109). The Common Enterprise 
shaped their demands to account for needs and desires of those outside their immediate 
circle; and, by targeting practices most damaging to the gentry, the reforms allowed the 
barons to style themselves as the protectors of the communitas regni.  
Most importantly, the Provisions restructured the administrative machine 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of these reforms.  Indeed, the Common Enterprise 
must be understood as part of the lengthy struggle for local and national control of the 
administrative apparatus.  Unlike most of Western Europe, the discourse of sovereignty 
in England focused on the control of royal administration rather than a freedom from it 
(Holt 28-29).  The development of administration was fundamental to Angevin power.  
Since Henry II, the Angevins developed an administrative apparatus capable of exerting 
royal influence throughout England. During the early years of Henry III’s majority, he 
fought to regain control over the administrative apparatus; and, from 1258 forward, the 
barons sought reforms that increased their own administrative oversight.   
The barons assumed a significant role in the day-to-day workings of government 
by creating a fifteen-member Privy Council that established a direct link between 
parliament and the executive authority of kingship.  This baronial council appointed and 
oversaw the chief justiciar, the chancellor, castellans, and the treasurer (DBM 105-107). 
Like both sheriffs and bailiffs, these positions were one-year appointments to be 
reconfirmed by the council on a yearly basis. By seizing control of the courts, chancery, 
castles, and the exchequer, the Provisions of Oxford, for all intents and purposes, put the 
regal powers of the king into conciliar receivership.  Most importantly, Clause 21 of the 
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Provisions formalized the power of the communitas regni, by establishing three 
scheduled parliaments every year. As Treharne notes, the provisions “converted” 
parliament “into a political institution,” transforming what was “a vague untechnical 
colloquialism” into “a clearly defined and precise constitutional term (Simon 223).  The 
parliament was no longer summoned at the will of the king.   
The Provisions of Oxford established a functional, if tentative, power-sharing 
arrangement, between the king and the barons. Moreover, the provisions were so popular 
throughout the realm that Henry sent his sheriffs throughout the shires to deny that he had 
any intention of abrogating his oath at Oxford (Foedera, I.i 433).34  Nonetheless, this was 
Henry’s endgame.  Despite the popularity of the Provisions, the baronial coalition, as 
early as 1259, began to face internal challenges from the conservative reformers and 
external challenges from the king.  Henry III began to exploit “the sharp hostility which 
had sprung up” between Simon and Gloucester over the Provisions of Westminster 
(Treharne, Simon 111).  The Westminster Provisions, the logical extension of the 
Provisions of Oxford, protected the gentry from the abuses of lords. Although Gloucester 
initially opposed these new provisions, eventually he accepted them with reluctance.  The 
king, eventually, was able to draw Gloucester into the royalist fold in large part because 
majestic rhetoric secures the rights of the barons against the encroachment of political 
reform (such as the Provisions of Westminster). Conservative barons, such as Gloucester, 
sought in the Provisions immediate fixes to what they saw as temporary problems.  Their 
frustration with the king’s lenient treatment of the Lusignans was not enough to convince 
them that the royal prerogative must be permanently bound to the kind of direct baronial 
                                                
34 See also Maddicott, Simon 256. 
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oversight proposed in the Provisions of Oxford.  More importantly, they recognized that 
the king’s favor offered more advantage, and less risk, than trying to bind the king’s 
authority more directly to community of the realm.35   
The king was able to exploit the tensions in the Baronial party when, in 
November of 1259, he travelled to France.  The absence of the king actually weakened 
the power of the barons at a time when the rift between conservative and radical 
reformers was widening (Treharne, Simon 109-118).  Since many members of the Privy 
Council travelled with the king to France, the presence of radical reformers was 
weakened at home. Their absence allowed conservative barons to undermine many of the 
reforms. When the king originally left, it was expected that he would be back for the 
mandatory Candelmas parliament set for February 3.  However, by extending his trip in 
Paris, the king tested the resolve of the barons to oppose his will and on January 26 he 
wrote a letter demanding that the parliament be postponed until he returned.  The fault 
lines in the baronial party crystallized when the conservative reformers accepted the 
king’s demand that the magnates “make no arrangements for a parliament and permit 
none to he held” (DBM 169) until after the king’s return.   
As Treharne explains, the king’s demand in contravention with Clause 21 of the 
Provisions (viz. that parliament was to meet three times independent of royal summons) 
“reduced [parliament] to the position . . . it had occupied before 1258 . . . an assembly 
which met and dispersed at the royal will” (DBM 29). Simon Montfort’s attempt to 
convene a ‘parliament’ during Candelmas demonstrates that he recognized that the king’s 
                                                
35 In all likelihood, as Treharne points out, Henry III’s majestic authority maintained silent support, even at the zenith 
of the reform movement: “We do not even know that it was a majority of barons [that supported Simon], for although 
Henry found no English support in his extreme need, it seems probable, from what followed, that many, possibly even 
most of the barons were neutral or at best lukewarm to Simon’s cause” (Simon 150).   
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demand for postponement was an assault on the “common provision [the Provisions of 
Oxford] made by the king and his council” and an attempt to undermine the work of la 
comune emprise (DBM 206-209).36  Parliament and the communitas regni were reduced 
once again to “a vague untechnical colloquialism” that did not exist outside the will of 
the king.  The tension between majestic and political models of power manifests itself in 
the king’s assertion that his royal presence in parliament supersedes the needs of the 
realm.  The fact that no official parliament was convened in February shows the relative 
force of majestic authority even during the conciliar years.   
Four years later, in January 1264, Henry III and the remaining insurgent barons 
each presented a schedule of complaint to Louis IX for arbitration. On the brink of war, it 
is no accident that these two documents stake out very different, and rather rigid, visions 
of kingship that sketch out a conflict concerning the role of dignitas regi and communitas 
regni.  These documents brazenly reveal (what was implicit in the Provisions) the 
emerging fault lines within the discourse of sovereignty by raising, openly, critical 
questions such as:  What are the rights and responsibilities of a king?  When is a king (or 
can a king be) in dereliction of duty?  Where does the king’s authority come from?  Louis 
IX not only ruled in favor of Henry III but he also quashed the Provisions of Oxford.  
As a political resolution, the Mise was an utter failure. Louis IX’s lopsided 
decision favoring Henry III left no remedy for the political grievances of the barons and 
ultimately precipitated the Second Barons’ War.  While Henry will win the war, the 
conflict registered in these documents shapes the political and rhetorical atmosphere for 
                                                
36 At his trial, Simon defended his decision: “in the common provision made by the king and his council, it is provided 
that three parliaments shall be had each year, of which one is at Candelmas and to keep his oath the earl came there 
along with the other sound councilors who were in England” (DBM 207); see also Maddicott, Simon 193-6. 
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the rest of the medieval period. The civil war that followed the Mise, ultimately, 
strengthened the bonds between those groups invested in political reform to such a degree 
that the ideas of reform continued to shape the rhetoric and policy of Edward I and later 
contributed to the deposition of Edward II.37 
The suasive effect of the rhetoric of the Common Enterprise is registered in a 
contemporary London-based chronicle’s account of Louis’s lopsided arbitration: “And 
altogether the whole community of ‘middling people’ [mediocris populi] of the English 
kingdom, who, to be sure, did not set themselves before the king of France, spoke against 
his already declared arbitration”  (Lib. De Ant. Leg).38  The chronicler’s assertion that the 
mediocris populi largely rejected his arbitration demonstrates how the political rhetoric of 
the Provisions and Common Enterprise created lines of cooperation among the middling 
class.  Moreover, they reject the French king’s decision to support the English king 
because “they had not been party.” This highlights the illegitimacy of majestic authority 
(both Louis’s and by extension Henry’s) and emphasizes the belief that legitimacy 
depends upon the involvement of a wider community.  
 
A Rhetorical Analysis of Majesty 
The sharp divide between the rebels’ political rhetoric and the majestic rhetoric of 
Henry’s coalition is apparent in the King’s Gravamina entitled “Per ista subscripta 
                                                
37 As Clanchy points out, the Mise d’Amiens had the paradoxical effect of uniting forces against the king (England 
279-280).  Treharne and Powicke similarly argue that, although he won in the court of Louis, he lost in the court of 
public opinion that favored Montfort.  Powicke suggests that in England the award stoked “fears of French 
intervention” in English affairs and thus was more of a “call, not to submission, but to more resistance” (455).  The 
popularity of Earl of Leicester remained so high that after his death his torso became a relic at Evesham abbey and 
some even claimed that they had been healed by this relic, see Miracles of Simon de Montfort 67-110. For a dissenting 
view, see William Blaauw, 116-17. 
 
38  Translation mine.  The original text: “et fere omnis communitas mediocris populi regni Angliae, qui vero non 
posuerunt se super Regem Franciae, praedictum arbitrium suum contradixerunt” (Lib. De Ant. Leg).   
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grauatur Rex Anglie” (the king of England has suffered harm in the following ways”) 
(DBM 252-3).39  The first seven clauses outline the specific accusations of Henry III.  In 
Clause Eight, the king petitions for damages.  Despite his declaration to uphold the 
Provisions before sailing to Amiens, Henry asks Louis to quash them.  His complaint, 
typical of the Angevin majestic rhetoric, reframes baronial claims primarily in terms of 
lésé majesté that emphasizes his “control over temporalities” and his incontestable legal 
authority: 
The chancellor and the treasurer, who have a special duty to safeguard the king’s  
rights [qui iura regis specialiter conseruare debent], and who can easily subvert  
those rights at the instance or for the profit of others [et qui iura ipsius leuiter 
subuertere pro voluntate], are appointed by these same councilors, whereas the 
king himself ought to choose and appoint them, and was always accustomed to 
choose [eos eligere et ponere debeat semper consueuerit quatenus eos] those 
whom he knew to be the best and most faithful to himself.  And also that the 
sheriffs, who especially are bound to preserve the king’s rights in their bailiwicks 
from other people and by whose connivance the magnates and others will be able 
to encroach upon the king’s rights and to appropriate them to themselves, are 
appointed by these same councilors, whereas the king himself, and his ancestors, 
were always accustomed to appoint [eos semper ponere et deponere 
consueuerunt] and to remove them at their own will [pro sua voluntate].  (DBM 
253)  
 
Henry III seeking to restore the personal kingship of his Angevin and Norman 
predecessors makes a case grounded in the dignitas of the king. The argument is simple, 
if somewhat tautological.  Instead of referring to the barons’ grievances or even the iura 
regi, the king emphasizes the barons’ insult to iura regis.  The king emphasizes his 
authority to act pro voluntate sua in five of the eight clauses of his grievance. The 
justification for authority is tradition: “the king himself, and his ancestors, were always 
accustomed to appoint” these local and national administrators.  The Provisions were 
                                                
39 All translations of the Mise, the King’s Gravamina and the Barons’ Gravamina are from R.F. Treharne’s Documents 
of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion. 
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wrong because they oppose a customary hierarchy; the barons, as Henry had complained 
in 1248, sought to put the “disciple above the master.”  Alongside a majestic diction, the 
king’s appeal to Louis provides the syntax of majesty.  The relative clauses such as qui 
iura regis specialiter conseruare debent above shows that all power derives from the 
king.  Likewise, all illicit power is a subversion of the relative clause. Henry III’s 
complaint exemplifies the majestic discourse of the thirteenth century in which kings and 
royal supporters had appropriated and were developing Innocent III’s assertion in Per 
venerabilem of 1202 that "the king recognizes no superior in his temporalities" into a 
justification for increased majestic authority (Dunbabin 490).40 
The majestic rhetoric of Norman and Angevin kings from William the Conqueror 
to Henry III focused on creating and controlling an administrative apparatus capable of 
enforcing the king’s will in the English shires. In Henry III's robust defense of the right of 
appointment (i.e. eos eligere et ponere debeat semper conserverit quatenus eos), the king 
himself recognizes that this use of prerogative was central to Angevin power first 
asserting that the king and his ancestors were accustomed to these rights and then 
acknowledging how the prerogative was necessary to avoid inappropriate subversion of 
power “for the profit of others.”  The king speaks in general terms, but he is talking about 
important mechanisms of power.  For example, the control over the chancellorship was a 
control over lines of income such as escheats, wardships, and widows.  The king's use of 
these additional lines of income to bolster the fortunes of his half-brothers and his wife's 
relatives had caused considerable frustration among the barons.  Without these lines of 
                                                
40 It should be noted that those in the monarch’s camp wrested the phrasing of Per venerabilem which was meant to 
stress the subservience of kings to the papacy.   
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revenue, the king would have a more difficult time stitching together coalitions powerful 
enough to maintain his own sovereignty.   
Ideally, Angevin kings sought to appoint efficient and docile curiales drawn from 
the middling nobility (the second son of a lord etc.), people who were influential enough 
to manage local politics but weak enough to be dependent upon the king. If the magnates 
chose the chancellor, then they could appoint someone who not only supported magnate 
ideas, but someone who had a powerbase that allowed him to act more independently.  
He could reduce royal influence in the shires and even refuse to seal certain orders of the 
king by claiming that they would harm the king (as Ralph de Neville had in the early part 
of Henry’s rule). 41 The King’s Gravamina in 1264, like his speech before parliament in 
1248, was relitigating Henry’s initial demonstration of his “exalted view of royal power” 
(Carpenter 58) in the palace revolution of 1234. As in 1234 and 1248, the majestic 
rhetoric in the King’s Gravamina attempts to restore and secure the mechanisms of power 
through which kings extended the jurisdiction of the Crown.   
Henry III’s forceful defense of hereditary iura regis and his freedom to choose 
ministers pro sua voluntate draws from the civilian tradition that had become more 
prominent both on the continent and in England during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. The reintroduction and dissemination of civilian law throughout Western 
Europe strengthened majestic rhetoric by providing an intellectual basis for royal 
aspirations—in particular, the expansion of legal jurisdiction and reinforcement of the 
concept of prerogative.  Two famous civilian maxims, ubiquitous in the Middle Ages, 
                                                
41 Ralph de Neville, Henry’s Chancellor from Magna Carta to 1244, had repeatedly resisted actions that seemed to run 
against the customs of the realm, see Denholm-Young, “The Paper Constitution” 415; and Carpenter 62-63. Similarly, 
Chancellor Scrope in 1382 refused to comply with Richard’s distribution of the Mortimer estate.  Scrope claimed “the 
king was impoverishing himself by such profligacy” (Saul 111).  In other words, the king’s profit could be used by 
strong chancellors to actually thwart the king’s stated will.   
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demonstrate the majestic claims at the core of the civilian model of sovereignty: princeps 
legibus solutus est and quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem.42 The justification of 
this authority was justice. Civil law increased legislative and judicial authority of the king 
in order to maintain pax regis so that in the words of Glanvill the “glorious king may . . . 
[crush] the pride of the unbridled and the ungovernable with the right hand of strength” 
(1). 
Henry III mobilizes this construct of sovereignty against the model advocated by 
the barons.  I will speak more fully about the barons’ customary model of sovereignty 
below, what is crucial to understand now is that majestic rhetoric of civilian law (lex) 
provided an important justification for the appropriation of power and jurisdiction that 
had been described in terms of custom (consuetudines).43  Thomas Aquinas identifies the 
tension between lex and consuetudines in his so-called “Treatise on Law” (questions 90-
108 of the Summa Theologica).  He describes law as established both by “an ordinance of 
reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community” and as 
something that “happens many times” such that “it seems from the deliberation of reason 
[that] this custom has the force of law” (ST, I-II, q. 90, art. 4).  In his discussion on the 
mutability of law, Thomas negotiates the potential conflict between consuetudo and lex, 
which separates common law (that may have vim legis) from the lex of the legislator.  
Although these two statements are not necessarily antithetical, they point to two different 
                                                
42 These maxims should not be read literally.  They represent majestic ambition, but ignore the real world forces that 
constrain royal power.  That said, they also suggest considerable flexibility of royal power (read: “what pleases the king 
has the force of law” as long as it did not anger many powerful barons). 
     
43 For example, in his Laws, Alfred declares “I king Alfred, have collected these laws, and have given orders for copies 
to be made of many of those which our predecessors observed and which I myself approved of.  But many of those I 
did not approve of I have annulled, by the advice of my councilors” (See “The Law of Alfred” Section 49; p.26).  What 
is crucial here is the near unfettered nature of the king’s legislative power.  As Hanson points out, the consultation 
process was so informal that one could hardly distinguish it from Tacitus’s description of the comitatus (58).    
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sources of power that could come into conflict—and indeed, in 1265, in England they 
did.  The words lex and consuetudines have different valences that create specific lines of 
cooperation through which certain powerbrokers were mobilized and sovereignty 
legitimized.   
The majestic rhetoric of the Mise, with its emphasis on the unbounded iura regis, 
reflects a particular shaping of civilian law, a rhetoric central to Angevin kingship.  For 
example, we encounter this majestic description of regal power in FitzNigel’s Dialogus 
de Scaccario (Dialogue of the Exchequer): 
Much of this wealth comes to kings not by strict legal process, but variously by  
ancestral laws, by the secret machinations of their own hearts, or even by their 
arbitrary judgment [sue uoluntatis arbitrio]; nevertheless, it is not for the king’s 
subjects to question or condemn his actions.  For princes, whose hearts and 
consciences are in God’s hand, and to whose sole care God himself has entrusted 
his subject, stand or fall, by divine, not human judgment. (FitzNigel 3) 
 
The exchequer was one of the three major administrative apparatuses through which 
sovereign power was translated.  Coming at the beginning of the Dialogus, this passage 
establishes the authority of exchequer as completely circumscribed by royal power—the 
exchequer, like all civil service, serves the king who surpasses all secular authorities.44   
The Dialogus, thus, shows how civilian principles that set the king above the law 
translated into administrative authority.  The authority of the king’s voluntas arbitrio 
echoes in Henry III’s vigorous assertion of his prerogative to choose curiales pro sua 
voluntate.  The Dialogus is particularly significant because it seems to enshrine the 
majestic ambitions of Angevin kingship throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
The book, originally written during the reign of Henry II, the first Angevin king of 
                                                
44 As J.C. Holt comments one of the few attempts to reconcile the royal will and the law. More importantly, this 
passage shows the how the majestic Neoplatonic model of kingship was connected to the practical concerns of state 
such as finances and defense 
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England, still had considerable currency during the reign of Henry III.  Indeed all the 
extant manuscripts of the Dialogus, three in all, come from the years of Henry III. While 
the sample size is too small to draw any definitive arguments, it makes sense to see the 
reproduction of this manuscript as a response to baronial incursions on administrative 
affairs (Amt xxix-xxx).45 
Despite the emphasis of the king’s autonomy in the Dialogus or the King’s 
Gravamina, the central conflict between majestic and political rhetoric was not between 
absolutism and constitutionalism; indeed, neither Henry nor his baronage would have 
understood this language.  The difference was a matter of emphasis.  Both, in fact, allude 
to the importance of the communitas regni and customary law. Embedded in the iura 
regis was a historically-accepted responsibility for the community, but it was cast as an 
ethical responsibility to God—“princes’ hearts and consciences are in God’s hand.”  This 
short-circuits the baronial argument that the king can be judged or coerced to act for the 
common profit.  The royal prerogative (iura regis) supersedes all jurisdictions except 
God’s alone.  Authority derives from a sacred and legal right handed down from his 
antecessores as part of his estate.  While it is natural, indeed easy, to read a theoretically 
unbounded iura regis as a justification for autocracy, the measured deployment of this 
"theoretical" power tempered the contemporary perception of majestic rhetoric.46  
                                                
45 In her introduction to the Dialogue of Exchequer, Emilie Amt explains how the work fit within a thirteenth-century 
context: “not only had concerns with record-keeping come to be of prime importance to the royal administration at this 
time, but the extent of royal power was the great political issue of the day . . . The Dialogus represented a positive and 
venerable tradition of loyal service to the king’s best interests.  As such it was a text of interest not only to clerks, but to 
anyone inclined to promote views of the royal party in the ongoing discussions of royal prerogatives” (xxix-xxx). 
 
46 Majestic rhetoric is not the same as absolutist policy.  D.A. Carpenter has argued at length that Henry III does not 
blatantly exercise extralegal authority, which he sees as the main tenet of absolutism, see 77-81. Nonetheless, the 
policies of Henry III, which Clanchy and Wilkerson identify as absolutist, do reflect the majestic ideal of kingship and 
it is this ideal that informs the introduction to the Dialogus. 
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In fact, the ethical expectation that the king would curb his power was, itself, 
formalized in civilian law as lex digna:  
It is a word worthy of the majesty of the ruler that the Prince professes himself 
bound to the law: so much does our authority depend upon the authority of the 
Law.  And truly, greater than the imperium is the submission of the principate to 
the laws. 47  (C.1, 14,4)  
 
Lex digna suggests that the law of the land offered some resistance to untrammelled regal 
power. 48  This idea of an external authority that bound the king's power was, as Robert 
and Alexander Carlyle have shown, a medieval commonplace.  Moreover lex digna did 
not merely assert that the king was morally bound by the law but also, on a practical 
level, that the king’s power and authority ‘depended’ upon “the submission of the 
principate to the laws.”  The practical point, which was not lost on medieval jurists and 
theologians, was that medieval kings did not have the instruments of coercion necessary 
to suppress the social unrest that violent disregard for custom would cause.  Indeed, 
Chaucer quietly tucks this bit of wisdom into Prudence’s observation: 
And the juges and sovereyns myghten in hir land so muchel suffre the shrewes 
and mysdoers/ that they sholden, by swich suffrance, by proces of tyme wexen of 
swich power and myght that they sholden putte out the juges and sovereyns from 
hir places,/ and atte laste maken hem lesen hire lordshipes. 49  (VII.1474-6) 
 
The “proces of tyme” points to (while simultaneously masking) the ways that social 
unrest, caused by “suffrance” of injustice, weakens sovereign power.  It points to the 
                                                
47 Translated by Ernst Kantorowicz in The King’s Two Bodies (104). 
 
48 For the text of lex digna, see Corpus Civilis Iuris (C. 1,14) 4.  For a discussion of Digna Vox, particularly as it is 
developed by fourteenth-century jurists and Ricardian poets, see van Dijk 96-97.  For example, he points out  
that Baldus, one of the chief jurists in the fourteenth century, affirmed lex digna when he wrote: “The prince ought to 
live according to the laws for from the law he receives his own authority” (qtd. in Van Dijk 97).  Schulz argues that this 
passage, which has caused much confusion, clearly meant to suggest that the king had a moral obligation to the law 
while still recognizing that he was “not legally subject to the law” (160ff).  According to Tierney, Schulz’s distinction 
fails to grasp how the king’s obedience to the laws of the land was the rational basis of his authority—“so much does 
our authority depend on the authority of the law.”  Thus, lex digna had a coercive element: the failure to adhere to the 
law would undermine the king power to rule (“Bracton” 298-302).  
 
49 This same threat is made more explicit in Gower’s “Folly of Rehoboam,” see discussion of the tale in Chapter III.  
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political grounds of authority.  Although civilians tended to be more sympathetic to 
royalist authority, some of them asserted that the people, when transferring authority to 
sovereign retained the right to “revoke this for a reasonable cause” (67) and some, like 
Odofridus, went even further by asserting that the people in transferring imperium to the 
prince, did not abdicate their own power as a collective (Carlyle 66).50  Likewise 
theologians and canonists acknowledged that legislative authority derived from both 
princeps and populus.51 In other words, jurists by the thirteenth century had developed a 
legal infrastructure for the principles of ancient constitutionalism; and, as Brian Tierney 
argues, the convention of following the law was, at least, as natural to kingship as the 
freedom from coercion (Accursius 391-92).52  
So what do we make of these seemingly contradictory descriptions of sovereign 
power?  I would suggest that the perceived contradictions stem from a modern desire to 
pin down the precise nature of royal authority.  Instead, these legal descriptions of 
sovereign power depict the field of forces that constrain the unlimited authority of the 
king—the practical reality that sovereignty, depends upon the appearance that of the 
“submission of the principate to the laws.”  So the king must always cast his assertions of 
iura regis as the will of the many turned into one; the credibility of this assertion is the 
                                                
50 The majority of civilian lawyers agreed with Placentinus’s interpretation of Ulpian’s definition of sovereignty as the 
transferal of imperium from the people to the emperor.  Placentinus argued that once the people transferred the 
imperium to the emperor, he alone had legislative authority, see Hinsley 42-3; and Carlyles 66. English kings, from the 
fourteenth century until the James, funded the study of Roman law in order to buttress their own prerogative; see 
Cobban 256-58. For citations of Odofridus and Andrew of Isernia as well as a lengthy discussion of civilian arguments 
for the legislative authority of the populus, see Carlyles Ch. 6, particularly 66-67. 
 
51 Aquinas in his treatise of law states that “the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public 
personage who has care of the whole people” (ST I-II.Q90.A3); Canon law equally emphasized that “the human race is 
ruled by two things: namely, natural law and custom” (Decretum, D.1 d.a.c.1).  
 
52 Discussing Accursius’s gloss of lex digna, Brian Tierney shows how the authority of law should supersede the 
prerogative rights of the king.  For Accursius, however the king’s was not an “act of superogatory virtue.  He laid down 
as legal fact . . . that the emperor did in fact do so” (“Accursius” 392).  
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limit of majestic rhetoric.  Read in light of lex digna, Henry III’s claims that he has the 
right to act pro sua voluntate is not a defense of untrammelled power.  At no point does 
Henry III explicitly state that his authority transcends the authority of the Law.  Instead, 
Henry III would have seen himself as defending the traditional model of Angevin 
sovereignty in which the relationship between the king and the law was an ethical 
obligation (i.e. “the Prince professes himself bound to the law”) and that the barons had 
no right to question or condemn his actions.  The Provisions, then, were, from the king’s 
point of view, an incursion on royal jurisdiction—an attempt to make the king’s will 
subject to “human judgment.”   
The claims that the king is “under the law” and that the barons had no right to 
question or condemn his actions creates a practical ambiguity.  Simply put, what is the 
law without the authority or the power to enforce it.53 This ambiguity is not accidental. 
By accommodating competing strategies of interpreting and maintaining sovereign 
power, it effectively tables the ideological argument, which boils to the surface from time 
to time. 
At the heart of this accommodation of majesty lies a crucial, indeed dangerous, 
embarrassment; namely, majesty has no foundation—it is strategic, traditional and 
functional, but there is no essential principle to arrive at the proper interpretation.  
Majestic rhetoric, in Macherey’s terms, is an “ideological fiction” that attempts to 
resolve, but in fact only papers over the “determinate disorder,” in this case the lack of 
foundation for legitimate authority, the embarrassment of authority.  
                                                
53 This was a central concern for Ricardian authors like Gower, see van Dijk 71-2.  
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Many scholars (both modern and medieval) point to religion to establish the 
foundation of medieval political thought. Theology was used to defend both political and 
majestic modes of authority.  Henry III thought he had a sacred responsibility to protect 
the prerogative; Simon Montfort cast the Common Enterprise as a holy crusade.  
Theology is a symbolic language that (most often) reproduces the realities of power by 
describing and reinforcing the hierarchical power structure.  When the king appropriated 
scripture to defend his right to alienate lands or appoint members to his own court, his 
interpretation situates his own office in the same sacred context as Jesus and his 
disciples. The hermeneutic act creates and reinforces the relationship between religion 
and regal power.  However, the barons will invoke this same magister-discipuli power 
structure when they argue that the will (voluntas) of the king should never act against his 
reason (ratio) and that when it does the barons have a duty to save the king.  
Religion does not provide a stable foundation for medieval political thought, but 
rather it offers a mythic language deeply entwined with hermeneutic strategies of those 
coalitions that it reproduces and creates—strategies that overlap with narrative practice of 
poets.  As Walter Ullman shows in Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle 
Ages the theological roots of majestic rhetoric derive “genetically” from those ideas 
central to the consolidation of papal authority in the fifth century, a consolidation 
occurring at the same time that princes “shed their Gottkaisertum [i.e. emperor as God on 
earth] and . . . adopted the standpoint more appropriate to a Christian ruler, namely that 
they were emperors by the grace of God” (49).  The Neoplatonic doctrine of the fifth 
century (particularly the work of pseudo-Dionysius), which deeply informed medieval 
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ecclesiology, was easily redeployed to validate the severely hierarchical structure of fifth-
century principates.54   
Adapting the works of Proclus for a Christian audience, pseudo-Dionysius 
develops a cosmic hierarchy out of the principle that all things are united in God, what 
Ullmann calls, the principium unitatis:  
“God as its leader of all understanding and action . . . causes it members to be 
images of God in all respects, to be clear and spotless mirrors reflecting the glow 
of primordial light . . . Therefore the hierarchic order lays it on some to be 
purified and others to do the purifying, on some to receive illumination and others 
to cause illumination, on some to be perfected and other to bring about perfection, 
each will imitate God in the way suitable to whatever role it has. (pseudo-
Dionysius 154) 
 
Perhaps the most important contribution of pseudo-Dionysius is the transformation of the 
personal journey to the One into a social structure (an ascetic and ecstatic journey where 
the soul purifies itself by casting off the phenomenal world). The “ascent” is no longer a 
personal journey but rather a series of subordinated powers each either being “purified 
by” or “purifying” those below. Thus, religion underwrites a social organizing principle 
such that God, at the top of this hierarchy, was the “leader of all understanding and 
action” and that each individual member of this hierarchy “reflected God’s “primordial 
light” in a degree “suitable” to him.  In the Neoplatonic view, all power is concentrated at 
the top, and all power of subditi, or subjects, was reflected.   
                                                
54 The theological doctrine supplied “ultimate justification” for what Hanson saw as the more “proximate source of 
authority,” namely the king and his magnates. Hanson glosses over the gap between “ultimate” and “proximate source” 
of authority (44-45). I will argue that thirteenth-century thinkers began to revise what Weaver would call, the “God-
terms” as they sought to create a new foundation for the proximate source of authority.  Walter Ullmann gives a full 
description and genetic history of the theological principles undergirding majestic rhetoric in Chapter 2 Principles of 
Government in the Middle Ages.  Richard II, who was intent on restoring Angevin ideal of kingship, portrayed himself 
in hieratic pose (Scheifele 263-4) and encouraged regal addresses that emphasized the “theocratic character of the 
king’s or prince’s rule” (Saul, “Kingship” 46).  For a description of how Richard II’s hierocratic rhetoric intersects with 
his use of Aegidian philosophy and Roman law, see Saul, Richard II, 249-50.      
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Translated into the discourse of sovereignty, all authority came from God and, 
mediated by the king, was distributed throughout the hierarchy in a “way suitable” to 
each person’s position.  Walter Ullmann refers to this appropriation of Neoplatonism as 
the “derivational thesis of all power” (Principles 53-6). The theological idea that the 
king’s heart and conscience were “in God’s hand” reinforced the legal construct of 
kingship as a “corporation sole,” an estate all to himself, and as such could not be held 
responsible for his actions by any human authority.  Of course, the king was human and 
thus both fallible and amenable to counsel, however royal voluntas stood below only God 
(and in some matters the pope) alone. 
This paradigm defined the way authority was understood.  In his description of 
spiritual purification, pseudo-Dionysius describes authority in terms of a “hierarchic 
order” that “lays it on some to be purified and others to do the purifying.”  Some act, 
others are acted on.  This description of the angelic order foisted onto medieval society 
produces a Neoplatonic social order that embodies three critical aspects about majestic 
rhetoric: first, all earthly authority derives from the king’s will, second the latitude of 
one’s authority depends upon their place in the hierarchy and finally, this authority is 
defined as a power over.55  The authority of a baron, knight and most lowly subject was 
the reflection of the king’s voluntas (read: “primordial light”) and their placement in the 
hierarchy determined to what degree they had power over others.  Two related corollaries 
to the “derivational thesis” had a chilling effect on public debate.  First, any attempt to 
encroach upon the authority of a superior was an act of lésé majesté, “an offense against 
the semi-religious aspect of the royal persona” (Saul, Richard II 249); and second, the 
                                                
55 Ullmann describes how pseudo-Dionysius’s model of hierarchy shaped ideas of governance.  It should be noted that 
medievals believed that pseudo-Dionysius was a direct disciple of St. Paul; see Principles 46ff.  
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idea that all authority was reflected left no room for dispute—there was no room for a 
public forum.56 The mystical social paradigm underwritten by pseudo-Dionysius 
reinforces the narrow hierarchical structure in which the king and his elite barons 
controlled all national political power.   
This theologico-social paradigm (crucial to majestic rhetoric), in which 
submission is virtue, is embodied by those characters whose quest is to submit 
themselves to the “cosmic framework” (i.e. narratives that involve an obvious ascent like 
Alain de Lille’s Anticlaudianus, romances that require a return from a fallen order in 
which the errant knight must wander through a maze of “and-thens” such as medieval 
Orpheus or Havelok, or tales, such as the Pearl and Sir Gowther where the protagonist 
subjugates himself to the proper authority).57  It is this paradigm that, according to James 
Simpson, underwrote the political imaginary of twelfth-century humanists who describe 
political authority in hierarchical terms: 
the self achieves integration through submission to the highest most incorporeal 
faculty of the soul . . . and if the concord of the soul is effected in this way, then 
the operations of concord in the political realm would imply that the realm finds 
its integration through submission to its highest, most incorporeal member, the 
king      . .  . The transcendent intellect stands as figure for the transcendent power 
of the king. (278-79) 
 
The trope of “integration through submission” in medieval literature, which mirrored the 
ideological claims of political and religious institutions, had two critical effects on the 
                                                
56 These corollaries provided powerful ideological tools that the king could deploy against both the barons and 
commons.  The threat of being accused of lésé majesté had a chilling effect on public debate insofar as made it difficult 
for the baronage to explicitly oppose the king’s will without first creating a significant coalition to guarantee their own 
safety.  The Neoplatonic model mapped perfectly onto a severely hierarchical society in which “the possibility of 
public policy dissolved” (Hanson 50).  The theocratic image of kingship, alongside the concomitant development of 
Roman law, which only accelerated in the fourteenth century, were part of the larger attempts of Angevin kings to free 
themselves from ‘feudal’ restraint; see Cobban 256-8. 
 
57 This narrative model, as Patterson shows in Chaucer and the Subject of History, finds its historiographical parallel in 
those chronicles that imagined history as the work of Providence.     
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workings of causation in narrative.58  I will expand on these effects in future chapters; it 
is enough here to point out two crucial ways they overlap with majestic political 
imaginary.  
First, the idea that ethical and social integration were achieved solely through 
submission diminished the kind of political power that was constructed through alliance.  
Since the king’s power was divorced from the community, there was no functional space 
for public debate.  The king’s status as Vicar of Christ meant that political tracts were 
often manuals of ethical self-governance advising the king to restrain his own desires.59  
This inhibited the development of a political science capable of describing the social 
constructions of power, constructions that underwrote the operative political strategies of 
the magnates in the Second Barons’ War.  In short, the king’s authority was not derived 
from and nor responsive to the community.   
Second, narrative was largely divorced from historical time.  Neoplatonic 
philosophy conceived of progress spatially as an ascension toward the One, or God.  As 
such, the hermeneutics of Neoplatonism presents temporal events in eternal terms and 
thus renders the ‘secular’ narrative little more than “a series of symbolizations” with 
“expository significance” (Pocock 8). This Neoplatonic influence on the discourse of 
sovereignty played a significant role in the “radical devaluation” of “causal modes of 
historical explanation or explorations of the relation of the individual to the course of 
                                                
58 The idea of virtuous submission shaped most medieval institutions—from fealty rituals to monastic rules.  In other 
words, the “derivational thesis” was part of the institutional practices reproducing majestic hierarchical ideology 
throughout medieval society.  Duby shows how the doctrine of Gregory, Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite were 
all transformed into social doctrines that justified the inequalities that, in turn, justified hierarchical authority and 
demanded submission to it; see 66-69.   
 
59 Book 7 of Gower’s Confessio Amantis significantly breaks with this tradition by disenchanting sovereign authority.  
Gower imagines power as founded on political alliance, a trouthe between the prince and the governed. While his tales 
tend to demonstrate the expedience of the virtuous exercise of political authority, they emphasize the political 
mechanisms through expedient end is brought about.  
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historical events” (Patterson 86, 88). In terms of narrative, majestic rhetoric diminishes 
the social dimension (making political science impossible), and looking at history as “full 
fledged Heilsgeschichte” diminishes the importance of contingency and the events of the 
temporal world.60  
The “derivational thesis of power” manifests most clearly in Henry III’s blatant 
assertion of the sacred authority of the king.  While scholars are torn over whether Henry 
III had a specific absolutist agenda, most willingly admit that he increased royal influence 
in church affairs.  Treharne even claims, “no previous king had gone so far in breaking 
the spirit of the church as the cowardly, pious Henry III” (Simon 56). Historians tend to 
characterize Henry’s intrusion into ecclesiastical business as part of the historical 
narrative concerning the secularization of authority; however, as Clanchy points out, the 
anti-clericalism of Henry III arises from his pious belief that the king was part of the 
sacred hierarchy and thus “he was obliged by the sanctity of his office to supervise 
clerical affairs”(“Did Henry III” 212). The intrusions were power plays that reinforce the 
sacred idea of the sacramental kingship. 61 
For example, he repeatedly intruded into the ecclesiastical jurisdiction by granting 
the ‘writ of prohibition court Christian’ generously to all petitioners.  This writ allowed a 
defendant to claim that the case should be tried in secular courts instead of an 
                                                
60 Heilsgeschichte is the interpretation of history (usually ecclesiastical history) as the working out of God’s salvific 
plan.  Lee Patterson explains how, during the twelfth-century, intellectuals began to interpret secular events as evidence 
of God’s saving acts.  Patterson rightly suggests an increasing interest in secular events during the twelfth century 
(Chaucer 86-99).  However, one must recognize that this model of history, like the narrative model described by 
Simpson, reinforced the idea of subordination through integration where political crises were interpreted as a “moral 
failure of each estate.” (Harriss 13) 
 
61 Matthew of Paris frequently portrayed Henry III as usurping or complaining about Church authority.  For example, in 
1250, Henry III sought to secure the bishopric of Winchester for his half-brother Aymer, although he was considered 
by many to be unqualified.  In order to secure his election, Henry III actually went to the cathedral church of St. 
Swithin in person and entering “the chapter, as though he were a bishop or a prior, and taking the seat of the presiding 
prelate” he delivered a sermon (Paris 395). For more on Henry III’s sacerdotal view of kingship, see Clanchy, “Did 
Henry III” 212-215. 
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ecclesiastical court.  Henry III continued the Angevin tradition of expanding the judicial 
authority of the king.  For Henry III, the sacral kingship, then, was not some ideological 
fig leaf but rather part of his broader goal of centralizing justice in order to broaden the 
reach of regal power and to add to the royal coffers.  In 1242, for example, when Henry 
III issued a writ barring Robert Grosseteste from prosecuting the canons of Lincoln, he 
claimed, “the all Highest has constituted us defender of the church.”62  The king’s 
arrogation of ecclesiastical justice based on an authority “constituted” by God, 
demonstrates how the king’s claim to be “vicar of Christ” intersects, in a very practical 
way, with legal and economic concerns.  These ‘intrusions’ establish the sacred nature of 
his power, much like the pope’s unique authority to canonize saints demonstrated that he 
had “a leg in heaven and a leg on earth” (Ullmann, Principles 39).63   
We must be careful, however, not to conflate majestic rhetoric with absolutism.  
That is, we are always warned—and rightly so—that continental absolutism fell on a 
more barren ground in England.  The maxims of Roman law or the sacred titles were 
evocative, but did not accurately reflect the operative strategies through which 
sovereignty was secured.  Nonetheless, we should not dismiss the importance of this 
majestic rhetoric as it shapes the Angevin vision of kingship that might be, for our 
purposes, usefully described in terms of Bourdieu’s habitus: 
One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of 
a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by the consensus of 
the meaning (sens) of practice and the world, in other words the harmonization of 
                                                
62 The passage drawn from the Close Rolls 1237-42 (435) is quoted and translated in Clanchy Did Henry 212; see also 
Flahiff 292.  
 
63 Ullmann describes the way papal rhetoric was mobilized by kings and emperors to assert their own descending 
authority: “genetically the fifth century demands attention not only as regards the permanent fixation of the principle of 
papal primacy by the papacy itself, but also in regard to the philosophic and theological buttressing of the papal theme 
by non-papal writers, who thus powerfully supported the descending theme of government” (Principles 45).     
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agents’ experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each them receives 
from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals for example), 
improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical 
experiences. (80)  
 
Majestic and political rhetoric describe two competing strategies that create “consensus” 
and “harmonization” necessary for reproducing or challenging the social structure.  
Indeed, majestic rhetoric can be seen as a kind of “commonsense” because even the 
opponents of Henry III cannot escape the authority of this dominant rhetoric. The maxims 
of Roman law, the coronation ceremony, and all the religious pageantry surrounding the 
kingship is to a degree a “transfigured expression of . . . economic and political facts” 
(Bourdieu 61) of the dominant model of sovereignty.64 The religious claims of “cosmic 
framework” and the “derivational thesis of all power”—claims that consolidate power 
into the hands of the few—manifest in practical aims of maintaining strict control over 
the royal demesne, increasing the jurisdiction of coram rege, controlling administrative 
positions, and maintaining his choice of counselors.  Such a mythic representation of 
kingship was readily believable precisely because the “consensus of the meaning (sens)” 
mirrored the realities of power and because this ‘meaning’ satisfied the aspirations of 
those members of society capable of disrupting the received order.   
After the Conquest, the distribution of power created an environment particularly 
amenable to the centralizing majestic rhetoric of the Norman and Angevin kings. The 
manorial system in post-Conquest England was hostile to the development of political 
discourse because there was almost no cohesive community capable of challenging the 
king’s authority.  The system of financial and military obligations between tenants and 
                                                
64 Bourdieu describes how symbolic systems interact with the realities of power (i.e. how majestic rhetoric provided a 
way of describing and authorizing the hierarchical system of governance evolved from the chief comitatus 
relationship).    
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kings created very little political cohesion between the barons; in fact, the manorial 
system most often kept people divided amongst their individual holdings.  Earls had lost 
their role in the administration of shires, and the extensive earldoms they once controlled 
were reduced considerably.65  Moreover, from the Conquest to the beginning of the 
Angevin line of kings, the royal demesne, and thus the king’s influence was dispersed 
throughout the kingdom.  The king’s presence throughout the realm made organized 
adversarial discourse almost impossible (Holt 28). The ubiquity of royal authority 
combined with the Angevin king’s use of household knights compensated through the 
royal chamber reinforced the independence of the king.  Reducing the king’s dependence 
on the feudal services of enfoeffed knights, restrained the development of baronial 
military forces capable of challenging the king.66  The Neoplatonic models of kingship 
(i.e. “derivational thesis of all power” or the idea of the king as “vicar of Christ”) provide 
a powerful ideological fiction supporting the “de facto realities of power”(Wallerstein 44) 
in post-Conquest England. 
Prior to the thirteenth century, the chief men of the realm were not put off by the 
claims of king’s special dignity or prerogative, largely because this rhetoric aligned with 
their own historically conditioned aspirations.  The isolating effect of the manorial 
                                                
65 One of the most significant differences between Old English and Norman regimes was that “the suppression of the 
greater earldoms destroyed any tendency there may have been towards provincial autonomy and promoted centralised 
administration” (Richardson and Sayles 26).   Holt explains that the “compact and distinct baronies,” unique to 
England, “deprived the Anglo-Norman aristocracy of one of the most important conditions for the maintenance of 
honorial justice and administrative and political resistance to the pretensions of the Crown” (Holt 28).  For example, 
Morris explains how after the Anarchy of Stephen, Henry II and his sons quickly built up the office and presence of 
sheriffs necessary for “institutional absolutism” (111). 
 
66 By utilizing mercenaries, the king was able to reduce the fighting class’s loyalty to the aristocracy.  David Rollison, 
for example, suggests that the arming of the peasants, an idea put forth in Policraticus, was part of “constitutional” 
progress in so far as it increased the ability of the community to resist the authority of the king (100-105).  Chris 
Givens-Wilson likewise argues that these retainers were part of an “outer circle of warriors of the king’s familia, 
closely bound to the king and easily assimilated to the domus” (Household 8).  For a full discussion of how 
demonstrates that the composition of armies influences “constitutional and social change,” see Michael Roberts 13-29; 
Stone 361-80.  
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system combined with England’s unique distribution of royal lands created a situation 
where the baronage willingly surrendered their prerogative in order to gain “the 
advantages of a centralized and efficient exercise of jurisdiction” (Holt 28).67 Majestic 
rhetoric, for the local powerbrokers was more a means of upward mobility than a 
limitation of their ambition.  Powerful landowners concentrated on gaining various feudal 
rewards and honors (escheats, heiresses, wards, etc.) rather than sovereign power. 
Majesty was the water they swam in and it was through royal favor and patronage that 
many sought advancement.  Thus, while there was a substratum of feudal politics that 
consisted mostly over charters and land claims, the governance of England could be 
described more aptly as an efficient employment of administration, which was itself 
largely indistinguishable from the curia regis (Chrimes, Introduction 18-27).  Aside from 
the most-narrow circle of royal advisors or barons vying for honors and patronage, the 
idea of political rhetoric had little meaning.  
The coronation ritual was the most visible example of the sacral language that 
conditions the discourse of sovereignty.  During this ritual the king publicly accepts the 
accoutrements of power, the royal regalia including the sword, the mantle, the sceptre, 
and most importantly the crown.  Several of these symbols of power are carried in the 
procession by “three dukes and three earls . . . near the royal stock” at the beginning of 
the ceremony. The ritual dressing of the king emphasizes the transformative—almost 
                                                
67 Bourdieu allows us to see how the willingness to cede certain privileges is conditioned by the habitus itself such that 
what is not likely is never desired (77). The acceptance of majestic privileges happens below the surface such that the 
political structures described by Jolliffe and Holt condition, but are not explicitly spoken of in, majestic rhetoric.   
The political class accepted the king’s special dignity and rights because they shared in this discourse.  J.C. Holt 
explains that all these rights were “accepted because the Crown’s tenants-in-chief, those namely who could oppose 
them most effectively, depended on these same rights for the maintenance and effective exploitation of their own 
estates” (29). For a discussion of how Angevin kings capitalized on the fragmentation of power, see Joliffe 1-6.   
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sacramental—power of the office.68  In fact, originally the king only became a king 
through this ceremony. 69 In the coronation ceremony, luxurious objects and vestments 
symbolize the principles of good kingship.  For example, Henry III’s pall of red samite 
covered in precious stones is redescribed in the Archbishop’s prayer:  
Receive this pall with four Corners, to let thee understand that the four Corners of 
the World are subject to ye power of God: and that no man can happily reign upon 
Earth, who hath not received his authority from Heaven.  (ECR 261) 70   
 
The coronation ceremony is a spectacle of royal authority that embodies the legal and 
sacred claims that underwrite the Angevin theory of sovereignty.  The bishop’s prayer 
over the mantle emphasizes the central organizing principle of the coronation as a 
whole—the king is subject to God alone and as such the world is subject to him.  Indeed, 
almost every item of clothing or symbol of power reminds the king that he has “received 
his authority from Heaven.” While invoking the idea that the king has “one leg in 
heaven,” the bishop admonishes the king that he can only “happily reign,” if he 
recognizes his responsibility to God.  However, even this prayer emphasizes that the 
                                                
68  The text of the coronation ceremony, the Liber Regalis, repeatedly draws attention to the king’s garb.  The king rides 
from the Tower of London to the palace at Westminster the day before his coronation wearing suitable attire.  The next 
day the king is “clothed with spotless apparrell, so his soul may shine” (ECR 113-4).  One sees how power, virtue and 
sumptuary thinking are conflated into a justification of power.  At his coronation, the king will adorn various 
accoutrements of power such as a “tunic and dalmatic of red samite, with a jewel and with precious stones in the 
orphrey” and sandals and stockings of red samite with an orphrey, and symbolic accessories from the jewel encrusted 
gold crown down to a pair of golden spurs, see ECR, “The Reglia of Henry III” 55-56.  King Richard II frequently uses 
clothing as a way of expressing his power both over his magnates and even in foreign affairs (Saul 352-57).  For a 
contemporary defense of magnificent display necessary for the prince, see Roger Dymock, Liber contra XII errores et 
hereses Lollardum 293-5.   
 
69 The coronation ceremony became a ritualistic language of great importance during the twelfth and thirteenth century.   
In Europe, at this time, there was considerable debate over during the twelfth and thirteenth century over when the 
prince became verus imperator.  These debates, usually centered around the Holy Roman Emperor, shaped the debates 
over kingship.   The Roman jurist, Accursius gave the conservative opinion that “the Prince’s privileges are not valid 
before his coronation.”  Those jurists who supported the Emperor argued that “emperors existed before there were 
pontiffs and that the emperors in former days had full power even without a consecration, because all power was from 
God anyhow (Kantorowicz 319-24; 324).  Richard II made his own subtle modification to the coronation ceremony.  
By swearing the oath before the acclamation of the people, Richard II, “emphasize[d] the people’s allegiance to a king 
who was already their ruler de jure” (Saul, Richard II 25) 
 
70 From ths point forward, the abbrevation ECR refers to English Coronation Records, ed. Legg.  I have modernized all 
of  the Legg’s English spellings. 
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royal prerogative stands outside all jurisdiction save that of God.  As such, the coronation 
ritual with its ethical admonitions is a theatrical performance of a mirror for princes.  
Through this quasi-sacrament the king assumes his character angelicus and becomes the 
hinge between the divine hierarchy and temporal hierarchy; the king receives his 
authority from heaven, and the magnates, knights, and bailiffs reflect “the glow of 
primordial light . . . in the way suitable” to his “role.”  The king as the source of earthly 
authority becomes, as it were, “the Immutable within Time” (Kantorowicz 8).  
More importantly, the sumptuary logic of the ritual also validates the whole 
hierarchical structure in which wealth and authority were intimately bound.  That is, 
while it seems obvious (even today) that expensive objects such as a jewel encrusted 
mantle would be used in a symbolic investment of authority, the “obviousness” only 
belies the degree to which people have naturalized an aristocratic language of power, a 
language in which authority is equated with visible signs of wealth.71  The red samite 
mantle justifies not only the authority of the king, but of the nobility as well.  Indeed, the 
prayers of the bishop frequently allude to the nobility as a class with special importance 
(i.e. “protect him and his nobles with thy shield” and “that he may be amiable and loving 
to the Lords and Nobles”) (Legg, p. 256, 258).    
Moreover, by making the nobility part of the pageant, the gaze of the audience 
was turned not only to the king but also to the nobility surrounding him.  The gaze of all 
spectators and participants in the ceremony mirror the Neoplatonic social hierarchy. 72 
                                                
71 For example, in the latter half of the fourteenth century, the relationship between wealth and power manifests in the 
1363 Statute of Diet and Apparell that created a dress code based on income and wealth, see Paul Strohm, Social 
Chaucer 4-7.  
 
72 One of the most significant twelfth-century changes to the coronation ceremony (and crown-wearing ceremonies) 
was the “growing tendency to associate services rendered at a coronation (using the word in its widest sense) with the 
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The elevation of the king both subjected the lords to the king and confirmed their own 
authority; the king’s majesty confirmed their majesty. In fact, during most coronations, 
the king ‘magnanimously’ conferred new titles and honors to his baronage.  Thus, the 
ritual performs the kind of “mutual recognitions” through which the king and baronage 
agree to the structure of power—a structure that elevates the king above all, but 
simultaneously reinforces the social order that benefits the nobility. 
Following the Fürstenspiegel-logic in which peace and prosperity were imagined 
as submission to the cosmic framework, the coronation ceremony intimately ties royal 
majesty with the stability and prosperity of the realm. Handing the king the scepter with 
the cross the Bishop prays: 
That thou may governe thyself aright, and defend the holy Church, and Christian 
people, committed by God unto thy Charge: punish the Wicked, and protect the 
just: and lead them in the way of righteousness, that from this temporal Kingdom, 
thou may be advanced to an eternal Kingdom.  (ECR 263) 
 
The claim that the justice of the realm depended upon the strength of the king was not a 
vain pretense of those who benefited from the majesty system, not just an attempt to 
justify their own power; it was a central tenet of Angevin policy.73  Angevin kings had 
built up “central and itinerant courts capable of subjecting the whole nation to the king’s 
law and government” (2).  This centralization of the law allowed Angevin kings to curb 
                                                                                                                                            
tenure of certain lands.  The conception of the twelfth century was that certain functions at a coronation were 
appropriate to earls, others to barons and others to knights” (Richardson, “Coronation” 131).  While Richardson 
demonstrates that these practices had no traditional provenance, he explains that they were easily accepted because 
“they fitted into the pattern of contemporary thought” (133).  Moreover, coronation ceremonies, frequently involved the 
elevation of members of the nobility. Thomas of Woodstock, for example, became the Earl of Buckingham at the 
coronation of Richard II. 
 
73 J.C. Holt describes three basic tenets of Angevin royal policy.  The first “tenet” was that they “exploited many 
functions attached to feudal lordship as financial resources for their wars and as instruments of political discipline to 
compel support” (28).  Through various legal innovations, the Angevin kings appropriated manorial justice and turned 
it into a royal “commodity.”  These tenets were not part of a conscious plan, but rather were conventions of rule that 
had developed organically since the time of the Conquest.   
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the suzerainty of the lords, which bound the legal control of lords more firmly to the 
crown.  The king’s benches had quite literally become the fountain of justice (26).  While 
local government handled some of the smaller crimes and misdemeanors, justice was 
primarily meted out through appointees of the crown (Baker 23).  Only the court of 
assizes, the wandering eyres, and the various courts in Westminster could hope to contain 
the dangers of local legal disputes between landed people—disputes that could impact 
entire communities. While this royal presence, at times, caused some grousing, the 
increase in pleadings suggests that people, on a whole, appreciated the royal courts. 
The association between the king and justice should not be described purely in 
institutional terms because the authority of the law and its institutions, to a considerable 
degree relied upon the acquiescence of the people.74  The king simply did not have access 
to the coercive force or power of surveillance necessary to maintain true autocratic rule.  
As we see in the Mise d’Amiens, the terms (literally the boundaries) of this authority was 
constantly being negotiated.  Majestic authority depended upon an effective rhetoric that 
established the “mutual recognition” (Wallerstein 44) between crown and commons 
through which order was maintained.  However, the king could draw from the deep well 
of historical precedent to defend the iura regis.  This customary authority of the king “is 
self-validating; its own existence and its own presumed longevity are the main reasons 
for presuming it to be good and well suited to the needs and nature of the people,” or as 
Edmund Burke flippantly observed “the multitude, for the moment is foolish; but the 
species is wise and, given time, as a species it always acts right” (Pocock 18, 24).  
                                                
74 Richard Firth Green explains that folk law was less about enforcement than creating a system that all members 
recognize and accept as part of their social duty (75-77).  In such a system the rhetorical idea of “legitimacy” plays a 
crucial role in maintaining peace.  For a full description of the workings of folk law, see Green, Crisis Ch. 3.    
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The stabilizing power of majesty is best seen through negative example at the 
moment when “mutual recognitions” deteriorate and the king’s sovereignty is, thus, 
undercut.  After Louis IX’s judgment had ended all conciliatory possibilities, the 
inevitable war broke out between the king and the barons.  The barons and Simon 
Montfort, in particular, tried to avoid engaging the king.  Aside from the fact that the 
king’s army would be militarily imposing—the king’s presence created a political threat 
more dangerous than the swords.  How can you attack the anointed one?  How can you 
attack majesty?  Even though they won the battle and captured the king and many of his 
allies, the open assault on majesty weakened Montfort’s position significantly.75  The 
rebels’ open challenge to king’s justice, an offense to the king’s majesty, caused a 
breakdown in custom and order described by the Furness chronicler: 
Indeed such horrible deeds touching many parts of England, and old 
disagreements, renewed [veteres discordiae], erupted between neighbors, while it 
seemed that it was permitted with impunity for any more powerful to steal and 
oppress the weaker and inferior, because there was common war throughout the 
province. From which father rose up against son and son against father, brother 
against brother, and neighbor against neighbor, by the devils machination [diablo 
machinante].76  (Furness Chronicle 545)  
 
Notably this attack on majesty was experienced religiously as an inversion of the natural 
order, the diablo machinante that set father against son, son against father, and so forth.  
The diablo machinante set off by the encroachment of royal majesty provoked three 
imbricated reactions that undermined justice and stability.   First, the willingness to 
                                                
75 As Maddicott points out, “victory in battle may have given divine legitimation to his power, as the author of the Song 
of Lewes believed, but it also meant that his regime had been established by force and lacked the free consent of the 
defeated” (284).  The lack of legitimacy for Montfort’s regime manifested in the refusal of the Marcher barons to 
support Simon, the threat of French Invasion, and giving license to continued spoliation, see Maddicott, Simon 282-89.  
  
76 Translation mine.  Original text from Howlett, Richard Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I: 
Talia quippe horribilia alibi per plures partes Angliae contigerunt, discordiaeque veteres inter vicinos renovatae 
proruperunt in medium, dum impune licere videbatur cuilibet potentiori [spoliare] atque opprimere debiliorem et 
inferiorem, eo quod communis esset guerra per universam provinciam.  Unde pater adversus filium et filius contra 
patrem, frater in fratrem, et propinquus contra propinquum, diablo machinante, insurrexit (Furness Chronicle 545). 
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commit lawless acts increased because the principle of justice is no longer held as valid. 
The attack on the king translates almost immediately into the renewal of former feuds 
throughout the whole of England.77 The renewal of these feuds was largely opportunistic.  
In other words, the assault on majesty created a license for theft and rapine.  Second, 
undermining the king’s majesty diminished the strength of local institutions because of 
the uncertainty created. In fact, several local communities had two competing sheriffs.  
As Claire Valente argues that the political and institutional reforms of Montfort could not 
stem local violence and “uneasy victory had turned a political strategy of reform into 
something akin to despotism.”  Finally, the lack of international support diverted 
resources from attempts to bring about domestic security, which in turn weakened 
institutions necessary to maintain stability.  Behind the willing acceptance of a sacral 
kingship, a belief that the king as the conduit of divine justice, was a sense that offending 
majesty would disrupt the stability and cause violence within local communities.  A sense 
conditioned by a long history of such outbreaks of lawlessness that the king, the 
hierarchy, the status quo were holy.   
 
The Suasive Force of Political Rhetoric 
The temporary reforms (and consequent coalitions) from 1258-63 brought on by 
frustration with Lusignans, baronial ambition, widespread dissatisfaction and sincere 
reformist zeal accelerated the development of political rhetoric. During Henry III’s 
kingship, particularly during the minority, the English baronage played an increased role 
                                                
77 According to Maddicott the “disorders of 1263” caused many barons and knights to abandon Simon’s coalition 
(250).  This points to the discursive force of majestic rhetoric to maintain order itself. The open challenge to king’s 
authority had led to outbreak of vendettas against various landed allies of the king.  The violence in the shires, 
particularly during the summer of 1263, destabilized Montfort’s regime.  The disorder weakened the support for the 
Common Enterprise; see Jobson 96-98.    
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in the administrative functions of government.  This increased role clashed with Angevin 
strategy of filling administrative positions with lesser nobility who were easily 
manipulated.  In order to legitimize their claim for increased authority, the magnates 
needed to reshape the discourse of sovereignty.  To this end, they combined the need to 
control the administrative apparatus of government with a series of reforms aimed at 
helping the gentry. This articulation of magnates with subordinate classes created a 
political coalition with enough coercive force to challenge the dominant rhetoric of 
majesty. 
The viability of political rhetoric at the close of the thirteenth century depended 
upon the strength of the coalitions it formed.  Although he was one of the most powerful 
earls in England and even frequently outside the country, Simon had a significant grasp 
on domestic issues concerning the vavasour class.  His immediate circle of advisors, 
including several influential landholders such as Peter de Montfort (no relation) and 
Walter Cantilupe, had frequent interactions with the knights and gentry and thus intimate 
knowledge of the concerns of knights and gentry.  Simon was able to use his awareness 
of local concerns to develop strong ties between the dissident barons and local 
communities (Carpenter 230-2) and to fashion the political rhetoric necessary to create a 
broad coalition between barons and gentry.  While the role of the gentry in reshaping the 
authority of the communitas regni was informal, as they served the barons solely in an 
advisory capacity, these informal relationships were not superficial.78 
                                                
78 The real strength of Montfort “lay in its leader’s close relation with prelates and schoolmen.  They brought to his 
service dialectical skills, practical support in negotiating and preaching, and a reputation for probity and intellectual 
distinction which the royalists could not match (Maddicott, Simon 250-1. 
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Montfort ensured the aspirations and needs of the gentry gained official 
representation in the Provisions of Oxford and Westminster. 79   The Provisions of Oxford 
had extended the “rights and liberties” of the vavasour class giving them increased 
protection from crown and baronial curiales and increasing their access to the legal 
system through reform of the writ system. As a result, the Provisions created new lines of 
cooperation around the legal concept of a communitas regni that could push back against 
regal will.  The barons described themselves as protecting “customary law;” however, the 
legal status really depended upon the size and strength of the coalition that underwrote 
it.80  Indeed, even the king’s agreement did not ensure their authority.  Henry III accepted 
the provisions under duress and frequently pushed back, either rescinding them, ignoring 
them, or finally, in his written grievance to Louis IX, asking for them to be quashed.  
Nonetheless, the king’s occasional acquiescence to the Provisions demonstrates that the 
strength of the alliance formed between the gentry and the barons was strong enough to 
make capitulation the “least costly strategy” (Wallerstein 44) for maintaining 
sovereignty.81    
                                                
79 Simon Montfort refused to go back on his oath to uphold the Provisions of Oxford, even when it became apparent 
that they were impractical; see Maddicott, Simon 270-1; see also Song of Lewes: “For the Earl had first pledged his oath 
that whatever the zeal of the wise had provided for the reformation of the King’s honour, and for the repression of 
wandering error, at Oxford, he would steadfastly keep it” (trans. ll. 227-231; p. 83). 
 
80 I use the phrase “legal status” to echo Joe Griffith’s description of political constitutionalism in which the “legal 
status” is always a fiction underwritten by the coalitions capable of securing its “legality.”  The Provisions had popular 
support throughout the realm and extended the political class by uniting those members of the gentry with localized 
power with the insurgent barons.  
 
81 As Crick argues “politics arises from a recognition of restraints.  The character of this recognition may be moral, but 
more often it is simply prudential, a recognition of the true power of social groups and interests, a product of being 
unable without more violence than one can risk and stomach to rule alone" (16).  Aquinas provides a medieval example 
of this political thought In libros politicorum 2.7.245: The best government is a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy and 
democracy “because one government is tempered from the admixture of another, and less material is given for sedition 
if all have a part in the rule of the city, namely if the people dominates in something, the powerful in something and the 
king in something” (trans. in Blythe 49).   
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Through the development of a robust political rhetoric, the barons of the Common 
Enterprise established those “mutual recognitions” necessary to legitimize their authority 
(Wallerstein 44) and to challenge the king’s authority.  Entitling their document 
“Grauamina quibus terre Anglie opprimebatur” (“Grievances which oppressed the land of 
England”) (DBM 269-70), the insurgent barons focused on a broader coalition-building 
concept—terre Anglie.  In the body of the Barons’ Gravamina, the barons repeatedly 
invoked the corporate health of the English people through words such as the communitas 
regni, status regni, regni utilitatem, and regni consuetudine.  Evoking the widespread 
dissatisfaction in terre Anglie, they countered the king’s complaints of lésé majesté with a 
corporate language that formed and arose out of this new baron-gentry coalition, a 
coalition capable of challenging and disrupting the king’s majestic claims to sovereignty. 
Fashioning themselves as the voice of terre Anglie, the insurgent barons 
demanded that the king respond directly to the needs of the community of the realm.  
Whereas the king had argued that officers such as the chancellor and treasurer “ought to 
protect the rights of kings,” the barons bind these officers to the needs of the realm.  The 
Barons’ Gravamina explains that because many chancellors have issued writs 
against right, and customary forms of the chancery, for courtiers and certain aliens 
and other influential men who had the ear of the court, while other writs, which 
by right and custom of the realm ought to have been granted to individual 
plaintiffs, could in no wise be obtained against these people . . . and as many other 
perils arose from the carelessness of chancellors, it was necessary for all these 
reasons to apply a suitable remedy to this running sore.  (DBM 261-63)   
 
The claim that “certain aliens” and “influential men” can take advantage of the court 
system points to the real and perceived abuses of the Savoyards and the outrageous 
behavior of the Lusignans, both who were elevated by the king to the great displeasure of 
the English barons. Invoking the popular dislike of these two families, the barons accused 
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the king’s appointed chancellor of failing to provide equal access to the royal courts.  The 
argument against the chancellor fits in with the broader argument of their complaint that 
the king had failed to deliver justice to England.  This critique cuts at the most 
fundamental principle of the monarchy, namely that the king “punish the wicked, and 
protect the just” (ECR 263).82 
On the grounds that his appointees subverted justice, the barons challenged the 
king’s right to appoint (“eligere et ponere”) his own counselors. Their appeal was a legal 
challenge to the royal prerogative. 83  By emphasizing that the king’s appointees benefited 
“certain aliens,” the barons present the unbound prerogative as alien and a threat to the 
common profit, a belief supported by the sense that Roman law was an imported threat to 
the ancient customs of the realm.  That the king recognized this, as an assault on his 
prerogative is clear in his own schedule of grievances that repeatedly insists that his right 
to act pro sua voluntate came from his ancestral claim (sui antecessores).  By claiming 
that his power derived from his ancestors, the king was arguing that the barons have no 
legal jurisdiction to judge his acts.  Whether the barons’ accusations were right or wrong 
was immaterial.  Their revolutionary (and imaginary) act was to claim the right to accuse 
and respond to regal crimes against the community of the realm.  
The failure of the chancery and perils that it causes to the realm made it necessary 
“to apply a suitable remedy.”  Indeed, each stipulation of the barons’ document points out 
that their acts were justified because of regal failure. While this may seem to be a 
                                                
82 When the king was accepting the scepter, the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered the following prayer: “the rod of 
the kingdom, the rod of virtue, that thou may govern thyself properly, and defend the holy Church, and Christian 
people, committed by God unto thy charge: punish the wicked, and protect the just” (ECR 263).  I modernized the 
spelling.   
 
83 For a discussion of the connections between prerogative, royal dignity and the appointments, see Jobson 96.  
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function of the document itself, it is worth noting that the king, in his grievances, rarely 
makes use of causal arguments.  Instead he accuses the barons of encroaching on his 
rights immemorial without describing the effects of this encroachment.  Communitas-
rhetoric, in the Mise d’Amiens reconfigured the responsibility of the king, imagining it 
not as an ethical responsibility to God (and thus notional responsibility without 
meaningful safeguards) but rather as being “in service of those governed” (Foucault 
96).84  It began to imagine kingship within a field of lateral obligations.  Although the 
Common Enterprise failed, the barons forged an oppositional rhetoric that established 
imagined lines of cooperation necessary to resist majestic authority and exposed the 
political realities inherent within majestic rhetoric.  The barons’ political rhetoric 
legitimized the imaginary construct of the community of the realm through which royal 
power could be assessed and judged, a rhetoric that transformed the ethical obligation of 
the Fürstenspiegel-prince into a legal obligation.  Moreover, by conflating the 
communitas regni with the “rights and customs of the realm,” the barons assumed the 
duty and authority to interpret and protect what amounts to the ancient constitution of the 
realm.  
However, political rhetoric cannot be understood simply as a language of 
“customs and rights,” since much of this language was already nominally part of the 
dominant rhetoric of majesty. Indeed, what I am calling political rhetoric has often been 
treated merely as part of a practical evolution of administrative reforms necessary to limit 
royal abuse.  While the barons might have seen their reforms solely in this practical light, 
                                                
84 Foucault describes a shift from the discourse of souvereignté to a discourse of gouvernmentalité (96), which he 
locates in the fifteenth century.  Foucault’s distinction between souvereignté and gouvernmentalité resembles my split 
between majesty and political rhetoric.  However, I focus more on the way that political rhetoric (gouvernmentalité) 
evolved out of and created resistance against the structures of souvereignté. 
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it is crucial to emphasize that these reforms develop a language of the “customs and 
rights,” that introduced a more robust “communitas regni” capable of resisting regal 
authority.  
A study of the subtle shifts in significance within this shared vocabulary points to 
the "active creation" of an authoritative communitas regni, a community that, in 1215 and 
again in 1265, would challenge the king’s authority on the battlefield.  Quentin Skinner 
has suggested that "a new vocabulary" is the "clearest sign that a society has entered into 
the self-conscious possession of a new concept" (x).  I would propose a useful corollary: 
when two groups fight violently over and within a single vocabulary, then, in all 
likelihood, one should look for an emergent rhetoric being shaped out of the dominant 
rhetoric.  Majestic rhetoric was the dominant language.  By “resignifying” and 
“proposing new applications” for the inherited terminology of this rhetoric the barons 
created a political rhetoric (Strohm, Politique 7).85   
The language of “customs and rights of the realm” is an ancient language.  For 
centuries it had been the language of Fürstenspiegel and romance depictions of the 
ethical king.   Political rhetoric is performative; it transforms the language of ethics into 
royal obligations in order to form coalitions capable of restraining the king.  We must 
understand how the barons transformed a discourse of customs into an authority to limit 
the prerogative of a sitting king, how they gave an old argument new and increased force.  
What I propose then is to give a brief history of the shared terms of political and majestic 
rhetoric in order to trace out how the barons’ political rhetoric creates "new 
                                                
85 Discussing linguistic strategies for identifying new ideas, Paul Strohm argues that “pressured by the exigencies of its 
context or circumstances of articulation, the individual utterance may be itself innovative, reinstating a superseded 
usage, resignifying an inherited term, proposing a new application” (Politique 7). 
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significances" and "applications" for a vocabulary once controlled and deployed in the 
service of majestic sovereignty—to show how the barons reshape a language of regal 
benevolence to a language with the authoritative force to strike at a sitting king.  
The assertion that a king must protect “rights and liberties” of his subjects for the 
sake of the common good was axiomatic.  In Henry II’s Coronation Charter, the king 
restores all the liberties and free customs granted by Henry I.  The charter begins with a 
formula that first acknowledges the king’s primary responsibilities to the honor of God 
and Church and then a secondary but important responsibility for the improvement of the 
commonalty (ad honorem Dei et sanctae ecclesiae et pro communi emendatione).  While 
the king has a holy duty to protect the interests of the commonwealth, the rights and 
liberties of the realm are, nonetheless, depicted as royal gift: 
Therefore, I will [volo] and strictly require that [quod] the holy church and all the 
earls and barons, and all my men should have and hold all those customs and 
grants and liberties and free customs, freely and quietly [libere et quiete], well 
and in peace, and completely, from me and my heirs to them and their heirs, as 
freely and quietly and fully in all things as King Henry, my grandfather, granted 
and conceded to them and by his charter confirmed them.86  
 
Henry by ignoring the charter of his predecessor, Stephen, and alluding explicitly to the 
practices of Henry I, uses his own coronation charter to heal the rifts caused during the 
“anarchy” of Stephen.87 The benevolence of Henry II’s charter dovetails with his own 
reform of the Angevin legal system.  During Henry II’s reign, the crown began an 
                                                
86 Anonymous translation at: http://conclarendon.blogspot.com/2012/09/coronation-charter-of-king-henry-ii.html.  
Latin text: 
Quare volo et firmiter praecipio quod sancta ecclesia et omnes comites et barones et omnes mei homines, 
omnes illas consuetudines et donationes et libertates et liberas consuetudines habeant et teneant, libere et 
quiete, bene et in pace et integre, de me et haeredibus meis, sibi et haeredibus suis, adeo libere et quiete et 
plenarie in omnibus sicut Rex Henricus avus meus eis dedit et concessit et carta sua confirmavit.   
 
87 When Henry II had “won the throne, division between foreign lords [Norman lords] and native subjects was as sharp 
and complete as it would ever be” (Rollison 46).  This division, which Rollison sees as contextualizing the philosophy 
of John of Salisbury, also explains the need for Henry II’s renewal of his grandfather’s coronation charter; see also Holt 
115-16.      
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ambitious program that developed new legal instruments desired by the king’s subjects.  
The rhetoric of emending the realm (pro communi emendatione) was part of the 
substantial legal reforms through which the crown seized increased control over local 
courts and thus garnered local power and revenues to the crown (Dunbabin 514).88  
For David Rollison the language of these charters acknowledges the king’s duty 
to protect “the material and spiritual strength of the commonalty” (49).  While these 
charters point to the king’s duty to the realm, the vague language of “customs and grants 
and liberties and free customs,” like the language of justice evoked in the coronation 
ceremony or in Fürstenspiegel genre, avoids any objective standard against which the 
king’s actions or authority can be judged or limited.  The ambiguity of royal diction is 
itself part of a majestic rhetoric. Insofar as the king’s will creates freedom and peace, it 
secures “the material and spiritual strength of the commonalty;” and insofar as it refuses 
to acknowledge any specific limits, it maintains the ideological illusion of an unbounded 
prerogative.  The king could claim to address the needs of the community of the realm, 
but this community was “not the arbiter of how those needs ought to be satisfied” 
(Dunbabin 515).  This is a crucial distinction because the barons of the Common 
Enterprise reinterpret the charters of Henry I and II as ensuring all the specific liberties 
and rights that would be adumbrated in Magna Carta;89 and thus, they imagine these 
charters as part of an ancient constitution extending into time immemorial.  
                                                
88 Dunbabin argues, “the meteoric rise of English and French kings in the second half of the twelfth century was owed 
principally to their acceptance of their subjects’ view of justice, to their willingness to put legal sanction behind rights” 
(514).  For example the use of royal commissions and justices of the peace made “county assemblies” less relevant 
such that “it might be said that in reality the Crown had taken the county from the sheriff and put it into commission;” 
see Baker 25). 
 
89 As Pocock points out, Matthew of Paris himself believed Magna Carta “contain[ed] little that is not in Henry II’s 
charter or in the laws, which are called King Edwards,” (Ancient Constitution 44).  The passage from Matthew of Paris 
exemplifies the legal fiction that barons used to justify their resistance to John and Henry III.    
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The coronation charter exalts the king’s position as the protector of justice.  By 
granting these “liberties and free customs” into perpetuity, Henry I reminds his audience 
that “he gives and concedes [these rights] to them”—his law is a gift. Equally important, 
it allows Henry II to exercise his own will (volo et firmiter praecipio) in restoring and 
ensuring the continuation of these rights, in reasserting his authority after the anarchy of 
Stephen.90  Like Henry I’s charter, Henry II uses the concession of liberties and 
termination of evil customs to emphasize the idea that the king is fount of all justice.91  
This idea is built into the syntax of the charter itself: that is the primary verb “volo” (I 
will) guarantees the whole structure of rights that “the holy church, earls and barons and 
all” the king’s men enjoy.  The rights, which the nobility enjoyed (habeant et teneant), 
are part of a quod-clause dependent on volo; as such they are syntactically subordinated 
to the free action of the king to will.  Without the king’s will there would be no rights.  
Moreover, characteristic of majestic rhetoric, the subjects’ proper subordination to this 
“will” creates the conditions for the realm to live libere et quiete. Through the reign of 
Henry II the customs and rights of the realm, quite literally, depended upon the bene-
volence of the king.  This traditional Angevin understanding of the royal will shapes 
Henry III’s majestic emphasis on voluntas in his schedule of grievances.  
Since its conception, Magna Carta (i.e. the Great Charter) has often been read as 
part of a continuous legal tradition expanding upon the ideas of previous coronation 
charters, a tradition guaranteeing and extending the “rights and customs of the realm.”  
                                                
90 Graeme in Restoration and Reform suggests that Henry II used his Coronation Charter “to present himself as the 
continuator of Henry I’s reign . . . so that he could be free to recover the estates and reclaim the rights lost by the 
Crown since 1135” (2).  In this sense, the “gift” was part of a strategy of recovering and reclaiming royal authority.   
 
91 Henry II exploited the idea of the king as the “fountain of justice,” an idea that arose from the “revived study of 
Roman jurisprudence” in Bologna.  The premise was that “while the Roman people were the ultimate source of all 
political authority, it had transferred its authority to the emperor”(Carlyles 5:83-84).  
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Interpreting Magna Carta in this light would have been essential to baronial reformers 
looking for some authority to justify their demands.  However this ignores how Magna 
Carta, unlike the coronation charter of Henry II, specifically identifies liberties shared by 
the entire realm and how it imagines a coercive mechanism to guarantee these rights. 
Drawing on the gift-language of previous coronation charters, Magna Carta masquerades 
as a kind of benevolent concession: “we have also granted to all free men of our realm for 
ourselves and our heirs in perpetuity all these liberties written below” (Clause 1).  
However, Magna Carta is anything but a benevolent concession.  For all intents and 
purposes, it is a peace treaty between the barons and the king.  However, by identifying 
particular “liberties” such as protections against disparagement (Clause 8), rules about 
inheritances (Clause 1-7), forest law (Clause 47-48), the charter defines and establishes 
limits for the king’s authority.  Instead of the vague concept of royal restoration of 
liberties pro communi emmendationi, Magna Carta, with its specific demands, embodies 
public interest or common profit.  It is an early intimation of public policy and a public 
more generally. 
The language of Magna Carta does not show that the king’s power was actually 
limited by this charter (in fact King John swiftly revoked it and had his oath annulled by 
Innocent III).  What it does show is the rhetorical mechanism through which a king’s 
ambiguous ideological claim of an ethical responsibility pro communi emendationi could 
be transformed into legal obligation.  For example, in Clause 39, perhaps the most 
famous clause of Magna Carta, King John asserts that: “No free man will be taken or 
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor shall we go or 
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send against him, save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”92  
The assertion that a free man cannot be punished without such judgment provides a 
clearer articulation of the principles of justice than the notional concept of liberas or 
malas consuetudines that Henry II, in his coronation charter, promised to maintain or 
quash respectively.  Since all of this is part of a royal concession, the power to imprison 
can still be described as part of royal authority (i.e. a royal gift).  However, the specificity 
disarticulates an aspect of sovereign authority (the right to imprison without lawful 
judgment) from the king’s personal will.   
By granting these liberties for him and his “heirs in perpetuity,” King John 
redefines the relationship between king and commonwealth. The king’s gift is the self-
limitation of his own authority. In other words, the authority to imprison has been 
imagined as a royal institution, an institution that over time could not, without significant 
violence, be completely rescinded.93  We see here an early understanding of the 
separation between the personal king and the Crown in which certain powers, such as the 
authority to imprison, derive from the impersonal authority of the Crown.  The 
development of highly specified “conventions of the Constitution” that both authorized 
and limited the king’s voluntas was a central concept of political rhetoric.  
                                                
92 All citations are from Holt’s translation of the original 1215 Magna Carta in appendix 6 of his book, Magna Carta. 
 
93 Although Magna Carta was revised continuously, often weakening enforcement clauses that felt onerous to majestic 
authority, it was never rescinded, and the document continued to offer a template for resistance rhetoric that was 
renewed in the Provisions or the Ordinances of 1311, or again during the trial of Edward II.  It was even used, though 
somewhat cynically by the barons who deposed Richard II. As Nigel Saul points out, Magna Carta appears in the 
records of the Merciless parliament.  After a document “appointing the ‘continual council’ for twelve months, in the 
form it which it was issued in letters to the sheriffs on 1 December 1386,” the next document in the register is “an 
incomplete transcription of the ‘Carta de Rounkemede’ as it is termed – the 1215 Magna Carta - consisting of the 
opening address, clauses 1 and 2 and the security clause.” http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/ read/feature_of_the_ 
month/Mar_2015_2.  Viewed December 20, 2016. “Magna Carta and the Politics of the Reign of Richard II” from the 
Magna Carta project.   
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Much like the barons at Runnymede, the dissident barons of 1265 deployed a 
language of common law emphasizing rights, liberties, and customs.  What made the 
barons’ demands unique from Magna Carta was that a coalition formed within the 
rhetoric of “rights and liberty” seized control of the levers of power and made royal 
authority dependent upon the communitas regni.  The Mise d’Amiens uses the communal 
rhetoric to legitimize opposition to royal power.  In the Provisions and the Mise, the 
barons actualize the potential coercive force inherent in Clause 61 and develop a conciliar 
government capable of wielding sovereign power in the name of the king—a power that 
radically divorces the king and full sovereignty.  Through this conciliar authority, the 
barons amplified the legal implications behind the concept of communitas regni in such a 
way the “needs of the commonalty” (Rollison 49) directly (and indeed explicitly) limited 
the scope of royal power. These were not royal gifts; they were direct interventions meant 
to address the needs of the realm. 
Instead of imagining liberties and rights as magnanimous gifts of the king, the 
Barons’ Gravamina is grounded in an authority that protected the rights and liberties of 
the community of the realm.  The perceived needs of the community determine the 
necessary remedies to the administrative apparatus through which royal power was 
disbursed.  This relationship between community and sovereign power is embedded in 
the syntax. Most of the clauses of Mise begin with a propter-clause outlining a deficiency 
in condition of the communitas regni and then conclude with a necesse fuit-clause 
indicating the council’s amendment.  For example, we see this syntactic structure in 
Clause 7:  
“Because of [propter] the lack of justice . . . it was necessary [necesse fuit] to 
create a chief justiciar who should have the power to correct all errors of lesser 
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justices and of all lower officials and of earls and barons and all other persons 
according to the laws of the realm.”  (DBM 260-1) 
 
The propter/necesse fuit structure is a very different paradigm than the volo of Henry I 
and II.  The lack of justice (deffectum iusticie) requires the creation of a chief justiciar, a 
new office with an old title.  What is crucial here is that the king’s authority depends 
upon his responsiveness to the community. 
Through this “imagined community,” the baronage claimed control over vast 
portions of the administration from national positions (such as the justiciar, the 
chancellor, the head of the exchequer) to local offices (like castellans and sheriffs).  
Political rhetoric was a mechanism for asserting control over the apparatus of sovereignty 
and ultimately discovering a method “to carry on administration in the king’s name” 
(ECH 102).  On the flip side, the effectiveness of this rhetoric depended upon “genuine 
accommodation” of the needs of some broader community. The barons achieved this 
through providing expanded access to a legal system that offered protections from lower 
officials and sometimes from more powerful landlords.  
One may argue, as S.B. Chrimes has, that this represents more of a change of 
personnel than actual principle of governance.  For the most part, the barons do not 
introduce new administrative positions or functions.  Nonetheless, the Provisions of 
Oxford mark a significant change in the way that sovereignty was imagined: the needs of 
the communitas regni create lateral obligations that impinge upon sovereignty. The king 
had a legal duty to respond to the needs of the community and could be legally resisted if 
he failed.  Thus, unlike Henry II whose concession of “rights and liberties” pro communi 
emendatione emphasized regal control over the legal system, the barons’ communitas 
regni established a system that limited the scope of majestic authority.  That is, the very 
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word communitas regni was no longer an important yet vague responsibility of the king, 
but rather, through the council, it became a means of judging, challenging, and 
intervening in sovereign decisions.  
The amplified sense of communitas regni fostered an alternative and oppositional 
representation of the relationship between sovereign power and royal will. The barons’ 
present royal authority not as unfettered will (i.e. iura regi or the ability to act pro sua 
voluntate) but more as ‘will’ that must be carefully protected from dangerous desires. The 
barons establish a rival rhetoric that emphasizes both the fallibility of the king and the 
standard of justice to which he is held, an emphasis that culminates in Clause 13: 
Therefore it seems that this provision or ordinance is sanctified and honest, and 
that it is made for the honour of the lord king [honorem domini regis] and for the 
common advantage of his kingdom, the king being bound to give justice to every 
one.  As human malice [malicia hominum] grows this purpose could be achieved 
no other way; but those who strive to overthrow this provision or ordinance and to 
draw the lord king by snares of deception into the opposing party, are seeking to 
pull him into confusion, which heaven forbid, and his kingdom into ruin.  (DBM 
265) 
 
The barons depict the provisions and ordinances as a way of protecting the “honor of the 
king” from wicked men who aim to infringe upon the king’s authority through deception 
and flattery.  Presumably, the king, failing to see the danger, will fall into their snare,s 
and thus his power will be used to bring ruin to the kingdom. The barons’ rhetoric pivots 
from dignitas regi of hereditary personal kingship, stressed by Henry, to honorem regi as 
an idealized spiritual condition of the king that must be protected from malicia hominum 
and as will be suggested in the Song of Lewes, from the possible malice in the king’s own 
earthly will. While the trope of the wicked advisor was a commonplace in political 
invective, meant to sidestep blaming the king directly, the barons brought this trope to its 
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logical conclusion, namely the fallibility of the king and the potential effects of that 
fallibility justify a conciliar government that protects against human malice.  
 
From Mise d’Amiens to The Song of Lewes 
The establishment of a semi-permanent conciliar body capable of intervening in 
the flow of sovereign imperium caused a paradigm shift that cut across discursive 
domains from legal-political register of the Mise d’Amiens to a religious register in the 
Song of Lewes, a poem celebrating Simon Montfort’s unlikely victory over Henry’s 
forces in 1264.  While the Song had no official function, it aspires to provide a 
theologico-legal justification of barons’ authority.  In fact, as a literary scholar, the Song 
of Lewes sticks out precisely because it is one of the few political poems, perhaps the 
only one, that explicitly and extensively bridges the gap between grand political theory 
and operative political practice in medieval England.   
The Song provides the legal resolution that eluded the barons at Amiens.  By 
bridging legal and theological registers, the anonymous poet imagines the Battle of 
Lewes as a kind of trial by combat in which God rendered the final judgment:  
Gladious inualuit, multi cecidereunt, 
Veritas preualuit, falsique fugerunt, 
Nam periuris restitit dominus uirtutum, 
Atque puris prestitit ueritatis scutum; (23-26) 
 
The sword was powerful; many fell; truth prevailed; and the false men fled, For 
the Lord of valour resisted the perjured men, and defended those who were pure 
with the shield of truth (Trans. Wright 73) 94 
 
                                                
94 All citations and translations of Song of Lewes from Wright, Thomas. The Political Songs of England, from the Reign 
of John to That of Edward II.   
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Rhyming the strength of the sword and the deaths of many (inualuit/ceciderunt) with 
victory of truth and the flight of falseness (preualit/fugerunt) presents the battle as a 
conflict between two opposing ideological systems. The false flee because the virtue of 
God withstands the perjurers.  One of the central claims of Mise, the claim that the king 
and his men broke their oath to the Provisions of Oxford, becomes the legal complaint in 
this trial by battle.  The deployment of the language of God’s judgment (periuris restitit 
dominus uirtutum), the use of shame and valor (Veritas preualuit, falsique fugerunt) as 
modes of proving one’s guilt or innocence, and the consistent reference to Henry’s 
faction as “periuris” suggest that the Song of Lewes was meant to be read as a legal 
document.95   
Trial by combat was seen as a way of resolving a conflict between two claims that 
seemed to have no other legal remedy, usually because both claimants were able to 
validate their claims, or, as in this case, because the barons could not appeal to a higher 
authority.96  The Song of Lewes reprises the legal conflict; more importantly, however, it 
renders the legal conflict in more explicitly theological terms. The political imaginary of 
the Song—the imaginary through which the barons understood, represented, and justified 
their actions—derives from a strain of political Augustinianism that had been expressed 
most clearly in John of Salisbury’s Policraticus.97   
                                                
95 These are not isolated examples.  Henry III and his armies are repeatedly referred to as perjurers, and the strength 
and valor of Simon Montfort is carefully articulated as a proof of the justness of his claims.  The description of the king 
and his men as perjurers establishes the legal context of the judicial ordeal in which those who are not oathworthy (i.e. 
perjurors) can only prove their innocence through ordeal, see Green, Crisis 62-3.  
 
96 As Green notes in his discussion of a ninth-century case from Orléans, trial by combat was a “last resort when rival 
legal systems were in hopeless conflict” (83).   
 
97 Trial by combat may offer the only way to bring charges against someone who exists outside of all jurisdictions. 
Maddicott notes that the Song of Lewes was the most elevated expression of the religious rhetoric and forensic power 
which . . . had come to characterise the public face of the reform movement;” see Simon 280.   
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In the Song of Lewes, the fundamental relationship between will and reason that 
defines the barons’ politics derives from Augustine’s faculty theology. The tension 
between will and reason manifests itself, at the beginning of the poem, in the tight 
linguistic construction describing the king’s bloody wrath: “Racio furori, vita cessit ensi” 
(18). Emphasized by the use of zeugma, furori, in this oppositional structure, represents 
the most dangerous and arbitrary expression of the king’s will, as will entirely divorced 
from reason.  Furori racio collapses quickly into vita cessit ensi.  The life yielding to the 
sword, here, is both a result and judgment of the king’s furiori.  The will/reason dyad, 
here described with some bias, as furori/racio, already not alien to legal language, derives 
from Augustinian faculty psychology.98  This psychological construct enabled political 
reformers to reimagine the source of sovereign authority without explicitly denying the 
claims of majestic rhetoric.   
Faculty psychology, described at length in De trinitate and De libero arbitrio, 
describes how faculties of the mind—memory, intellect and will—negotiate a world of 
corporeal perception and divine illumination—what Augustine calls inner and outer man. 
Notably, will or love, part of the mental trinity acts as the pivot between both inner and 
outer man.  When will bends toward reason, it moves away from the corporeal world and 
toward “the participation in that highest light” (De Trinitate XIV.12.15), but when it 
bends toward self-love or love of corporeal things it foolishly seeks “servile liberty” 
                                                
98 Augustine’s faculty psychology shaped one of the most important texts that informed medieval psychology, Boethius 
Consolation: “Human souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the contemplation of the mind of God and 
less free when descend to bodies, and less still when they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood.  They reach 
extremity of enslavement when they give themselves up to wickedness and lose possession of their proper reason” 
(118).   
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(XI.v.8).99 This line of theological thought continues to shape Christian views of literary 
thought throughout the Middle Ages.  For example, Robert Grosseteste, archbishop of 
Lincoln and friend of both Henry and Simon Montfort, expounding on Galatians 5.18 “if 
you are led by the spirit, you are not subject to the law” describes Christian liberty in the 
following terms: “if you follow the guidance of the higher reason that is conformed to the 
Holy Spirit, you are not under the law, that is, you do not follow the law through fear of 
punishment, but being with the law you follow it through love of justice” (Grosseteste 
184).100  What is important, for the legal application of this psychology is that it creates 
new ways of imagining liberty and servility. Grosseteste does not connect this passage to 
sovereignty.  Nonetheless, the Pauline principle that following “higher reason” actually 
frees you from the law, provides an interpretive lens through which the civilian maxim, 
princeps solutus legibus est assumes a whole new meaning.  
There is, of course, something ironic about Augustine providing the foundations 
of resistance rhetoric, since Augustine generally advocated political quietism even in the 
face of tyranny.101  For Augustine the proper alignment of the faculties led to vera 
iustitia, however, this justice was predicated upon the heavenly city that had little need 
for earthly justice; indeed, Augustine contrasts vera iustitia with the Cicero’s more 
political summa iustitia, a justice more dependent on consensus iuris and utilitatis 
communio (Parel 71-74).  John of Salisbury, using a register similar to Augustine, 
describes a model of justice in which “the will of the ruler is determined by the law of 
                                                
99 All translations of De trinitate by Stephen McKenna from The Trinity. 
 
100 Translations from McEvoy, J. J. Robert Grosseteste.  
 
101 Augustine advocated a kind of quietism very popular in medieval political theory: “For whatever injury wicked 
masters inflict upon good men is to be regarded, not as a penalty for wrong-doing, but as a test for their virtues” (De 
Civitas Dei 4.3).   
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God and does not injure liberty.  By contrast, the will of the tyrant is the slave to desires 
and, opposing law which supports liberty, it ventures to impose the yoke of servitude 
upon fellow slaves” (Policraticus VIII.22).  We might assume that John’s “law of God” is 
divorced from the laws of the realm, if John did not make it clear that a king’s tyrannical 
and enslaved desires “impose . . . servitude” upon others.  The tyrant’s will perverts 
justice for others.  More importantly, when it perverts justice, when it makes others into 
slaves, the king’s will is not the will of a prince.  That is, insofar as the tyrant is enslaved 
by desire, this desire cannot even be described as his will. 
John’s description allows for the will of the tyrant to be perceived not only as a 
threat to others, but to the king himself; the language of the king’s plaint to Louis IX—
his invocation of iura regi and his right to act pro sua voluntate—becomes ambivalent.  
This distinction is crucial because it allows the barons to act in the name of the king, to 
seize control of the administration in the name of the king, to rule in the name of the king 
and to do all of these things to save the king.  Members of the barons’ coalition (with 
greater or lesser sincerity) could legitimately claim that they had “no designs against 
kingly honour,” but rather that they sought “to reform and magnify the kingly condition” 
(Song of Lewes 536; 537-38). The reformation of the “kingly condition,” as an abstract 
principle, to which the corporeal king was bound, establishes an early and somewhat 
vague concept of state.  
The barons’ reformation of the kingly condition is different not only from 
Augustine but also from Policraticus.  Much like Augustine’s vera iustitia, John’s “law 
of God” is not imagined as the subordination of the will to a public entity.  While John 
makes a case for tyrannicide, the actual “sword of god” is not a public entity.  God’s 
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avenger acts privately and within the bounds of Church.  The barons’ big achievement 
then is to imagine an institutional protection and institutional measure of the “kingly 
condition;” they reimagine a language of communitas regni, long part of the political 
discourse, as a lateral obligation (i.e. “qui tenetur omnibus dare iusticiam”) limiting royal 
authority.  The Song of Lewes imagines the barons’ obligation to protect the community 
of the realm in political and theological terms: 
There be permitted to a king all that is good, but that he dare not do evil,—this is 
God’s gift.  They who keep the king from sinning when he is tempted, they serve 
the king, to whom he should be grateful that they deliver him from being made a 
slave; so that those by whom he is led do not overcome him.  But he who should 
be in truth a king, he is truly free if he rule rightly himself and the kingdom; let 
him know that all things are permitted him which are in ruling convenient to the 
kingdom, but not such as destroy it.  (687-696) 
 
This is not mere rhetoric. The idea of keeping “the king from sinning” establishes a 
religiously-sanctioned and coercive, legal authority.  This coercive authority stops the 
poem from devolving into the ethical instruction of a Fürstenspiegel.   
While the king saw any legal obligation as impinging on his prerogative, the 
relationship between law and freedom was more ambivalent. The king’s freedom from 
the law, much like Grosseteste’s Christian liberty, is ultimately an absolute freedom to 
serve the law. The barons imagine this theology in public terms.  The conciliar 
government safeguards the king’s honor by stopping the “king from sinning” and ensures 
that the king “rule rightly” and thus ensures the king’s freedom.  Put another way, the 
barons’ conciliar government is protecting the royal prerogative by maintaining his 
freedom.  Equally important is that the “material and spiritual condition of the 
commonalty” provides the barons with a moral obligation to protect the both the realm 
and “kingly condition” (i.e. honorem regi).   
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The transformation of faculty psychology into a public state apparatus is one of 
the momentous rhetorical achievements of the barons.  The barons’ claim that a conciliar 
government is meant not to limit the prince’s will but rather to protect his will from the 
corporeal desire that enslaves the tyrant. The barons’ use this concept of “higher reason” 
to separate the justice of the prince from the arbitrary “furor” of the tyrant.  Read in this 
light, the king is conferred with the duty to protect the commonwealth and, insofar as the 
king protects the commonwealth he is acting as a prince and is not “under the law;” 
however, when the king harms the commonwealth then he turns away from higher reason 
and is wallowing in a kind of “servile liberty.” In short, he has become a slave.   
Thus, in order to protect the honorem regi the barons must seize control of the 
administrative apparatus and do justice to the commonwealth to save the king.  The 
prince becomes an abstract principle divorced from the physical king himself.  The prince 
is the murky beginnings of the state itself.  This psychological construct of sovereign 
authority shapes the political aesthetic of Ricardian England: it is the psychological space 
inhabited by Chaucer’s Walter, Gower’s Lycurgus, and countless other imaginary 
Ricardian characterizations of sovereignty. Each character in their own way reflects the 
anxieties alive within the discourse of sovereignty—anxieties that shape and were shaped 
by the Second Barons’ War.  
While kingship remained hereditary and hierarchical, the political imaginary in 
Song of Lewes established a potential (imaginary) construct in which legitimate authority 
can be imagined as psychological alignment of the king’s moral universe—an alignment 
that can be (and is) used to justify conciliar authority and even deposition.  It presents us 
with a potential that exists within, and yet, stands apart from the “worldview” that 
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dominates the medieval political scene.  This alternative model emerges from potential to 
actual for a brief moment, is memorialized in the Song of Lewes, garners the support of a 
few chroniclers and then is crushed out by Henry III.  While the actual political 
institutions are undone, Edward I appropriates and deploys political rhetoric to strengthen 
his own kingship.  What is important for this dissertation is not the success or failure of 
the barons’ revolution but rather the continued existence of alternative rhetoric struggling 
to articulate a public arena—the struggle to establish a civic consciousness.     
It is tempting to conclude this chapter with bulleted lists neatly separating 
majestic and political rhetoric, but this mistakes the “working out” for the worked out.  It 
would be to replace one dogma with another.  The reality is far murkier.  Political 
rhetoric is an emergent rhetoric.  It rises out of the sale of liberties meant to fund foreign 
wars and the ambition of Angevin kings to increase regal authority by establishing a 
larger and more efficient administrative and judicial apparatus. Political rhetoric emerges 
from majestic rhetoric.  And yet, the Crown could sell these liberties and expand its 
authority precisely because the people desired these political boons.  There was, and 
probably always is, some natural impetus for political liberties.   From the Coronation 
Charter of Henry I to the Song of Lewes we find traces of an evolving political language.  
Henry plays to the aspirations of “his people,” using the communitas-rhetoric to expand 
his own regal powers; one century later, it is this rhetoric revised and strengthened that 
the barons deploy to constrain the authority of the king.   
Political rhetoric in the Middle Ages, since it is still being worked out, cannot be 
reduced to definitions, it can only be understood as motivated and thus moving toward: it 
cannot be reduced to coordinates, but must be understood as a vector.  When we try to 
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understand the political imaginary of Ricardian poets we must look beyond the cosmic 
framework and certainly beyond prince pleasing rhetoric.  This chapter provides a picture 
of the discourse of sovereignty in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries so that 
we can understand Ricardian political imagination as complex, ridden with anxiety, 
driven by aspiration, and ultimately confused as it reaches toward a language not yet 
created.   
 91 
CHAPTER III 
FROM ETHICS TO LAW: THE REVISION OF THE PRINCE’S MIRROR IN THE 
CONFESSIO AMANTIS 
In his earliest work, the Mirour de l’Omme, Gower describes the “crisis of 
authority” that shaped his later work.1  Towards the end of the Mirour, the narrator 
allegorically interrogates the world about the origins of evil. Gower describes evil as a 
dispute within the discourse of sovereignty:  
Nowadays men by common dispute, argue and pretend to be wise men, each 
upholding his own argument.  You say it is the fault of the nobles, I say it is the 
priests, through whom our world is becoming evil.  Someone else says the 
common people behave badly and do not fulfill the obligations of their estate.  
But whoever thinks reasonably must well realize there is no advantage in 
chattering idly like this. 
 
When the foot rises up against the head, this is very dishonorable; and likewise 
when the people rise up like savage beasts in a multitude and a tempest against 
the lords, it is a great error.  And yet the little people say that their superiors give 
cause for the disturbance that is their common clamor.  But all this is only folly, 
which gives no remedy to the world. 2  (trans. of ll. 27217-40; p. 357) 
 
Gower’s pragmatic analysis of the political landscape in this allegorical interrogation of 
the world points to his dedication to the political perspective focused on the actual 
conditions of power.  The rhetorical division between those blaming the “nobles” and 
those blaming the “common people,” which sounds remarkably similar to the discourse 
of sovereignty in 1265, reflects the anxiety that is the subject of this book, the tension 
between political and majestic rhetoric.  Gower’s description of the actions of the little 
                                                
1 Yeager suggests that the Mirour serves as a “suitable introduction to Gower’s methods and to what he expected his 
audience to notice” (R. Yeager 83).  While he argues that the text illuminates Gower’s literary project, I would suggest 
that the Mirour shows the development of Gower’s political imagination.  His pronouncements in the Mirour, much 
like Vox Clamantis, assume a transcendental perspective.  The Confessio does not allow this transcendental perspective.  
We see what Anne Middleton may argue is a movement from a narrator with a “transcendent status” to the common 
voice (99).  
 
2 All translations of the Mirour de l’Omme are from William Burton Wilson’s Mirour De L'omme (The Mirror of 
Mankind).  
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ones as “very dishonorable” as the behavior of “savage beasts” and as “great error” 
acknowledges the value of a strict hierarchical organization of society—the kind of 
hierarchalism that underwrites majestic rhetoric.   He clearly favors this over the “little 
people[’s]” rebellious claim that “their superiors give cause for the disturbance.” Gower’s 
conservative image among scholars is well earned.3 However, the accusation that the 
commoners fail to “fulfill the obligations of their estate” (much like the complaints of 
commoners against nobles) provides “no remedy” for the fault, the social division. It 
offers no practical “advantage.” In a very real sense, the narrator’s interrogation of the 
world and worldliness, alongside his sidelining of majestic rhetoric as worthy but not 
practical, mirrors Gower’s development of a political rhetoric through which social 
division can be both represented and resolved.4 
Gower’s poetry embodies the historical friction between majestic and 
‘constitutional’ rhetoric in the late Middle Ages, a transitional moment fraught with both 
conflict and ambiguity.  Although political rhetoric often conflicted with majestic claims, 
this rhetoric did not emerge fully formed and separate from majestic rhetoric, but rather it 
‘emerged’ from within majestic rhetoric over time.  J.C. Holt has described the 
development of this political thought as a “educative process”(51) through which 
liberties, once little more than the wishful thinking of the disgruntled and powerless, 
became commodities “given” by the king (usually for a few hundred pounds sterling), 
                                                
3 See Strohm “Form” 26-29; Kendall 60-2; Giancarlo 93; and Arner 45-8. 
 
4 Recently Georgiana Donavin’s “Rhetorical Gower: Aristotelianism in the Confessio Amantis’s Treatment of 
‘Rethorique’” and Allan Mitchell’s “Gower’s Confessio Amantis, Natural Morality and Vernacular Ethics” have 
explored Gower’s use of practical rhetoric.  Like Middleton, they emphasize the strategies through which Gower 
separated his narratorial voice the cosmic models we see in writers like Alain de Lille.  Mitchell, for example, argues 
that the Confessio provides “a distinguished alternative . . . example of serious philosophical and ethical reflection” to 
the “customary privileging of a metaphysical foundation” of “medieval ethical theory” (137). 
 93 
which in turn became “universal” rights delineated in Magna Carta.5  Holt is clear 
however, that the “learning process” was one of trial and error, a process of a feeling their 
way in the “darkness of corporate liberties” (73).  There are two crucial points to 
highlight here.  First, the development of constitutional thought was worked out within 
the epistemological limits of majestic rhetoric; it was a revision of the king’s gift.  
Second, the jagged learning process through which the king’s gift becomes a universal 
and legal obligation involved imaginative reconstructions of the social order.  This 
tension between new and old is apparent in Gower as well. That is, like the insurgent 
baronage of Henry III who thought they were protecting the traditional rights of the 
communitas regni, Gower, in all likelihood, thought of his own work as part of traditional 
discourse of kingship rather than part of an emerging rhetoric aimed at the reformation of 
sovereignty; and yet in his turn towards the practical, in his turn towards the world, 
Gower develops a powerful narrative form that destabilizes the metaphysical façade of 
sovereignty and rendered an increasingly political order intelligible.  He reimagines 
majestic ideals such as strength, justice, trouthe, and law within a more political 
framework.  
The purpose of this chapter is to imagine Gower’s poetry as part of an “evolving 
political consciousness” (Chrimes 109) imbued with a nascent constitutionalism. By 
constitutionalism, I mean the “older traditional view in which the word was applied only 
to the principles to be deduced from a nation’s actual institutions and their development” 
(McIlwain 2-3), what Pocock describes as the “ancient constitution.”  Gower imagines a 
                                                
5 Holt describes Magna Carta not as “a sudden jump into the darkness of corporate liberties but rather the last strides of 
a long journey which had started far back in the history of the English kingdom and which had been illuminated in the 
twelfth century by increasing confidence with which men sought and granted such liberties” (55); see also Chrimes 
ECH 60-1; and Jolliffe 3-5. 
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body of laws, of “ancient liberties” possessed from time immemorial, that could not be 
denied per voluntatem regis (Pocock, Ancient 45-56). Gower’s attempt to heal the social 
division described in the Mirour takes a constitutional form, insofar as it imagines 
authority not as a reflection of the cosmic framework, but rather as constituted by 
relationships within society.  Scholars such as Elliot Kendall, Conrad van Dijk, and Lynn 
Staley have begun to demonstrate how a social construction of power informs Gower’s 
poetry.  By and large, these studies examine how Gower opposes the abuse (and thus 
supports the limitations) of royal prerogative. Indeed, Conrad van Dijk argues that Gower 
opposes the prerogative so vigorously such that “little appears left of the idea that the 
king is legibus solutus” (127). Aside from van Dijk’s analysis of Gower and the law, 
these studies, reading Gower against the backdrop of the events leading up to the 
Merciless Parliament, tend to depict Gower as supporter of baronial political agenda 
(Olsson 150-6; Staley, Languages 25-7).  They highlight his politics rather than his 
poetics.  
James Simpson’s Sciences and the Self in Medieval Poetry, to my knowledge, 
gives one of the only comprehensive descriptions of Gower’s constitutional poetics.  
Simpson’s study initiates an important exploration into how constitutionalist thinking 
transforms narrative and hermeneutics. According to Simpson, Gower works out a 
“constitutional compromise between the demands of the body and those of reason” by 
making the “secular science of politics” the organizing principle of his work (Simpson 
273).  Developing this line of reasoning, I show how the development of “secular science 
of politics” in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries manifests in a new narrative form. 
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Since narrative embodies the ideological relationships necessary to maintain a 
particular social order, it was only natural that it slowly transformed as a result of 
changes in the discourse of sovereignty occasioned by the constitutional violence of the 
thirteenth century.  J.G.A. Pocock’s description of the dominant narrative structure (and 
the interpretive approach it encourages) reveals the ideological relationships embedded in 
majestic narrative that was under pressure after the thirteenth century.  Like many 
medieval scholars, Pocock presuming that medieval politics was a derivative of 
theological thought (rather than vice versa), describes medieval hermeneutics and 
narrative as related to an eternal order: 
Christian thought concerning a succession of particulars . . . tended to consist of a 
succession of efforts to relate the particulars to universals, carried out by means 
that might be philosophical or poetical, typological, anagogical, or analogical—
there was an impressive, even majestic array of devices existing to this end—but 
operated so as to view each particular in its relation to eternity and to pass the 
succession of particulars itself as revealing nothing of importance. (Machiavellian 
8) 
 
What J.G.A Pocock describes here, Ad Putter saw in traditional romance (Ch. 4), and 
Donald Hanson discerned in political tracts: a narrative structure in which cause and 
effect operate on a higher plane in which “praiseworthy or reprehensible conduct [gets] 
its just deserts” without showing any “orderly progress from premises to conclusions” 
(Hanson 41).  Such a model is found in Alain de Lille's Anticlaudianus where an 
"understanding of politics is inseparable from an understanding of the justice which 
informs the cosmos and the soul” (Simpson 219).  The reader interprets a text in relation 
to an “eternal order” that diminishes or excludes altogether the temporal accounts of 
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cause and effect, a textual practice that effaces historical order.6  For example, in the 
Knight of the Cart, Lancelot crosses the hazardous Sword Bridge safely because his faith 
in God is “praiseworthy;” insofar as worldly realities exist—i.e. a razor sharp bridge—
these temporal facts are illusory.  The relationship between Lancelot and God determines 
the outcome of this scene, a relationship that parallels the majestic relationship between 
subject and king (Putter 149-55).7 The reader must separate sensus litteralis from sensus 
spiritualis, an interpretive procedure popularly described in the Middle Ages as 
separating the grain from the chaff.  
Interpretation subjected the particulars to a universal that was assumed, not 
constituted.  The act of interpretation required a subjection to power and authority 
external to human jurisdiction.  Of course, this cosmic jurisdiction reproduced the 
traditional hierarchical relationship between lord and liege.  The theocratic aspect of the 
majestic hermeneutic develops out of and reinforces “the stark realities of social and 
economic power”(Wallace 287).8 The kings and lords in Europe after the fall of Rome 
had the economic and social power to demand obedience from their subjects and 
eventually this obligation of obedience was encoded into Christianity (Hanson 47-50).  
This “privileging of metaphysical foundation” (Mitchell 137) provided a way of thinking 
about and (to a degree) securing a government grounded in the principles of “double 
                                                
6 Lee Patterson describes the history of "the radical devaluation of both historiography and the historical life;" see 86-
99; quotation from 86).   
 
7 James Simpson, likewise, describes how poets such as Alain de Lille relying on Neoplatonic philosophy was used to 
show “justice in human affairs finds its “’fons et origo’ in natural justice of the cosmos” (106)—an idea that Simpson 
connects with the absolutist political thought of Anticlaudianus, see 98-116; Harriss 6-13; and for a developed example, 
see Putter's discussion of Knight of the Cart, 149-55. 
 
8 David Wallace is specifically describing the magnificence of the “noble theatre” where Palamon and Arcite will fight 
in the Knight’s Tale.  The “theater” creates a symbolic system that creates a sense of transcendent religious authority 
born out of “the stark realities of social and economic power.”  For a discussion of magnificence-rhetoric, see Kendall 
24-25.  Kendall’s language of magnificence closely aligns with what I have called majestic rhetoric.  
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majesty,” that is a government controlled by the king and the most elite circle of 
magnates.  By excluding or diminishing historical time, majestic rhetoric reduced the 
significance of socio-political constructs like community of the realm.9  In short, power 
was authorized in eternity, not by the community of the realm. Book VII of Gower’s 
Confessio Amantis challenged this hermeneutic.   
When you change the construct of sovereignty from one authorized by God to a 
construct dependent on and constrained by an invigorated and expanded concept of a 
communitas regni, power becomes subject to human jurisdiction and the importance of 
the world and historical time increases.  In searching for a practical “remedy to the 
world,” Gower rarely invokes the “cosmic framework” to validate a particular action.  At 
the beginning of Book I, Gower declares that he will limit the scope of the Confessio 
Amantis: 
I may noght strecche up to the hevene 
Min hand, ne setten al in evene 
This world, which evere is in balance: 
It stant noght in my sufficance 
So grete thinges to compasse, 
Bot I mot let it overpasse 
And treten upon othre thinges. 
Forthi the Stile of my writinges 
Fro this day forth I thenke change 
And speke of things is noght so strange, 
Which every kinde hath upon honde 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
And that is love, of which I mene  
To trete.  (I.1-11; 15-16) 
 
Gower’s poetic approach mirrors constitutional thought in that it imagines poetic 
authority as constituted, and thus limited, by relationships within society.  As many 
                                                
9 Donald Hanson emphatically states that because of the severe hierarchical structure “there was no ‘public’ only a 
partly overlapping series of personal and familial dependencies” (50).   
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critics have recognized, the love story is a metaphorical vehicle for describing politics 
and “social behavior in general.” In particular, “love drunkenness” of individual 
characters and Amans point towards “the failure of self-regulation which has undermined 
personal and worldly order” (Strohm, “Form” 27).  In Book VII, self-regulation becomes 
more political as his tales focus on the tensions between the individual “self” and the 
common profit.    
Gower’s prologue makes clear that his love story will turn towards more worldly 
matters.  Acknowledging what is not in his “sufficance,” he turns to “othre thinges.”  This 
“turning” is a crucial point in the poem.  It not only sets the stage for Gower’s more 
earthbound perspective, but it also anticipates a central aspect of Gower’s political 
imaginary—namely the idea that the lover-citizen must recognize the limits of his 
authority.  This “turning” is the political turn, a turn that is discussed by Anne Middleton 
in terms of the development of the “common voice” that is “less exclusively detached and 
cosmic, more implicated in, and circumscribed by, the mortal world” (102). I will 
demonstrate how the Confessio itself constructs this voice, how it creates a political voice 
by disengaging majestic rhetoric.  
Gower’s modesty topos (i.e. his decision to “noght strecche up to hevene/Min 
hand”) anticipates Amans-Gower’s recognition that he is not “sufficant” to hold love’s 
“covenant.”  The poet’s self-limitation authorizes his work much like Amans’s 
recognition of his impotency allows him to escape his love drunken state.  The idea that 
the Confessio Amantis promotes self-limitation is axiomatic.  However, in this chapter, I 
demonstrate that these limits assumed a more political character. They were more 
political because they were grounded in mutual obligations formalized by law.  While 
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‘Moral Gower’ never loses sight of ethical dimension, he focuses his attention on the 
political effects of ethical decisions.10 The Confessio elevates the importance of the 
communitas regni as the foundation of sovereign authority.  Developing the political 
rhetoric occasioned by the Second Barons’ War, he resituates Augustine’s handling of 
will and reason within a political framework by aligning willful power with an impotency 
that “overstrecche” the worldly limits of authority that ultimately renders this kind of 
sovereign power not “sufficant” to hold the “covenant.”11  
This emphasis on the worldly limits of authority (on poet, lover and prince) 
shapes the narrative structure of each of his tales.  Gower frequently translates classical 
and biblical material from tales that “strecche up to hevene” into practical narratives of 
authority that operate within a more secular king-community power structure, often by 
removing or naturalizing cosmic intervention.  Even when divine intervention is a part of 
Gower’s story, the logic that impels the narrative forward, the narrative motor, is the 
effect of a specific act on the community.  Gower uses narrative to translate (i.e. resituate 
and reinterpret) the ethical kernel into a political context so that one reads sin as a breach 
of trouthe with the communitas regni.  For example, in the “Tale of Horestes” (III.1885-
2216), Gower’s translation of Aeschylus’ cosmological drama, Gower focuses on 
                                                
10 Ethics provides a platform for Gower’s political ideas.  In Vox Clamantis Gower writes, “Fortune can afford no 
salvation to the unjust man, for Creator and creation stand together in opposition” (2.6; p.104).  The Confessio focuses 
on how creation stands in opposition to the unjust man through political mechanisms.  Translations from the Vox 
Clamantis are from The Major Latin Works of John Gower: The Voice of One Crying, and the Tripartite Chronicle. 
Trans. Stockton, Eric.   
 
11 "The modern reader of the Confessio Amantis," Russell Peck explains, "would do well to keep in mind the traditional 
model of faculty psychology which stands behind Gower's vocabulary for the mind's behavior.” Sin is most often the 
result of "a rebellious Will . . . assuming a sovereign position over Memory and Intellect to exact some private end;” 
see Peck 2-3.  
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whether Horestes’s punishment of his mother was becoming for a king?12  Fittingly, 
Gower transforms the tragedy of Aeschylus into a political drama that is ultimately 
resolved in parliament.  Even in the “Tale of Vulcan and Venus” (V.635-746) where all 
the main characters are gods, Gower focuses so heavily on the effects of adultery on the 
Olympian community that one might easily imagine these gods as mortals without 
affecting the story.  These are by no means rare examples.  
This reduction in scope enables Gower to construct a “center of authority” that is 
not transcendent—a common voice replacing divine sanction of authority with the needs 
of the community. Gower makes the community of the realm the moral touchstone of his 
exemplary tales.  Much like the political rhetoric of the Common Enterprise, Gower 
imagines the king’s authority as grounded in sacred covenant with the community.  The 
morality of any action is, accordingly, measured against the effect it has within this 
community.  Occasionally, Gower even treats naive innocence as punishable.13 The ethics 
of a sovereign act, its legitimacy, and its register are understood within time.  To examine 
how political rhetoric shapes Gower’s narrative we must ask:  How does Gower 
recalibrate the register of sovereignty to fit within a temporal-political sphere? How does 
he reimagine ethics in relation to its temporal effects on the community? Ultimately, how 
does this practical commitment to the “world” redeem narrative time?  
                                                
12 This seemingly forced political reading of the Orestes material led Derek Pearsall to suggest, "Gower is simply not 
equipped to cope with it.  It is difficult to know . . . exactly what lies behind his telling of the story of Orestes (III.1885-
2195).  Purportedly an exemplum against murder, it fails completely to make its point or even to extract any single 
story line, and the pressure to provide motives and to relate cause to effect in a moral sphere results in a sad mangling 
of high tragedy" (“Gower’s Narrative Art” 483). 
 
13 Celestine shoulders part of the blame for Boniface’s deceit (II.2803-3049) and Carmidotirus must suffer the capital 
consequences for forgetting that he still had his sword (VII.2845-2888).  The point here is that legal oaths had hardened 
into “absolute formalism” (Green 288).  In other words, we see a kind of legal positivism taking shape, see Green 137-
41. 
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In order to identify and describe the characteristics of Gower’s political rhetoric, 
we must show how his poetry departs from majestic affirmations of royal authority, and 
how it challenges and redefines kingship.  When Gower was composing the Confessio 
Amantis, the majestic position was most popularly staked out by Giles of Rome’s De 
regimine principum.  For example, by affirming the metaphysical relationship between 
imperial hierarchy and the eternal order, the French monarchy used Giles’s text "linked 
Aristotelian thought . . . to its own realization of benign absolutism" (Staley 29).  When 
we imagine these texts in dialogue with each other we recognize how Gowerian narrative 
emphasizes a political relationship driven by what Wallerstein identified as the 
“hypothetical trades” and “mutual recognitions” necessary to legitimize sovereignty in a 
way that alters both the narrative structure and the register of sovereignty (Wallerstein 
44).14  
 
Reading Gower against Giles: Trouthe and the Rhetorical Situation of the Confessio  
Partly due to a dearth of well-known medieval political theory, readings focused 
on Gower’s royalist leanings tend to conflate the political thought, structure and appeal of 
Gower’s Confessio Amantis with the most well-known political treatise of the period—
Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum.15  Written shortly after the Second Barons’ War 
for Prince Phillip of France, De regimine provides a full-throated expression of the kind 
of majestic authority to which Henry III aspired.   The text, which was popular in 
                                                
14 For more on Wallerstein's definition of sovereignty, see 44.  Tales such as “Lucretia,” “Virginia,” and “Folly of 
Rehoboam” show how insult or harm to the community delegitimizes authority and destabilizes kingship, see 
discussion of "The Folly of Rehoboam" in Chapter III. For more on Gower's revision of political register of sovereignty 
see Burnley 52-55. 
 
15 Porter 142. For the lack of political texts, see Dunbabin 477-479. 
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Ricardian England, shows how the ideas at the center of the Second Barons’ War were 
still at the center of the discourse of sovereignty.  
Elizabeth Porter in her detailed account of the philosophical underpinnings of the 
relationship between the political macrocosm and the ethical microcosm describes the 
central role of Giles in the political thinking of the Confessio Amantis.16  Gower derives 
the general connection between the “lesser world” of the individual and the wider 
“universe that he inhabits” from the popular Secreta Secretorum.17  However, whereas 
the Secreta focuses solely on the “ethical hierarchy within the man,” the Confessio 
situates the ethical microcosm within Gower’s contemporary political macrocosm (136).  
Gower derived the link between ethical and political spheres from Giles of Rome’s De 
regimine principum (c. 1285).  According to Porter, Gower’s division of practique into 
Ethics, Economics and Politics, which Giles used to structure De regimine, demonstrates 
his sympathies with Giles’s political thought.   Employing metaphysical arguments that 
model kingship on the spiritual hierarchy, the Fürstenspiegel tradition, as practiced by the 
scholastics like Giles of Rome, commonly used natural law to create an absolute moral 
authority for kings in the temporal sphere that is identical with spiritual powers.  Thus, 
Giles repeatedly asserts that politics should be modeled on the divine plan so that the 
people “as under oon God that ordeyneth alle thinges . . . shal be ordinat” (II.iii.16.10).18   
                                                
16 What follows is based on Elizabeth Porter’s "Gower's Ethical Microcosm and Political Macrocosm."  
 
17 Simpson points out that the microcosmic-macrocosmic theory might have been derived from more sophisticated 
sources such as Gregory's Moralia VI.16 (PL 75, col. 740), Calcidius' commentary on the Timaeus, and Alain de Lille's 
De Planctu Naturae VI.41-140; see Simpson 217-219, particularly 218n25.   
 
18 Unless otherwise noted, citations of Giles of Rome come from John Trevisa's Middle English translation. The 
Governance of Kings and Princes: John Trevisa's Middle English Translation of the De regimine Principum of 
Aegidius Romanus, eds. Fowler, David et al. 
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By modeling kingship on the divine order of the cosmos, Giles imagines the king 
as the lynchpin for the stability of the hierarchy, and consequently suggests that ethical 
self-restraint is the only viable method of assuring justice and peace in the realm.  This 
tradition promotes regal kingship in which the king treated as semi-deus cannot be 
restrained by external pressure.  It is important to acknowledge that Giles, like Gower, 
drives a wedge between the secular authority of the prince and the ecclesiastical authority 
of the pope.  However, Giles replaces one metaphysical superstructure for another; 
whereas Gower imagines sovereign authority as derived from the communitas regni, 
Giles argues that the king’s power is authorized by its relationship to a cosmic framework 
that makes the king the intermediary between God and the political community.  This has 
important implications regarding the constraints put on sovereignty.  Most importantly, 
for Giles, the only plausible constraint of sovereignty is the ethical appeal to self-
restraint, an appeal that relies on a pedagogical rhetoric and the good faith of the king.  
Elizabeth Porter tracing out Giles’s influence on the Confessio Amantis, argues that 
Gower’s “remedy for political disorder is that each man should practice that . . . ethical 
self-governance . . .  expounded in De regimine principum as the foundation of good 
governance within the political community” (142). The good of the realm “radiat[es] 
outward” from the ethical king.  Although Porter emphasizes the importance of restraint, 
it is always self-restraint.19  In other words, the only check to royal power is a good 
king—the king who restrains himself.  Consequently, all rhetoric must be either a 
pedagogical or supplicatory appeal to that restraint 
                                                
19 The idea of regal self-restraint reinforces the majestic ideal of power that foreclosed the concept of a public policy by 
"encouraging readers to adopt a stance of what the Confessio codes as benevolent paternalism" (Arner 63).  As James 
Blythe argues, the principle of “self-governance” as “expounded in De regimine” “pave[d] the way for the genuine 
theories of absolute monarchy that reach their apex in early modern times” (70).  See also Strohm, “Form” 38. 
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By this reasoning, Gower’s Confessio Amantis figures restraint as a kind of 
magnanimous act of self-fashioning rather than a bowing to external pressure.  This 
magnanimity resonates with the legal concept of lex digna in which the king ought to 
avow (profiteri) that he is bound to the law (lex alligatum).20  As the word profiteri 
suggests when the king acts lex alligatum this is only a choice, a choice that actually 
reinforces the fact that the king is supra leges.   It is precisely this point that Kurt Olsson 
makes when he describes the circumspect critiques of Richard II’s tyrannical behavior.  
He argues that, by urging “self-restraint,” Gower employs a soft mode of correction that 
ultimately “affirm[s] the king’s superior power”(148).  Larry Scanlon in Narrative, 
Authority and Power, makes the point even more vigorously by linking the discourse of 
self-restraint in the Confessio directly to the royal prerogative. Moreover, the prerogative 
is not just a right of the king, but his primary obligation.  Only the king’s free submission 
to the law produces the authority necessary to secure secular power.  The king’s 
obligation to protect his prerogative stabilizes the hierarchy and ensures distributive 
justice.21 
Describing Gower’s politics as an extension of personal ethics underestimates the 
external forces that threaten the legitimacy of the king’s sovereignty.  I will argue that 
Book VII of the Confessio Amantis, a book that describes four depositions, Gower makes 
an appeal with more teeth—“self-restraint” cannot really be called a “choice” when the 
                                                
20 Kantorowicz translates lex digna in King’s Two Bodies: “It is a word worthy of the majesty of the ruler that the 
prince professes himself bound to the law: so much does our authority depend upon the authority of the Law.  And 
truly, greater than the imperium is the submission of the principate to the laws.  (C.1, 14,4). Schulz suggests that lex 
digna only had moral force, see 160ff.  Brian Tierney, on the other hand, suggests that jurists such as Bracton and 
Accursius recognized it relied upon a practical understanding of the workings of power and as such offered a practical 
description of power, see “Bracton” 298-302.   
 
21 By adopting the Aegidian concept of a king that is both “exemplary” and “superjust,” Gower  “continually presents 
monarchy as a form of exemplary self-restraint whose overriding purpose is maintaining first its own privilege and then 
the privilege of those who share his power” (Scanlon 286).   
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alternative is deposition.  Gower transforms the Fürstenspiegel tradition to emphasize 
political consequences such that self-restraint is not “endless ideological power;” it is 
self-preservation.  
These obligations, much like the matrimonial pacta described by Giles, 
emphasize constitutional definitions of kingship and thus constrain the king's "unlimited 
power" to the legitimate power of the office of the crown. Not unlike the Barons’ 
Gravamina and Robert Grosseteste's theological interpretation of law, Gower, in The Tale 
of the Three Advisors, deploys the will/freedom dialectic to show that willful actions are 
part of the royal prerogative only when they coincide with reason: the tyrant is one who 
tyrannizes because he himself is tyrannized by an errant will.  Ultimately, much like 
Aristotle and those who adopted his metaphor, Gower imagines trouthe as married love, a 
love that operates within an institutional structure.  In Genius’s description of justice, 
Gower shows how this principle—the trouthe of Alceste—in turn, establishes the 
foundation for the institution most capable of protecting the common profit—the law. 
Gower changes the ethical question “what makes a good king” into a legal one—“Do 
lawe awey, what is a king?” (VII.3075). 
The deposition narratives, particularly the “Folly of Rehoboam,” demonstrate that 
authority depends upon the trothplight between king and subjects.  Once the trouthe is 
broken, kingship collapses.  Thus, ethical behavior is right, not because it aligns with 
some absolute metaphysical morality, but because by diminishing the threat of violence 
and unrest, it strengthens the commonwealth. That is why, in the negative exempla of 
Gower’s Fürstenspiegel, crimes against the common profit are punished by the public 
and external discord that the crimes cause—from Cyrus’ public shame to Tarquin’s exile.  
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I am not arguing that Elizabeth Porter is wrong, nor am I suggesting that Gower does not 
promote self-restraint, but rather that, unlike Giles of Rome, Gower’s Fürstenspiegel 
emphasizes political restraints that go beyond the ethical realm of personal choice—
restraints that are fundamental to the development of a constitutional rhetoric.  
The comparison between Giles and Gower is an important one; indeed, the 
Confessio invites this comparison by imagining Book VII as part of the Aristotelian 
discourse of politics—a discourse whose chief representative in fourteenth-century 
England was still De regimine principum. At the end of Book VI, Amans asks Genius to 
tell him what Aristotle taught to Alexander (2411-12).  That is, Amans is asking Genius 
to summarize the Secreta Secretorum, which presented itself as Aristotle’s letter to the 
Alexander.  After admitting that he is not an authority and that the “scole” of Aristotle “is 
noght to the matiere/ of love” (VII.7-8), which is the reason that Venus sent him, Genius, 
accedes to the wishes of Amans.  After modestly admitting that he is not “al cunnynge/ 
upon the form of this wrytynge” (2437-8), Genius develops his authority by attributing 
his ideas to Aristotle, drawing heavily upon the Secreta Secretorum and alluding 
structurally Giles’s De regimine.22 Larry Scanlon, in Narrative, Authority and Power 
describes Book VII as Amans’s “entrance into the philosophical discourse which 
authorizes royal power” (283).23 Gower organizes this “philosophical discourse” by using 
three successive frameworks nested like matryoshka dolls.  First, he breaks up Aristotle’s 
matter into three “sciences of philosophie”—theorique, rhetorique and practique. Then, 
                                                
22 See Porter 135-62; and Staley, Languages 28-30. 
 
23Lynn Arner makes a similar point suggesting that “what is innovative . . . is to understand the Confessio as 
legitimating itself by investing its contents with a cultural authority akin to Bourdieu’s formulations of cultural capital 
and to argue that Confessio attached a version of cultural capital to English literature in its embryonic moments” (49).    
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using the structure of Giles, he subdivides the science of practique into ethique, 
iconomique and policie.  
However, many scholars have been content with citing Gower’s allusion to Giles 
and then reading Giles’s absolutism into Gower’s political philosophy.24 Nigel Saul 
imagines that Gower rather uncritically “derived . . . many ideas” from De regimine 
(“John Gower” 94), while Alistair Minnis provides a more nuanced suggestion that De 
regimine played a crucial role in Gower’s “selection and structuring of materials” 
(“Moral” 74).25  De regimine’s organization assumes a kind of ideological content 
because, through this creative structuring of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian 
material, Giles uncovers the natural and divinely ordained order that governs all 
hierarchical structures, particularly the regal or absolutist kingship. These accounts do not 
explain the way that Gower’s royal virtues displace any trace of Aegidian absolutism.  
In order to understand Gower’s political thought, we must explore how Gower 
distances himself from the texts that he appropriates. Unlike Giles, Gower depicts the 
constitutional limits of royal power.  This change in emphasis is mirrored by the fact that 
he reduces Giles’s extensive descriptions of ethics and economy to a mere 28 lines and 
spends the rest of Book VII focused on policy, or the art of politics.26  But even Gower’s 
handling of “policy” significantly departs from Giles’s work. Gower eliminates Giles’s 
use of family to naturalize regal authority and replaces this with exempla illustrating the 
                                                
24 The emphasis on De regimine’s influence over Gower’s political thought at least partially accounts for interpretations 
of Gower as royal absolutist who in Paul Strohm’s words fostered a “view of a hierarchically organized state ruled by 
the firm hand of a monarch who reconciles all strife."(Strohm, "Form" 38).  See also Olsson 149; Dunbabin 485; and 
Porter 142.   
 
25 For discussion of Gower’s use of Giles, see Minnis, “Moral” 72-75. 
 
26 Burnley suggests that Gower’s study of “policie” is one of the most schematic examples of the development of 
practical reasoning in the latter half of the fourteenth century, see 54-55.   
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five royal virtues—Truth, Liberality, Justice, Pity and Chastity—which are “essentially 
of his own devising” (Porter 155).  More importantly, the exempla imagine the royal 
virtues in terms of mutual social obligations rather than in terms of the “metaphysical 
foundation” of “medieval ethical theory” (Mitchell 137) that underwrites the scholastic 
Fürstenspiegel.  
In his discussion of “Policie,” Gower inserts an entirely new framework that 
governs the actual arrangement and content of the tales. In other words, Gower both 
claims the authority of Aegidian philosophy—an authority grounded in Aquinas and 
Aristotle—and uses the five royal virtues to overwrite this authority.  Once Gower shifts 
the structural principal of Book VII from Giles to the “fyf pointz . . . for worthi 
governance” in line 1706, he begins his own On the Governance of Princes and Kings.27  
In fact Gower’s ability to appropriate Latin authorities has been a focal point for much 
critical discussion: Rita Copeland, for example, has argued that Gower’s translations of 
Latin material are so novel and dominant that the Confessio effaces the authors it alludes 
to and produces a “full-fledged rhetorical appropriation . . . [that] asserts its own 
canonical authority” (202).  In a similar vein, Winthrop Wetherbee argues the Confessio 
Amantis challenges and assimilates “the authority of the penitential discourse” (“John 
Gower,” 599) and J. Allan Mitchell suggests that Gower appropriates Latin texts to 
construct a pragmatic “vernacular ethics” (144).28  I will suggest the effect of embedding 
the royal virtues within Giles’s framework is the same: Gower effaces the text of Giles 
                                                
27 Rita Copeland identifies a similar pattern noting that Gower’s translations of Latin material are so novel and 
dominant that the Confessio effaces the authors it alludes to and through this strategy, Gower produces a “full-fledged 
rhetorical appropriation . . . and asserts its own canonical authority” (202).   
 
28 Diane Watt argues that Gower is creating “a new vernacular authority” (29); Similarly, Larry Scanlon argues that the 
clerical tradition of the penitential is being substituted by a secular tradition; see 251-2.  
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and appropriates his authority. If, alongside Larry Scanlon, we assert that Book VII is 
Amans’s entrance into the “philosophical discourse, which authorizes royal power” (283) 
then we ought to recognize this entrance does not lead to a simple recapitulation of 
Aegidian philosophy, as Scanlon suggests, but rather that Amans’s “entrance” allows 
Gower to rewrite that philosophical discourse.29  
The phrase “philosophical discourse,” however, may be misleading.  De regimine 
was not just part of a conversation between schoolmen and philosophers, it was also an 
integral part of the governing discourse of Richard and his ministers. Unlike his more 
literary appropriations, Gower’s abbreviation of Giles allows him to insert this literary 
text into the contemporary discourse surrounding this book, the discourse of kingship.30  
Giles of Rome’s work was, if not well-read, well-owned among aristocratic circles and 
was directly connected to one of the larger political trends in fourteenth-century 
politics—namely a distinct shift towards rigorous absolutism on the continent (Saul, 
“Kingship” 38).31 Charles Briggs suggests that De regimine may have been a status 
symbol for the owners it was a text connected with continental court culture (6).32  Within 
aristocratic and royal circuits, the text, even if it was not read, was almost certainly 
known as a vigorous defense of “benign absolutism” (Staley, Languages 29).  Originally 
                                                
29 Scanlon often suggests Gower is rewriting power. However, he seems equally content emphasizing the similarity 
between Gower and Giles; see also Simpson 205-7.  
 
30 Nigel Saul states the case more emphatically by arguing, “the courtiers, the higher nobility and many of the senior 
administrators knew their Giles of Rome" (“John Gower” 94); see also Rigby, Wisdom 66.  Jones suggests that even if 
Giles did not directly influence it, De regimine is a convenient text that draws together and summarizes the attitudes of 
the men that comprised Richard’s court (161).  
 
31 For more on the French attitude towards sovereignty, see Dunbabin 489.  Moreover, it should be noted that Richard 
II was raised in the court of the Black Prince in Aquitaine and, as Richard Jones points out, was surrounded “men, 
whose experience was more European than insular” (131). Scattergood suggests that De regimine can be seen as part of 
“a distinctive aristocratic and knightly taste in literature” (36). 
 
32 See also Scattergood 36-8. 
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composed for Phillip the Fair, De regimine had long been identified with the model of 
“benign absolutism” where “some are naturally lords, and some naturally servants” (qtd. 
in Blythe 76). 33  Charles V, actively promoted the Aegidian philosophy, by making it 
part of the Crown’s vernacular translation program.34  
While England did not have program of vernacular translation, the number of 
extant medieval manuscripts of English origin or provenance point to an aristocracy 
invested in Giles (Briggs 46).  Historians have often suggested that De regimine was 
formative text in Ricardian politics, with Saul even calling the kingship of Richard II “a 
textbook example of Aegidian ideas in practice” (“John Gower” 94).35  These studies 
frequently point to the tonal similarity between Giles’s absolutism that calls for strict 
obedience and the repeated language of "obedience" employed by Richard and his 
ministers.36  The moral universe depended upon each thing accepting its proper place in 
the cosmos (Rigby, “Aristotle” 240) and the king, who must obey God and God’s law, 
should rule as “God ruleth and governeth al the worlde” (I.i.13).  The structure of the 
kingdom depends upon a model of hierarchy where each individual submits 
appropriately.  Similarly, Michael de la Pole in his 1383 address to Parliament declared 
obedience  “the sole foundation of all the peace and quiet of the realm” (Saul, 
“Kingship”52).  
                                                
33 Blythe suggests that this passage demonstrates Giles’s opposition to mixed forms of government.  While he 
recognizes different “organs” of government “he does not envision any balance of these elements or any tempering 
effect” (76). 
 
34 Thirty-one extant copies of Henri de Gauchy’s translation and a handful of less popular translations remain (Briggs 
16). 
 
35 See also Jones 144. 
 
36 Giles suggests reading “the book on the rule of princes, both so that princes themselves might be instructed in how 
they should rule, and that others might be taught how to be obedient to princes” (2.3.20). The editors added this passage 
into the Trevisa text, as there was a lacuna in the original MS.  
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The language that Michael de la Pole employs echoes Giles’s paternalism: “þe 
rewelynge of children is ilikned to þe rewelyng real, for þe fader is aboue þe children not 
by couenantes and foreward but by his fre wille.  For bytwene þe sogette and þe 
souereyne is no couenant imaad” and “this rewlyng of children cometh of love” (II.ii.3).  
Having established the connection between father-son relationship and royal government, 
and having set the foundation of this relationship as paternal love, Giles concludes 
children “scholde be obedient and soget to hem [parents]” (II.ii.4). The paternal king 
rules “by his fre wille” and his love for his subjects naturally constrains the king’s will 
and thus this love demands that his subjects “scholde be obedient and soget” to the king 
in order to secure the “peace and quiet of the realm.”  
By figuring royal authority as paternal love, a love that exists in the absence of 
legal “covenantes,” Giles presents us with a king-subject relationship in which the only 
check on royal power is rhetorical. When kingship is personal, politics is ethical 
instruction.  Giles repeatedly praises noble virtues of the good king.  Through usage and 
repetition, words like “noble” or “good king” become a kind of “ideological fiction” with 
a suasive force of its own. As Scanlon points out, Giles creates an ideological fiction 
where nobility is an imagined construct that through repetition and usage becomes 
reality.  The ethos of nobility, apotheosized by chivalric romance, became the only way 
to discern the difference between the king and the tyrant, who otherwise were structurally 
the same. (Scanlon 112).37   
                                                
37 It is worth noting that the same concept underlies Olsson’s suggestion that Gower uses a soft mode of correction in 
which Gower must compose the king rather than accuse him.  This composition is achieved through “analogies of 
parallels.” 
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Imagining Gower’s Confessio Amantis as an English De regimine principum, a 
book of ethical instruction for the young English king Richard II, Larry Scanlon argues 
that the tales present Gower’s “fyf poyntz” (trouthe, largesse, justice, pity and chastity) as 
“effects of king’s personal behavior” (Scanlon 283).  By this reasoning the common 
profit is an extension of the king’s virtues and vices; and the political, insofar as it exists 
at all, exists in the domain of ethics rather than any institutional or legal structure. In one 
important sense Scanlon is right: since there did not yet exist a language capable of 
imagining the legal office of the king separate from his person, the “king’s personal 
behavior” was in a very real sense political action.  
In Book VII, Gower repeatedly develops this rhetoric of resistance by depicting 
“the king’s behavior” in the face of particular external conventions that were in the 
process of becoming “conventions of the Constitution” (ECH 7).38  Although Gower 
believes in a monarchy, he emphasizes the external standards, and sometimes the 
institutional authority necessary to limit royal power.  When identifying the 
constitutionalist strain of thinking in medieval poetry, what is at issue is not royal power, 
but rather the mechanism of ensuring the king’s appropriate behavior.  The belief that 
“self-restraint” is that mechanism is a central tenet of benign absolutism, a discourse at 
dialectical odds with nascent constitutional ideas. In his allusion to the coronation oath 
and his handling of the “Tale of Lycurgus,” Gower as I will argue below, contributes to 
the imaginary force needed to institutionalize kingship, and to conceive of the Crown as 
having public obligations.  
                                                
38 This is what historians generally refer to as the ancient constitution; see McIlwain Ch. 4; and Pocock, Constitution 
46-55. 
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Whereas the ministers of Richard II and the Gower’s Vox Clamantis emphasize 
the moral failings of unruly and disobedient subjects, the Confessio, particularly Book 
VII, focuses on the dangers to the common profit caused by the failures of the king’s 
good governance.39  Gower shifts his focus from the virtue of obedience to the power of 
“trouthe” or the bonds of fidelity involved in covenantal relationships between the ruler 
and the ruled.40 It is crucial to recognize that the king in Gower’s Fürstenspiegel “is not 
the main imagined audience, but an occasion for gathering and formulating what is on the 
common mind” (Middleton 107). We do not encounter the mature “civic habit of mind” 
(Ginsberg 233) of Italian poets, nonetheless the imagined “king” and ‘king-talk’ develops 
a political language and perspective that was largely absent from the English political 
imaginary.41 
Gower’s “fyf pointz” replace Aegidian benign absolutism with a form of political 
kingship focused on the formal and institutional restraints necessary to prevent tyrannical 
acts.   He signals this shift by calling trouthe “the vertu soverein of alle” (VII.1776). 
Gower’s merges his description of trouthe with the symbolism of the crown evoking the 
royal and sacred trouthe forged in the coronation ritual.42 In late medieval England, this 
ritual had become an important arena for the rhetoric of royal authority.  The symbols and 
oaths in the coronation were used to reconcile the interests of the magnates, the Church, 
                                                
39 Warren Ginsberg points out, I think rightly, that “history” in Gower’s Vox Clamantis “is regressive, the occasion for 
moral condemnation, rather than forward looking in its concern for the ethical formation of the polis” (Italian 234).  
The Confessio Amantis, I would suggest, shows the evolution of a “civic habit of mind” occurring in Gower’s later 
works.   
 
40 For discussion of trouthe as a “compact” or covenant, see Green, Crisis 18-20. 
 
41 See Staley Languages, 26-27; Scanlon 252; and Middleton 107. 
 
42 For discussion of Gower’s narrow ethical definition of trouthe, see Green, Crisis, 17. 
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the gentry, the King, and to a much lesser extent the community of the realm.43 Although 
the coronation usually only happens once, the authority of that ritual is frequently 
appealed to throughout a king's reign. As such, the coronation oath becomes an 
accountability mechanism, a mechanism strengthened by the deposition of Edward II.  
The introduction of the fourth clause occurring at the beginning of the fourteenth century 
shows the influence of thirteenth-century ideas; while the rest of the oath was hallowed 
by long usage this fourth clause, introduced in 1307, showed a new attitude towards 
kingship.   
The language of oaths and crowns played a crucial role in the discourse of 
sovereignty.  Indeed at the very outset of Richard’s kingship, his ministers recognized 
that the fourth clause added to the 1308 coronation oath substantially weakened the royal 
prerogative and strengthened the magnates’ political power and they attempted to 
diminish its effect by inserting the words “juste et rationabiliter” into the official records 
(Saul, Richard II 25).44  About eleven years later, after the Merciless Parliament in which 
the Lord Appellants forced Richard II to execute members the curia regis, the 
Appellants, according to the Westminster Chronicler, seem to have required the king to 
renew his coronation oath in order to reaffirm the “proper relationship between the king 
and the law” (Saul, Richard II 195).  Gower’s invocation of the coronation inserts the 
                                                
43 Ullmann describes the ideological power of the coronation ceremony in advancing theocratic claims for kingship see 
Principles 127-31.  For example, towards the end of the Merciless Parliament the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered a 
sermon emphasizing the importance of oaths before Richard renewed his own coronation oath; see Historia sive 
narracio de modo et foma mirabilis parliamenti 24; Richard II was well aware of the power of the coronation 
ceremony.  Richard’s advisors attempt to have the king assume his regality before the acclamation of the people in 
order to emphasize that his authority came from God alone; see Staley, Languages 115-116.  
 
44 In fact, the clause was completely omitted from the Anonimalle Chronicle, which otherwise provides an accurate 
account.    
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Confessio Amantis into a highly charged debate concerning prerogative, law and 
obligations. 
In order to understand Gower’s description of the crown, we must turn first to the 
coronation ceremony.  During this ceremony the prayer over the crown (like many 
objects representing the king’s power) invests the king with certain powers: 
God . . . bless and sanctify this crown, that . . . is adorned with diverse precious 
stones, so this thy servant [who] weareth it, may be filled with thy manifold 
graces, and all precious virtues, through the King eternal thy son our Lord Amen 
(ECR 261)  
 
The coronation ceremony emphasizes that the king “was set apart from other mortals . . . 
He was God’s anointed” (Saul, Richard II 26). The only hint that the Crown places 
obligations upon the king is in the word “servant,” and, even then, imagining the king as 
“servant to God” actually diminishes the political obligation to the community.  The 
prayer infuses the king with the “manifold graces” and “precious virtues” that make him 
worthy of the office he holds.   
In its most extreme form the king through “the power of the sacrament of 
consecration” became what Norman Anonymous regarded as christus Domini 
(Kantorowicz 117).45  The sacramental language emphasizes the relationship between 
sovereignty and God and mystifies the relationship between the king and the 
commonwealth. When the community of the realm does appear, it is merely as a ward of 
the king.  Richard II understood the ideological power of the coronation ceremony.  For 
example, when he deigned to reconcile with the Londoners in 1392, part of the pageant 
included two angels coming down from a palace and crowning him (Maidstone 275-
                                                
45 For a discussion of the king as “christus Domini,” aee Kantorowicz 42-61, particularly 49n13. 
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300).46 The crowning forcefully reinstates the proper relationship between subject and 
sovereign and, thus, reconciles the Londoners to Richard.  Richard’s invocation of 
sacramental crown attempts to recover the majestic rhetoric of the Plantagenet kings 
throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
By analyzing the symbolic significances of each part of the crown, Gower’s 
consciously picks up the majestic rhetoric found in the coronation:     
The gold betokneth excellence, 
That men schull don him reverence 
As to here liege soverein. 
The Stones, as the bokes sein, 
Commended ben in treble wise: 
Ferst thei ben harde, and thilke assisse 
Betokneth in a king Constance, 
So that ther schal no variance 
Be founde in his condicion  (VII.1751-9) 
 
First, Gower acknowledges and respects the king’s regalie; the gold signifies the king’s 
“excellence,” a quality that does demand “reverence” from his subjects.  Gower does not 
stamp out the idea of the regality of kingship.  He frequently describes hierarchy in 
majestic language of “reverence” due to the king as the pinnacle of the state.  However, 
Gower revises the concept of the regal king—he politicizes it—such that one is left with 
a political model of kingship that looks nothing like the regal kingship imagined by Giles 
of Rome.  As we will see, Gower replaces Giles’s cosmological foundation for 
sovereignty with the community of the realm; thus situates regal authority within an 
increasingly legal register. 
                                                
46 In the form of angels a boy and a girl descend “enwrapped in clouds, suspended in the air.”   
 The maiden then presents the warden with the crowns 
    He holds them in each hand, and then he speaks these words: 
 “O king illustrious and noble queen,” he said, 
    May God guard both of you and keep you safe and sound! 
 May He, who gave you crowns of rulership on earth, 
    Reward you too with heaven’s everlasting realms! (Maidstone 297-300) 
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Unlike the ceremonial prayers over the regal objects, Gower’s description of the 
crown does not instill virtue or authority but rather represents the ethical obligations of 
the good king.  Gower’s uses the ethical register of the Fürstenspiegel-tradition to 
describe the crown and stones as symbolically representing three qualities of a good 
king—constancy, honesty and a good name.47  The Fürstenspiegel genre, however, also 
develops a language capable of critiquing the king; it is in this sense that Conrad van Dijk 
suggests that ethical obligations of the Fürstenspiegel constitute what might be called a 
“quasi-judicial” genre.48  I am arguing that the political energy let loose by the 
revolutionary political ideas of the thirteenth century transformed ethical (“quasi-
judicial”) principles of the Fürstenspiegel into increasingly legal constructions—legal 
constructions that begin to separate the person of the king from the institution of the 
Crown.  In Book VII of the Confessio Amantis, Gower reshapes the mirror genre to 
forcefully engage with political rhetoric.  Majesty is revised, not written away.  
 Gower translates the ethical demands that a king be constant, honest and worthy 
into a more explicitly political system by shifting the symbolic function of the crown 
from a sacramental object that fills the king with “manifold graces” to a legal object—a 
“tokne of al the londe.”  In the Middle Ages, the legal token—whether a clod of earth 
(used in charters) or a hunting horn (used for forest rights)—provided a visible and thus 
mnemonic symbol of contractual agreement between parties, which could be “called 
                                                
47 Olsson connects Gower’s description of the stones to the language of the coronation ceremony, see 152.   
 
48 Conrad van Dijk saw the Fürstenspiegel as quasi-judicial in its tendency to establish the philosophical grounds of the 
kingship (Ch. 4). The word quasi-judicial usefully reminds us that political limits (what Chrimes called “conventions of 
the Constitution”) developed through usage.  The ancient constitution was not systematized.  Nonetheless, I argue that 
during the thirteenth century, the language of kingship and the ethical values of the Mirror for Princes genre became 
increasingly formalized.  
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upon in court and other juridicial proceedings” (Gurevich 1985, 176).49  In this passage, 
the crown is legal symbol of the contractual arrangement in which king guarantees “al the 
lond withoute” that he shall protect and guide it well.  The contract distances the personal 
king from the impersonal Crown by making the authority of the Crown dependent upon 
the king’s performance of his duty to “kepe and guye.”50  Similarly the stones (7.1754-
1770) signify that “in a king . . . ther schal no variance be found,” that a king “schal ben 
honeste.” The word “schal” (i.e. should) strips the coronation of sacramental graces that 
empower the king; and placing the onus on him, it aligns the coronation tokens (i.e. 
crown, scepter, etc.) with the more secular and legal coronation oath.51  The Crown does 
not infuse the king with “precious virtues,” but rather obliges the king to act virtuously. 
Gower’s allusion to coronation discourse desublimates the authority of kingship 
and establishes the hierarchy on the more constitutional ground of trouthe.  Unlike most 
mirrors for princes, Book VII of the Confessio Amantis, repeatedly invokes external 
political conventions and developing political institutions such as parliament, separation 
of king and Crown, a more positive concept of law, and the threat of cession.  So while 
Gower engages in language of regalie, it is less the regality of the Prince than the Crown.  
In Trevisa’s English translation of De regimine, a scholastic mirror, the word trouthe 
rarely appears.  When it does, it never assumes this quasi-legal sense that binds the king 
to the people.  Since the best form of government mirrors the father-son relationship, the 
                                                
49 For discussion of tokens in trothplights, see Green, Crisis 50-57.   
 
50 We see this possibility to some extent begin to emerge in Policraticus where he seemingly limits the king’s power to 
keeping the law by accusing flatterers of proclaiming that “the prince is not subject to law, and that his will has the 
force of law not only in establishing legal right according to the form of equity, but in establishing anything 
whatsoever” (4:7); see also Kantorowicz 355-56.  
 
51 It is clear that barons used the oath to challenge the king’s authority.  When Richard II was formally deposed he was 
repeatedly accused of crimes that were “expressly contrary to justice and to the laws of his realm, and to his oath” 
(Chris Given-Wilson, “Record” 172-84; quotation from 174.  
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basis of governance is paternal love from the father and obedience from the children; 
authority moves in one direction, top-down.  Princeps solutus est legibus.  While Gower 
is no democrat, the concept of trouthe as described in Book VII binds the free will of the 
king and through the an oath that binds him to the laws.  Gower’s mirror resembles De 
regimine, insofar as it employs Aegidian “economic” metaphors of kingship, in particular 
the use of marriage to represent, what Giles considered, a debased form of kingship - rex 
politicus.  In this way, Gower is also most unlike Giles because, as we will see in "Darius 
and his Advisors" the marriage covenant represents the ideal model of kingship. 
 
The Tale of Darius and his Three Advisors 
In “The Tale of Darius and His Three Advisors,” the one tale dedicated to 
describing the sovereign virtue of trouthe, Gower uses an apocryphal story from Esdras 
to analyze the extent of regal force. In the original tale, three guards put advice beneath 
the pillow of the tyrant Darius in order to gain his favor.  The first writes wine is strong, 
the next, the king is stronger, the third, women are strongest, but truth overpasseth all.  In 
Gower’s version, Darius asks his three advisors, “which strengest is/ the wyn, the woman 
or the king” (VII.1812-13)?  Gower shuffles the order of the counselors’ answers: 
Arphages argues that kingship is strongest, Manchaz wine, Zorobabel women.52  
Zorobabel, unlike Arphages and Manchaz, uses exemplary tales to support his answer. 
He narrates tales of women who are closely connected to royal power—Apame, Cyrus’ 
concubine, and Alceste, Duke Admetus’ wife. By introducing the tale with an account of 
the king’s power and concluding with the exempla of the tyrant Cyrus and Duke 
                                                
52 Gower’s order seems to come from Peter Comestus’s Historia Scholastica (L. Burke 6).     
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Admetus, Gower creates a chiastic structure (royal power-wine-women-royal power) in 
which the responses of Manchaz and Zorobabel critique and revise Arphages’ definition 
of royal strength.  In the process of debating which entity is strongest (king, wine, or 
women), Gower revises traditional notions of strength and refashions the discourse of 
kingship in relation to questions of obedience and freedom.   
The tale begins with Arphages pointing out the political reality that undergirds the 
absolutist model of kingship: 
 . . . it semeth noght, 
He seith, that eny erthly thing 
Mai be so myhty as a king. 
A king mai spille, A king mai save, 
A king mai make of lord a knave 
And of a knave a lord also: 
The pouer of a king stant so, 
That he the lawes overpasseth.  (VII.1832-39) 
 
Arphages argument that the king “overpasseth” all laws reflects the belief held by 
medieval jurists in the absolutist camp that is summed up by the Roman maxim princeps 
legibus solutus est. As we have seen, Giles of Rome provided a coherent philosophy that 
authorized the king’s monopoly on coercive authority in which the king could licitly 
disobey law.  Arphages position, contrary to Giles’s metaphysical explanation of regal 
authority, establishes the king’s freedom upon the king’s coercive force rather than any 
moral authority to licitly disobey the laws of the land.53  The king “stant himself of lawe 
fre” (VII.1845), because of the fact that he can “spille” or “save” any “erthly thing.”  
                                                
53 We get a similar account of the king’s power in relation to the law from John of Gaunt “it was shameful for a king in 
his own kingdom . . . to avenge himself by means of private murder when he was himself above the law and had the 
power to vouchsafe life and limb with a nod, or if he were so minded, to take them away” (Westminster Chronicle 114-
115).  
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Without the naturalizing economic metaphor of Giles, we are left with Arphages bald 
account of absolutism in which the king’s freedom from laws depends upon brute force.  
Instead of Giles’s analogical justification of royal prerogative, in which the king 
is compared to a loving father who should be obeyed, Arphages presents the strength of 
the king in Bractonian terms in which “the will of the prince has the force of law” 
(2.305); Bracton’s analysis of the prerogative carefully distances the prince’s voluntas 
from the ethical authority of law by saying only that it has the amoral force of law. More 
importantly, even as he recognizes that the king’s will has the force of law, Bracton does 
not reify this coercive force, but rather recognizes it as a political reality.54 It has the force 
of law, but it is not the same as law.  By showing the connection between authority and 
brute force, Arphages’ description of regal strength exposes the political reality that 
majestic rhetoric mystifies.  
Gower alerts the reader to the dangers of this unconstrained force by depicting the 
sweeping breadth of royal power over life and the social order in seven lines.  Arphages’ 
use of spille/save, in particular, recalls Genius’s explanation that a king must learn the 
virtue of trouthe because the power to “bothe save and spille/ . . . stant upon his wille” 
(VII.1715-16).  Here Genius explicitly connects the power to “save” and “spille” to the 
king’s will.  While Arphages does not say, “will,” it is clear in phrases like “his pouer 
stant so” that he too imagines the king’s authority to save and spill connected to will.  
This repetition of save/spille alliteration in different contexts concerning royal will 
reveals the importance of this construction in his political orientation.   The wille/spille 
                                                
54 The king is the coercive authority of law and as such he is “necessarily removed . . . from the sphere of coercive 
jurisdiction” (Tierney, “Bracton” 303).  This illustrates how the “de facto realities of power” (Wallerstein 44) 
underwrite theories about jurisdiction.   
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rhyme, in this earlier passage, calls attention to the dangerous power of king’s free will. 
Arphages ignores the potential danger and sees will, solely, in terms of strength. 55 The 
remainder of the tale interrogates Arphages conclusion and shifts the authority of the king 
from the rickety foundation of force to the stronger foundation of trouthe.  
Just as Gower overwrites Giles’s De regimine principum with his own virtues of 
kingship, he starts this exemplum of trouthe with Arphages’ crude idea of absolutist 
power and then critiques this model of sovereignty through the responses of Manchaz and 
Zorobabel.56  Their advice exposes the transgressive freedom inspired by wine and 
women – a freedom of will that John of Salisbury calls the “fictitious liberty” of the 
tyrant.  Throughout the “Tale of Darius” the appearance of constructive results makes the 
fictitious liberty of wine and women alluring to both the king and the reader; however, 
Gower consistently signals that these “constructive results” are unnatural and thus, either 
illusory or fragile.   
After Arphages describes the strength of kingship that “overpasseth lawes,” 
Manchaz describes the liberating effect of wine.  Manchaz, who says, “wyn is the 
strengest,” describes how wine allows people to step beyond the limitations established 
by the body: “it maketh a blind man to behelde,/And a bryht yhed seme derk” (VII.1856-
57).  This “use of contrast and oxymoron” has led critics to assert that Gower 
“interweaves the theme of possible beneficence as well as destructiveness in all three 
                                                
55 R.F. Yeager argues that Gower’s repetition of certain rhymed and alliterated words lines throughout the Confessio 
Amantis point to Gower’s thought patterns and predilections (Chs. 1-2). 
 
56 Kurt Olsson similarly argues that, through Arphages answer, Gower “follows leading medieval political thinkers, 
including Giles of Rome” who represent the king as ‘an half god;’ that ‘passeþ oþere men in dignite and in myht.” 
Olsson argues that the “Tale of Darius” does in fact “interrogate” this position, but that he draws the same absolutist 
conclusions as Giles. Larry Scanlon goes even farther suggesting that Arphages’ “maximalist interpretation of lex 
regia” aligns with Gower’s own view of royal authority (Scanlon 284-86); see critique of Scanlon’s position in van 
Dijk 101-6. 
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entities” (L. Burke 8).  After all, the power of wine to make the blind man “behelde” 
seems constructive. However, the constructive results of wine and women really only 
reflect the alluring dangers of the “fictitious liberty” of tyrannical will.  The blind man 
cannot see, but he transgresses the boundaries of his body because the wine takes “reson 
fro the mannes herte.” Wine is the strongest because it “mai the hertes binde/well more 
than the regalie” (VII.1869-70 emphasis mine). Gower implies that actions outside the 
bounds of reason ironically bind the person “be weie of kinde” (1869). Sight in the blind 
man is a defect of reason.  Actions are only free when they align with reason.  Likewise 
the coercive authority of the king only offers freedom when the decisions of the king 
align with reason. For some transgression is immediately and apparently harmful (i.e. 
“bryht yhed” are blinded), but for others the transgression gives the appearance of 
“beneficence.”  The obvious signals that differentiate transgressive and natural freedom 
in Manchaz’s response, prepare the reader to make the more difficult distinctions 
necessary to understand the strength of women.   
Unlike Arphages and Manchaz, Zorobabel gives two answers and tells two tales. 
The two tales analyze politics and “social behavior in general” (Strohm, “Form” 27) 
through the prism of two love stories—one between a king and courtesan the other 
between a lord and his wife.  Similar to Manchaz, Zorobabel’s first tale represents 
strength as a transgressive force. The courtesan, Apame, subdues the will of the king, 
Cyrus.  Cyrus becomes a tyrant by accepting a servility in which “manhede,/ thurgh 
strengthe unto the wommanede/ of love . . . obei shal” (1877-1379). The “love” 
represented in these lines is a degraded form of “love” that unnaturally transforms the 
man into a woman (much like wine makes the blind sighted), and alters the gendered 
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power structure by making the man obedient to the woman.  This gender transgression 
directly borrows from the tyrant/king discourse in which tyranny is often figured as 
sexual deviance as in medieval depictions of Caligula, Nero and Holofernes.57 The 
tyrant’s unnatural lust and submission to a woman represent the unnatural submission of 
the king’s reason to the tyrant’s will.  
At first, Zorobabel exemplifies the strength of women by emphasizing the 
positive effect that Apame has on the tyrant:  
Whan he was hotest in his ire  
Toward the grete of his empire, 
Cirus the king tirant she tok, 
And only with her goodly lok 
Sche made him debonaire and meke, 
And be the chyn and be the cheke 
Sche luggeth him riht as hir liste  (VII.1887-93) 
 
On the surface, Zorobabel focuses the reader’s attention on mollifying effects of desire 
where beauty through a “goodly lok” calms the “ire” of the tyrant and seemingly instills 
virtue by making him “debonaire and meke.”  Gower intentionally tones down the 
violence of Esdras material – in all the other analogues of this tale Apame slaps the king 
publicly rather than tugging him by the cheek.  As Linda Burke points out, Gower’s 
revision “suggests the perversion of an affectionate gesture as means of domination” 
rather than simple violence” (11).  By softening the violence, the reader can more readily 
accept the way that Gower recasts the story within the tradition of courtly love: the 
“goodly lok” of the beloved makes the violent warrior suddenly “debonaire and meke.”  
                                                
57 In Book VIII of Policraticus, John of Salisbury describes Caligula’s “lewdness” and “lustfulness” (204); he shows 
how Holofernes’s reason is overcome by his own lust towards Judith (208-209); Gower similarly stresses these tyrants’ 
sexual deviance in Book VIII of the Confessio Amantis, first with a discussion of Caligula (VIII.199-212) and then with 
“Apollonius of Tyre” (VIII.271-2008). 
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He makes this point explicit in his summary to the tale of Apame and Cyrus “thurgh hem 
[women] men finden out the weie/ To knighthode and worldes fame” (VII.1994-5).   
Arising out of vice (i.e. the king’s lust), the “debonaire” and “meke” quality of the 
courtly lover is suspicious. The relationship between Apame and Cyrus, between 
courtesan and king, shows how courtly love masks a power structure grounded in 
domination and tyranny.58  Although Gower accentuates the mollifying effects of lust, his 
depiction of the besotted and foolish king signals the dangers underlying the appearance 
of virtue.  As Gower’s meke/cheke rhyme emphasizes, the reality is that Cyrus’ 
“debonaire and meke” posture is not an expression of the king’s will but the will of the 
courtesan, who literally reduces Cyrus to a dog lugged by chin and cheek “riht as hir 
liste.” 59 
Lechery represents both the willful violence of tyranny—a violence that breeches 
contracts and cultural mores—and the utter servility of the tyrant.  The sin of lechery is 
both symptom and symbol of tyranny because in the figure of the tyrant will and servility 
become synonymous.  If the illicit violence of the crown bearer is not in fact done of his 
own will, but is actually an expression of will chained to vices, then can we consider this 
                                                
58 For Olsson, Apame is a rhetorical figure of fickleness, a fickleness that Olsson reads into the descriptions of Richard 
II’s psychological profile.  Olsson argues that Apame, as Dame Fickleness, ultimately derives from Boethius’ Fortune; 
see 158-9.  I would suggest that Apame as an embodiment of fickleness, more specifically, signifies tyranny. She is not 
just an allegorical figure but also a person that appropriates the power of kingship.   
 
59 The “beneficent powers” of the courtesan are recast in chivalric terms: 
Thurgh hem men finden out the weie 
To knihthode and to worldes fame 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
Thurgh the beaute of hem is fyred 
The Dart of which Cupid throweth, 
Whereof the jolif peine groweth, 
Which al the world hath under fote.  
(1904-5; 1908-11) 
For more on the beneficent powers of love, see L. Burke 11.  Instead of showing the “beneficent powers” of courtly 
love, Gower makes clear the dangerous desire that grounds this singuler love.  This parallels the love-drunkenness of 
Amans, who frequently is doing the right things for the wrong reasons, see Gallacher 102-105.  For more on how 
Gower chastens courtly love, see Shuffelton 74-84; and Robins 169.   
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violence to be the king’s prerogative?  It is precisely this question that is at the center of 
the both the Barons’ Gravamina and the Song of Lewes.  The tyrant-courtesan 
relationship between Cyrus and Apame, though ending with less violence, resembles 
John of Salisbury’s account of the tyrant-concubine relationship in his handling of 
Holofernes and Judith.  In both cases, the tyrant appears to wield supreme authority and 
instill fear into his subjects. But this authority is a “fictitious liberty,” though he seems 
powerful, there is in fact no “condition more servile than tyranny . . . indeed [the tyrant] 
is weighed down by a most miserable servitude” (John of Salisbury 190).  The tyrant, in 
both cases, cedes his power to a female—symbolically reason cedes power to will.  Cyrus 
becomes a fool; Holofernes is slain by Judith.   
Zorobabel’s original answer that “women ben the myhtieste” is not his final 
answer.  He goes on to assert, “trouthe above hem alle is myhtiest.”  The use of mightiest 
to refer to both truth and women seemingly creates a logical problem – how can both 
women and trouthe be mightiest?  This logical problem led Patrick Gallacher to suggest 
that “women” is a synecdoche for trouthe itself (102-5).  However, such an explanation is 
unnecessary because Zorobabel does not actually contradict himself: his first answer 
responds to the king’s question: “of thinges thre which strengest is,/ the wyn, the 
womman or the king?” The king’s question is a closed question that forces the counselors 
to adopt one of three possibilities; it creates a grammatical power structure.60  
Zorobabel’s second answer, “trouthe is myhtiest,” however, provides an answer that 
stands outside the king’s assumptions of the question—trouthe is a kind of syntactic 
grace, something bound to the initial question and yet beyond the form in which it was 
                                                
60 Russell Peck, who argues that trouthe commonly reaches outside the expected terms, compares this moment to 
Amans’s recognition of the truth (i.e. that he is too old to be a lover); see 149-50.  
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posed.  While the king’s involvement and interest in intellectual problems creates a more 
flattering portrayal of Darius than the Esdras material, the king’s question also allows 
Gower to present Zorobabel’s second response as outside the king’s control.  
Unlike the biblical material, Zorobabel, still arguing, “womman is the mannes 
bote,” provides another “ensample” of women as “myhtiest” drawn from the Ovidius 
Moralizatus (Mainzer 222).  Alceste’s husband, Duke Admetus is dying of some 
sickness.  Alceste asks Minerva how her lord “recovere myhte his hele ayein” and 
Minerva answers that Alceste must suffer the illness and die in his place.  Alceste without 
pause chooses “hir deth and his livinge . . . with al hir hole entente.”  Instead of a woman 
who controls the king “as hir liste,” Alceste is willing to sacrifice her life to save the life 
of the king with “hir hole entente.”61  Zorobabel’s second answer, “trouthe is myhtiest of 
all,” establishes a paradigm of strength born out of, rather than divorced from, the free 
acceptance of the limits of authority what John of Salisbury calls “the yoke of 
subjection.”  Zorobabel’s two depictions of strong women point to the insufficiency of 
the king’s question.  Strength is not in the entities themselves: strength is not in the king, 
in the wine or in the woman.  Instead, strength arises out of proper use or relationship.  
Indeed the crucial detail between the two stories hinges on the relationship between lover 
and beloved.  Zorobabel tells a love story of a courtesan and a king followed by the love 
story of a lord and his wife—a tale of fin amour followed by married love.   
Placing the tale of Alceste’s sacrifice immediately after Apame and Cyrus 
encourages the reader to transpose the two lovers: would Apame sacrifice her life for 
Cyrus?  This question elucidates the political valence of trouthe.  Because of the power 
                                                
61 Gower’s exclusion of Hercules rescue of Alceste emphasizes the queen’s selfless devotion (L. Burke 13) 
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dynamics that shape these two “love” stories, it is hard to imagine Apame taking on 
Alceste’s sacrificial role.  Alceste’s sacrifice depends upon trouthe to her husband, on the 
mutual obligations initiated by marriage.  Apame’s relationship, on the other hand, is 
grounded in dominance.  If we see Apame’s domination symbolically as the will’s 
domination of reason, which produces tyranny, then Alceste reverses this model by freely 
choosing to sacrifice her life for the life of her husband, a sacrifice that negates her future 
will.62 Her sacrifice demonstrates that political kingship, represented by the marriage 
covenant, is stronger than Cyrus’s displays of power.  The two tales of Zorobabel enact 
the conflict at the center of Book VII, a conflict between majestic and political rhetoric, 
figured throughout the Confessio in terms of fin amour and married love.63 “The Tale of 
Alceste” establishes pattern of political trouthe overturning majestic modes of 
domination central to Gower’s refashioning of the Fürstenspiegel genre upon the 
foundation of the political kingship.    
Whereas Apame’s will (i.e. “hir liste”) upsets both political and sexual mores and 
thus, represents the tyrannical domination that strives for a fictitious freedom, Alceste 
represents a proper bond (“al hir hole entente”).  Recognizing the “yoke of subjection” 
she freely accept her obligation (Policraticus VIII:17).   After he acknowledges the 
trouthe of women or love” as strongest, Zorobabel, following Esdras identifies trouthe as 
the most powerful of all.  However, Gower excises the passage where the third advisor 
uses veritas to incite Darius to resume construction of the Temple of Jerusalem and 
                                                
62 Alceste’s pledge reflects the medieval concept of the vow, articulated in Dante Paradiso (V.25-33) in which the oath 
the free choice to forfeit one’s free will.  This becomes particularly important for Gower who suggests that the 
coronation oath is one of these oaths.   
 
63 Genius’s exempla of Apame and Alceste address Amans’s love-drunk condition and anticipate the critical moment in 
the frame narrative.  The Apame-Cyrus relationship represents the besotted condition of Amans, while Alceste-
Admetus relationship represents the civic love that the fictive John Gower discovers.   
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chooses to conclude the tale by grafting a pagan story onto the biblical account.  
Moreover, unlike Esdras in veritas is “virtually equated with God,” Gower uses trouthe in 
the sense of fidelity (often legal fidelity) to one’s word or lover.64  We might expect a 
more conservative thinker, such as Giles, to keep truth as God and thus make the king 
only beholden to divine law and thus, suggest that the king restrain his own actions 
following divine precepts.  Gower, on the other hand, by switching from the biblical to a 
secular register places the office of king in a binding relation not to God, but to the 
people.65 
Manchaz and Zorobabel do not merely present different answers from Arphages; 
their answers indirectly refashion the terms of Arphages response.  They redescribe the 
transgressive strength in Arphagus’s answer as “fictitious freedom” and subtly impose 
limits to the king’s coercive authority to “save” or “spille.” The choice to spille, for 
example, can only be made freely when that choice corresponds to the dictates of reason 
and thus does not transgress the liberties of others.  When it does not correspond to the 
dictates of reason, when the king acts “willfully,” then the king is enslaved to passion and 
becomes a tyrant.  Gower shifts self-restraint from a language of personal ethics to one of 
law and politics where the act of self-restraint can be interpreted, in Wilks’ terms, as the 
                                                
64 The Wycliffe Bible uses the word “treuthe” to translate “veritas,” but the context particularly the advisor’s 
connection of veritas to the reconstruction of the temple reveals a very different function of trouthe—than the trouthe 
that drives Alceste to self-sacrifice.  Richard Firth Green argues that the theological sense of truth as “absolute truth, 
God or the God head” was “fairly recent” and the “intellectual sense of the word truth” as “correspondence to reality” 
was “very new indeed.”  Linda Burke discusses the difference between veritas in Esdras and trouthe in Confessio 
Amantis, 8-9.   
 
65 Gower’s concludes his translation of the Esdras material before it reaches its “psalm-like” conclusion that “would 
have drawn the story back to his subject kingship, raising it to a height suited to its dignity (Olsson 163). 
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initial “voluntary act of abdication of absolute power” that both establishes, 
acknowledges and limits regal authority (216).66  
While the political potential of this story lies beneath the surface, an astute reader 
of the Confessio must always read love politically, just as he must read politics erotically.  
Since Gower calls trouthe the sovereign virtue of the prince, it is obvious that Gower’s 
use of the Alceste material does not merely valorize married love.  Married love must 
perform some political work.  The figurative work it performs originates from Aristotle’s 
Politics that had been translated around 1260.67  After this translation, a number of 
scholastic Fürstenspiegel and an even larger number of advice manuals led to the rapid 
and wide dissemination of a political metaphor that would deeply influence the social 
imagination: namely, that modes of government could be represented through household 
relationships.68  In De regimine, for example, Giles, employing Aristotle’s metaphor from 
Politics, describes political kingship in terms of the conjugal relationship between a 
husband and wife:  
For conjugal kingship is similar to political rule: because wives ought not to be 
presided over simply through will [arbitrio], but ought to be presided over as the 
                                                
66 In The Problem of Sovereignty, Michael Wilks explains that "the ruler's restriction of his own authority puts his 
power into the category of private right: and here he is on par with his people and therefore not only morally but also 
legally bound to observe the law…this voluntary act of abdication of absolute power comes to be seen as the first act of 
kingship" (216-17).  Larry Scanlon gives a more ethical reading in which Gower repeatedly exemplifies the 
“monarchy's inherently self-regulating character, the paradoxical but inevitable logic whereby the absolute prerogative 
produces its own self-generated restraint” (265).  
 
67 In Politics, Aristotle describes household management through political language explaining that “the science of the 
household management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave . . . one the paternal relation and the third 
the conjugal—for it is part of the household science to rule over wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not 
with the same mode of government, but over the wife to exercise republican government and over the children 
monarchical” (I.v.1-2). 
 
68 Giles’s use of economics as a model for discussing kingship was picked up by Nicholas Oresme’s Yconomique, 
which discusses the household in strict monarchical terms. Yconomique, in turn, “sparked a vogue for books of 
household management during the fourteenth century” (Staley, Languages 90-1). 
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laws of matrimony [leges matrimonii] require and through those mandatory and 
honest pacts, which intervene between man and wife.69  (II.II.3; 291) 
 
In the larger context of the Fürstenspiegel, the Alceste myth not only depicts married 
love but also hints at a mode of kingship—regimen politicum. The central difference 
between regimen politicum and regimen regalis is that the political king, like a husband 
bound to leges matrimonii, must abide by the laws of the commonalty; the king is, as 
Bracton says in one part of his work, sub leges.   
If married love in Alceste myth alludes to political kingship, then “The Tale of 
Darius” can be read as tale in which political kingship trumps regal kingship. Unlike, 
Giles who treats political kingship as inferior to regal kingship, Gower makes the 
relationship between the husband and wife the strongest bond of all—certainly above 
Arphages’ definition of royal prerogative.70 If the allusion to political kingship seems 
tenuous in “The Tale of the Three Advisors,” the “Tale of Lycurgus,” 500 lines later, 
foregrounds the political dimension alluded to by Alceste legend, by replacing the 
“trouthe of love” with the “trouthe of governance” (VII.2925).   
 
Justice in Gower’s Fürstenspiegel 
During the reign of Richard II, trouthe based on mutual obligations was 
challenged on both ends of the hierarchical spectrum by the Uprsing of 1381 and the 
Appellants rebellion of 1388.  By 1386, while Gower was writing the Confessio Amantis, 
Richard II was just entering his majority.  The barons, like they did in 1227, lost power 
                                                
69 Passage from Giles of Rome II.II.3: “Nam regnum conjugale assimilatur regimini politico: quia uxori . . . non quis 
debet praesse debet ut requirunt leges matrimonii, et ut potius per pacta debita et honesta, quae interveniunt inter virum 
et uxorem.”  
 
70 While Giles acknowledges marriage as “natural,” the relationship between a father and son is more natural still and 
as such the regal kingship is the most natural mode of authority; see Blythe 67; and De regimine 2.14.155. 
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simply because Richard, upon coming of age, turned increasingly towards his own curia 
to make important decisions.  Again like Henry III, Richard elevated members of his 
inner circle (e.g. Simon Burley, Robert de Vere and Michael de la Pole), gave generous 
properties to each of them, and expanded their role in local politics.  Through these 
elevations, he sought to increase royal presence and diminish the power of the lords 
within their dukedoms and earldoms.  As in 1258-1265, the assertion of royal power 
created tensions between him and his magnates and made England into a hotbed for 
constitutional ideas that would otherwise lie dormant.  
For Gower the solution to this crisis of trouthe does not lie in any political faction, 
but rather in the abstract principle of the law itself.  At the center of Genius’s sermon on 
the five points of policy is justice, and it is under the rubric of justice that trouthe is given 
its most overtly political treatment.  In Gower we see the a self-conscious development of 
the “ancient constitution” as a kind of covenant through which powers of the king were 
limited and certain liberties were guaranteed. The law was the formalized agreements 
between the members of society that created unity and peace.  This fixed law, resistant to 
the more fickle prerogative of both kings and lords, provided the cornerstone for 
constitutional government, or what Gower in the “Tale of Lycurgus” calls the “trouthe of 
governance.”  
In Book VII, Gower emphasizes the political rather than the ethical dimensions of 
justice. Indeed, all the tales under the rubric of justice focus on the social relationship 
between the subjects and the king through the laws, rather than the ethical function of the 
law itself.  Most notably, in the “Tale of Carmidotirus,” a king makes a law banning 
weapons in the senate on pain of death.  After he accidentally breaks the law, he insists 
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upon his own execution so that “Rome sholde nevere abreide/His heires, whan he were of 
dawe/that here Ancestre brak the lawe” (VII.2882-84). The tale invokes a standard 
convention of kingship: the king ought to be subject to the law.   
Gower rarely departs from a conventional discourse of kingship. Carmidotirus’ 
defense of the law, however, is not an ethical argument for justice because the king’s 
moral culpability is never in question.  Instead, Gower explains this convention in terms 
of its political effect of this on the larger community.  Carmidotirus insists upon his own 
execution in order to maintain the future integrity of the law and secure the relationship 
between the kingship and those who must themselves respect the law so that there can be 
no reason to “abreide” his heirs.71  The origins of the word “abreiden,” which at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century meant to “cast down or destroy” (MED) hints at the 
political importance of this relationship.  In the tales of deposition (“Rehoboam,” 
“Lucretia” and “Virginia”), we see the practical necessity of keeping the law.  The 
abstract principle of an unchanging law firms up the trouthe between the kings and his 
subjects and thus, strengthens the commonwealth.  In Book VII, the highest good is the 
good of the state, what Cicero calls summa iustitia.  In other words, politics is not an 
extension of ethics, as Porter suggests (154), but rather ethics often operate within a 
political framework.  
The “Tale of Carmidotirus” exemplifies a constitutional vision of law that cannot 
be abridged or rescinded.  The law provides a contractual foundation for the trouthe 
between the king and his subjects—establishing the rules of the game, so to speak. It is 
precisely this foundation, that Genius describes when in his introduction to justice he 
                                                
71 Gower provides an ethical argument in the voice of the senators who urge the king not to hold himself to the law.   
They argue that it was not intentional and therefore he should not meet such a harsh fate.   
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claims that “the lawe mai comune/ The lordes forth with the commune,/ Ech hath his 
propre dueté” (VII. 2709-11).  Again, Genius emphasizes the political, rather than the 
ethical nature of the law: that is, the primary purpose of the law is to unite or 
“commune[n] forth” the lordes with the commoners.  More importantly, Gower gives the 
law agency: the law acts upon the nobles, not the other way around.  This points towards 
a kind of legal positivism that can act upon the lords, that resists interpretation by both 
lords and kings, and that, ultimately, establishes a constitutional trouthe between 
community of the realm and lords.  
Genius does not mention the king in this line because, technically, the king’s 
“pouer stant above the law,” which is to say the law cannot act directly upon the king.  
The king’s position above the law, posited by lex regia, was a primary tenet not only of 
Roman law, but of common law as well appearing throughout Bracton’s De legibus et 
consuetudinibus Angliae.72  Bracton’s work is complicated and at many points he 
suggests that the king is bound by the laws—a legal problem that Conrad van Dijk has 
called the “Bractonian dilemma:” how can the king be both above and below the law at 
the same time?  Gower resolves the Bractonian dilemma, as I will discuss more below, by 
conflating the power of the king with the law—rex and lex meld into one entity.  Similar 
to the marriage pact, the power and limits of regal authority occur simultaneously.  The 
man becomes husband only after having agreed to the terms of the marriage, which limits 
the kind of authority he has over his wife.  While many Fürstenspiegel suggest that a 
king should consent to be governed by the law, Gower’s mirror shows why the king’s 
                                                
72 For discussion of king and law, see Bracton 2:33.   
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power depends upon the law.  He rebuilds the mirror genre around a trouthe formalized 
in the law.    
As Genius himself asks on two occasions, what is the authority of a king in a land 
“Where that ther is no lawe in londe” (VII. 2699)?73 In other words, the king’s power 
cannot be questioned by the law, but without the law the king’s power simply does not 
exist.  Gower acknowledges the king’s hereditary authority, his “hihe worthiness,” and 
that his “pouer stant above the lawe,” but he also carefully defines his role.  The king 
guides the law (“he which shall the law guide” (VII.2717)).  Gower’s choice of the word 
“guides” rather than “creates” pushes back against the strident royalist rhetoric that often 
made use of civil law to foster a continental model of benign absolutism.74  
Gower’s limitation of the king’s legislative authority, which is the repeated theme 
in Genius’s handling of justice, develops the ‘constitutionalist’ discourse surrounding the 
coronation oath which explicitly defines the king’s relationship to the law in the first 
clause:   
Sire, will you grant and keep and by your oath confirm to the people of England 
the laws and customs given to them by the previous just and god-fearing kings, 
your ancestors, and especially the laws, customs, and liberties granted to the 
clergy and people by the glorious king, the sainted Edward, your predecessor? 
(ECR 117, 251)75 
 
and again in the fourth: 
 
                                                
73 The other instance occurs when Genius, making a more extended argument about the relationship between the king 
and law, asks, “Do lawe awey, what is a king?” (VII.3075) 
 
74 In particular, the idea that the king governs as one who guides, rather than makes, the law pushes back against the 
notion that par in parem non habet imperium.  
 
75 The language above appears in Liber Regalis, but the English Coronation Records in order to save space refers the 
reader to the full text of the oath in Coronation Ordo of Charles I.  The first page number then refers to the place in the 
Liber Regalis that the full text would appear and the second page refers to where to find the language.   
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Sire, do you grant to be held and observe the just laws and customs that the 
community of your realm shall determine, and will you, so far as in you lies, 
defend and strengthen them to the honour of God?   (ECR 117, 252).  
 
The oath was frequently treated as a key component of the ancient constitution that 
limited the king’s legislative authority. 76 That is, the king has absolute power to execute 
and defend the law, but he has very little legislative authority and he can only make new 
statutes if the entire realm agrees with the law. The law, in theory at least, derives from 
the consent of the people and thus is a “convention of the Constitution” (Chrimes 8) 
resistant to abrupt change that clearly identifies the nature of regal authority.  These 
clauses of the coronation oath were added for Edward II and were evoked in his 
deposition and later in the deposition of Richard II. In this sense, the coronation oath was 
not merely a pro forma ritual but rather the cornerstone of constitutionalist political 
theory.  
Gower’s concentrated critique of the royal prerogative has caused many critics to 
align him with the Appellant cause.  Book VII is often read in light of the events of the 
Merciless Parliament, since this rebellion provides the most spectacular manifestation of 
the tensions between the Lords and the King. This reading, however, tends to focus on 
the factional politics between the king and lords rather than the political conditions that 
made the Merciless Parliament possible. This is particularly important because pro-
Appellant readings of Gower tend to read the Confessio as a polemic against 
                                                
76 There was considerable anxiety surrounding royal legislative authority.  Elliot Kendall, for example, suggests that 
Gower’s “Tale of Lycurgus” “locates ideal legislative activity in the past” (215).  The actual effect of the oath on 
legislative authority is up for debate.  For lengthier discussions on the relationship between the oath and royal 
legislative authority; see Green, Crisis 241-2; and Saul, Richard II 25.  Most historians agree that the clause was 
essentially an ideological tool that could be ignored when kings and magnates worked together, but that, barons could, 
when needed, use the clause to defend any action that seemed to limit the king’s prerogative.  I would suggest that 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth century these clauses of the oath are becoming “convention of the Constitution” 
(Chrimes 8). In 1399 the “Record and Process,” which records the charges brought against Richard II, make frequent 
allusion to the oath.  
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centralization, which leads to a distortion of many of the important characteristics of 
Gower’s “trouthe of governance.”  Elliot Kendall, for example, reading the poem through 
pro-magnate lens, argues that Gower’s desire for “traditional conceptions of law” 
founded upon trouthe lead him to critique an increasingly bureaucratized and centralized 
king’s law (211).  Comparing Gower’s tales of justice to his description of the “Golden 
Age” in the Prologue, Kendall argues:  
[the] ideas of law in the Confessio are equally nostalgic.  The concept of a 
kingship that preserves a fixed and monumental body of law, and guarantees this 
preservation by the power of sworn trouthe, finds an apotheosis in the tale of 
Lycurgus.  (214)  
 
For Kendall the maintenance of the law requires the decentralization of the legal system 
so that law is part of “asymmetric reciprocalist” relationships.  Based selectively on 
Robert Firth Green’s complex study of the evolution of the concept of truth in the Middle 
Ages, Kendall separates the asymmetrical reciprocal relationships formed through 
trouthe-bonds from “the judicially enforced written contract” (Green xiv).77   
Kendall thus portrays Gower’s position as closer to one nostalgically longing for 
the loosely organized political structure of feudal England, a structure that resembles 
feudalism more than constitutionalism.   By emphasizing the “nostalgia” of Gower’s 
thinking, Kendall paints a picture of an “extremely conservative” author, who deeply 
distrusts the king’s law and desires to return to a legal system based on personal trouthe 
                                                
77 For Kendall the trouthe-bond necessarily refers to old feudal bonds.  The conflict in Gower’s text thus mirrors the 
conflict between baronial networks and royalist centralization; see 28-35.  Richard Firth Green, however, shows how 
these trouthe bonds were becoming the basis of a written legal code in the fourteenth century; see Crisis 44-50.  
Moreover, as I have suggested in Chapter II, the barons themselves did not look to stop centralization, but rather to 
seize increased control over central administration.  
 
 138 
in which justice was managed by “local aristocratic networks.”78  The old fashioned oath 
is central to Gower’s Confessio, but only insofar as it undergirds a more modern 
centralized judicial system. As we will see more clearly in the “Tale of Lycurgus,” the 
oath that Gower discusses is not a unique troth-plight between a knight and his lady (the 
kind of private trouthe that Gower undermines in the Tale of Zorobabel), but rather a 
public oath that binds Lords, commoners and the king publically to one law, and thus 
makes that law sovereign. This imaginative expansion of the trothplight to the whole 
realm mirrors the leap necessary to imagine liberties as universally enjoyed in Magna 
Carta or the Provisions of Oxford.79  Gower’s fictional nostalgia fashions a new model of 
trouthe in terms of a legal relationship.  Adopting the common voice, Gower recasts 
majestic ideas into more political terms.  He reorients the discourse of majesty and shifts 
the reader’s attention from the person of the king to the “office” of kingship.  
At times, he advances positions similar to the rhetoric of the Appellants.  
Nonetheless, occasional agreement between Appellant propaganda and Gower’s poetry 
should not be read as collusion; and certainly, we should not read all of Gower’s ideas 
through a pro-Appellant lens based on these few points of agreement.  I will suggest that 
Book VII reveals that Gower does not view either Richard’s position or the position of 
the lords so favorably that he assumes one of these models will resolve the political 
tensions of English governance that stretched back to at least William the Conqueror.  
Like the Appellants, Gower acknowledges the threat of Ricardian absolutism particularly 
                                                
78 Elliot Kendall discusses how Lycurgus represents the “reciprocalist great household discourse [that] imagines the 
law as a basically unified and unchanging authority that is always mediated by (and thereby subordinated to) personal 
trouthe according to certain normative forms of personal relation and local networks” (210).   
 
79 The big achievement of Magna Carta was not the creation of liberties but rather the “shift from individual to 
communal or corporate privilege” (Holt 55). 
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in the king’s application of civil law to appropriate legislative authority and assert his 
position above the law.   At the same time, however, Gower’s exemplary tales of justice 
advocate a strong centralized legal system that establishes a unified law under the 
guidance of the king, a legal system in which “asymmetric reciprocalist relationships” 
would be replaced by abstract principles.  Gower does not support the Appellants against 
the king; he fashions a rhetorical position through which (he imagines) the realm can 
unite and part of this vision relies upon a legal construction of sovereignty based upon the 
coronation oath.   
 
The Tale of Lycurgus and the Primacy of Law 
"The Tale of Lycurgus," a tale likely adapted from Justinus's Epitome 
Historiarum Philippicarum P. Trogi, is Gower's most lucid vision of a constitutionalist 
kingship.80  The tale, told frequently in the Middle Ages as an exemplum of good 
kingship, describes a king, Lycurgus, who establishes good laws for his city and then 
aims to make those laws permanent.  He decides upon a trick.  He convinces the people 
that his laws came from a god—usually Apollo, but in Gower, it is Mercury.  He tells the 
people he must meet with this god on the island of Crete and that he wants the people to 
swear an oath to uphold his laws until he returns.  The people swear the oath and the king 
goes into exile “nevere to be founde;/ So that Athenis, which was bounde,/ Nevere after 
scholde be relessed” (VII.3003-5).  But whereas Justinus, Valerius Maximus and John of 
Salisbury focus on how Lycurgus’s laws imposed a stringent code that promoted labor 
                                                
80 Scanlon suggests that this must have been Gower’s source because of its connection to the ruse; see 287ff.   
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over luxury, Gower valorizes the king’s sacrifice of royal prerogative for the common 
profit by amplifying the king’s self-imposed exile.81  
Gower dramatizes the king’s sacrificial exile, which I will argue is the original 
constitutional gesture, by focusing his source material through the lens of Augustinian 
psychology.  Thus Gower, stripping the original material of both the history of Lycurgus 
(i.e. how he assumed the throne) and the specific content of his laws, ennobles the 
sacrifice of temporal power for the highest political good—the common profit.  Gower 
describes Lycurgus’s sacrifice entirely within a secular register in which trouthe, not 
mere obedience, is affirmed through self-sacrifice. The sacrifice of sovereign power for 
the common good provides the cornerstone of Gower’s constitutionalist aesthetic.82 
As we have already seen in the “Tale of Darius and his Advisors,” Augustinian 
psychology plays a crucial role in Gower’s constitutionalist thought.  For Augustine, the 
faculties of the mind inhere in Wisdom when the will shuns selfish interest (its own 
lights) and seeks “participation in that highest light” (De Trinitate XIV.12.15).  Even 
though Augustine shows no sympathy for constitutionalism—he does not advocate any 
resistance theory against tyranny aside from prayer and passive suffering—and ultimately 
shows no faith in the state’s ability to administer justice, political discourse surrounding 
                                                
81 Typically, the laws of Lycurgus emphasize the value of discipline and the danger of luxury. For example: “He 
enjoined frugality on all, thinking that the toils of war would be made more endurable by a constant observance of it. 
He ordered all purchases to be made, not with money, but by exchange of commodities. The use of gold and silver he 
prohibited, as being the origin of all evils” (Justinus III.ii).   In John of Salisbury, Lycurgus “abolished the use of gold, 
silver and all other wicked materials” so that “those things which nature . . . commends as useful would alone be 
valuable” (Policraticus IV: 3, 5).  Valerius Maximus in Memorable Doings and Sayings says that “Obeying the austere 
laws of Lycurgus, for some long time it drew the eyes of its members back from gazing at Asia, lest ensnared by her 
seductions they should slide into a daintier style of living. For they had heard that from Asia flowed elegance and 
extravagance and all kinds of unnecessary pleasure, and that the Ionians had invented the custom of providing perfume 
and garlands at dinner and serving dessert, no small stimulants to luxury” (Valerius Maximus II.vi.1) 
 
82 As Russell Peck notes, the “abandonment of self-interest so that the ‘commune’ might profit is the primary lesson” of 
the “Tale of Lycurgus,” see 148-49; quotation from 149.   The legalization of this “abandonment of self-interest” is the 
turn towards constitutionalism that I have been arguing.   
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the royal prerogative (i.e. voluntas regi), not surprisingly, absorbed Augustinian 
psychology of the will.  Without a distinctive field of politics, the theology of the will 
provided a way of speaking about the relationship of the king to the law; more 
importantly, since absolutism depended upon theocratic principles, the appropriation of 
Augustine challenges its religious authority.  John of Salisbury developed this political 
usage of Augustinian psychology in Policraticus:  
For the will of the ruler is determined by the law of God and does not injure 
liberty.  By contrast, the will of the tyrant is the slave to desires and, opposing law 
which supports liberty, it ventures to impose the yoke of servitude upon fellow 
slaves. (VIII.22) 
 
John of Salisbury clearly identifies the ruler’s desire to “impose the yoke of servitude” as 
a form of political oppression and an act against the law.  The word “law” carries both the 
sense of the “law of god” and laws of the ancient constitution that guarantee the liberties 
from time immemorial.  Unlike Augustine, for whom “liberty” and “servitude” could 
only be determined by one’s relationship with justice of God, liberty and servitude in 
Policraticus are the effects of the ruler’s will upon the state.  Turned inside out, the 
effects become a means of measurement and those acts that “injure liberty” are acts 
against the law of God—it is precisely this type of thinking that allows Hobbes, centuries 
later, to conclude that “all actions and habits are to be esteemed good or evil by their 
causes and usefulness in reference to the commonwealth” (Hobbes Behemoth 45).  By 
aligning the “law of God” with civic benefits, John bends Augustine’s vera iustitia back 
towards Cicero’s civic ideal of summa iustitia. 
Similarly, in “The Tale of Lycurgus,” Gower reimagines Augustinian will in 
political terms by emphasizing the king’s submission to the law.  But unlike the “law of 
God” from John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, Gower emphasizes the king’s obligation to 
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the secular laws of the land.83 The opening description of Lycurgus’s laws is Gower’s 
most forceful statement about the possibility of establishing an idyllic community by 
means of an objective, central and secular law that eliminates those social maladies 
caused by selfish interest: 
Hou he the lawe in every cas, 
Wherof he scholde his poeple reule, 
Hath set upon so good a reule, 
In al this world that cite non 
Of lawe was so wel begon 
Forth with the trouthe of governance. 
Ther was among hem no distance, 
Bot every man hath his encress; 
Ther was withoute werre pes, 
Withoute envie love stod; 
Richesse upon the comun good 
And noght upon the singuler 
Ordeigned was, and the pouer 
Of hem that weren in astat 
Was sauf . . .    (VII.2920-34) 
 
As in the works of Augustine and John of Salisbury, true liberty comes from the 
submission of a dangerous will (i.e. the “singuler”) to a higher authority, but in place of 
vera iustitia or the “higher law of God,” Lycurgus’s law focuses on the secular good of 
the community.  It is concerned with matters such as the equitable distribution of wealth 
(“richesse”) “upon the comun good.”  That is the law regulates the relationship not 
between man and god, but between individual members of society.  Gower replaces the 
sacred foundations of justice with a secular ‘comun good,’ but he retains the structure of 
justice defined by the submission of a selfish will to an abstract principle.  He does not 
explicitly look at will in terms of a theological good and evil, but rather focuses on how 
                                                
83  As John Dickinson argues, John of Salisbury gives significant power to the Church, rather than the law, in 
determining the rightful authority of the prince  (318).  I argue that Gower increasingly imagines the secular restraints 
of kingship coming from the community of the realm.   
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the selfish will causes the social evils (such as war and envy) that infect the 
commonwealth.  Political virtue arises from a historically contingent relationship 
between the individual and the community that requires the subordination of the 
“singuler” to the “comun good”—a relationship formalized by law.  The law creates a 
communal and secular standard to which subjects of the king (whether nobles or 
commoners) can subordinate their own selfish desires so that “Ther was withoute werre 
pes;/Withoute envie love.” Much like Augustine, Gower suggests that the singuler 
ultimately punishes itself by breeding social evils such as war and envy.  As a result, 
those seeking singuler profit are, in fact, working against their own self-interest, as the 
common good is identical with the good of the individual.  
This conflation of the good of the commonwealth with the good of the individual 
is axiomatic in nearly all iterations of resistance theory and English constitutionalism.  As 
we have seen in Chapter II, this collapse of will into law began as the impotent political 
grumblings of the dispossessed under Norman and early Angevin kings; it then played a 
critical role in legal grievances against the crown, and finally expanded into a full-fledged 
resistance theory that undergirded English politics and was made manifest in Magna 
Carta and subsequently strengthened in the revolutions of 1265 and 1327.  This binary, 
fundamental to Confessio, was so widespread that it surfaced "in [the] everyday thinking 
of and arguments of articulate laymen" and was eventually formalized in prominent legal 
compilations such as the Leges Edwardi Confessoris: "right and justice ought to rule in 
the realm rather than the perversities of will; law is always made by right but will and 
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violence and force are not right” (qtd. in Holt 102).84 This legal appropriation of 
Augustinian will exhibits two principles crucial to constitutionalist rhetoric: first, the “not 
right” will is associated with social hazards such as “violence and force” and second, 
employing a rhetorical move, recurring in resistance discourse, the Leges conflates law 
and justice by arguing that human law is made by right (ius facit).   
The “trouthe of governance” arises through the subordination of the factitious will 
to “the comun good.” Thus ius et iustitia, instead of providing the essential foundations 
of law, are themselves historical products of a dynamic relationship between the 
individual and community mediated through laws.  Again, Gower emphasizes political 
outcomes.  As a result, Gower establishes a narrative space that prepares the ground for a 
“secular science of politics” (Simpson 273).  By ensuring peace, love and the common 
good, Gower’s lex becomes synonymous with ius and thus his near apotheosis of the law 
becomes a metaphysical foundation of governance that stands in contrast to traditional 
scholastic approaches that put the king in this position.85   
In the same way that absolutism often relied upon theological models of 
kingship—models that identify the king as the vicar of Christ or even, as Giles puts it, 
semi-deus—constitutional theories often imagine the law as an “absolute and 
                                                
84 For example, Gerard of Wales deploys this nascent constitutionalist distinction between will and law: “A king, who 
gets his name from ruling, is held to rule first himself and then the people under him. But it is the nature of the tyrant . . 
. to oppress the people with his furious sway” (De principis instuctione, cap XVI; trans. in Holt 99).  The language of 
tyranny, here, is general.  J.C. Holt discusses the pervasiveness of these ideas in the twelfth century and shows how 
these notional criticisms at a time when “authoritarian impulses ran deep” (89).  Gower and Chaucer specify and tune 
this language to reimagine royal power.  In particular, Gower’s exempla, operating much like the legal exempla used to 
train lawyers, articulate the parameters of licit authority.    
 
85 S.E. Thorne argued that “the terms in which an act was phrased had gained greater importance . . . and they could not 
easily be augmented without parliamentary action” (45); see also Green, Crisis 137-41. 
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unchanging” principle synonymous with ius.86  The need for a fixed, yet secular, 
foundation for authority helps explain why Gower separates the law even from Lycurgus.  
In Gower’s source, Justinus repeatedly focuses attention on Lycurgus’s active role in the 
creation of law: 
He ordered [iussit] all purchases to be made, not with money, but by exchange of 
commodities (3.2.1.11); 
 
The use of gold and silver he prohibited [sustulit], as being the origin of all evils 
(3.2.1.12).  
 
He divided [divisit] the administration of the government among the several 
orders (3.3.1.1) 
 
Justinus’ Lycurgus establishes the law, he orders and divides it; the law is emphatically a 
human product.  In contrast, Genius focuses the reader’s attention on the power of the 
law rather than the lawmaker.   Instead of ten active legislating verbs such as iussit or 
divisit, Gower’s lone legislative verb “set upon” diminishes the role of the king and 
stresses the agency of law itself.  Thus, even in the creation of the law, Gower distances 
the king from the legislative process.  Moreover, by using the passive “ordeigned was,” 
in line 2932, Gower emphasizes the invisibility of Lycurgus’s legislative authority.  After 
Lycurgus “set upon” the law, the king’s primary role is to execute it in “every cas,” and it 
seems as if the law itself manages the commonwealth without “distance” or “debat.”  
Literary critics, however, have often read constitutionalism, as a simple foil to the 
royalist agenda.  These kinds of Appellant/king interpretations, what Ferster describes as 
“bipolar” readings, simplify the complexity of Gower’s political thought (Ferster 102).  
Although Gower limits the prerogative and legislative authority of the king, one should 
                                                
86 Elliot Kendall explains, “along this line of thinking, the role of the king as supreme power was not to make law but 
guard it as an absolute and unchanging value” (212).  
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not assume, as some critics suggest, that Gower presents an “extremely conservative” 
view of royal judicial authority in which justice ought to be administered by local 
aristocracy (Kendall 215).87 While Gower clearly favors justice that ensures that “the 
pouer/of hem that weren in astat/ was sauf” (VII.2932-34) and suggests that this 
protection of magnate power partially assures that there would be no strife or “debat” 
among the commonwealth, his support of magnate “astat” should not be conflated with 
the desire to decentralize authority. The limitation of the prerogative and legislative 
authority of the king were part of political reform, but they were not motivated by dislike 
of the monarchy but rather designed to create security through positive law.  While 
barons may have desired more control over judicial authority, the king’s justice was a 
necessary component for the commonwealth since it provided a check against the abuses 
of baronial prerogative.  There is no evidence in Confessio Amantis that Gower believes 
the king should cede judicial authority to local powers.88 
Thus, Kendall is only partly right when, apparently ignoring the conjunction in 
line 2932, he argues, “the uncontested authority of those who are “in astat” ensures that 
the laws scarcely need administering” (214).   Gower clearly argues that the law 
eliminates “debat” through a combination of distributive justice that ensures aristocratic 
authority and stringent assurances that “richesse” be distributed for the common good.  
Instead of reading Gower against some imagined feudal time, we see here the alignment 
                                                
87 For Kendall, this “extremely conservative” nostalgic view of self-restraint in which local political circumstances 
trump the centralization of justice that was occurring in the later Middle Ages benefits the aristocracy.  
 
88 The only tale that comes close might be the “Tale of Demetrius and Perseus,” in which Gower shows describes how 
Perseus corrupts the royal court to have his brother killed so that he might be made king.  This tale simply reveals the 
dangers of close relationships within the judicial process, and, in fact the tale concludes by going to a higher and more 
centralized court of the Empire to resolve the crisis.  In other words, Gower suggests that the solution is always 
distance between the judge and those adjudicated.  For discussion of “Tale of Demetrius and Perseus,” see van Dijk 65-
73. 
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of Gower’s thought with the political thinking behind the Provisions of Westminster that 
protected the commoners in general, and the gentry more specifically, from the majestic 
abuse of lordship.  That is, “the laws scarcely need administering” not only because of 
the “uncontested authority” of the great household but also because it protects the 
common good from predatory singuler actions, including the “singuler” acts of the lords.  
The laws do not create some kind of radical equality but rather establish what Aristotle 
called distributive justice, a kind of “proportional equality” (Blythe 20) that ensured each 
person had specific rights under the law as pertains to his general status; thus, the law 
protects the subject against abuses of both royal and baronial prerogative.89  
The assurance that the aristocratic “astat was sauf” and the fair distribution of 
‘richesse’ were conditions of good laws that “scarcely need administering,” but in order 
to understand the relationship between justice and the king, we must remind ourselves 
that they are the effects of the king’s initial law.  Elliot Kendall argues that Gower was 
concerned with restoring and enhancing the ‘reciprocalist’ authority of the great 
household, especially against the onslaught of ‘magnificent’ authority employed by 
Richard II.  In his reading these theoretical terms take on almost an either/or partisan 
quality—one supports either a reciprocal or magnificent brand of politics, when in reality 
both forms of authority had their place.  Kendall equates Gower’s tendency of favoring 
‘reciprocal’ exchanges with a belief that Gower supports the baronial local distribution of 
justice. However, while Gower does advocate distributive justice that protects the power 
of the magnates, the poem simply does not support the belief that judicial authority 
should be applied more locally.  Everyone has his “increase” because there is a uniform 
                                                
89 For a discussion of distributive justice, see Aristotle Politics III.vii. 
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rule that can be used in every case and, indeed, the very fact that aristocratic power is 
“sauf” derives from this uniformity.90 The confessional mode advocates an 
institutionalized conscience of the state that produces this uniformity. 
While the “trouthe of governance” eliminates “distance,” protects everyone’s 
“encress” and creates a temporary peace, Lycurgus’s laws do not have the binding 
authority necessary to be considered a constitution because they do not permanently 
establish the relationship between the king and law—that is, Lycurgus’s personal 
relationship with the law is still a matter of choice.   Lycurgus wonders, “Hou that his 
lawe . . . /Mihte afterward forevere laste”(VII.2945-46).  This question in fact is the 
central question of constitutional thought: how does one create a law through which the 
ease of the people might be guaranteed forever?   Lycurgus strikes upon a plan in which 
he will get all his subjects to swear oath that they will “kepe and holde” his laws until he 
“come ayein,” but he does not “come ayein” (2991-95).  Instead he goes into a self-
imposed exile so that his  “goode lawe [nevere] cessed”(VII.3006).   The king’s exile 
combined with this oath establishes a permanent ordering of Athens.  Genius explains the 
purpose of Lycurgus’s exile: 
To do profit to the comune, 
He tok of exil the fortune, 
And lefte of Prince thilke office  
Only for love and for justice,  
Thurgh which he thoughte, if that he myhte, 
For evere after his deth to rihte 
The cite which was him betake.  (VII.3011-17) 
 
                                                
90 John Fisher suggests that “the concept of one law for a various population is the shadow line that divides the modern 
world from the medieval” (199); van Dijk discusses the tension between  “O lawe” and his ideal of the prince as 
legibus solutus in the Confessio (102-6); see also Peck who describes the relationship between law and the individual in 
more ethical terms (215-217). 
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Genius emphasizes the importance of Lycurgus exile by neatly rhyming the king’s 
“fortune” with “profit to the comune.”  Unlike his source material, which provides 
detailed descriptions of Lycurgus’s equitable laws—laws that ensure that everyone eats 
publicly, laws that forbid the use of money to buy things—Gower dramatizes the heroism 
of Lycurgus’s kenotic sacrifice, the emptying out of his sovereign authority in an act that 
makes him his laws.91 Lycurgus laws are equitable.  They eliminate “werre” and “envy,” 
“debat” and “distance” but it is only his exile—his willingness to sacrifice all his power 
“for love and for justice”— through which he might “for evere after his deth to rihte/The 
cite” so that “thilke goode lawe [never] cessed” (VII.3006).   In this tale, Gower does not 
merely advance a constitutional agenda: he creates the constitutional hero who, similar to 
Augustine’s Christian hero, bends his own will to a higher power.  But unlike 
Augustine’s Christian hero, this power is the law that ensures the common profit.  
Scholars traditionally describe this bending as advising royal self-restraint.  As I 
have argued, the idea that Gower assumes what Olsson calls a “Nathan-esque” role 
actually reinscribes the Ricardian concept of absolutism, namely royal justice is always 
magnanimous (Olsson 145-47).92 For example, Larry Scanlon, convinced that Gower was 
an absolutist, suggests that Lycurgus, “Gower’s ideal monarch,” still fits the Aegidian 
mold of benign absolutism: the king has absolute authority over the government, but 
since power depends upon self-restraint he achieves this power kenotically through 
                                                
91 By spending roughly 19 lines describing the laws and 93 describing Lycurgus’s exile, Gower changes the focus of 
his source material; instead of describing the actual laws, Gower dramatizes heroism of Lycurgus’s self-exile through 
which he dissolves regal legislative authority in perpetuity, see Scanlon 287-88. 
 
92 For a discussion of Gower as circumspect Nathan-figure, see Peck, Kingship 149-150: and Porter 135-162. For a 
more legal look at Gower’s work, see Simpson 217-230. 
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sacrificing his power.93  The abdication of his own authority brings about both the 
commonwealth and the law.  This magnanimous submission of authority resembles lex 
digna in which “the king is above the law but ought to act like one below the law;” and, 
like lex digna, the conditional subjunctive makes the existence of law part of a plea in 
which Lycurgus operates as pedagogical exemplum teaching all kings self-restraint.  
Scanlon suggests that Lycurgus’s exemplary action shows the subject’s “endless 
responsiveness to the initiatives of a self-producing, self regulating monarch” (Scanlon 
289). In these terms, the king brings the law and commonwealth into existence, and in 
theoretical sense, he is right.  Only it is more accurate to say that the king brings the law 
and commonwealth into existence by swearing an oath through which he voluntarily 
subordinates his absolute authority to the law at the same moment that he becomes the 
king of the land.  His authority legally depends upon his oath to give up authority.   
In response to Scanlon’s argument that the king authorizes the law “through 
sovereign generosity”(286),94 Conrad van Dijk makes an important distinction by 
pointing out that the “Tale of Lycurgus” does not provide an exemplum of  “hou a worthi 
prince is holde/The lawes of his lond to holde” (VII.2911-12), precisely because 
Lycurgus is not an exemplary hero but an exceptional one (125-128).95 The kingship that 
Lycurgus inherited, much like the kingship predating Henry III, was a personal kingship 
that, in theory, was not bound by laws.  After his exile, the Athenian monarchy shared 
                                                
93 Peck likewise argues that authority is secured “by exiling egotism” (Kingship 149).  
 
94 For Conrad van Dijk’s argument that Gower, in the “Tale of Lycurgus,” separates law and king, see 125-128.  
 
95 Van Dijk draws upon Peter Nicholson assertion that Lycurgus’s “conduct would no doubt be difficult for any king to 
imitate, but he is the clearest example of how even the king is subordinate to a higher truth and of how he occupies a 
particular place and performs a particular function in gods order” (353). 
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more in common with the permanence of the ancient constitution embodied in Magna 
Carta or the Provisions of Oxford than Angevin vis and voluntas.  Lycurgus’s exile is not 
to be imitated because it initiates a fixed law.96  No future king could make Lycurgus’s 
sacrifice, precisely because Lycurgus sacrifice institutionalized the limits on royal power 
and you sacrifice what you don’t have.  
The simultaneous obtaining and abdicating absolute authority stands at the center 
of the theory of governance born out of the Magna Carta and developed in the Second 
Barons’ War.  Through the coronation oath, and the exceptional king who takes it, Gower 
imagines the terminal point of a personal kingship and suggests a time in which the royal 
prerogative is constrained by the law.  By using both an old story and the traditional 
mechanism of the oath, a mechanism that had become a political weapon during the reign 
of Edward II, the “Tale of Lycurgus” reimagines sovereign authority.  For Kendall the 
oath reaches back to England’s golden age when peace was maintained through 
asymmetric networks of trouthe.  Gower redeploys the nostalgic concept to imagine the 
translation of royal authority to the abstract principle of law—a law which is the promise 
to an eternally absent king.  The oath becomes a means through which the newer concept 
of an abstract positive law can be grasped.  As Lycurgus set a parliament in which he 
asks the people to:  
. . . assure and seie 
With such an oth as I wol take, 
That ech of you schal undertake 
Mi lawes for to kepe and holde. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
                                                
96 The “Tale of Lycurgus” examines on “how the law gains authority and how that affects later rulers” (van Dijk 125). 
For Kendall the idea of an “absolute and unchanging” (212) law was the lynchpin of baronial political theory that 
aimed at limiting of the king’s legislative authority (210-15); I have argued, using Wilkes terminology, that the 
coronation oath, which institutes the king’s power includes “voluntary abdication of absolute power” (216) an 
abdication that cannot be undone by royal will; thus, the legal sphere is carved out of royal will.   
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And therupon thei swore here oth,  
That fro the time that he goth, 
Til he to hem be come, 
Thei scholde hise lawes wel and plein 
In every point kepe and fulfille.  (VII.2988-2991; 2993-7) 
 
In the traditional medieval narrative, like Sir Orfeo or Havelok, we might expect the king 
to transfer power to a seneschal and bind this seneschal by oath.  What gives the “Tale of 
Lycurgus” so much imaginative possibility is that the subjects swear to “kepe and holde” 
the laws from the point of his departure to the moment of his return.  Since he never 
returns, no one, including future kings, has the authority to undo Lycurgus’s laws.  
Unlike transference of power to the seneschal or Justiciar, which maintains the Ulpian 
concept of the personal kingship, the tale of Lycurgus subordinates everyone, including 
future kings to the law.  Such a transference of power was not only a political 
mechanism, but rather it was part of a much wider cultural shift in attitudes towards law.   
In his careful anatomy of the concept of trouthe during the Ricardian period, 
Robert Firth Green explains this shift as linguistic movement “from a truth that resides in 
people to one located in documents” (Green, Crisis xiv) The change, as Green explains, 
is not just a change of medium but rather a change in nature, from personal relationships 
to abstraction.  Through the oath, Gower registers this seismic shift as the communitas 
regni swears fealty to a king, who, through his self-exile, becomes a non-personal 
principle, an institution; the oath becomes the vehicle through which Gower imagines the 
transference imperium to an institutionalized law that exists in the absence of the king, 
from a relationship between subditus and rex to a relationship in which subject and rex 
are bound to one another by the idea of law.  Personal trouthe becomes public trouthe.   
By emphasizing the legal constraints on the office of kingship, the tale pushes back at 
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those powerful Roman ideas that had long infiltrated English legal theory: princeps 
solutus est legibus and par in parem imperium non habet.  
Van Dijk’s practical assessment is indispensable to understanding the political 
logic of the tale because it emphasizes the importance of institutionalized law that limits 
the legitimate authority of the king.  Gower, however, not only envisions the king 
obeying the law—not only restraining himself—but actually imagines the law continuing 
to function in the king’s absence and binding future kings.  Through his depiction of 
fealty to an absent sovereign, Gower reimagines the web of relationships between king, 
lords, commoners and the law.  That is, Lycurgus’s exile develops a permanent 
relationship with the center that binds all the citizens of the realm. Much like the barons 
who designed Magna Carta, Gower extends ideas once applied locally to “the 
community of the realm” (295) so that all English men should be bound by “o lawe.”  
The earliest liberties were the gift of the king—Magna Carta itself was framed as 
royal largesse—and it was through these liberties that the people (first palatinate tenants, 
then lords, then subtenants and knights) slowly learned to exert political force and claim 
increased political authority. Larry Scanlon, in Narrative, Authority, and Power, likewise, 
argues that Gower “define[s] justice…not as protection of existing rights secured by 
correspondence to external standards and regularized institutional procedures, but as 
king’s gift” (268).”  While Gower represents justice as royal largesse, he also imagines 
the “external standards” and “institutional procedures” as manifestations of the “king’s 
gift,” or perhaps more accurately we should call it the “Crown’s gift.”  The point is that a 
political language of law begins to emerge from the dominant Fürstenspiegel 
representations of justice.  As J.C. Holt points out, the English understood rights and 
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liberties not as divinely endowed but rather as acts of regal self-limitation and that kings 
granted the “control of the administrative functions of the Crown” through charters and 
royal statutes (29).  There are two things to note about Holt's account: namely, that the 
rights and liberties were seen as royal gifts of “self-limitation,” and they involved the 
ceding of royal authority to “external standards and institutional procedures.”  Through 
this procedure much of the king’s authority became the institutionalized authority of the 
Crown.     
As an exceptional hero, the character of Lycurgus establishes the relationship 
between the king and law in England; and the “royal sacrifice,” although—or perhaps 
because—it is part of a ruse, represents an idealized constitutionalist narrative that elides 
the tumultuous history of constitutional practice: it elides Runnymede, and “The 
Common Enterprise;” most of all, it elides the deposition and execution of Edward II.  
That is, there was no Lycurgus in England.  Instead, the proper relationship between law 
and king was established through continued resistance to royal overreach that established, 
through repetition what Chrimes has called the constitutional conventions.  At those 
historical flashpoints where the “mutual recognition” necessary to sovereignty collapsed, 
the relationship between the monarch and the commonwealth was often redefined—most 
notably in Magna Carta, the Oxford Provisions, the Westminster Provisions and the Oath 
of Edward II.  Whether the will of the king was being expressed or extorted, the language 
of politics was the language of king’s gift.  Lycurgus is the idealized and the fictitious 
self-restraint of King John in the Magna Carta, Henry III in the Oxford and Westminster 
Provisions, and Edward II in the fourth recension of coronation oath.    
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Just as it is easy from a modern vantage point to imagine Gower as either a 
royalist or an Appellant sympathizer, it is equally easy to argue that both van Dijk and 
Scanlon are right—either the king is limited or he can exercise boundless “ideological 
power.”  However, when we try to understand how constitutional thought could arise out 
of a muddle of conflicting charters and legal agreements between kings, tenants and sub-
tenants, I would suggest they both emphasize different aspects of the same solution: van 
Dijk emphasizes how Lycurgus represents limits of kingship inherent in the “ancient 
constitution,” while Scanlon recognizes the cultural vehicle through which constitutional 
thought could be brought about—i.e. the “king’s gift.”  If we look at outcomes (by 
looking at the past from the future) the importance of Scanlon’s analysis here might be 
overlooked—in both cases the king’s power is limited.  So what purpose does calling it 
the “king’s gift” serve?  As we have seen in past attempts at reform, the English simply 
did not have linguistic or conceptual framework to imagine authority existing outside 
monarchical government.  Thus, in order to imagine positive law that binds the king, 
Gower does not envision a new world order but rather pushes against the political 
framework.  By transforming the oath into positive law and reimagining the concept of 
legitimate sovereign actions in relation to this law, Lycurgus’s exile provides a critical 
resolution to the Bractonian dilemma.  The “king’s gift” is a way of imagining 
institutional limitations of kingship in a way that makes sense in a trouthe-oriented 
culture.  The king’s turn from his rule to the future, achieved through his exile, signifies 
the turn from law to constitutionalism.  In “The Folly of Rehoboam,” Gower explores 
how this constitutionalism is sustained by the practical limits of authority. 
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“The Folly of Rehoboam” and the Consequences of Majestic Rhetoric 
 
“The Folly of Rehoboam” is a rarely discussed tale. When it is discussed it is used 
to demonstrate Gower’s condemnation of the rule of Richard II.  Judith Ferster has shown 
that Rehoboam frequently provided a code for royal critique and that Rehoboam’s heavy 
taxation of Israel as well as his reliance on young counselors resembled the burden of 
taxation foisted upon the English and the king’s favoritism of Robert de Vere, 
respectively.  Thomas of Wimbledon lengthily compared Richard II to Rehoboam in a 
sermon delivered in both 1386 and 1388.  The Richard-Rehoboam comparison seemed so 
apparent and the deposition message so radical to Wim Lindeboom that he argues that 
Book VII must have been written after Richard’s deposition.97 However, even if we 
accept (and I do) the assertion that the poem alludes to contemporary events, the 
interpretation and evaluation of those events requires a particular rhetorical stance; here I 
return to Gower’s practical reconfiguration of sovereignty.  For Gower, the conditions on 
the ground shaped not only a new way of thinking about a king but also a new way of 
thinking about kingship.   
 “The Folly of Rehoboam” imagines sovereign authority as circumscribed and 
contingent upon the community of the realm.  Whereas the traditional majestic posture 
emphasizes the relationship between king and god, Gower shows how this king-God 
relationship is mediated through creation.  At first glance, the distinction may seem 
subtle.  After all, in both cases God’s will sustains sovereignty.  However, by imagining 
sovereignty as mediated, Gower both naturalizes (i.e. demystifies) sovereignty and 
introduces a third term, the people.  Through this third term Gower reconfigures authority 
                                                
97 Lancastrian propaganda explicitly used the archetype of Rehoboam to defend the deposition of Richard II. “The 
Folly of Rehoboam” is likely the most topical political tale in the Confessio Amantis.  
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as a sacred political bond (a trouthe) between the people and the king.  Like other 
medieval authors, Gower depicts the ethical as effective.  The idea of an unethical 
effective act (i.e. a necessary evil) is not part of Gower’s political thought.  Nonetheless, 
what makes his approach innovative is that the sovereign act is either punished or 
rewarded in and by creation.  That is, the illegitimate act brings about its own punishment 
from the community.  This allows Gower to create a political hermeneutic, a way of 
interpreting sovereign legitimacy in relation to a practical political structure.  The ethical 
sovereign act makes the “hypothetical trades” necessary to maintain the “mutual 
recognitions” that allow the king, in the words of the his old counselors, to his “regne 
achieve.”  
In order to construct this political hermeneutic, Gower modifies the traditional 
function of the exemplum: he shifts the focus from the interpretation (i.e. the meaning) to 
the act of interpreting.  After the thirteenth century, the exemplum became a popular 
preaching device to reach lay audiences, but its function was limited to conveying a 
moral. James of Vitry in a thirteenth-century sermon describes the function of the 
exemplum as follows: 
When we are speaking in Latin, in a convent and to a congregation of the wise, 
then we can say many things, and do not need to descend to particulars: to 
laymen, however, it is necessary to demonstrate everything as though to the eye, 
and in a way perceptible to the senses. (qtd. in Runacres 117) 
 
Since laymen cannot grasp “many things” understood by the congregation of the wise, 
preachers must employ the exemplum genre to communicate these difficult ideas through 
a concrete language that makes the moral “perceptible to [their] senses.”  Charles 
Runacres broadly describes the split as narrative (the particulars) and moral (the abstract 
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idea). 98  For the medieval preacher, the particulars of the narrative are a necessary evil, 
something to “descend to” for the sake of “simpler audiences” (Runacres 117).  The 
particulars, in the last instance, are not important and the wise can seemingly do without 
them altogether.  The exemplum reflects an attitude towards history and narrative that has 
been at the center of this book: the belief that the validity of a “succession of particulars,” 
of history or narrative exists only its “relation to eternity.”   
The narrative tells how the people of Israel petitioned King Rehoboam for relief 
from the heavy “yoke” of taxation imposed by his father.  After seeking the advice of his 
older and younger counselors, Rehoboam takes the advice of his young counselors and 
maintains the heavy taxation of his father.  The Israelites rebel and the kingdom is split.  
If we accept Genius as our preacher, then we must equally accept that the moral of the 
tale is about listening to the wisdom of old advisors over the hotheaded young ones—a 
platitude that seemingly supports Coleman’s dreary assessment of Gower as someone 
who provides an encyclopedia to the moral saws of his day.  Reducing the narrative of 
“The Folly of Rehoboam” to its explicit moral ignores how Gower reworks the biblical 
narrative to redefine legitimacy as a political relationship between the king and 
community. Gower’s exemplary narratives train the reader ‘how’ to interpret the 
particulars of narrative.  That is, the reader judges morality and legitimacy of 
Rehoboam’s actions by their particular effects.  As such, Gower’s exemplary narratives 
train the reader to adopt a political perspective that points towards a political science that 
examines power as cause and effect within the world of contingency.  This perspective is 
                                                
98 What follows borrows heavily from the interpretive strategy described by Charles Runacres.  The choice of narrative 
and moral translates Runacres use of narracio and moralitas, which he drew from collections of medieval exempla; for 
a lengthy discussion of this terminology, see Runacres 109ff.  
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far more important than the “moral saws” that Genius’s exempla purportedly 
demonstrate.   
The Kings-writer emphasizes that Rehoboam loses all of Israel except Judah 
because God is punishing the sin of Solomon:  “the king did not listen to the people, 
because it was a turn of affairs brought about by the Lord that he might fulfill his word” 
(I Kings 12:15).99  King Solomon worshipped the gods of his concubines and thus lost the 
favor of God.  The biblical account lends itself to a majestic approach to sovereignty in 
which power is described solely as an immediate relationship between the king and God: 
the civil war arises because King Solomon disobeyed and thus, lost the favor of God. 
Gower, on the other hand, removes Solomon’s idolatry and God’s direct role in the story 
and thus can write the history of Rehoboam in purely political terms:  a sovereign act (i.e. 
Rehoboam’s taxation) causes a political effect (i.e. civil war).  The outcome, not God’s 
prophet, provides the interpretive lens through which the narrative and sovereignty must 
be understood.  By amplifying direct discourse and removing divine intervention, Gower 
accentuates the political elements within his biblical material and challenges the reader to 
arrive at the ethical moral by thinking through how the actions of the narrative affect the 
community, to construct a political ethics within “experience and history” (Runacres 
108).  
As in the “Tale of the Three Advisors,” Gower’s removal of divine intervention 
places the community and the material world at the center of Gower’s political drama.  
After hearing the king’s “malice and manace” the people began to “rave:”  
                                                
99 Again, when Rehoboam considers fighting the people, God warns him through Shemaiah: “Thus says the Lord, you 
shall not go up or fight against your kindred the people of Israel.  Let everyone go home, for this is from me.”(I Kings 
12:24) 
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For as the wilde wode rage 
Of wyndes makth the See salvage, 
And that was calm bringth into wawe, 
So for defalte of grace and lawe 
This poeple is stered al at ones 
And forth thei gon out of hise wones; 
So that of the lignages tuelve 
Tuo tribes only be hemselve 
With him abiden and nomo: 
So were thei for evermo 
Of no retorn withoute espeir 
Departed fro the rihtfull heir.  (VII. 4111-4122) 
 
Although Gower, like the Kings-narrator, recognizes the role of God’s “grace” in the 
Tale of Rehoboam, he nonetheless minimizes the function of divine intervention reducing 
it to a single sentence in which he attributes the rebellion to “the defalte of grace and 
lawe.”  Whereas the biblical account focuses on the role of divine intervention in history, 
Gower focuses on the political motivation of people—“the defalte of lawe.”  Crucially, 
Gower does not divorce the divine and the political, but rather allows the ideas of grace 
and law shade into each other.  Through the syntactic conjunction of law and grace, 
Gower gives law a religious connotation not uncommon in the Middle Ages in which law 
functions as “regulating and animating force of society,” or as the Visigoth Laws of the 
seventh century state “Lex est anima totius corporis popularis” (law is the soul of the 
body of all the people) (Ullmann, Individual 47).    Shifting the narrative to political 
analysis, Gower interrogates the most vulnerable point within majestic rhetoric: the 
potential tension between principles of prerogative and law.  Gower is unequivocal.  The 
law—a Lycurgian compact with the people—is given primacy over royal prerogative.   
Characterizing Rehoboam’s act as a “defalte of grace and lawe,” an absence that 
both causes and legitimizes the revolution by the common people. Gower thus turns away 
from the dominant majestic idea that the king is the law personified (rex est lex animata) 
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towards ancient constitutionalism in which the law is soul of the kingdom.  The tale 
implies that one who does not embody the law is ipso facto not a king regardless of their 
father.  The implication was dangerous, but not uncommon. Thomas Wimbledon publicly 
recites Rehoboam’s exemplary crimes in a sermon delivered before the Merciless 
Parliament in which many of Richard’s own court were convicted of treason. 
By blending grace into law Gower can naturalize his description of the 
rebellion—the sin against God and his retribution occurs within the natural sphere of 
creation.  Most notably, Gower replaces the voice of God with a natural simile: the 
“wilde wode” of Rehoboam causes the riot of the people as the winds bring the calm seas 
to violent waves.  These similes situate sovereignty and community within a natural 
discourse of cause and effect; the violence of the king naturally destabilizes the 
community making the “See salvage” such that they “gone out of hise wones.”  In the 
King’s narrative, Rehoboam cannot defeat the people; he does not even challenge the 
people “because it was a turn of affairs brought about by the Lord.”  The loss of grace 
leads to the loss of authority through divine punishment.  In the Confessio, power is like 
wind on the waves and like wind and waves; it can be studied.  The importance of the tale 
is less in the moral than in developing a science of power in which the social reality of 
sovereignty can be analyzed and a political ethics created from a study of the effects of 
power on the community.  Gower’s use of direct discourse, more analytical than 
dramatic, shows an astute awareness of, or, at the very least, a natural attunement to a 
science of power.  Gower’s Rehoboam, unlike his biblical counterpart, simply does not 
have coercive force to turn back the tides of revolt that he started. Rehoboam is a bad 
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king because he acts in a way that naturally weakens the community and undercuts his 
own sovereign authority.  
In the Bible, the debate between the king and the Israelites depicts Rehoboam as a 
cruel king who oppresses a just people, a depiction that Gower certainly maintains.  
However, Gower provides a much more nuanced analysis of sovereignty and the 
sovereign act by amplifying the central speeches.  Direct discourse not only marks 
Rehoboam’s tyranny but also introduces many of political questions that Gerald Harriss 
felt were absent from the medieval literary model: what acts are valid uses of power? 
What criteria validate the use of sovereign authority?  What is the source of sovereign 
authority?  How is sovereign power properly channeled?  The speeches in the narrative, 
which have little to do with the moral, train the reader to interpret the public sphere 
(Harriss 13).   
About a third of “The Folly of Rehoboam” consists of speeches (mostly direct 
discourse) that analyze the political act of taxation (specifically), and the nature of 
sovereignty (more generally). Gower renders the two critical speeches—that of the 
“comun poeple” and that of the “yonge conseil”—in direct discourse.  The other two 
speeches (the speech of the old counselors who support the commoners and the speech of 
the king who “confourmed” to the young counselors) are reported in indirect discourse.  
It should be noted that even though the purported moral of the story is that a king ought 
to listen to the advice of his older wiser counselors, Gower’s narrative gives greater 
length and weight to the voice of the common people.  The speech of the commoners is 
27 lines of direct discourse, while the speech of the olde conseil is reported in five lines 
of indirect discourse. Gower amplifies and modifies the text of the speeches from I Kings 
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12 such that they come to embody the anxiety between political and majestic rhetoric—
the commoners and the young counselors respectively.  Since these speeches mirror the 
conflict that is the subject of this book, it is worth quoting them at some length. 
The first speech delivered by the commoners with “comun vois” in “Parlement” 
introduces the crisis of the tale.  In the Bible, the people’s speech is relatively short: 
“Your father made our yoke heavy.  Now therefore lighten the hard service of your father 
and his heavy yoke that he placed on us, and we will serve you” (I Kings 12:4).  Gower 
extends this speech by including nine lines of verse in which he explains that Solomon 
taxed the people and made their yoke heavy in order to build the temple.   While many 
medieval texts depict tyrannical kings oppressing their people through taxation, Gower 
shifts the emphasis to a subtler question: what makes an act of sovereign authority 
tyrannical?  Instead of isolating the burden, the heavy yoke that we encounter in the Old 
Testament speech, Gower accentuates the political question of utility.  He demonstrates 
how utility places a limit on sovereign authority.  Since the purpose of the taxation has 
been fulfilled and temple is “al mad” there is,  
no maner nede, 
If thou therof wolt taken hiede, 
To pilen of the poeple more, 
Which long time hath grieved sore. 
And in this wise as we thee seie, 
With tendre herte we thee preie 
That thou relesse thilke dette, 
Which upon ous thi fader sette. 
And if thee like to don so, 
We ben thi men for evermo, 
To gon and comen at thin heste. (VII. 4051-61) 
 
The argument suggests that once the need of the taxation is gone the authority to tax is 
gone as well.  The justness of the political act hinges upon its value to the community: 
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since the temple is “al mad,” and his father “riche deide” the continuation of these taxes 
can only be understood in terms of thievery (“to pilen of the poeple”).100  Unlike majestic 
discourse that treats royal justice as benevolence and authority as derived from above, the 
‘comun vois’ clearly interprets the validity of sovereignty by its effects upon the common 
profit.  
Gower initially constructs the relationship between people and king through a 
language of cautious humility—the people “beseche” and “preie” with “tendre herte.”  
This is how society should look: the majestic structure of society is most natural.  
However, beneath this language of humble addresses, characteristic of the majestic 
tradition, Gower develops political rhetoric from the seemingly throwaway rhyme “taken 
hiede.”  This phrase poses an implicit (soon to be explicit) challenge to sovereign 
authority; it calls for “a recognition of the true power of social groups and interests.” It 
calls political space into being (Crick 16).  Gower appositely concludes this analytical 
narrative of political power with a conditional promise: “if thee like to don so,/ We ben 
thi men.”  The threat is that if the king does not listen to the people then they will not 
recognize his authority.  The conclusion of their speech cuts through the majestic 
decorum of the tenderhearted entreaties and leaves the reader with a blunt analysis of 
sovereign authority as dependent on a political “if.”  
This “if” threatens the young counselors “lusti” concept of kingship.  Instead of 
creating a legal trouthe with the common people (a trouthe resembling Admetus-Alceste 
marriage covenant) by accepting the conditional promise of the people to “bi thi men,” 
                                                
100 That Gower actually spends a line assuring his reader that Solomon died rich suggests that Rehoboam should have 
no pressing need to tax the people further.  This line emphasizes tyranny of Rehoboam’s tax by emphasizing that it has 
no purpose.     
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the young counselors advise the king to don an appearance that will make the people fear 
the king’s power.  The speech of the young counselors despite its bluster reveals the 
weakness of majestic rhetoric:  
Sire, it schal be schame 
For evere unto thi worthi name, 
If thou ne kepe noght the riht, 
Whil thou art in thi yonge myht, 
Which that thin olde fader gat. 
Bot seie unto the poeple plat,   
That whil thou livest in thi lond,  
The leste finger of thin hond 
It schal be strengere overal  
Than was thi fadres bodi al. 
And this also schal be thi tale, 
If he hem smot with roddes smale, 
With Scrorpions thou schalt hem smyte; 
And wher thi fader tok a lyte, 
Thou thenkst to take mochel more. 
Thus schalt thou make hem drede sore 
The grete herte of thi corage, 
So forto holde hem in servage.  (VII. 4079-4096) 
 
The conflict between the young and old counselors turns on the proper relationship of 
power and authority between a king and his subjects. The king is asking how he should 
answer the demands of the commoners. They tell Rehoboam to deliver a rhetorical 
performance that will strike dread into his subjects. He should “seie plat” to the 
commoners: if you dare complain about Solomon’s “roddes smale” you will find them 
replaced with “scorpions.”  The counselors advocate a hyperbolic response that 
emphasizes the power differential to shut down the political demands for compromise 
and foreclose the threatening “taken hiede.”  They reject “mutual recognitions” between 
king and people (‘we ben thi men’), and replace this political exchange-rhetoric with a 
majestic rhetoric in which the “requirement of the consent of the citizen was replaced by 
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the faith of the subjects. . . . The king . . . did not belong to the kingdom” (Ullmann, 
Individual 31).  The king holds the people “in servage.”  
The schame-name rhyme that opens the speech points to the interpretive problem 
at the heart of the exemplum.  The phrase “worthi name” is an English translation of the 
Latin word dignitas, a word central to majestic model of kingship.  By acknowledging the 
requisite demands of the commoners, the king, according to these counselors, would lose 
dignitas, which they immediately associate with the loss of “riht” that his “fader gat.” In 
this political context, the heritable “riht,” which his “olde fader gat,” points to the 
collection of royal rights and privileges called the royal prerogative.   As we see in the 
Mise-documents, the quasi-legal concept of “riht” or iura regis, inherited through the 
father (sui antecessores), pressed uncomfortably against the political concepts of custom 
and community of the realm.  King Henry III refused to respond to the barons’ claims 
because he perceived in their communitas regni-rhetoric the threatening idea that the 
authority of the king was derived and conditional, that a king not only had an ethical 
responsibility but also a legal obligation to the community of the realm. The speeches in 
Rehoboam reenact this historical tension—a tension that had its modern counterpart in 
Richard II.  Since the young counselors can only conceive of “name” as part of the 
majestic rhetoric, their register is entirely determined by this majestic orientation.  
“Schame,” “name,” “strengere” and “myht” can only be understood in terms of 
domination.  Like Arphages in the “Tale of the Three Advisors” strength is external (i.e. 
power over) rather than internal (i.e. power between).  
The ideal of dominion (power over) and its register actually constrain the king: 
Rehoboam “confourmed” to the advice of the young counselors, much as Apeman led 
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Cyrus around “bi his cheke.” If the tone of the counselors’ speech were less intimidating, 
then the word “confourmed” would be less pejorative.  However, the counselors bully the 
king: if you don’t do as we say you will lose your name, your “yonge miht” will be 
weaker than the strength of your “olde fader.”  In this context, the word “confourm” 
reads like capitulation; the insecure need of the young king to protect his name in front of 
his peers.  In carefully calibrated words such as “confourmed,” the reader encounters 
Gower’s astute descriptions of the psychological dimension of sovereignty.  In his 
attempt to demonstrate his dominion, the king reveals that he is a subject.  Tyrannical 
acts are merely part of “fictitious liberty,” and actual slavery.  The psychological lens 
inverts majestic rhetoric and creates a political perspective through which the king 
himself can be judged.     
“The Folly of Rehoboam,” one of Gower’s most overtly political tales, undercuts 
the majestic belief that sovereignty derives immanently from God because the people, in 
an action thoroughly naturalized by Gower, separate the king from his sovereign 
authority when he fails to “take hiede.”  But, more importantly, the tale trains the reader 
to understand sovereignty through a political lens. As in the Mirour, Gower treats 
sovereignty not as a metaphysical homology in which the king-subject relation mirrors 
God-people, but rather as part of a social system that brings unity, which in turn, brings 
about a strong kingship and strengthens the hierarchy.  By emphasizing the conditional 
“if” involved in the relationship between Rehoboam and his people, Gower analyzes 
social mechanisms of sovereignty.  Gower uses “The Folly of Rehoboam” to imagine a 
science of power whose object of analysis is the social reality of rule.  Ultimately, 
Gower’s “The Folly of Rehoboam” is not part of the divine Kings narrative that details 
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Israel’s complex relationship with God; it is a tale about taxation, about measuring the 
utility of sovereign action, about the natural effects of what happens when a sovereign 
oversteps his authority—ultimately it is a tale that interrogates the source of sovereign 
authority. 
 
Framing the Confessio Amantis: A Conversion Story 
The Confessio Amantis ends as it began—as a love story.  Focusing on this love 
story, and the character of Amans in particular, J.A. Burrows argues that Gower uses the 
confessional genre to “chasten” the aberrant and willful love of Amans specifically, and 
fin amours ideology, more generally (“Portrayal” 5-24).  Genius addresses the love-drunk 
state of Amans in overtly confessional language:  
Tak love where it mai not faille: 
For as of this which thou art inne, 
Be that thou seist it is a Sinne, 
And Sinne mai no pris deserve, 
Without pris and who shal serve, 
I not what profit myhte availe. (VIII.2086-2091) 
 
Like the penitent, Amans must turn away from sinful love and submit to that unfailing 
love—a love that Burrow defines in religious terms:  “although the priest of Venus can 
hardly specify . . . the true object of such unfailing love, the Christian implication is 
clear” (“Portrayal” 16).  Though one cannot deny the “Christian implication” in a love 
that “mai not faille,” this love translates into and is expressed by a political love of 
community.  
Entreating Amans to “tak love where it mai not faille,” Gower seems to borrow 
from Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose.  Like Genius, de Meun’s Reason exhorts the 
lover to find a love “all men may attain” (26.159-68): 
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If that love 
Is unattainable, as well may be 
In your case as in others, for your faults, 
I’ll tell you of another—no, the same  
In different guise—which all men may attain. 
It is a mere extension of true love,  
Embracing all mankind, not only one. 
Participating in community 
Of love, you may love all in general, 
And love all loyally. (159-68) 
 
Jean de Meun describes a turning away from singular love towards a civic love. Unlike 
de Meun’s Reason, Gower’s Genius makes no explicit connection between the unfailing 
love and “participating in the community.”  In fact, Genius, adopting a religious register, 
contrasts this unfailing love with “sinne” and later Venus gives Gower rosary beads “por 
reposer.” When Venus gives “Gower” the rosary beads she tells him to pray for peace.  
The political imperative to turn love towards the common profit is couched within 
theological diction and imagery. 
The peculiar addition of Book VII, a mirror for princes, into a confessional genre 
encourages the reader to interpret the Genius’s “scheme of sin” and Amans’s “moral life” 
within a political framework.  The conversion of Amans can be read politically as turn 
away from “singuler” lust (mistakenly called love) towards civic love—a political 
rendering of caritas.   Although both Gower and de Meun advocate civic love, Gower, in 
Book VIII, dramatizes this turn towards “participating in the community.” Amans turns 
towards civic love only after he realizes the absolute limits of his desire:  
For loves lust and lokes hore 
In chambre acorden neveremore, 
And thogh thou feigne a yong corage, 
It scheweth wel be the visage 
That olde grisel is no fole 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Er thou make eny suche assaies 
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To love, and faile upon the fet, 
Betre is to make a beau retret; 
For thogh thou myhtest love atteigne, 
Yit were it bot an ydel peine, 
Whan that thou art noght sufficant  
To holde love his covenant.   (VIII. 2403-7; 2414-20) 
 
The reality of Gower’s impotence is a “historical” fact.  His “beau retret” is brought 
about by the recognition that his will, which allows him to “feigne a yonge corage,” 
simply is not “sufficant” to hold the “covenant.”  One might suggest that Gower 
concludes with a traditional joke at the expense of the senex amans and that civic love is 
simply the default mindset of the old lover that is no longer capable of physical love.  
However, Gower turns the conventional joke into a complex examination of the 
relationship between power and limits.  Amans’s civic love is not simply a passive 
response to impotency; it involves an active acceptance of the limits of his own power, 
which ironically generates his authority.  The ‘joke,’ after all, is not that Gower is 
impotent, but that he realizes for the first time that he is old.  He did not know his limits; 
he did not know himself.  
The Confessio Amantis consistently teases out the ways in which authority 
depends upon an understanding of the limits of one’s power. Darius learns the strength of 
mutual obligations; Lycurgus’s ideal city depends upon a law that stood above kingship; 
and King Rehoboam’s authority is diminished by his attempt to overstep the rational 
limits of authority. “The Folly of Rehoboam,” in fact, provides a useful parallel to 
Amans’s own folly.  Much like Amans, Rehoboam feigns “yonge corage” and his desire 
for youthful strength leads him to accept the advice of his young counselors.  He is under 
the illusion of his own potency.  His illicit desire—illicit because it does not acknowledge 
the actual conditions of his power—allows his counselors to manipulate him and leads to 
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the rebellion that destroys his kingship.  Rehoboam like Amans does not realize that he is 
impotent.  Both figure irrationality as a failure to recognize one’s lack of potency, a 
failure to recognize that voluntas, alone, cannot transcend the worldly limits of the body 
or body politic.    
R.F. Yeager rightfully points out that this recognition is part of a conversion 
narrative anticipated by Amans’s declaration to Venus “I am John Gower.”  As Yeager 
explains: 
the transformation of ‘Amans’ into ‘John Gower’ – an exchange of an 
intertextually referential, generic appellation meaning only ‘Lover’ . . . for a 
unique name of a ‘real’ person who receives both his identity and his life-role (to 
become a poet by praying for peace) [occurs] simultaneous with the death of his 
passion. (Yeager 234) 
 
Yeager’s description of Confessio as a conversion narrative, like Augustine or Dante, 
shows the way that the poem creates a kind of “Archimedean point” through which a 
dead past can be re-examined and thus re-incorporated.  However, it is a complicated 
conversion that turns our attention not towards some new spiritual truth causing this 
“reincorporation,” but rather towards the birth of the political man through the rejection 
of a “dead” and impotent majestic rhetoric.  As a lover he could not have a role precisely 
because he sought profit without “availe.”  Once he has submitted his relationship to the 
community creates the “life-role” as Arionic poet praying for peace.  The conversion is 
one that establishes his relation to the community.  Gower’s frame and poetic project as a 
whole can be best understood, not as a single conversion but rather as three imbricated 
conversions: on a literal level as a conversion of Amans (lit. Loving) to John Gower poet 
“praying for peace,” on a narrative level as a conversion of fin amour ideology towards a 
political rhetoric, and on a thematic level as a conversion from majestic sovereign 
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strength sanctioned by the “cosmic framework” to political strength derived from the 
community of the realm.    
This refusal to relate narrative particulars of his exempla “to eternity” establishes 
the narrative time necessary for what Simpson calls “a secular science of politics” 
(Simpson 273) Gower refuses to embrace a narrative structure in which readers once they 
grasp the “kernel,” or divine meaning of an event, can cast aside the “husk,” the narrative 
itself.  As we have seen in each of the tales discussed in this chapter, Gower’s poetry 
exposes how majestic narrative form supported a narrow hierarchical structure in which 
the king and his elite barons controlled all national political power.  Gower’s poetry, 
shaped by a political rhetoric that emerged in the thirteenth century, turned the narrative 
conventions of fin amour literature into a site of conflict, and, from this conflict, the 
contours of political science began to come into view. By destabilizing the metaphysical 
façade of sovereignty Gowerian narrative embodies this emerging “science” and renders 
a new political order intelligible.   
Gower’s narrative time, like the Song of Lewes, allows him to reconfigure reason 
as a political principle in service of the community of the realm.  Accordingly, the law, 
exemplified by Lycurgus, is the institutionalized conscience of the state.  Law creates the 
“Archimedean point” through which king, lords, and commoners can be incorporated into 
a body politic—a body politic based on recognizing the social limits of personal power. 
Just as Richard in order to become king must promise “to grant and keep . . . the laws and 
customs given to them by previous just and God-fearing kings,” Amans must submits to 
the court of Venus to become John Gower.  Social conversion represented the creation of 
an individual identity through a submission of the will to the common profit. 
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This concept of conversion embodies the psychology of the state slowly 
constructed out of John of Salisbury’s Policraticus in which the actions of temporal king 
can be judged against idealized prince.101  During the Second Barons’ War, those actions 
that harmed that realm were deemed as irrational and thus without authority.  The king’s 
authority was dependent on the community of the realm.  Like Cicero, Gower frames 
reason as a civic faculty aimed at securing the common profit, or summa bonum of the 
community.  As such, reason and sovereignty are represented as a trouthe bond with the 
community embodied by law and secured by the coronation oath.  
Gower’s construction of sovereignty, like the political model advanced by the 
Common Enterprise, imagines power as a sacred, dynamic and temporal bond between 
the king and the communitas regni. Even at the end of the poem, Gower refuses to 
“strecche towards hevene,” but instead, turning back towards natural time, he promises to 
“wende unto trouthe.”  The vision of the poem frees Gower from the “peine” of his love-
sin, but it does not release him from the secular (i.e. time bound) constrictions of the 
poem: he does not come face to face with the Empyrean, but rather the rejected lover and 
senex amans confronts the worldly limits of authority and laboriously continues his 
Arionic song. 
                                                
101 It is important to recognize that this early model, primarily aimed at extending regal authority, provided very little in 
the way of actually constraining royal power and left the reader with the conventional language of the Secreta 
Secretorum in which the king ought to restrain his own will.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FROM KING’S PEACE READER’S PEACE: CHAUCER’S SOCIO-POLITICAL 
HERMENEUTICS 
In this chapter, I examine how Chaucer’s poetry arises out of a “crisis of 
authority.”1  However, this does not mean that I will be looking for the connections 
between Richard’s tumultuous rule and Chaucer’s poetry: I will not attempt to ferret out 
his allegiances, show how he responds to topical events, or examine his particular ideas 
about policy or the machinations of government.  Instead, I will show how Chaucer’s 
poetry negotiates the tension between political and majestic rhetoric, two modes of 
legitimizing authority that structure the way one perceives the world.  What may be a 
source of confusion is how political or majestic rhetoric shapes narrative material that 
seems to have little to do with questions of governance.  In other words, I will be arguing 
that political rhetoric not only shapes the obvious political moments of the Canterbury 
Tales, such as Prudence’s Fürstenspiegel advice to her husband, but it also shapes more 
emotionally charged and seemingly apolitical scenes such as the death of Arcite.  
Let me point to this death scene in order to demonstrate how narrative moments 
embody the anxieties of the discourse of sovereignty. Toward the end of the Knight’s 
Tale Arcite, who has lived a life disordered by erotic passion, dies with stoic calm: 
What is this world? What asketh men to have? 
Now with his love, now in his colde grave 
Allone, withouten any compaignye. 
Fare wel, my sweete foo, my Emelye! 
And softe taak me in your armes tweye, 
For love of God and herkneth what I seye 
                                                
1 The phrase deliberately echoes Lynn Staley Languages 98.  Lynn Staley account of late fourteenth-century England 
refracted through the lens of Ricardian poets was an early impetus for this dissertation.  The argument of this 
dissertation situates this crisis within the broader historical development of the languages of power.   
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.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
So Juppiter have of my soule part, 
As in this world right now ne knowe I non 
So worthy to be loved as Palamon, 
That serveth yow, and wol doon al his lyf, 
And if that evere ye shul ben a wyf, 
Foryete nat Palamon, the gentil man. 
And with that word his speche faille gan . . .” (I. 2777-82; 2792-8)2 
 
It is unlikely that, at first glance, most readers would find anything in Arcite’s mournful 
dying speech they would call political.  We experience, as we should, the pathos of 
Arcite’s existential confrontation with death; we sense the small heroics in the dying 
lover telling Emelye to “foryete nat” the very person who, to some degree, caused his 
loss; and through Arcite’s eyes, imagining ourselves “in the cold grave/Allone,” we 
engage in a kind of memento mori.3  One may reasonably ask what could Arcite’s death 
have to do with the royal prerogative or the common profit? We expect political readings 
to focus on particular historical questions: how does Chaucer’s poetry address the 
Merciless Parliament?  What was the effect of the 1381 Uprising? Who was Chaucer 
supporting—Appellants? The king?  And yet, I will suggest that Arcite’s heroic pivot in 
this passage, from grave to marriage—the same pivot Theseus makes in the first mover 
speech—arises out of (or perhaps gives rise to), what I have called, the political 
imagination; and in this same vein Arcite should be understood as a political hero who 
calls for the continuation of community in the face of death. 
The emotional effect of this speech depends upon a political perspective. Arcite’s 
brooding questions, meditation on death, and even his stoic farewell to his “sweete foe” 
                                                
2 Here and throughout, citations of The Canterbury Tales are from Larry Benson’s The Riverside Chaucer.  3rd ed. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). 
 
3 This is particularly compelling because both Arcite and Palamon usually see the events of the story through the bias 
of their jealousies, a trait that Lee Patterson ascribes to their “Thebanness.”  This produces a kind of social blindness 
that leads to a cycle of violence (Chaucer 198-204).  This political response disrupts the Theban pattern. 
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reminds the reader of Cicero’s enjoinder: “to philosophize is to know how to die.”  The 
story of Arcite’s love and death assume near cosmic dimensions: What is this world?  
What should people ask of it?  However, these philosophical questions are frustrated by 
the concrete realism of Chaucer’s line “Now with his love, now in his colde grave.” As 
we move from loving to dying—from now to now—without so much as a conjunction or 
a transition, what meaning can make sense of this world?  Unable to answer, “what is this 
world?” Arcite turns from cosmos back to community.  After imaging the loss of “his 
love,” Arcite imagines the absence of any “compaignye,” a word that implies the wider 
community and, most obviously, the pilgrims of the frame who are “wel nyne and twenty 
in a compaignye” (I.24).  Envisioning the loss of this community, Arcite does not turn his 
speech inward; he does not entreat Emeleye “foryete nat” Arcite; he does not, like his 
Theban predecessors, Oedipus or Polynices, curse or kill his cousin, but rather facing the 
meaninglessness of the “colde grave” he turns toward marriage—the marriage of Emelye 
and Palamon.  The call for community, to appropriate a metaphor of Charles Muscatine, 
stands against death much like bulwark “against the ever-threatening force of chaos” 
(Muscatine, Chaucer 81).4   
Arcite’s yearning is answered with heavy silence.  It is precisely this silence that 
will allow Chaucer throughout the Canterbury Tales to address political questions 
“without recourse to higher theological explanations” (Nolan 250n15).5  More important 
than Chaucer’s secular “explanations,” what “he wants to say (veut dire),” is how his 
narrative reorients our perspective, how his narrative allows the reader to experience a 
                                                
4 Muscatine is speaking particularly about the relationship between the style of the tale and its relation to the “noble 
life.”  I will argue that the resistance to chaos involves a political turn. 
 
5 See also Spearing 46. 
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shift from cosmic to prudential perspective—a shift that mirrors the change underway in 
the discourse of sovereignty.6  The emotional force of Arcite’s death scene—like many 
others in The Canterbury Tales—is governed by an abrupt turn from metaphysics to 
‘political realism.’7   
 Community, symbolized by earthly love, offers a provisional answer to Arcite’s 
questions—an answer that is both unsatisfactory and heroic precisely because it is 
unsatisfactory.  Arcite’s use of the word “love” anticipates Theseus’s application of the 
Boethian chain of love in his first mover speech.  Chaucer’s addition of the “chain of 
love,” which Boethius describes as “the holy knot of marriage” which joins people “by 
sacred bond of treaty,” (2.m.8) accentuates the connection between marriage and 
sovereignty central to the Knight’s Tale, and, indeed, the Canterbury Tales as a whole.8  
After all the violence, it is this love that Arcite calls for as his breath “gan faille.”  In 
Theseus’s terms—we see the very moment here that society “enduren by successiouns” 
(I.3014). 
In Chapter II, I examined how an “emergent” political rhetoric evolved from, 
accommodated, challenged and often elided aspects of “dominant” majestic rhetoric.9  In 
short, I have demonstrated how this rhetoric gave rise to political imagination fraught 
                                                
6 For an extended discussion of Foucault’s separation of “veut dire” and a performative model of literature, see 
Macherey 147-56. 
 
7 As I argue in my introduction, political realism should not be mistaken with modern conceptions of realism (i.e. 
Flaubert or Hardy). Instead, it involves an increased awareness of the actual conditions of power in history, the natural 
mechanisms of power, and the forces of historical contingency, what Patterson calls “causal historiography” (Chaucer 
86-99) Here, political realism is a turn away from a particular model of Christian historiography in which the 
“succession of particulars itself” reveals “nothing of importance.”  See J.G.A. Pocock Machiavellian 8. Barbara Nolan 
makes a similar observation regarding the “unromantic, clinical description of the death-in-process” of Arcite in 
Chaucer and the Tradition of the Roman Antique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257.  
 
8 All Consolation citations from Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Victor Watts, trans.,  2nd ed.  
 
9 The words dominant and emergent adapt “emergent and dominant hegemonies;” see Williams 108-115.   
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with anxiety and potential.  The purpose of this chapter is to read moments such as 
Arcite’s death speech as part of the changing landscape of the political imagination: 
Arcite’s speech has political content, and more importantly this content requires a new 
narrative architecture to express it.  Here I will focus on how the political 
experimentation of the thirteenth century fostered a new “social imaginary.”  Peggy 
Knapp usefully defines the “social imaginary” as the “free play of possibilities” that 
possess an “aesthetic force that binds loyalties and consolidates structures of feeling” 
(157).10  The relationship between loyalties and imaginary structures is crucial for my 
argument, since rhetoric, and thus narrative (as a part of rhetoric), create the real and 
imagined lines of cooperation necessary for political organization; new loyalties require 
new aesthetics.  Ricardian poets developed a narrative structure that accommodated the 
changing structure of loyalties brought on by the expansion of the political class (i.e. the 
class of people who had meaningful access to the levers of power). 
The relationship between political realities and narrative architecture carries broad 
implications best understood as features of an ‘imagined community,’ to borrow a term 
from Benedict Anderson.11  For Anderson, loyalty—including the kind of loyalty you 
will die for—is an imaginary construct.  However, whereas Anderson focuses on 
imagined communities (“worked out” ideas of State), my argument examines the 
discursive process of imagining a community—the “active moment of creation.”12  Let 
                                                
10 Knapp discusses the relation of the social imaginary to narrative that Paul Ricoeur discusses in From Text to Action.  
  
11 For an extended discussion of “imagined community” in the Canterbury Tales, see Knapp 155-75. 
 
12 Robert Venturi suggest that historiography rarely accounts for the transformations (the “moment of active creation”) 
necessary to bring about new “structures mentales” (14).  In Ricardian poetry, we see the working out of the problems 
of sovereign legitimacy that are, as Anderson points out, central to the development of nation in the long eighteenth 
century.   
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me be clear, I do not think, as some do, that Chaucer had a fully developed vision of the 
English nation, but rather, by imagining political kingship, he engages the questions at 
the heart of the modern idea of nation—he is participating in what might now be called 
the discourse of nation. Political rhetoric aligns with the discourse of nation insofar as it 
shifts loyalty from a personal king toward an administrative Crown.  However, as the 
metaphor ‘Crown’ itself suggests—a metaphor quite obviously imbricated with the king 
who wears it—this transformation of loyalty from the personal to the institutional, 
required a lengthy period of disengagement and a reworking of shared language.13   
The shift from a world ruled by a personal king like Henry III to a political 
kingship transforms not only the nature of government but also the conception of the 
universe and one’s place in it.  And consequently it changes the stories we tell and how 
we tell them.  As Anderson points out, the modern idea of the nation to arise only after:  
three fundamental cultural conceptions, all of great antiquity, lost their axiomatic 
grip on men’s minds.  The first of these was the idea that a particular script 
language offered privileged access to ontological truth . . . second was the belief 
that society was naturally organized around high centres – monarchs who were 
persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of 
cosmological (divine) dispensation . . . Third was the conception of temporality in 
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable (Anderson 40). 
 
What is particularly compelling about Anderson’s “imagined communities,” from a 
literary standpoint, is that the community depends upon the structures of the narrative 
imagination—time, cosmology and language.  In Chapter II, I have shown how the 
development of political constitutionalism in the thirteenth century began to challenge 
these “fundamental cultural conceptions . . . of great antiquity.” In this chapter, I intend to 
                                                
13 Broadly, Ernst Kantorowicz argues that the Crown allows jurists to separate the private will of the personal king 
from the corporate public entity of the king.  Specifically, he traces the discursive separation of personal king and 
Crown to the seventh century, suggesting that the distinction is a variation of princeps-respublica and papa-papatus 
from the papal tradition; see 336-382, particularly 359n159.   
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demonstrate how Chaucerian narrative accommodates and fosters these socio-political 
changes.  In elaborate and often schematic meditations on prudence, authors and political 
thinkers of the late fourteenth century developed an increasingly “practical wisdom” of 
politics.14  Chaucer’s political poetry and his narrative adaptations shape and are shaped 
by the development of a prudential rhetoric.   While I do not discuss Chaucer’s decision 
to write in the vernacular, a matter too broad and well traversed for the confines of this 
work, I do examine how Chaucerian language emphasizes the distance between 
experience and “ontological truth.”15  
Political rhetoric shares much in common with what has been regarded as the 
middle class ethos. Anne Middleton’s definition of “public poetry” or “bourgeois style” 
provides a lucid outline of many of the values I locate in political rhetoric: 
a coherent set of ethical attitudes toward the world—experientially based, 
vernacular, simple, pious but practical, active—and the poetry that gives 
expression to this essentially high minded secularism.  (Middleton 112)  
 
Middleton usefully demonstrates that an “experientially based, vernacular, simple, pious 
but practical, [and] active” voice characterizes Ricardian poetry.  These “attitudes” are 
part of a political rhetoric that rejects “presumptive reasoning” that had reproduced a 
cosmic framework throughout the early Middle Ages.16  In other words, public poetry is 
the aesthetic crystallization of the political rhetoric.  This crystallization was part of the 
“working out” of a new civic consciousness that affected not only the content of narrative 
                                                
14 J.D. Burnley shows how Chaucer’s depictions of prudence and ire, particularly in the Knight’s Tale and Melibee are 
part of a larger shift in the fourteenth century in Chaucer’s Language and the Philosopher’s Tradition (Cambridge: 
D.S. Brewer, 1979), 44-63. 
 
15 It is important to note that “ontological truth” had little to do with actual nature of being.  Instead, Anderson means 
those truths, jealously guarded by the elite class, ideas deployed to maintain hierarchy.  
 
16 Citing Edmund Burke, J.G.A. Pocock defines “presumptive reasoning” as a process in which “the goodness of a 
good custom can be inferred from its preservation” (15).  
 181 
but its architecture as well.17 Middleton often describes “public poetry” as a category, 
indeed as almost a genre of Ricardian poetry—claiming for example that Gower’s plaints 
fit the model of “public poetry” better than Chaucer’s satires.  The term becomes a mode 
of categorization rather than a historical tool, which Middleton herself admits.18   
Historicizing Middleton’s argument, I will treat “public poetry” as a rhetorical 
outgrowth of political constitutionalism.  By looking at “public poetry” as political 
rhetoric (i.e. performative language aimed at creating political coalitions), I am more 
interested in the “conditions of literary production:” how this poetry is rooted in, 
structurally entangled with, and in perpetual conflict with majestic rhetoric (a 
performative language that reproduces elitist coalitions of power).  I use Middleton’s 
description of public poetry to analyze ways that “ethical attitudes” and “high minded 
secularism” (what I have preferred to call political theology) are part of a continuing 
internal dynamic within the discourse of sovereignty driven by the engine of political 
constitutionalism.  Chaucerian aesthetics bends away from the “fundamental cultural 
conceptions” of the cosmic framework toward  “experientially based” social order.19  
This chapter begins with an analysis of The Knight’s Tale, precisely because, as 
the inaugural tale, it registers the shift in language, cosmology and temporality from a 
                                                
17 Whereas majestic narratives, informed by pseudo-Dionysian cosmology, fostered a hermeneutic in which “each 
particular in its relation to eternity and to pass the succession of particulars itself as revealing nothing of importance” 
(Pocock, Machiavellian 8), Chaucer elevates what Middleton calls “worldliness” and historic time (94-114). 
 
18 Middleton briefly suggests that guilds or the efflorescence of a middle class may have led to the production of public 
poetry but concludes saying, “I leave it to others to speculate, beyond these brief suggestions, as to the causes, both in 
social fact and social myth, that made the last quarter of the fourteenth century especially congenial to the development 
of a poetic “common voice” (112). 
 
19 What is often referred to as “secular” is really part of a political theology that emphasized that the prince had a divine 
obligation to the communitas regni.  As a result narrative focuses more on the relationship between the king and the 
realm than the king’s role as Vicar of Christ. I will often use the word ‘secular’ because it fits my work into the larger 
scholarly discussions about Chaucer’s secularization of ethics such as A. J. Minnis’s Chaucer and Pagan Antiquity, 
A.C. Spearing’s Medieval to Renaissance in English Poetry, and Barbara Nolan’s Chaucer and the Tradition of the 
Roman Antique. 
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majestic rhetoric (more in line with pseudo-Dionysius) to a political (prudential) rhetoric 
that secures authority.20  Next, I show how the conflict between majestic and political 
rhetoric manifests as a tension between allegorical and ‘realist’ readings of Walter in the 
Clerk’s Tale. And, fittingly, the chapter ends with the Tale of Melibee, Chaucer’s most 
nuanced rendering of political rhetoric—a tale in which Prudence’s rhetoric most clearly 
addresses the actual conditions of power.     
What I am calling the political perspective has often been described under the 
aegis of a new middle class voice—a theory some call ‘the middle class thesis.’  This 
makes sense since the idea of nation is, itself, often tied to the rise of the middle class.21 
Crucially, this thesis (particularly as developed by Paul Strohm and Anne Middleton) 
focuses attention on the relationship between political conditions and poetry; and many of 
the common beliefs of the English late Middle Ages that Middleton or Strohm identify as 
born out of a middle class ethos (i.e. social tolerance, aversion to violence and 
commitment to pacifism) are products of the longstanding conflict between majestic and 
political rhetoric.  Since my discussion of political rhetoric borrows from the middle class 
thesis, it is imperative to address not only how I will expand upon this scholarship, but 
also explain how the term “political rhetoric” more accurately reflects the historical 
conditions that give rise to “public poetry.”   
Let me begin then with a précis of the middle class thesis. While it can be found 
as early as G. K. Chesterton’s description of Chaucer as a figure that “bestrides the gap 
between” “bourgeois” and “chivalric” systems, it is Paul Strohm, in his Social Chaucer, 
                                                
20 For a full discussion of the pseudo-Dionysian cosmology and the secular justification of kingship (and its fifth 
century origins), see Ullmann, Principles 146-56. 
 
21 For lengthy discussion of the middle class or middle strata introduced new values, see Paul Strohm, Social Chaucer 
(Ch. 1.) 
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who provides the most developed and often cited expressions of this thesis (Chesterton 
39).  Broadly, Strohm argues that an anti-hierarchical attitude erupts from “the middle-
strata.22   For the most part thirteenth- and fourteenth-century descriptions of society 
remained “deferential to the principles of hierarchy.”  However, some practical 
documents reveal “alternative” descriptions of society developing in the fourteenth 
century—descriptions that he suggests develop out of the changing fortunes of the middle 
strata in the fourteenth century (Strohm 5).  For example, the 1367 Statute of Diet and 
Apparel, establishing the proper dress for each class, proclaims that “those who ‘clearly’ 
possess ‘biens & chateux” to the value of 500L are entitled to attire themselves in the 
manner of esquires and gentlepersons with lands and rents worth L100 annually” (Strohm 
5-7).  The statute points to the development of a dual hierarchy in which a 500L member 
of the “middle strata” is—at least in sumptuary terms—equal to a 100L nobleman. 
According to the typical formulation of the middle class thesis, the dual hierarchy and the 
Chaucerian aesthetic are spontaneous attempts to negotiate the contradictions between 
“chivalric” Chaucer and “bourgeois” Chaucer;23 that is, the conditions that necessitate a 
solution have precedent, but the solution is seen as novel. 
However, this statute not only shows the formation of a dual hierarchy but also 
reveals that the alternative “social description” is entangled within the traditional 
description of majestic authority—the language of clothes. Anxiety over clothing arises 
out of the sumptuary logic majestic rhetoric most vividly expressed in the coronation 
                                                
22 The term "middle strata" allows us to imagine a disorganized group of people that share characteristics without being 
part of a class in any meaningful sense.  I would suggest that the rhetoric aimed at expanding the political class turned 
this “strata” into a class.   
 
23 For a discussion concerning Chaucer’s particular position within the social hierarchy, see Strohm, Social Chaucer, 
10-13:10-11. 
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ceremony. What Strohm calls ‘the alternative descriptions of society’ did not arise 
naturally out of the amorphous middle strata, but rather embodied the tension between 
majestic ideals of nobility and the political need to incorporate select members of the 
middle strata into the political class.24 The statute embodies a political solution to a 
majestic conflict, which helps illuminate Pocock’s tautological description of language as 
that which “determines what can be said in it, but is capable of being modified by what is 
said in it” (Concept 20).  The middle strata were not solely, or even primarily, responsible 
for the vocabulary, terms, or conditions for a “middle class” rhetoric or ethos.  In fact, 
one may reasonably say the “middle class ethos” was not created by the “middle class,” 
but for them, as a rhetoric aimed at creating lines of cooperation between the aristocracy 
and upper echelon of the middle strata.25 
Ricardian cultural production did not arise spontaneously as part of the formation 
of a new class, but in fact arose out of a political ideology. By understanding the 
“bourgeois style” or the ideals of “felaweshipe” not as associated with the defined 
interests of a specific group, but rather as an imaginary construct aimed at forming new 
coalitions, we get a better sense of the kind of social problematic that Chaucer’s poetry 
engages.  To this end, Lee Patterson comes closest to describing the source of this new 
voice when he argues Chaucer’s style arises from an emergent gentleman-bureaucrat 
                                                
24 The Poll Tax, for example, shows the desire to maintain a separation between nobility and non-noble wealth, but 
recognizes the need to take their money at proportional rate.   
 
25 The association of the political rhetoric with the middle class—such that its sympathies may even be seen as 
spontaneously arising from the middle class—makes sense because the political rhetoric of the thirteenth-century 
barons sought to articulate the middle class to the Commun Enterprise.  In other words, the rhetoric imagines a middle 
class by interpellating it. For example, while critics stress the anti-hierarchical nature of the “bourgeois style,” they 
must embarrassingly admit that once you get beyond the relatively more associational overtures of Chaucer’s universe, 
most of his poetry reinforces hierarchical social organization in which parliaments and public meetings tend to produce 
foolish advice (i.e. Clerk’s Tale and Melibee).  What has changed, in fact, is not hierarchy, but the foundations of 
hierarchy—not vertical/horizontal, but majestic/political.   
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mentality that was grounded in civil service.  Patterson, like those who advocate the 
middle class thesis, suggests an aesthetic arises from this new group to meet its apparent 
needs.  Reversing the polarity, I would suggest that the new bureaucratic group and its 
ethos does not innocently express the aspirations of Ricardian arrivistes, but arises out of 
a thirteenth-century political rhetoric aimed at creating lines of cooperation between the 
aristocracy and the middle-strata.26  The translation of thirteenth-century political rhetoric 
(i.e. the obligations of the barons to oppose Henry III for the sake of the community of 
the realm) into fourteenth-century juristic thought manifests in jurors’ attitudes toward 
the obligations of the king and administration toward the Crown.27 The gentleman-
bureaucrat constitutes the exact point of articulation between the nobility and select 
members of the middle strata.   
Chaucer’s and Gower’s political perspectives are consistent with political 
constitutionalism of the thirteenth century.  Their poetry does not merely address new 
conditions, but arises out of and is conditioned by a particular historical rhetoric. Unlike a 
class movement where we would expect exertion of pressure (i.e. supporting 1381 
Uprising), this rhetoric aims for peaceful integration while simultaneously developing a 
critique of royal prerogative.  Proponents of the middle class thesis tend to map aesthetic 
forms onto imagined new social configurations (indeed often using literature to imagine 
these relationships).  David Wallace, for example, suggests that Chaucer’s middle class 
                                                
26 According to Patterson, Chaucer was part of an influx of lay administrators into government positions that began in 
the fourteenth century and became common in the early 15th century.  Chaucer’s poetry is informed by a civil servant 
ethos in which the “distinction between personal service to the king and administrative service to the Crown” was 
becoming increasingly apparent (37); see Chaucer 37-9.  For an important discussion of the developing ethos of the 
civil servant and the “gentleman-bureaucrat,” see Storey 90-129. 
 
27 For example, Baldus asserts: “all kings in the world have to swear at their coronation to conserve the rights of their 
realm and the honor of the Crown,” and Petrus de Ancharano “the king, at the time of his coronation swears not to 
alienate the things of the kingdom” (qtd. in Kantorowicz 357-58). 
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politics and poetics of the associational polity made him a kindred spirit with the fierce 
republican polemicist Albertano Brescia, who wrote the Liber Consolationis, a book that 
indirectly became Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee.28  However, this downplays the caution and 
circumspection with which Chaucer’ “engages the ethics of history by deflecting the 
consequences of its demand for public commitment” (Warren Ginsberg 263).29  His 
circumspection is not merely a product of self-censorship, but is consistent with civic 
ideals of the gentleman-bureaucrat.  Chaucer’s associational polity is not Albertano’s 
republic, but a measured form of political kingship focused on unity and unanimity.  In 
her review of Chaucerian Polity, Louise Fradenburg asks us to reevaluate the intersection 
between political interests and the Chaucerian political aesthetic embodied through her 
critique of Wallace’s term “associational polity”: 
whose ethical or political vision is being served when Chaucer is read as a poet 
distinguished above all by his ability to balance social antagonisms, to effect a 
‘conjunction of court, religious, urban, and commercial worlds’ and, thereby, 
create a ‘handbook for go-betweens.’ 30  (221).  
 
Fradenburg’s question forces us to look for a more nuanced understanding of the 
Wallace’s “associational polity.”  I will suggest this “associational polity” is a rhetorical 
fiction that shapes and is shaped by political constitutionalism.  Insofar as this serves the 
interests of the middle class, it does so by advocating a kind of political quietism meant 
                                                
28 David Wallace 212-23.   
 
29 While I agree with Ginsberg’s argument, I think it is important to stress that Chaucer fosters a new civic imagination 
even as he minimizes the demand for “public commitment.”  
 
30 Louise Fradenburg argues that Wallace’s description of Chaucer and Albertanus as “kindred spirits” elides 
significant differences between the two authors: “Wallace's detailed account of Albertano's political circumstancing 
helps to explain why Chaucer, struggling to negotiate forms of polity, might have found Albertano's work moving. But, 
at the same time, Wallace's account makes ineluctably clear the gulf that separates the two men. Albertano did not 
spend his career avoiding Usk-like fates or balancing hierarchical versus associational claims from within monarchical 
culture; he took enormous risks to defend republican polity.”  Louise Fradenburg.  “Chaucerian Polity (Book Review):” 
quotations from page 15. 
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to ingratiate this class with nobility.  In this sense Chaucer’s “associational polity” does 
not represent the radical republicanism that landed Albertano of Brescia in prison, but 
Robert Peel’s “enlightened conservatism” that insulated England from the revolutionary 
politics that embroiled the continent in the 19th century.31  Chaucer is not advocating 
rebellion, but reminding the king that legitimate power is strong precisely because it is 
not undermined by the erotic violence of power (Arcite and Palamon), because it does not 
succumb to the myth of its own absolutism (Walter), and because it balances its own 
desires against the conditions of power on the ground (Melibee). 
Chaucer had ties with both Ricardian and Lancastrian factions: he was a civil 
servant for the king, and gentleman-bureaucrat at a time when the prestige of civil service 
was increasing and the authority of the Crown/King was threatened.32  However, 
Chaucer’s poetry does not litigate the crisis of authority.  Chaucer’s political rhetoric 
addresses the deep fissures within the discourse of sovereignty without advocating civic 
activism, revolution or taking a side in the king-baron crisis.  One cannot, satisfactorily, 
read it as either royalist or Appellant.  The king was concerned with his prerogative, the 
barons with their prerogative—no one was talking, like Montfort, of expanding the 
political class.  However, it is exactly this voice that shapes Ricardian poetic sensibility—
a new “public poetry” born out of the rhetoric of political kingship that flourished among 
fourteenth-century juristic thought.33  Chaucerian narrative embodies the political 
                                                
31 For a discussion of “enlightened conservatism,” see Wallerstein 64.  
 
32 For Chaucer’s specific relations to political factions, see Strohm, Social Chaucer 24-46. 
 
33 Kantorowicz describes the fourteenth-century rhetoric of the impersonal crown particularly as it draws upon ideas of 
inalienability 354-58. 
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sympathies and world-view born out of thirteenth-century political constitutionalism—a 
model that simultaneously induces and resolves the “crisis of authority.”  
Whether telling stories about kings or querulous wives, Chaucer’s tales focus on 
questions of sovereignty at a time when any idea of sovereignty was itself fractured. 
While I could look at the issues raised by the Wife or Harry Bailley, I have chosen, for 
this chapter, to examine those tales about lords and kings (the Knight’s Tale, the Clerk’s 
Tale and Melibee) not just for their overt representations of majestic and political 
authority, but more because these representations inspired “disenchanted” narratives 
giving new space for civic values of Ciceronian prudence.34   Often through the 
reenactment of the collapse of majestic rhetoric, Chaucer develops a social aesthetic that 
accommodates political rhetoric.  In the Melibee, Chaucer even fosters a new civic 
register. In the end, this is not a matter of provenance—of nailing down the right origins 
of the Ricardian public poetry; it is about creating a lens that helps us understand many of 
the aspects of public poetry that seem mismatched—the quietism of Chaucer’s 
antihierarchalism, his disdain for associational structures in poetry so engaged in the 
associational polity, a model of sovereignty that gains power by divesting itself of power, 
and a consistent reinforcement of hierarchy working alongside some of his more leveling 
rhetoric.   
I demonstrate how political thought (what might be seen as the explicit political 
content of the tales) shapes the narrative architecture.  Of course, when attributing any 
meaning to narrative architecture, one ought to recognize that a narrative structure can 
                                                
34 Marshall Leicester describes disenchantment as “the perception that what had been thought to be other-originated, 
the product of transcendent forces not directly susceptible of human tampering and subversion, is in fact humanly 
originated, the product of human creation” (26).   
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become a blank screen upon which the critic projects their whims and fantasies.35  For 
this reason, I have looked at the Knight’s Tale, the Clerk’s Tale and Melibee—tales 
where both tale and teller seem directly concerned about questions of sovereignty as they 
relate to lordship or kingship (as opposed to the Wife of Bath’s explicit desire for 
domestic sovereignty). Instead of looking at the general narrative features of the 
Canterbury Tales, I focus on how the political content shapes the narrative changes 
within the tale:  How the Knight has Theseus adapt his narrative structure to 
accommodate new realities of power, how the Clerk’s critiques of Walter shape the 
reader’s perception of majestic authority and how Melibee’s failed understanding of 
authority force Prudence to adopt new argumentative methods.36 
 
The Knight’s Tale: The Collapse of Majesty and Intimations of a Political Order 
The Knight’s Tale is one of Chaucer’s more lengthy meditations on the complex 
intersection between language and power—what Staley has aptly called the “semiotics of 
power” (Staley 2).37 I will demonstrate the tale self-consciously addresses the semiotics 
of power by looking at two rhetorical developments that shape the tale: first how Theban 
                                                
35 See Stanley Fish’s critique of stylistics in “What is Stylistics and Why are They Saying Such Terrible Things About 
It? –Part II,” 129-146. 
 
36 My work on Chaucer focuses on a problematic similar to the one Lee Patterson examined in his groundbreaking 
study Chaucer and the Subject of History.  However, by making the gentleman-bureaucrat part of a vanguard 
movement, Patterson, treating Chaucer as a proto-Marxist critic, shows how his tales and their narrative architecture 
critiques the received discourse of sovereignty.  What is missing from Patterson’s analysis is the positive political 
vision that Chaucerian narrative suggests. He does not acknowledge the importance of thirteenth-century political 
thought to the Chaucer’s positive worldview. So the Knight’s Tale is a critique of chivalry, Melibee the failure of the 
Fürstenspiegel genre, and even his assertion that the Clerk’s Tale is a critique of majestic authority ignores the political 
rhetoric that shapes this critique. I think it is time to revisit this the question with an eye toward how Chaucerian poetics 
espouses and enacts the political constitutionalism born out of the thirteenth century and embodied in the fourteenth-
century gentleman bureaucrat.  For Patterson’s take on the Knight’s Tale see Chaucer 165-230; for his discussion on 
the Clerk’s Tale and the Tale of Melibee see Temporal Circumstances 97-128 and 51-65 respectively. 
 
37 According to Lynn Staley the political violence from Merciless Parliament forward disrupted traditional modes of 
representing power.  Poets Gower, Chaucer, and Clanvowe and Usk sought an appropriate means of addressing 
authority; see Languages Ch. 1.   
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rhetoric, an erotic language of power governed by desire, undermines social bonds; and 
second how Theseus both resists this rhetoric of desire and establishes a rhetoric of 
kingship that restores tentative balance to the Athenian polity. It is, I think, precisely the 
fragility of the Athenian order at the close of the tale that critics, like Elizabeth Salter are 
responding to when they describe the tale as “expressing best not the great orthodoxies of 
medieval faith, but the stubborn truths of human experience” (Fourteenth Century 180) 
Because of the absence of great orthodoxies of medieval faith, critics suggest that the 
Knight’s Tale describes a benighted view of power that lacks grace.  Instead of 
comparing the Knight’s Tale to a Christian model of kingship (an approach that has its 
own rewards), I will examine how the absence of a Christian framework allows Chaucer 
to create a rhetoric of kingship that does not illicitly appropriate the workings of 
Providence. 
By tracing out the relationship between royal will and cosmic framework, the 
Knight’s Tale explores how cosmology is used rhetorically to justify royal power and as 
he seeks to “define the nature of royal power” (Staley, Languages 75), Chaucer 
recalibrates the relationship between language and what Anderson calls the “ontological 
truth” (Anderson 40).  Theseus’s attempts to define the divine source of his authority 
demonstrate that majestic descriptions of royal power still had a strong grip on the 
medieval political imaginary. Indeed, from the “noble theatre” to the first mover speech, 
Theseus describes kingship in majestic terms. However, I will demonstrate that the king’s 
majestic rhetoric undergoes a dramatic transformation.  I will argue that in Book III, 
through his construction of the “noble theatre,” Theseus suggests that his royal will is 
underwritten by Providence—i.e. he asserts the cosmic warrant of kingship.  By the 
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conclusion of the tale, Theseus’s first mover speech implicitly acknowledges that 
Providence does not guarantee the prerogative or authority of the king; in fact, it may just 
easily bring about rebellion or the collapse of cities.38  Recognizing, at the end, that his 
royal will cannot be grounded in a language of Providence, Theseus reconstitutes his 
prerogative and the social hierarchy in the face of “transmutacioun,” establishing a 
majestic rhetoric that grounds its authority in the fact that it creates a provisional order 
for a world of “transmutacioun.”   
Crucially, this narrative study on the rhetoric of kingship also explores the limits 
of representation and poetic authority.  Insofar as Theseus’s language comes against the 
hard limits of political exigency, the Knight’s Tale shares a common concern with what 
Anne Middleton called “public poetry.”  Middleton has suggested one important 
development of Ricardian poetry was the production of a common voice, a voice that was 
a “creature of time, place, event and language” (100).  I have argued that this voice, in 
part, arises out of the emergence of a political community (i.e. the communitas regni) and 
the subsequent decline in the belief in a “cosmological dispensation” of royal authority. 
Although Theseus and the Knight never adopt the “common voice,” the majestic 
perspective adapts to the pressures of the political conditions of royal power. Like 
Theseus’s first mover speech, the sign provides (for the king and his audience) a 
provisional order, a provisional peace, against the violence of transmutacioun, instead of 
offering “privileged access to ontological truth.” The Knight’s Tale expressing the 
                                                
38 The Knight’s Tale which is larded with allusions to Consolation of Philosophy, brings Boethius’s assertion “that all 
things happen for a reason” to its logical conclusion that “cherles rebellyng” (I. 2459) and “gret tounes” waning 
(I.3025) are part of the providential scheme.   
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“stubborn truths of human experience” is a way of acknowledging how Chaucer distances 
languages of power from the cosmic framework.    
The conquest of Scythia and the destruction of Thebes, which begins the Knight’s 
Tale, inadvertently unleashes the erotic violence at the heart of the Tale: that is, the crisis 
of the tale arises from the captives that Theseus brings back from battle.  At Scythia, 
Theseus seizes Hippolyta and her daughter Emelye and at Thebes Theseus captures 
Arcite and Palamon. Theseus marries Hippolyta, but the two Theban kinsmen fall in love 
with Emelye. Love, however, is rarely only about love.  As Lynn Staley points out, 
Chaucer, like his Ricardian counterparts, frequently “employed the rhetoric of sexual 
desire or favor as a way of exploring broader social issues” (Languages 55).39 The love 
language in the Knight’s Tale signifies a deeper political violence.  Indeed, it often shades 
into martial language such as when Palamon imagines that Arcite may “assemblen alle 
the folke of oure kyndrede,/ and make a werre so sharp on this citee” and take Emelye as 
his wife (I. 1286-87).  By transposing the hostility caused by war onto the antagonistic 
love story, Chaucer turns fin amour language into a vehicle to show how desire infects 
the discourse of sovereignty and attenuates the social bonds of kin, country and even 
sworn brotherhood.40  
Seeking to contain violence and exhibit his majestic authority, Theseus declares 
that the matter of Emelye’s betrothal will be decided by a judicial tournament in which 
                                                
39 Borrowing from Stephen Jaeger’s work Ennobling Love, Staley describes “the language of lovers as “policy made 
visible,” as indicating the honor associated with Ciceronian friendship, which was explicitly elitist and exclusive.  The 
classical language of love was transferred to relations between “members of the medieval nobility, whose claims to 
superior privilege were linked to their claims of superior morality (55).”  
 
40 Barbara Nolan discusses how both Boccaccio and Chaucer shift the martial parts of Statius’ Thebaid into the 
discourse of love; see Nolan 269-272.  Patterson describes the violence between Arcite and Palamon in terms of their 
“Thebanness” which embodies “an irrationality that Theseus must chasten into civilization” (Chaucer, 200).  He 
symbolically tied to cyclical internecine violence to magnate violence. For discussion of the political implications of 
the sworn brotherhood, see Stretter 501-524. 
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each of the knights will lead a company of a hundred knights.   Whichever knight wins 
the tournament ostensibly will marry Emelye.  He introduces this decision asserting, "My 
wyl is this, for plat conclusion." Although this line does not provide a fleshed out theory 
of medieval kingship, audiences alerted by the word "wyl," nonetheless would have 
recognized in this formula the king's majestic claim for the authority to act pro sua 
voluntate.41 Theseus’s majestic will manifests in the construction of the “noble theatre” 
where the tournament will take place.  The architectural rhetoric of the arena (what I will 
call arena-rhetoric) reinforces his regal authority.  This would all be rather conventional, 
if Theseus's "wyl" did in fact bring about the “plat conclusion,” to the cousins’ feud. 
However, as readers of the Knight’s Tale are well aware, Theseus' will is subverted 
during the tournament.  Arcite wins, but he dies before he can marry Emelye.  
Cosmological forces cause the death; however, these forces only empty out the elaborate 
symbolic systems that ground Theseus’s authority.  The poem complicates the 
relationship between royal prerogative, the rhetoric of kingship and actual conditions of 
power.       
Scholars have read Theseus as the embodiment of the “self-destructive” energy or 
“contradictions” of chivalric practices and values and consequently the failure of his 
prerogative has been woven into a critique of the Athenian polity and chivalry. 42  
Patterson explains:  
chivalry’s dilemma is anatomized in the figure of Theseus, seen by the Knight as 
providing an alternative to the self-destructive Theban lovers and exemplifying 
the civilizing process.  Yet as we have seen, this reading ignores both the threads 
                                                
41 The word “wyl” appears when Theseus changes course and makes a sovereign decision the decision to spare the 
cousins and build the arena the "Firste Movere" (I.1845) and in parliament at the end (I.2986). 
 
42 See also Aers 1986 30-32; Patterson’s Chaucer 203-4; and Wallace 107. 
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of the legend, plot, and character that link Theseus to Arcite and Palamon and 
more important, the moral incoherence of the Tale (229).   
 
Throughout the Middle Ages chivalric idealism provided a discourse aimed at civilizing 
(what Elias called “Verhöflichung,” literally, courtizing) the violent tendencies of the 
warrior class.43  The Knight continues this civilizing mission. However, according to 
Patterson, the Knight is blind to chivalry’s contradictions.  The dark imagery represents 
the moral failing of Theseus and chivalry as a whole; and consequently, the tale exposes 
the “moral incoherence” embedded in the civilizing process of chivalry. Many scholars 
have developed this argument claiming that the Knight’s Tale imposes a “moral idealism 
on a deadly profession” (Hanning 540) or that it represents the “epistemological and 
teleological darkness” in chivalry (Kolve 123).  Others, working along psychoanalytical 
lines, treat Palamon and Arcite as embodiments of the repressed erotic energy within the 
Thesian polity.  Although these claims demonstrate Chaucer’s keen awareness of the 
dangerous ideology of chivalry, they are ultimately conservative readings of the Knight’s 
Tale insofar as they focus on the question of ethics—and ignore the way the Tale 
transforms the “way” we evaluate sovereign decisions.  The problem, I will argue, is not 
“the moral incoherence” of Theseus’s civilizing mission, but the lack of coercive power 
necessary to ensure its success.   
The Knight does not anatomize  “chivalry’s dilemma . . . in the figure of 
Theseus,” but rather he narrates the struggle to resolve the anxieties of Thesian discourse 
of sovereignty.  The Theban cousins and their desire for Emelye pose both an actual and 
figurative threat to the Athenian polity.  While I will discuss how both cousins actually 
threaten to attack Athens later, it is important to note here, that the cousins equally 
                                                
43 For discussion of courtly language, see Jaeger 210-213 and 265.  
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represent the martial and erotic violence unleashed by Theseus.  The tale depicts the 
Duke’s various attempts resolve this violence through non-violent rhetoric. By focusing 
on the narrative development of Theseus’s rhetoric, I will argue that what Patterson 
perceives as the tale’s “moral incoherence,” is actually a rhetorical shift from the idealism 
of cosmic kingship towards prudential realism. The Knight’s Tale shows how sovereign 
discourse must transform to address two new critical questions: what constitutes 
legitimate authority and what is the relationship between legitimate authority and the 
actual conditions of power? 
By looking at the evolution of the Duke’s rhetoric, I demonstrate how the Knight 
explores Theseus’s limits as both king and meaning-maker.  First, I contrast the language 
of Duke with the Thebans when Theseus chances upon them dueling unlawfully in his 
grove.  On a stylistic level, Chaucer renders the tension between Athenian stoic justice 
and Theban erotic violence as an encounter between Fürstenspiegel and fin amour, 
respectively.44  I will argue that courtly love represents violent antisocial desires that 
sever the bonds of sworn brothers and blend into the language of private war represents—
a language analogous to both tyranny and magnate violence.45 Second, I contrast 
Theseus’s architectural rhetoric in Book III with the provisional rhetoric of the first 
mover speech.  Here, I demonstrate how Theseus’s majestic claim to authority collapses 
and how he develops a new more political rhetoric to recuperate his authority. 
                                                
44 I use the term “Fürstenspiegel” in its broadest sense here to mean a text with a particular “interest in kingship’s 
public dimension rather than by its Latinity, then one can well see these vernacular writings as the greatest flowering 
rather than its demise” (Scanlon 138); see also Ferster 1-4.  
 
45 Barbara Nolan, on the other hand, suggests that Chaucer’s deployment of fin amour to makes “the young lovers both 
sympathetic and typical,” Barbara Nolan 270.  For a comparison of Arcite and Palamon to magnate violence.  
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After conquering Thebes, Theseus initially sought to contain violence by putting 
Arcite and Palamon in a prison without ransom. However, both got out.  Arcite gained his 
freedom through the intercession of Theseus’s friend.  And despite being banished, he 
returned to Athens.  Palamon escaped prison by a stroke of fortune or plan of destiny. 
Shortly after a chance encounter in a nearby grove, the cousins begin to duel over 
Emelye. The violence represents the direct threat to Theseus’s royal image and the 
Athenian community posed by elevating singular desire over common profit.  It 
represents the problematic at the heart of the discourse of sovereignty, what Macherey 
calls the “determinate disorder” for which ideological fictions (i.e. political and majestic 
rhetoric) provide imaginary resolution by building coalitions capable of securing 
sovereign authority.  The remainder of the Knight’s Tale can be read as a search for a 
“rhetoric of kingship” (the ideological fiction) that contains hostility and repairs the 
social bonds undermined by violence.  
Chaucer’s subtle modifications to the Teseida underscore how the illicit duel is a 
symbolic assault on Theseus’s majestic image of kingship. 46  By formalizing aspects of 
the hunt, Chaucer changed Boccaccio’s spontaneous “once in a thousand years” hunting 
party into a ritualized daily hunt set in King’s forests (Grimes 34-6).  The scene assumes 
greater significance insofar as the ritualized hunt symbolically “celebrate[s] and 
perpetuate[s] aristocratic authority.” Arcite and Palamon, then, not only defy Theseus’s 
legal judgment (i.e. banishment and imprisonment respectively), but their trespass on 
                                                
46 Grimes points out that Chaucer excludes the scene from the Teseida in which Arcita attempts to stop the duel (349).  
This exclusion focuses our attention on the stark contrast between Athenian justice and Theban violence.    
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royal forests and disruption of the ritualized hunt represents “a symbolic act of aggression 
against the sovereign himself.” 47 
Theseus must address this aggression. And his reasoning provides one of the most 
psychologically nuanced meditations on legitimate authority—a meditation that manifests 
structurally as a clash between the values of mirror tradition and the conventions of fin 
amour.  The cousins’ illicit duel causes Theseus to returns to a martial attitude: 
Youre owene mouth, by youre confessioun,  
Hath dampned yow, and I wol it recorde;  
It nedeth noght to pyne yow with the corde.  
Ye shal be deed, by myghty mars the rede! (I.1744-47) 
 
Theseus’s invocation of Mars and his initial decision to kill the knights reminds us of the 
epic hero riding under the Red banner.  This initial reaction depicts the potential slavery 
of sovereign authority to perverse will—central to the political critique of prerogative—
the critique central to the Clerk’s Tale. The aggression of the cousins almost produces a 
like reaction in Theseus; thus the violent eros of fin amour threatens to become a majestic 
wrath.  The Knight’s Tale, like many Ricardian works, shows how fin amour and wrath 
(both products of singular desire) enslaves its devotees and how the enslaved will 
threatens the state itself. 48   
In the Knight’s Tale, as in much of Ricardian poetry, fin amour and ire are part of 
a carefully calibrated discourse of tyranny deployed to discuss the legitimacy of 
                                                
47 Chaucer intensifies the political threat of eros by making it part of Palemon’s plan to raise an army to take Emelye’s 
hand by force. Whereas Boccaccio associates the forest primarily with Arcita’s love laments, Chaucer turns the 
“boschetto” into the more ritualized space—the King’s forests (Grimes 334-6).  The hunt, in the Teseida, is a more 
spontaneous “once in a thousand years” event. Teseo delights in hunting and hawking, but it is not an essential part of 
his character.  For Chaucer’s Theseus, on the other hand, the hunt is both “al his joye and appetit;” he wakes up each 
morning “clad, and redy for to ryde/with hunte and horn and houndes hym bisyde” (I.1677-78) (Grimes 349).  
 
48 See Staley, Languages 15-16 and Burnley 30-31.  For a lengthier discussion of fin amour, see my discussion of  the 
“Tale of Darius and the Three Advisors” in Chapter III. 
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particular sovereign decisions.49  It is true that excessive desire and wrath were always 
signs of a tyrant and that medieval literature is filled with them—Nero, Antiochus, etc.  
What makes the Knight’s Tale interesting, however, is its subtle application of the 
discourse of tyranny. Theseus is not a tyrant. Even if he did execute Arcite and Palamon, 
it is unlikely the reader would feel that he was a Ricardian Caligula.  Theseus is not a 
typical tyrant, but he might be persuaded to act somewhat tyrannically.  This concept of 
“somewhat tyrannically” allows Chaucer to use the discourse of tyranny to make more 
finely tuned political analysis.    
Theseus, unlike Walter from the Clerk’s Tale, recognizes and resists this 
“perversion of will” and adopts a Fürstenspiegel-rhetoric that disrupts his initial martial 
response to kill the lovers:  
And eek his herte hadde compassioun  
Of wommen, for they wepen evere in oon,  
And in his gentil herte he thoughte anon,  
And softe unto hymself he seyde, “Fy  
Upon a lord that wol have no mercy,  
But been a leon, bothe in word and dede,  
To hem that been in repentaunce and drede,  
As wel as to a proud despitous man  
That wol mayntene that he first bigan.  
That lord hath litel of discrecioun,  
That in swich cas kan no divisioun 
But weyeth pride and humblesse after oon. (I.1770-81) 
 
Theseus interior monologue could fit into almost any handbook for princes under the 
rubric of mansuetude or what the Parson calls “debonairtee” (X.654).  Mansuetude steers 
a virtuous course between excessive revenge of wrath and a “wommanliche excess of 
                                                
49 Burnley 44-48.  By focusing his attention on Duke’s “ire” Chaucer engages the discourse of prudence common 
among Ricardian poets and, as we will see in the discussion of Melibee, “ire” in late medieval literature presents the 
greatest threat to political rhetoric. 
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mercy” (Rigby, Wisdom 64).50 The intercession of Hippolyta, Emelye and the ladies of 
the court allow us to imagine the monologue as a struggle between the excessive 
vengeance and “wommanliche” mercy.51  Once his anger is “aslaked,” Theseus 
recognizes that his initial reactions (i.e. having twice demanded their death in the name of 
Mars) are part of an animal will without discretion or the ability to make “divisioun.”  
Such a lord, who could not reverse his decision, would be more “leon” than man.  
Theseus escapes the “cruel ire” that will control the hermeneutic practices of Melibee in 
the Tale of Melibee.  
However, to suggest that the Knight’s Tale is merely an exemplification of 
Fürstenspiegel-prince diminishes its literary complexity.52   Unlike traditional mirrors 
that show how sovereign virtues induce obedience, the knight psychologizes the mirror.  
By forcefully rejecting the fin amour-passions that incited Palamon and Arcite to fight 
like “as houndes for the boon” (I.1177), Theseus maintains the “free will” of the true 
sovereign (i.e. Theseus resists the leon-will).  The reasoned response to the women’s 
emotional plea does not, as Wallace suggests, have the “the net effect of accentuating the 
isolation and self-sufficiency of Theseus,” but rather it shows how his decision-making 
incorporates and responds to the women.53  The noble ladies appeal to his affective 
                                                
50 For a full discussion of the virtue of mansuetude in Fürstenspiegel tradition, see Rigby, Wisdom 64-66.  
 
51 For an important discussion of this scene, see Wallace 116.  He argues that Theseus does not respond to the women 
in a sort of shared decision-making way—the queen is still silenced but he is saved from tyranny—“the net effect is to 
accentiate the isolation and self-sufficiency of Theseus.”  The women thus represent the majestic isolation of the king’s 
decision making within his court.  This contrasts with the parliament at the end, which suggests a more political setting.   
 
52 Rigby contrary to most literary critics does in fact suggest that Theseus is the perfect exemplification of the 
Fürstenspiegel-prince in Wisdom and Chivalry (Ch. 1). 
 
53 Wallace 116. Wallace demonstrates how Thesian majestic rhetoric accommodates political anxiety (the desires of the 
ladies of the court).  Wallace’s reading of this scene seems like an unnecessary attempt to make Theseus’ interior 
monologue part of his broader thesis that the Knight’s Tale is an exploration of “the possibilities and limitations of one-
man rule within a context of magnate rivalry.”  I would suggest that the women represent the curia regis, those people, 
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intelligence such that “his herte hadde compassioun/ Of wommen.”  Their 
“wommanliche” compassion draws him away from his initial “ire” and towards the 
rational virtue of mansuetude: “although that his ire hir gilt accused/ Yet in his resoun he 
hem bothe excused” (I.1765-66, emphasis mine).54  The monologue depicts the complex 
transition between ire and resoun as an engagement with the community.   
By contrasting this monologue with the various love plaints of Arcite and 
Palamon, one realizes the freedom of choice afforded by mirror rhetoric.  For example, 
when he was first released from the dungeon, Arcite complains “Allas that day that I was 
born/Now is my prisoun worse than biforn” (I.1223-24) because he no longer can see 
Emelye.  Through hyperbolic dedications of the knight to a lady, Chaucer makes fin 
amour into slave-tyrant metaphor central to political rhetoric in which singular desire (in 
this case the desire for Emelye) enslaves its devotees (makes their prison “worse than 
biforn”) and the enslaved will threatens the state.  Ironically, Arcite alludes to the 
Consolation of Philosophy to reinforce this idea:  
We faren as he that dronke is as a mous. 
A dronke man woot wel he hath an hous,  
But he noot which the righte wey is thider, 
And to a dronke man the wey is slider. 
And certes, in this world so faren we; 
We seken faste after felicitee, 
But we goon wrong ful often, trewely.  (I.1261-67) 
 
Arcite unwittingly uses the Boethius metaphor of the “dronke man,” from the 
Consolation of Philosophy (III.pr2), to describe his paradoxical situation (i.e. that his 
                                                                                                                                            
involved in the king’s private decision making, who in effect were always part of the will of the king.  As such these 
women contrast to the public situation at the end, when Parliament will make demands of Theseus.  One does not need 
to imagine that Theseus is completely “isolated” in order to suggest that the tale explores the workings of one-man rule.  
  
54 Equally, his internal abstraction of the lovers allows him empathize with the lovers: “he thoghte wel that every 
man/ Wol helpe hymself in love, if that he kan” (I.1767-8).   
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freedom is his prison). The drunk-man thinks he is going home but he discovers that he is 
going the wrong way; likewise, one would think Arcite’s escape from prison would bring 
him “joye and parfit heele” (I. 1270-1) but it only exiles him from his “wele” (1272).  
Arcite subordinates Boethius to a fin amour value-system and turns Emelye into his 
sovereign “felicitee.”  This, of course, breaks with essential idea of Boethius’s 
philosophy and signifies the rot of fin amour ideology.  That is to say, Lady Philosophy’s 
“dronke man” describes a person (much like Arcite) who mistakes temporal goods for the 
sovereign good.  The allusion to Boethius reminds us of the cosmological structure 
underwriting the tale, but it also illustrates the danger of illicitly appropriating the 
language of Providence to exert control over temporal events.  Boethian philosophy 
should free Arcite from the prison of his lust for Emelye (not vice versa).55  
Arcite and Palamon’s value-system blinds them from the sovereign good, binds 
them to their lust, and eliminates any freedom of choice.  Theseus’s rejection of fin 
amour-desire and his provisional freedom turn the mirror genre into a meditation on the 
political limits of authority and, paradoxically the freedom and power generated by those 
limits.56 The cornerstone of political rhetoric was that that the ‘free’ will of the king had 
the force of law, but that freedom was hedged in with political conditions that constrained 
the king.  As we have seen in Chapter II, the constrained “free will,” embodied in 
coronation oath and Honorian inalienability decretals, is the foundational equivocation 
                                                
55 Chaucer frequently employs fin amour value system to depict figures whose will is slavishly directed by external 
circumstance; see Lynn Staley, Languages 45ff.  Collette in Species, Phantasms and Images, shows how the prison is 
an actual mental illness “amor heroes” in which “fantasy unchecked by will and separate from reason transforms the 
image into an obsessive fixation” (34).  Kolve argued that Chaucer significantly expands upon the prison/life metaphor; 
indeed this metaphorical pairing establishes the philosophical problem of the tale (142).  As Hanning points out, Arcite 
and Palamon are “reduced to playthings by the knight” (86); however, he does this so he can separate their tyrannical 
will from Theseus majestic rhetoric.  
 
56 See Scanlon 266-69. 
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necessary to imagine the institutionalized Crown.  This political paradigm turns the 
mirror into a mode of expressing the same limits of prerogative central to thirteenth-
century reformers—one that develops the relationship of will and authority. 
It is no accident then that after the internal monologue, Theseus delivers a speech 
that makes the political implications of the erotic violence manifest:  
The god of love, a benedicite!  
How myghty and how greet a lord is he!  
Ayeyns his myght ther gayneth none obstacles.  
He may be cleped a god for his myracles,  
For he kan maken, at his owene gyse,  
Of everich herte as that hym list divyse.  (I.1785-1790) 
 
The violence in the grove is described figuratively through a political metaphor and also 
described as having actual political consequences.  Arcite and Palamon are lieges of the 
“God of love,” that “greet . . .lord” who can control “everich herte.”  This power to 
control singular desire, as we have seen, threatens not only the individual lovers but also 
all of Athens (Leicester 249-51).57  Continuing the Cupid-Lord conceit, he describes the 
situation in overtly political language “hir lord, the God of love, ypayed/ Hir wages and 
hir fees for hir servyse” (I.1802-3).58  However, while they are lieges to a figurative “God 
of love,” they have broken real laws: they have started an unauthorized duel, they have 
trespassed on royal forest, and they pose a potential military threat to Athens.  Perceiving 
this military threat, Theseus demands that they swere “that nevere mo ye shal my contree 
dere,/ Ne make werre upon me nyght ne day,/ But been my freendes in all that ye may” 
(I.1822-24). 
                                                
57  The speeches of Arcite and Palamon alluding to potential violence against Athens displace political considerations 
onto erotic object such that the Knight, according to Leicester seems “at pains” to demonstrate “the confusion of the 
relations between love, lordship and the “felaweshipe” of society; see 250-51, quotation from 250. 
 
58 Theseus’s full speech is replete with a quasi-legal register (i.e. “distreyne” (I.1816) and he forgives the “trespas” 
(I.1818)).   
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Through personification Theseus can purge himself of his checkered past with 
Cupid: “A man moot ben a fool, or yong or oold,/ I woot it by myself ful yore agon” 
(I.1812-13; emphasis added).  This admission (and the mercy it engenders) allows him to 
distance his sovereign power from the unauthorized erotic violence in the grove.  Thus, 
Theseus replaces the unauthorized duel (the God of Love’s jurisdiction) with a judicial 
battle that is part of the Athenian state apparatus—a judicial battle to be fought in an 
arena built on the grounds of the grove itself: 
My wyl is this, for plat conclusioun 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
 . . . this day fifty wykes, fer ne ner,  
Everich of you shal brynge an hundred knyghtes  
Armed for lystes up at alle rightes,  
Al redy to darreyne hire by bataille.  (I.1845; 1850-53) 
 
Through the establishment of the royal lists, Theseus will ostensibly decide who marries 
Emelye: “Thanne shal I yeve Emelya to wyve/ To whom that fortune yeveth so fair a 
grace” (I.1860-61).  The phrase “my wyl is this” repudiates Theban erotic violence, 
reminds us of his own personal suppression of his animal will and most importantly 
makes a legal conquest of Cupid.59 While this conquest fails for both cosmological and 
necessary reasons, it is this need to create semiotic systems that constrain erotic violence 
that authorizes both king and poet. 
Theseus replaces this volatile and transgressive erotic energy of the grove with the 
sturdy, looming and enclosed edifice of his own authority: 60 
I trowe men wolde deme it necligence 
                                                
59 In a theological register the displacement of the violence in the grove with a state sanctioned violence in the arena 
alludes to a Thomistic model of kingship that arises in order to control to the initial violence in the Garden of Eden.  
Robert Hanning, for example, hears echoes of Genesis (81).   
 
60 For the conventional reading of how Theseus’s arena establishes a “civilizing resolution” of the animal conflict in the 
woods, see Kolve 105-112.    
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If I foryete to tellen the dispence  
Of Theseus, that gooth so bisily 
To maken up the lystes roially,  
That swich a noble theatre as it was  
I dar wel seyen in this world ther nas.   
The circuit a myle was aboute, 
Walled of stoon, and dyched al withoute. 
Round was the shap, in manere of compas (I.1881-89) 
 
The “noble arena,” the subject matter for most of book III, symbolizes Theseus cosmic 
warrant (what Anderson calls rule by “cosmological dispensation”), displays his 
magnificence, and connects both to the “civilizing mission” or kingship.  The 
architectural language exerts control over (defines) those elements and people within it. 
Susan Crane has even called it the “precursor of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon” insofar 
as the circular lists bring the “lover’s willful resistance to Theseus’s law under 
institutional visibility and regulation” (Crane 34).61  
The size, shape and sturdiness of the arena make it a symbolic representation the 
cosmic warrant underwriting Thesian majesty.  Especially when read recursively in light 
of the orbits of the Saturn, Mars and Venus, the “round . . . schap” of the theater draws 
from the philosophical and theological traditions that imagined heaven in terms of perfect 
circle. The arena represents Theseus’s orbit.62  Chaucer places the theater “on an 
astrological axis to achieve an image of theatrum mundi in order to suggest that the 
“theater” is a micro-universe” (Clopper 135).  Theseus’s role in building the theater, then, 
                                                
61 For Kolve, the visibility of the arena contrasts with the woods, which, as a “place of hydynge and lurkkynge,” was 
“potentially perilous, beyond the law, antithetical to human values” (111).  However, whereas the “panopticon” works 
precisely because of the fear of an invisible surveillor, the arena depends upon maximum visibility to stage its own 
authority.  As Johnston notes the Duke’s “theatre mundi” creates a public spectacle where “no outside view is possible” 
(emphasis mine) and symbolically establishes a perspective that is “both totalizing and universal” (100-2). 
 
62  For Boethius “the form of divine substance is such that it does not spread out into outside things or take up into itself 
anything from them.”  As Parmenides says of it, ‘like the mass of a sphere well-rounded in all ways’ it rotates the 
moving sphere of the universe while remaining itself unmoved” (III.12.p). For lengthy discussion of the circle in 
relation to cosmological definitions of kingship, see Rigby, Wisdom 237-8. See also Patterson (216-222) for an 
explanation of switching between Gods and astrology.  
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mirrors depictions of God as a “master craftsman” or “choice architect of the universe.”63  
The civilizing rhetoric of the arena aligns with a majestic image of sovereignty that draws 
the conventional equation between the prince of the entire cosmos and Duke Theseus’s 
position within the realm.  
The building of the arena plays an important role in understanding its ideological 
purpose. In the Teseida, Teseo decides to have the judicial duel in a pre-standing theater.  
Chaucer, on the other hand, turns the theater into the exemplification of Fürstenspiegel-
virtue of magnificence by emphasizing Theseus’s role in its construction (I.1881-1913).  
The knight tells us that it would be “necligence” to forget the “dispence/of Theseus.”  
Occasionally ascribed to pride or corrupted chivalric values, the Knight’s praise of 
Theseus’s “dispence” aligns perfectly with magnificence found in mirrors for princes, 
such as Roger Dymock’s Liber Contra XII Errores et Hereses Lollardorum:  
it is fitting for a king to have sumptuous and beautiful buildings, excellent meals 
and ornate clothing, since it was because of these things that the wisdom of 
Solomon received great praise (295).64 
 
Dymock’s handbook, which was in fact a gift dedicated to Richard II, explains that 
“sumptuous buildings,” “excellent meals,” and “ornate clothing” all stabilize kingship by 
turning Solomon’s wisdom (an abstract virtue) into a concrete object of praise; the 
concrete object in turn enthralls the subject, that is goads them to praise that virtue. Regal 
construction was the primary expression of magnificence—a virtue Giles, through 
                                                
63 As Rigby notes, drawing from similar in Plato’s Timaeus, medieval theologians often represented God as an architect 
or “master craftsman.”  Alain de Lille, for example refers to God as the “the choice architect of the universe”, “the 
golden constructor of a golden construction, the skilled artisan of an amazing work of art” (Plaint 144).  
 
64 Translation by Rigby, Wisdom (51).  For the complete contemporary description of magnificence, see Roger 
Dymmok 292-97.  Nigel Saul argues that Roger Dymmok’s Liber contra XII errores et hereses Lollardorum provides a 
“defense of the luxurious style of dress at the court” (356). 
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fanciful etymology, links to “magna faciens” (Giles I.ii.19).65 Such demonstrations of 
majesty were so important that Malcolm Vale argues, “it was incumbent on later 
medieval rulers to indulge in the maximum degree of display which their resources and 
income would allow” (169).66  Magnificence is a kind of imperious exhortation that 
creates and reproduces the lines of cooperation necessary to maintain sovereignty.67  
“The public choreography of royal status and splendour, through courtly and civic 
ceremonial,” as Stephen Rigby explains, “both manifest[s] and in turn, reinforced [his] 
real power.”  The ceremonial reinforces the hierarchy in two ways: first it perpetuates a 
symbolic representation of the majestic hierarchy; and second, it forces the spectator to 
encounter the “stark realities of social and economic power,” (Rigby, Wisdom 51) or in 
other words his powerlessness to change this order.   
Shown the extent of their powerlessness, the rhetoric of the “noble theatre” 
encourages the spectator to accept a cosmological definition of their inferiority through 
which the spectator justifies his own submission to majestic authority.  Thus, 
magnificence might be understood as the virtue in which majestic rhetoric coordinates 
actual royal power with majestic hierarchies, or as Giles puts it:  
“For he is heed of the regne and therby he hath the liknese of God that is heed and 
prince of alle, it is most semelich that he bere hymsilf as magnificus shulde in 
makyng holy temples and ordinaunce and arraye of seruice and worship of God” 
(I.ii.20-24) 
                                                
65 Unless otherwise stated, references to De regimine are from a John Trevisa’s Middle English translation, The 
Governance of Kings and Princes: John Trevisa's Middle English Translation of the De Regimine Principum of 
Aegidius Romanus. Eds. Fowler, David C., et al..   
 
66 See also Rigby Wisdom 249-51; and Saul, “Vocabulary” 861 
 
67 For a discussion of the use of symbols (even “magical” symbols similar to those of the coronation oath) as an 
inducement to action, see K. Burke, Rhetoric 41-42.   
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The noble theater attempts to replace violence through a powerful display of regal 
magnificence that translates Theseus’s “social and economic power” into a cosmological 
view of the universe in which Theseus is head of the kingdom as God is “prince of alle.”   
The flurry of activity that opens Book IV demonstrates the power of arena rhetoric: we 
are immediately surrounded by the work of the goldsmiths and armorers and we hear the 
harnessing noises coming from the local hostelries, people are playing pipes, waving 
sticks like swords and betting on the contestants (I.2483-2522).  While these descriptions 
of the crowd are more chaotic than the architectonic language of the “noble theatre,” they 
demonstrate how the tournament controls the economic and social atmosphere.  All the 
movements of the crowd point to the majestic center.  The Knight shows the degree to 
which the arena exerts a form of social control.  The architectural elements of the 
theater—the circuit where the battle is fought, the oratories and the seating—project a 
model of sovereignty that depicts the Duke’s civilizing mission in terms of spiritual and 
social hierarchy. 
The mile-wide circuit performs one of the most crucial ideological functions of 
majestic rhetoric: it ties the legal judgment by battle (i.e. the chivalric tournament) to the 
civilizing mission of the regal state. The “circuit” heavily regulated by Theseus’s terms 
ostensibly constrains erotic, internecine, blind political violence in what, metaphorically, 
might be called the orbit of Theseus. The judicial battle replaces epic violence with an 
arena in which Theseus “wilneth no destruccion of blood” (I.2564). Unlike in Statius and 
Boccaccio, the only death occurs when Arcite falls off his horse.  Thus, the Knight’s Tale 
demonstrates the “maturation process” of Theseus as he turns from epic warrior to king 
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presiding over non-fatal tournament (Laskaya 66). 68  The ethical work of the arena is 
only matched by its ideological work; the restraint of Theban violence justifies Thesian 
authority.  The battle, removed from Cupid’s jurisdiction, does not take place in the 
temple of Mars or Venus but rather in a space governed by Theseus authority.   
Chaucer’s description of the paintings in the oratories illustrates the constructed-
ness of Thesian authority.  That is, the oratories in Boccaccio are not painted.  Instead, 
the Teseida represents the prayers of Arcite, Palamon and Emelye journeying through 
Olympian landscapes in search of their proper deity.  Chaucer turns these journeys into 
allegorical paintings representing primarily the dark forces of lust, war and perhaps most 
peculiarly chastity.  Theseus’s arena, thus, like language becomes an attempt to restrain 
“ever-threatening forces of chaos” (Muscatine 190).  By changing Boccaccio’s Olympian 
landscapes into paintings patronized by the duke, Chaucer emphasizes that Theseus 
projects the idea that the arena mirrors and is authorized by the “micro-universe.”  
Among the architectural features of the arena, the oratories of Venus, Mars and 
Diana have received the most critical attention.  Johnston arguing that the theatre does 
not provide  “privileged opportunities for remaining invisible” mentions in passing that 
the temples are an exception, as they alone “remain impenetrable to the Athenian 
commonality” (Johnston 101).  Because of this “impenetrable” secrecy, many scholars 
suggest that these temples, which depict only the “images of disorder,” point to “the 
repressed knowledge of military chivalry’s darker, more malevolent valence” (Patterson, 
                                                
68 Anne Laskaya argues that Chaucer “purposefully shapes the maturation process for” Theseus (66). Leicester 
describes this maturation process in terms of genre in which “the initial move from epic to romance in the poem” acts 
as an “assertion of a more refined and more socialized drive to order” (257). 
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Chaucer 226).69  Patterson, for example, connects the “malevolent valence” to Theseus 
and the Knight’s own failure to recognize the violent energies in chivalry itself.  Even if 
we accept that these paintings have a “malevolent valence,” we must remember that 
Theseus commissioned these paintings. As such, the paintings also represent Theseus’s 
recognition of the kind of erotic violence that the “noble theater” contains and 
suppresses.  These intimate spaces are associated with the prayers of Arcite and Palamon 
and as such represent violence.  Most importantly, the oratories, not unlike the oratories 
dedicated to saints in Cathedrals, are part of a larger construction dedicated to the 
worship of the highest authority.  The oratories are part of a larger orbit, a larger temple 
to Theseus, or Jove, or perhaps better yet Theseus as Jove—the cosmological warrant of 
the state.  
The amphitheater’s tiered-seating contrasts sharply with the “images of disorder” 
painted on the oratory walls by providing a shared vision of an Athenian hierarchy that 
mirrors the cosmic order.   One of the most crucial elements of the amphitheater, 
according to Andrew Johnston, is that it affords equal visibility to all the spectators.  The 
elimination of the “visual hierarchies” produces a perspective that “is shared by all and 
simultaneously encompasses all” (101).  However, when he suggests that the arena 
“effaces social differences” (101), he misses the point about what exactly is being 
staged—viz. Theseus’s magnificence and the majestic hierarchy.  The elimination of 
“visual hierarchies” is the naturalization (not the elimination) of social hierarchies.  
Through a magnificent display of power that excludes individual perspectives, Theseus 
produces a shared vision (an ideology) that naturalizes those “ideas that help to legitimate 
                                                
69 The D.W. Robertson camp that reads all medieval literature in terms of a “fully coherent and hierarchical world 
view” quite naturally read the Knight’s Tale as an allegory for spiritual failing (166); see also Collette 49.   
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a dominant political power” (Eagleton, Ideology 1-2).  In his description of the procession 
and seating arrangement at the theater, Chaucer emphasizes the hierarchical organization 
of Athenian society through a description of the audience: 
Ful lik a lord this noble duc gan ryde, 
Thise two Thebans upon either syde, 
And after rood the queene and Emelye, 
And after that another compaignye 
Of oon and oother, after hir degree 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   
Whan set was Theseus ful riche and hye,  
Ypolita the queene, and Emelye, 
And othere ladys in degree aboute. 
Unto the seetes preesseth al the route. (I.2569-73; 2577-80; emphasis mine) 
 
The theater, arranged so that the companies and noble ladies each sit “in degree” with 
Thesian majesty “riche and hye” at the center, recalls the earlier description of “Duc 
Theseus” in Book 4: “at a wyndowe set,/ Arrayed right as he were a god in trone” 
(I.2527-8).  Theseus is the focal point of the arena like the statue in each of the oratories.  
Likewise, the static descriptions of Lygurge and Emetrius (III.2129-89) appear as 
paintings on Jove’s walls whose animal characteristics are tamed (like their own animals) 
by a gold and jeweled encrusted magnificence.  In the battle scene, Chaucer focuses on 
two rather unknown figures and, instead of thinking about the vicious effects of Venus or 
Mars, we see the magnificence and stability of warrior kings—figures that bear the 
magnificence of Theseus “in trone.”   
Theseus produces a microcosm that “mirrors” the cosmic framework. The 
architectural metaphor provides a perfect image of imperial power as a reflection of (and 
thus sanctioned by) the stable majestic hierarchies.  The “noble theatre” in its 
conspicuous rigidity mirrors the whole tale, which Patterson describes as a tableau, a 
frieze, a set of static images, a pageant; at its most dynamic a procession” (Patterson 
 211 
209). By removing time from the narrative, the ecphrastic description of the arena 
imitates the atemporal order that purportedly sanctions Thesian order.  In short, Theseus’s 
architecture enacts majestic rhetoric. 
However, much like Theseus’s prisons could not contain Theban violence, the 
“noble theatre” cannot bring about his “will.”  While Chaucer begins book three with the 
magnificent construction of the arena, he concludes it with an almost comic counsel of 
the Gods that undercuts its rhetorical façade.  The sudden appearance of the parliament of 
the Gods at the end of Book III is particularly jarring because it diminishes the scale of 
the noble arena and shows the failure of its symbolic language. After Palamon, Emelye, 
and Arcite offer prayers to the Gods, Chaucer concludes with a counsel in which Venus 
and Mars fight over whether Palamon or Arcite would prevail.  Coming after the lengthy 
description of the theater, the counsel of the gods, quite literally telescopes the "noble 
theatre” with it mile long circuit within “cours” of Saturn that “hath so wyde for to turn” 
(I.2454) that it “hath moore power than woot any man” (I.2455).  Instead of  
representations of venereal and martial power of the oratories contained by the edifice of 
the arena, we see the orbits of Venus and Mars contained within the widest orbit of 
Saturn.  
Setting the claims of the "noble arena” against the authority of Saturn made 
visible the embarrassment of authority: it made visible the mechanisms that ‘naturalized’ 
the majestic hierarchy and created the Athenian subject.  Saturn’s resolution to Mars and 
Venus’s competing desires brings about formally ordered, but ethically bankrupt solution.  
Chaucer drives a wedge between Fürstenspiegel-rhetoric and the actual conditions of 
power.  Theseus attempts to resolve the violence peacefully, but his attempt to a just and 
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peaceful solution fits uncomfortably with the result; that is, the result emphasizes 
Theseus’s own lack of authority.  Theseus’s arena fails in part because it attempts to 
usurp the authority of Providence—he imagines that he controls the orbit of the arena. 
Some have seen this as a failing of pagan prince, I would suggest that it shows the failure 
of majestic rhetoric employed by Christian princes, particularly Richard II; or put another 
way Chaucer’s poem shows that majestic images of kingship are infected with a pagan 
element.  
While Theseus still imagines these events as part of a higher “necessity,” he must, 
like all people experience them and manage them as part of “unexpected and 
unforeseen.”70  After all the magnificent arrangements, from the construction of the 
theater to the feasting of foreign kings, Arcite, the victor of the lists, does not win the 
hand of Emelye, but dies instead.  Theseus's majestic rhetoric may legitimize and 
mobilize his ethical authority, but it cannot assure the efficacy of his “wyl.”  Royal will 
and prerogative is thus divorced from the cosmic framework. Despite its majestic 
intentions (aligning Theseus with the Prime Mover), the voice of sovereign and poet, in 
the Knight’s Tale, must increasingly address the political aims of  “worldly felicity and 
peaceful, harmonious communal existence” (95).71  
The anxiety in the discourse of sovereignty manifests in the histrionic mourning 
over Arcite; after all, Arcite has done nothing for the Athenians themselves.  They are 
                                                
70 Boethius describes the difference between chance and Providence “whenever something is done for some purpose, 
and for certain reasons something other than what was intended happens, it is called chance” (117)  
 
71 Similarly, Marshall Leicester describes the Knight’s Tale as disenchanted. In Middleton’s terms this 
“disenchantment” as a transformation occurring within the narrative perspective “The “I” of public poetry presents 
himself as, like his audience, a layman of good will, one worker among others, with a talent to be used for the common 
good.  It is his task to find the common voice and to speak for all, but to claim no privileged position, no special 
revelation from God or the muses, no transcendent status for the result, and little in the way of special gifts beyond a 
good ear” (Middleton 99).  
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mourning the loss of the great victor of the arena and as such are mourning the loss of 
arena-rhetoric itself.  In light of this loss, Theseus must recuperate the legitimacy of both 
his authority and that of the Athenian social order—a recuperation that emphatically calls 
for the end of mourning.72  Instead of employing his characteristic language of 
“architecture and procession,” Theseus delivers a speech that emphasizes mutability and 
contingency.  The first mover speech recuperates sovereign authority by making kingship 
and social order part of a rhetoric of resistance, a rhetoric that pushes back on 
“transmutacioun” signified by Arcite’s death.   
Nonetheless, the process of recuperation exacts its price. Muscatine has given this 
recuperative speech its most noble spin: “when the earthly designs suddenly crumble, 
true nobility is faith in the ultimate order of all things” (190).  Equally, David Aers, 
reading the speech in a Marxist light, is not wrong to claim that the speech combines the 
“rhetorical elaboration of the banal observation that all things must die” with “plund[ed] 
bits” of Consolation of Philosophy to “persuade us that whatever is, is right” (1986: 59-
60). Although they have very different opinions about what Chaucer “wants to say,” 
Muscatine and Aers both focus on the moral justification for order—the ideological 
fiction through which one creates order.  
Instead of analyzing the disparity between arena- and first mover-rhetoric in terms 
of ethics, I focus on the disparity between the language of kingship and the actual 
conditions of royal authority.  While performing the ideological function of creating a 
new fiction of power, Theseus’ speech reveals the internal fissures within ideology and 
                                                
72 Fradenburg describes the “end of mourning” as “a figure for the unanimity of community and assent, that is, both 
concurrence and submission” (180).   For a full discussion of the role of mourning and community, see Sacrifice 179-
182. 
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makes evident limits of power.73  The first mover speech critiques the structural 
limitations of majestic rhetoric.  However, these limitations do not necessarily constitute 
what some critics see as the dark underbelly of chivalry.  The speech points to a problem 
that is ethically neutral: the inability (not the unwillingness) of majestic rhetoric to 
contain erotic desires (magnate violence) that fray the bonds of communitas regni.    
In the final scene of the Knight’s Tale, the erotic energy of the Theban cousins 
becomes explicitly political when Theseus, at the behest of parliament, attempts to 
channel it into a marriage in order to create alliances with certain countries and to “have 
of Thebans obeissaunce” (I.2974).  The inclusion of parliament draws a stark contrast 
with the grove-scene. In the grove—a place of majestic sanctuary—Theseus bends his 
will to the entreaties of the “ladyes in the compaignye;” in the final scene, Theseus “will” 
works in and at the request of Parliament.  The poem thus narrates a shift from the 
majestic power contained in the private realm of the grove to a public political forum.74  
Likewise, the pivot from arena-rhetoric to the “first movere” stages a movement away 
from majesty towards a more political rhetoric—a movement away from the confident 
and transcendent subject position of the arena towards a more "limited but also more 
realistic and serviceable agent” (Leicester 370). Theseus’s will becomes an instrument of 
parliament. Parliament decides “upon certein pointz and caas” for which this noble 
Theseus anon/Leet senden after genti Palamon” (2975-76). 
                                                
73 For a lengthier discussion on how narrative exposes the “internal distance” of ideology, see Introduction.  For further 
theoretical discussion of this idea, see Althusser 222-23; Pieters 205; and Macherey 155.  
 
74 The “ladyes” (i.e. the wife, step-daughter, and their women attendants) would all be members of Theseus’ immediate 
household; as such they have the power to entreat—a private power that does not threaten regal majesty. In Outline of a 
Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu provides a similar description of feminine power as always “unofficial or even 
clandestine or occult” (41).  
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Insofar as it makes use of the king/god analogy, the first mover speech cannot be 
considered an example of political rhetoric par excellence.  Nonetheless, it highlights the 
same structural rift in sovereignty that produces political rhetoric that accommodates and 
revises Thesian cosmology.  The First Mover, who makes “the faire cheyne of love,” 
offers both an analogue and ethical justification for Theseus’s renewed authority deserves 
to be quoted at length: 
“The Firste Moevere of the cause above,  
Whan he first made the faire cheyne of love,  
Greet was th' effect, and heigh was his entente.  
Wel wiste he why, and what thereof he mente;  
For with that faire cheyne of love he bond  
The fyr, the eyr, the water, and the lond  
In certeyn boundes, that they may nat flee. 
That same Prince and that Moevere,” quod he,  
“Hath stablissed in this wrecched world adoun  
Certeyne dayes and duracioun  
To al that is engendred in this place,  
Over the whiche day they may nat pace,  
Al mowe they yet tho dayes wel abregge.  
Ther nedeth noght noon auctoritee t' allegge,  
For it is preeved by experience,  
But that me list declaren my sentence. (I.2987-3002) 
 
For critics, like V.A. Kolve, Theseus’s first mover speech seems spurious because his 
reasons simply do not support his claim—how does the existence of elements and 
mutability prove the existence of the prime mover?  Theseus, himself, seemingly 
acknowledges the absence of deductive reasoning through his own abrupt assertion of 
“experience” over “auctoritee.” These scholars describe the speech as exemplifying 
reason confounded rather than triumphant, as pragmatic not philosophic.  This, however, 
ignores how medieval science recognized that the four elements, like the humors of the 
body, were contained (i.e. the fairly experiential truth that fire cannot exist under water). 
Indeed, Gower’s description of “Physique” at the beginning of Book VII provides a fairly 
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detailed explanation of this containment that is mercifully summed up by Theseus “faire 
cheyne of love.”  The crucial difference between Theseus’s cheyne and medieval 
Christian science/theology is that, in medieval tradition, Aquinas’s first mover creates the 
universe ex nihilo while Theseus’s, more like the creator of the Ovidian universe, orders 
pre-existing elements by fixing them in “certeyn boundes.”75   
This Ovidian cosmology allows Chaucer to engage in a political discussion 
without “talking about souls,” a strategic move that parallels Gower’s authorial decision 
to tell a story that “does not strecche up to the hevene” (I.1).  The Knight makes a similar 
gesture after the death of Arcite:  
His spirit chaunged hous and wente ther,  
As I cam nevere, I kan nat tellen wher. 
Therefore I stynte; I nam no divinistre; 
O soules fynde I nat in this registre (I. 2809-2812) 
 
It is important to note that Chaucer’s decision to not speak of Arcite’s soul, deviating 
from Boccaccio’s description of the ascension of Arcite’s soul through the spheres, 
emphasizes how his practical narrative/translation technique (i.e. refusing to tell what he 
never saw) is connected to his refusal to play the role of divinistre, his refusal to 
transgress the boundaries of divine knowledge.  While the first mover speech lacks the 
Christian consolation, its cosmology is not unchristian.  Like the refusal to speak as a 
divinistre, the Knight’s Tale, in ways similar to thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
theologians, created a theological explanation for separation of political and theological 
discourse—what I have called political theology.  The pagan universe allows the knight 
                                                
75 To say this is Ovidian is not to suggest that this is pagan.  This same model was used at different points in Boethius 
(Consolatio II.viii.m; III.xii.p; IV.vi.p;) and Alain de Lille (Anticlaudianus I.53-54) to describe the creation of the 
universe and can fit within Christian thought.  The Knight, as many critics have noted, is limited in that he does not 
imagine a Christian creator.  
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to deploy a political register to describe this ordering of creation.  For example, the 
elements, which seem to have their own agency, need to be constrained so “that they may 
nat flee.”   Theseus, who binds erotic violence with the “faire cheyne” of marriage, 
appropriates the authority of the first mover.   
Unlike “noble theatre,” however, the authority articulated in the first mover 
speech is less an attempt to reflect a divine order than to regulate temporal disorder.  
Royal power resists entropy and is justified by the chaos it seeks to restrain. The speech 
replaces magnificence with politics. Theseus’s argument for a new political order is 
rooted in an uncharacteristically pessimistic view of the cyclical nature of the “wrecched 
world.”  He stresses the natural limitations of people in the face of mutability and death.  
After seventeen lines describing how trees, rocks, rivers, towns, kings and pages all 
“wexeth” or “deye.”  Theseus concludes: 
What maketh this but Juppiter, the kyng, 
That is prince and cause of alle thyng,  
Convertynge al unto his propre welle 
From which it is dirryved, sooth to telle? 
And heer-agayns no creature on lyve,  
Of no degree, availleth for to stryve.  
Thanne is it wysdom, as it thynketh me, 
To maken vertu of necessitee, 
And take it weel that we may nat eschue,  
And namely that to us alle is due.  
And whoso gruccheth ought, he dooth folye,  
And rebel is to hym that al may gye (I.3035-46) 
 
Theseus’s description of the inevitability of death is not only part of a general 
philosophical program justifying his authority, but more important it addresses the 
specific death of Arcite—a death that threatens his own sovereign authority.   The danger 
of Arcite’s death explains Theseus’s inordinate grief: upon the death of Arcite, the Knight 
tells us that “no man myghte gladen Theseus” except Egeus who “knew this worldes 
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transmutacioun” (I.2839 emphasis mine).  Arcite’s death, unlike those on the Theban or 
Scythian fields, was not part of war waged by Theseus.  Arcite was not supposed to die.  
In fact, Theseus had decreed that no one in the royal lists was to die.  As such Arcite’s 
death lacked significance to Theseus.  Arcite’s empty death is part of the “entropic drift” 
that undercuts Theseus’s worldview—for all his battles, he did not fully apprehend “this 
worldes transmutacioun.”  The death exposes the allegorical illusion of Thesian majesty; 
as Gordon Teskey shows, allegory always tentatively projects an illusion of order onto a 
field of chaos: 
The rift that slashes through the center of the field of allegorical expression, 
opening into chaos, cannot be shown for what it is except by the poets, who have 
the courage, at brief moments to do so.  These are the poets . . . who draw back 
the veil of an optimistic metaphysical illusion to reveal the truth of its origin and 
the certainty of its undoing. (1996: 30-31) 
 
The death of Arcite, as all the grief attests, is a moment that “slashes” the “optimistic 
metaphysical illusion” of the arena and exposes the “chaos.”  The death of Arcite has no 
meaning in the arena—it is the saturnine fury at the heart of a projected allegorical order.  
The first mover speech redescribes Arcite’s death in new cosmological terms: his life had 
reached “dayes and duracioun” and in cosmic (and rather euphemistic) language Juppiter 
has converted him “unto his propre welle.”  The reintegration of his life and death into a 
universe of meaning is central to the reconstruction of a model of sovereignty situated in 
mortal time.   
Theseus’s speech reveals the degree to which the discourse of sovereignty 
depends upon giving particular narrative significance to the life of his subjects.  Just like 
his grief was only closed off by Egeus’s explanation of the world of transmutacioun, 
Theseus must find a new register that gives meaning to the lives of his subjects in order 
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to end their mourning.  The death of Arcite signals the end of the cosmological warrant 
manifested in the arena and it inaugurates the search for a new discourse of sovereignty 
that might, in Anderson’s terms, give a “certain meaning to the everyday fatalities of 
existence (above all death, loss and servitude)” 
Since the 1980s many critics have treated the first mover speech as a power play.  
For instance, David Aers suggests the speech is a cynical deployment of religious rhetoric 
that: 
shows how theological language can serve those in power.  It enables them to 
present thoroughly limited class and nationalistic self-interests as universal ones 
dictated by a transcendental being to whom they have special, indeed 
monopolistic access.  Wonderful to say, this being never critiques the basic 
activities or views of the ruling class. (Aers 1986: 30) 
 
Aers points out how the Prime Mover essentially reproduces arena-rhetoric to establish 
“limited class and nationalistic self-interests as universal.”  Those who focus on the 
authoritarian side of the Thesian regime focus on how making “vertu of necessitee” 
reproduces the social order.  As such, the first mover speech can be read as just another 
use of religion to sustain his spurious authority. Theseus speech certainly reproduces the 
same social order that begins the tale: his observation that no one regardless of “degree” 
can strive against mutability and death, only leads him to conclude that to strive against 
this order is madness and political rebellion. His belief in a social hierarchy, however, 
does not make him into a “Machiavellian caricature.”76  Echoing Alexander Pope’s Essay 
on Man, David Aers describes Theseus’s justification for hierarchy as a simple assertion 
                                                
76 For discussion of Theseus as a “Renaissance machiavel,” see Neuse 252; Sherman 105; and Guidry 162. 
 
 220 
that  “whatever is, is right” (30).77  Aers’s bald and shocking précis masks the social 
context of Chaucer’s readership and all the socio-political processes that naturalize and 
anchor the discourse of sovereignty.  As we have seen in Chapter II, the reasons for 
hierarchy are not purely mythical, but rest on the fact that “what is” provided stability 
against lawlessness, civil war, and rebellion, those anti-social energies ascribed to 
Saturn’s orbit.  
Thus, while these cynical accounts of the speech rightfully point out its attempt to 
reproduce a certain social order, they also tend to flatten out the narrative of the Knight’s 
Tale and ignore an important question: What is the difference between the rhetoric of the 
“noble theatre” and the first mover speech?  They ignore Theseus’s own learning curve—
his journey from epic conqueror to parliamentary king.  They ignore the narrative thrust 
of the tale as a whole.   By focusing on the ends, both Muscatine’s “noble designs” and 
Aers’ “what is, is right” elide the difference between Theseus’s arena rhetoric and his 
recuperated authority.  This recuperation transforms the sign-system inherent in the 
discourse of kingship.  Instead of presenting himself  “as he were a god in trone” 
(I.2529), Theseus repeatedly makes use of leveling rhetoric to emphasize the weakness of 
political power: “grete tounes se we wane and wende” (I.3025) or again “in youthe or elle 
age—/He moot be deed, the kyng as shal a page” (I.3029-30).   
Theseus’s recognition that he is not only a king but also a subject is a crucial 
element of the mirror for princes genre.  Usually this recognition that makes the 
traditional mirror focus on the ethical instruction of the king.  The Knight’s Tale actually 
                                                
77 Aers appropriation of Alexander Pope points to one of the underlying tensions the Knight’s Tale investigates: 
namely, the attempt to use cosmic framework to justify political power.  Just because a medieval Christian accepts that 
all things happen according to divine plan does not mean that a Christian ruler can use this plan to justify their own 
authority because he, like all his subjects, does not have understand this plan.   
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shows the relationship between regal power and submission to the effects of fate.  Like 
the marriage of Palamon and Emelye, the king’s office creates a temporary order out of 
necessity.  Larry [Scanlon, speaking about Gower’s Lycurgus has argued that the 
sovereign “achieves his power from the gap between the monarchy and the divinity he 
simulates” (289).  The king’s subjectedness to the Prime Mover models the relationship 
of the Athenian to Theseus.  However, by illustrating the mechanisms of majestic 
authority (i.e. showing that majestic rhetoric is a response to the embarrassment of 
authority), the political world assumes increased significance. Although this language 
does not threaten the actual hierarchy, it does change the source of their authority.  
Unlike the arena—the enclosed edifice of his own authority—the first mover depicts the 
king as responsive to the conditions of “necessitee.”  To “maken vertu” requires 
negotiation with the forces of “necessitee” whether that is a Peasants's Revolt or a 
Merciless Parliament.   
The arena-rhetoric that made a magnificent pageant of the “stark realities of social 
and economic power,” is gone.  His speech no longer assumes Jove-like power to contain 
the deified or planetary forces of Venus, Mars and Diana but rather recognizes that the 
Prime Mover’s “ordinaunce” is such that “speces of thynges . . . shullen enduren by 
successiouns” (I. 3013-14).  The Knight’s Tale does not anatomize a static majestic 
rhetoric, but narratively depicts its collapse beneath the weight of contingency.  Rather 
than displaying Jovian plenitude, the new authority in the first mover is responsive to 
“this worldes transmutacioun.”  The Knight describes the shift from cosmology to 
contingency.  In Melibee, Chaucer provides a more detailed depiction of this political 
“responsiveness.”  
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In Sacrifice Your Love, Louise Fradenburg explains the transformation of 
necessity into virtue in psychoanalytical terms as a transformation of “finitude into 
creative power” (164-5).  Theseus exerts a kind of control over the uncontrollable forces 
of contingency by representing those forces.  His description of mutability (despite or 
even because of its conventionality) is hardly what Aers calls the “banal observation that 
all things must die.”  That is, the reason that mutability trope is so often repeated is 
because the representation of one’s “finitude,” what Fradenburg calls the “beautiful 
signifier,” allows the speaker some semblance of control.  The signifier gets its meaning 
not from an external order, but through its resistance to entropic drift.  Unlike the arena-
rhetoric that masks the embarrassment of authority behind an excessive display of earthly 
power, the prime mover speech emphasizes this embarrassment and turns it into creative 
power by including them in subjection to a higher necessity. 
In the absence of cosmological claims of the arena, the "creative power" power of 
the beautiful signifier provides psychological foundation of political power.  Rhetorically, 
the speech offers a new model of sovereignty that no longer confidently reflects the 
majestic hierarchy, but rather imagines hierarchy and royal power as a resistance to the 
forces of chaos.  While this does not alter—in Theseus’s mind—the actual social order it 
changes the nature and claims of kingship.  Unlike arena-rhetoric in which Theseus’s 
power is based on a cosmological order, the first mover speech imagines Theseus’s 
sovereignty as an act—resisting saturnine disorder.  In J.L. Austin’s terminology—the 
discourse of sovereignty changes from constative statements to performatives.  Since 
mutability and death are the primary conditions of the world, we must accept our 
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condition (rather than “stryve” against it) in order to continuously project order onto the 
chaos.   
The “parfit joye . . . lasting evermo” that concludes the tale offers a panoply of 
optimistic and pessimistic readings.  The idea of joining “two sorwes” into “o parfit 
joye” satisfies the generic expectations of romance in which the suffering of mutability, 
what Bakhtin calls “romance time” is closed off by the biographical marriage.  However, 
as many critics point out, given the conditions of the marriage proposal itself, which is 
actually embedded in a eulogy, such a conclusion seems wildly optimistic and even 
spurious.78 Reminded that all things “moot deye,” we recognize that Palamon and Emelye 
will, like all things “corrumpable,” be converted to the their “propre well” (I.3037) (i.e. 
“deeth is an ende of every worldly soore” (I.2849)).  The “joye” will be short lived.  Read 
another way, the “joye” is not strictly Palamon and Emelye’s but the “joye” of 
“successioun” (I.3014) that resists the endless cycle of death.  The marriage represents 
the “joye” that will continue the cycle of creation instituted by the Prime Mover.  
Pessimistic critics will counter argue that the whole Prime Mover system is likely to 
collapse much like his arena rhetoric did. What is crucial about all the potential readings 
of the tale is the ordering impulse embodied by Theseus.  Each reading of social order—
accepted as conclusive (much like Theseus’s confident belief in his “plat conclusion”)—
collapses because saturnine chaos cannot be enclosed.  While many critics end on this 
despairing note, it is essential to recognize that the Knight’s Tale does not solely seek a 
                                                
78 Kolve and Aers both suggest the materialism of Theseus’s speech fails to offer a real “philosophical resolution” 
(Kolve 148) or “metaphysical order” (Aers, Chaucer 189).  The speech asserts divine authority but focuses on decay.  
Thus, as Collette argues “no one who has read or listened to the tale, especially to Theseus’s speech, can expect that the 
joy – or anything else – will last for long, much less “evermo” (57-58). 
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truth to close off meaning, but suggests an interpretive strategy that responds to the new 
conditions.   
Theseus’s first mover speech exemplifies a greater truth still: namely that reading, 
meaning making and translation all respond to the conditions through which sovereignty 
is maintained.  The tale does not offer a meaning, but rather embodies a political 
sociolinguistic order, “a semiotics of power,” that challenges majestic allegories that 
sustain the cosmic framework. The story heals the tear in the “metaphysical illusion” by 
replacing an order with an ordering process embodied by Theseus.  While this ordering 
process maintains many of the same hierarchical assumptions, it accepts the limitations 
inherent in the “beautiful signifier” central to political rhetoric. At the end, the speech 
recognizes and provisionally contains the forces of entropy, it acquires its meaning 
through the forces it resists. 
This translates Theseus voice from the confident transcendent voice found in the 
arena to the anxiety ridden “common voice” of the first mover speech. Reading the first 
mover speech as part of a lengthy commentary on chivalry, scholars suggest the 
philosophical flaws of the speech or its dark imagery point to the failures of the Knight’s 
ideology.  The Knight’s Tale, as Galloway puts it, "de-authorizes” and reauthorizes 
“authority” in a different form—changed in order to create space for Chaucer’s own 
fictional voice.  What I have tried to demonstrate is that this de-authorization of 
authority is part of the emerging political rhetoric that developed new lines of 
cooperation outside the cosmic framework through which power was recognized and 
coalitions established. Unlike the sturdy, atemporal imperative rhetoric of the theater, the 
first mover speech is strategic and performative; Theseus reconstructs his authority.  The 
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movement from the noble arena to the first mover speech reflects a transformation in 
kingship, one in which a “coherent system of purely logical relationships” suddenly 
becomes strategic and visibly hortatory.79  As a result, this new “fictional voice” does not 
share the cosmic confidence of Theseus’s arena, or even his Prime Mover, but rather it 
anchors its authority in the broader Thesian imperative to create order in the face of 
historical circumstance—‘meaning’ as a ‘response to.’  In Middleton’s terms we see the 
transformation from the transcendent narrator to the common voice. The Knight replaces 
a depiction of Theseus as "god in trone" in front of a majestic spectacle with an image of 
Theseus in Parliament arranging a political marriage.  Galloway’s argument that this de-
authorization creates space for his fiction aligns with my broader idea that the emergence 
of political rhetoric required narrative that consistently negotiates the conditions of its 
power. It establishes an author/ruler who must continuously turn “sorwe” into “joye.” In 
our discussion of the Clerk’s Tale, we will see how the collapse of the transcendent voice 
(arena-rhetoric) and the rise of a common voice manifest in a political perspective (and 
thus a political identity) of the reader. 
 
Reading the Clerk’s Tale as A Critique of Majesty 
The Clerk tells a tale in which a Marquis demands absolute obedience from his 
wife and then tests this obedience by pretending to murder her children and marry a new 
woman.  The tale, to put it bluntly, is provocative; and it was equally provocative in the 
fourteenth century.  In the marginal comments to his 1384 copy of the Decameron, 
                                                
79 Bourdieu’s distinction between official kin and practical kin provides a useful paradigm.  He describes official 
symbolic descriptions of kinship  “serve the function of ordering the social world and of legitimating that order” (34).  
It is a language, like majestic rhetoric, that reproduces a given order.  Moreover, he shows how this official system 
often brushes against the “utilization of connections [kinship]”(34). For full distinction between official and practical 
uses of kinship, see 35-38. 
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Francesco Amaretto Manelli imagines Griselda violently responding to the Marquis’ 
offer of reconciliation “Go piss on your hand Gualtieri, who’ll give me back twelve 
years? The gallows?” (qtd. in Green, “Why the Marquis” 49).  Manelli’s response alerts 
us to the potential energy of the Griselda legend.  While one should not make too much 
of one marginal comment, I think it equally naive to dismiss it.  Boccaccio, Petrarch and 
Chaucer, each in his own way, anticipate and address an adverse reaction from his 
audience.  Boccaccio distances himself from the Griselda legend by relating it through a 
fictional narrator, who concerned that his story will be ill received opens with a withering 
critique of the Marquis:  
I want to tell you of a marquis, whose actions, even though things turned out well 
for him in the end, were remarkable not so much for their munificence as for their 
senseless brutality.  Nor do I advise anyone to follow his example, for it was a 
great pity that the fellow should have drawn any profit from his conduct (784).80   
 
Dioneo’s introduction to the Griselda story emphasizes the “senseless brutality” rather 
than the exemplary status of Griselda and calls attention to the fact that the “virtue” is not 
rewarded. 
Petrarch who translated the tale into Latin in a letter of Seniles removed the 
fictional narrator and focuses the reader’s attention on the exemplary conduct of Griselda.  
In Seniles XVII, 4 however, he gives an account of two responses to the legend.  A 
Paduan friend who was overcome “by sudden weeping” who “confessed he could not 
proceed” and another friend from Verona who,  
read it all without stopping anywhere, nor did his brow darken or his voice break . 
. . in the end he said, “I too would have wept, for the touching subject and the 
words fit for the subject prompted weeping . . . but I believed and still do that the 
whole thing was made up.  For if it were true, what woman anywhere, whether 
                                                
80 All citations from the Decameron are from G.H. McWilliams translation, 2nd ed. (London: New York: Penguin, 
1995).  
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Roman or of any nation whatever will match this Griselda? Where, I ask is such 
great conjugal love, equal fidelity, such signal patience and constancy? (669-
670)81 
 
Petrarch focuses the tale on the exemplary power of Griselda and even provides an 
imagined riposte to the Veronese friend “there have been many . . . for whom things that 
seem impossible to the multitude are simple.”  Petrarch wants to transform the “weeping” 
that Walter’s cruelty causes into a model of spiritual constancy.   
It seems likely that Chaucer never read Boccaccio’s account.  Nonetheless, by 
inserting it into the Canterbury Tales, he restored the ironic distance of the original. 
Chaucer exploits this distance even more than Boccaccio by foregrounding the narrator’s 
response to the tale.  Unlike Dioneo, the Clerk repeatedly interrupts with his own 
opinions “I saye that yvele it sit” (IV.460) or “O nedelees was she tempted” (IV.621).  
This running commentary shapes the reader’s response to the Petrarchan material and 
renders the reader’s reception of the tale conspicuous.  For Petrarch, Griseldan constancy 
confines and spiritualizes the tale’s potential energy (i.e. the potential violent reactions to 
the Marquis’s cruelty) in a way that fosters the “sphere” of individual moral self while 
submitting to the “conventions and compulsions” of public life.82 The two responses in 
Seniles XVII, 4 reinforce this reading.   
In my discussion of the Clerk’s Tale, I will look at how Chaucer’s Clerk fosters a 
political response to Petrarch’s Griselda.  However, there is one important caveat: my 
                                                
81 Translation of Seniles VII, 4 669-670 Letters of Old Age (Rerum senilium libri I-XVIII). Trans. Bernardo, Aldo S, 
and Levin, Saul.  
 
82 Developing Charles Trinkhaus’s discussion of Petrarch’s separation of the private and public sphere Warren 
Ginsberg describes the role his Griselda legend played: “The palms he [Petrarch] craves, however, are fundamentally 
civic virtues, yet like spiritual attainments, they must be gained through an intensely private inner battle to determine 
the constitution of the self.  Only the man who had made himself estimable in solitude, shut off from the public, will be 
able to win the public’s esteem . . . Throughout his life Petrarch sought a means that could accommodate the contesting 
impulses of this “double consciousness.”  The Griselda represents his maturest attempt to reconcile the demands of 
personal will and communal duty” (255). 
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discussion should not be read as a response to Petrarchan humanism, but rather as a 
response to subjectivity and majestic model of authority the tale seemingly invokes.  In 
its acceptance of absolute submission of the political self to the sovereign, the Griselda 
legend could be read as an exemplum of majestic obedience.  The reader response staged 
by the Tale establishes a metacritical frame aligned with political rhetoric that is absent 
from Petrarch.  This frame encourages a reading born out of resistance to the Griseldan 
subjectivity the tale engenders.  The act of reading is tied to the development of the 
political perspective.   
What makes Chaucer’s handling of the Griselda legend so compelling is that—
unlike Petrarch’s Griselda—the spiritual moral cannot contain the ‘physical’ revulsion 
caused by the narrative events—it is, in a sense, a broken exemplum. Usually, an 
exemplum is a short narrative that illustrates a point—the moral.  The narrative should 
interest the reader without drawing their attention away from the spiritual moral.  
Chaucer rips the moral and narrative apart—at once enjoining the reader to give 
obedience to God and simultaneously delivering a withering critique of majestic rhetoric.  
The audience’s reaction, then, can be understood formally as a tension between the 
narrative events of the exemplum and the moral those events are meant to illustrate.  On 
the narrative level, we have a disturbing tale about a Marquis who marries a peasant only 
after she agrees to never confront, question or even frown at any of the Marquis’ future 
commands.  After the marriage, Walter, in order to test his wife’s constancy in the 
extreme, pretends to kill her children and then divorce her. 
 Like Petrarch, the Clerk tries to dismiss these narrative events of the story by 
telling wives not to follow her example:  
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This storie is seyd nat for that wyves sholde 
Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee, 
For it were inportable, though they wolde (IV. 1142-44)  
 
Acknowledging that Griselda’s humility is “inportable,” the Clerk attempts to transform 
the tale into an exhortation for Christians: 
sith a womman was so pacient 
Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte 
Receyven al in gree that God us sent. (IV. 1149-51)   
 
However the Clerk’s moral does not satisfy.  One is left asking with Manelli’s Griselda: 
“who’ll give me back twelve years?”  Ultimately, Walter’s cruelty has such a presence 
that Chaucer’s Clerk—like Petrarch and Dioneo— feels compelled to remind us that he 
doesn’t believe “wyves sholde/ Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee” (IV.1142-3).  The Clerk 
tries to turn the reader’s attention away from the temporal world established by narrative 
events (turn away from inter-personal relationships) and focus instead on a transcendent 
relationship between the Christian and God.  However, the narrative and the interpersonal 
relationships have their revenge.   
The tension between the pat Christian moral and violent reactions to the tale 
continues to inform modern readings of the Clerk’s Tale.83  Charles Muscatine, with a 
hint of censure, suggests that Chaucer’s “superfluity of . . . pathos” (193) comes 
dangerously close to overwhelming the Petrarchan force of the tale. 84  Similarly 
Elizabeth Salter identified a powerful “discrepancy between austere allegory and realistic 
                                                
83 For a lengthier discussion of anxiety caused between moralizing the tale and responding to Walter on a more 
personal level, see Sprung 345-369, particularly 345-346; Green, “Why the Marquis” 48-50; and Cherniss 235-37. 
 
84 Muscatine describes the Clerks tale as “trembl[ing] on the edge of sentimentality” (193) which he postulates may be 
“a mark of the time.”  Muscatine’s “mark of the time,” seems as though he is dismissing a particular taste, a taste that 
does fit with his own more Petrarchan palate.  However, this phrase, “mark of the time,” may in fact be more 
significant than that.  I suspect the kind of “sentimentality” and “pathos” added by Chaucer to Petrarch’s tale is a 
product of a new political orientation, an orientation that focuses on human joy and suffering.   
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pathos” in the Clerk’s Tale (62). Although she has been criticized for reading the tale as 
allegory, Salter accurately emphasizes the anxiety caused by the failure of transcendent 
meaning to either displace (or even mitigate) the “real pathos” of the narrative.85  More 
recently, Michael Cherniss has argued that the Clerk’s Tale does not resolve “the surface 
tension between it [the marital theme] and the spiritual moral,” that it has a “double 
theme” (Cherniss 242).  He claims there is deep anxiety or “awkwardness” between 
reading Griselda’s constancy to a mortal husband as allegory/ exemplum of a Job-like 
obedience to God, and the “righteous anger” at the misery “inflicted capriciously by a 
human hand.”  
The Clerk not only tells an exemplum of spiritual constancy but also a narrative of 
marriage and politics; that is, the marriage narrative creates a fictive space for “the theme 
of sovereignty to be worked out” (Muscatine 194).  The Clerk describes Walter and 
Griselda as husband and wife, but he also emphasizes Walter as sovereign and Griselda 
as his subject.  Indeed, this ‘political’ relationship, a microcosm of the king’s relationship 
with his subjects, defines and subordinates the mutual obligations of the conjugal bond. 
For Muscatine, the political moral reinforces, rather than upsets the spiritual moral—
Griselda represents the perfect subject and perhaps, as some critics suggest, a rarefied 
resistance rhetoric.86  This Petrarchan interpretation of the Clerk’s Tale undercuts the 
anxiety of the tale—an anxiety that Chaucer amplified.  The “surface tension” between 
                                                
85 For example, Charlotte Morse argues that the allegorizers (Salter, Muscatine etc.) “shift[ed] attention away from the 
narrative itself and onto an abstracted pattern of divine-human relationship” (52).  While allegory reduces the tale, the 
desire to use some interpretive method to render the tale acceptable is not only part of “presentist” reading of 
obedience, but very much an anxiety recognized within the tale itself.  The allegorizers may find arrive at a false 
conclusion, nonetheless, the problem they adumbrate and try to resolve is very real.   
 
86 Muscatine argues that Griselda never gives into Walter and through “vertuous suffraunce” forces him to capitulate.  
Griseldan constancy, thus, represents the efficacy of political quietism in the face of tyranny.   
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marital theme and spiritual moral, a tension developed by the Merchant and the Franklin, 
encourages the reader to challenge the rhetoric that constrains Griselda.  On one level, 
Chaucer’s narrative conflates the spiritual moral and the political narrative; on another it 
registers the anxiety caused by this conflation.  And it is precisely this conflation at the 
heart of majestic rhetoric: that is, the subject ought to treat the sovereign as the “vice-
regent of God on earth,” or “semi-deus” because the earthly hierarchy mirrors the 
heavenly hierarchy.  By conflating and generating friction between the narrative and its 
moral, Chaucer forces the reader to disambiguate and revise the relationship between 
spiritual and political rhetoric. 
In order to understand the tale’s critique of politics, we must first examine it 
intentionally exacerbates the conflict between “austere” spiritual moral and the story’s 
“pathos” and then explain how it situates this conflict within a political context. As 
scholars since J. Severs have pointed out, Chaucer’s additions to the Petrarchan source 
amplify the tale’s emotional realism, which I have shown rises out of political realism.87  
Petrarch exalts Griselda’s exemplary constancy rather than critiquing the political 
relationship between Griselda and the Marquis.88 Petrarch’s Griselda, according to David 
Wallace is “classicized, mythologized, and moralized as a timeless exemplum of 
obedience to God” (Wallace 282).  As a result, the marriage, which has little political 
valence, primarily establishes a pretext for the cruelties Walter inflicts upon Griselda.  It 
proves Griselda constancy rather than Walter’s tyranny.  This spiritualized portrayal of 
                                                
87 For a full description of the emotional realism in the Clerk’s Tale, see Severs 233-245. 
 
88 According to Wallace, Petrarch imagines evaluating a potential bride as “a kind of masculine inventio which, in 
gazing at or through the female body, may lay bare the essential qualities beneath.  The female mind is valued, but only 
for its willingness to cast off any “ornatus elegantism” it brings with it, laying bare the essential “pietatem” that may be 
subjected to masculine molding” (274).  Chaucer’s Clerk encourages the reader to recognize and critique the Petrarchan 
subtext.     
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Griselda as a “timeless exemplum” of Christian constancy, Amy Goodwin argues, 
depends upon the “imperfect analogy between Griselda’ obedience to Walter and the 
Christian’s to God (62).89  The spiritual exemplum overwrites the political narrative.  
Petrarch maintains this implied, albeit “imperfect analogy” by downplaying the 
psychological violence of Valterius’ tyrannical acts.  For example, in the denouement, 
where Valterius returns Griselda’s children, the suffering caused by the Marquis seems 
to, in Wallace’s words,  “vanish into thin air” (292):  
His words produced almost unbearable joy and frantic devotion: Griselda rushes 
with the happiest tears to embrace her children, wearies them with kisses, and 
bedews them with maternal tears. (128-129) 90   
 
When the Marquis restores Griselda’s children, his words, produce “unbearable joy and 
frantic devotion.” Petrarch avoids adding psychological complexity here for the sake of 
the moral.  By focusing intently on Griseldan constancy, the cruelty of relationship 
becomes almost evanescent. He transforms the reader’s moral outrage into “moral 
approbation” of Griselda’s transcendent constancy and thus, elevating the spiritual, he 
effectively cordons off, or at least forcefully downplays, the political readings of the 
tale.91  The focus on Griselda’s virtue mystifies the relationship between sovereign and 
                                                
89 The attempt to understand Griselda as a Job-figure has led to all kinds of ways of trying to understand Walter as a 
God-figure.  Most often, this has assumed the shape of accepting that the anagogical relationship is “imperfect” and 
that the tale focuses on Griselda’s piety rather than Walter’s imperfection.  According to David Wallace, “the implied 
analogy between Walter and God can be taken seriously in Petrarch’s text because Walter’s tyrannical proclivities are 
played down" (Wallace 282) Robert Stepsis argues that the Clerk developed theological theories of “Oxenford” to 
represent Walter as the potentia absoluta of God—a power that renders reasonable explanation of God’s will out-of-
bounds (129-146).   
 
90 All citations and translation from Petrarch’s Griselda Legend are from Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury 
Tales. Ed. Correale, Robert M.   
 
91 For Muscatine, the “inner inspiration” of Clerk’s Tale “is Petrarchan.”  He locates this Petrarchanism in “The poem’s 
theme is in Job v, 17: ‘Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth. His is pure chastening, pure correction. 
Walter’s lack of motivation is an advantage in presenting this theme.  Griselda’s trial is a trial because there is no 
reason for it.  The life of the tale, simplified down to extremity, makes show of the nature of bare virtue itself” (194 
emphasis mine).  I am suggesting that the Petrarchan tale of “bare virtue” is a subtext.  It is not difficult to hear Petrarch 
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subject.  Petrarch imagines Griseldan constancy as interior virtue divorced from (and thus 
resistant to) the public sphere.92  
The Clerk’s Griselda is no less exemplary.  Chaucer, however, amplifies the 
imperfections of the analogy between Griselda’ obedience to Walter and the Christian’s 
to God in a way that “restores Griselde to the movement of history” (Wallace 283).  
Recognizing the frustration with reading Griselda as part of an “austere” allegory or 
exemplum, Chaucer amplified the political tensions within the narrative, which Petrarch 
had tried to erase.   Griselda’s subjugation allows Chaucer to examine the effects of 
majestic rhetoric.  For example, in his translation, the return of the children (an 
unproblematically joyous moment within the conventions of exemplum) ironically paints 
such an abhorrent picture of Walter and Griselda’s marriage that rivals (and for some 
readers) replaces Griselda’s exemplary constancy as the object of analysis.93 In his 
translation of this scene, Chaucer turns Petrarch’s three lines of prose into 34 lines of 
poetry in which Griselda repeatedly weeps and swoons.94 More importantly, he gives 
voice to something that has been suppressed throughout the text, Griselda’s emotional 
response: 
“O tendre, o deere, o yonge children myne! 
                                                                                                                                            
in the Clerk’s Tale, but Chaucer’s Clerk is not presenting that voice in its most flattering light.  Petrarch’s bare virtue, 
by moments of added pathos, is being exposed as violence.  
 
92 Comparing Petrarch’s humanism to Harry Bailley’s concept of fiction, Warren Ginsberg argues that both engage 
“history by deflecting the consequences of its demand for public commitment” (2002: 263).   While I agree that both 
texts avoid any call for “public engagement,” it is my intention to show that their attitude towards the role of the 
political in the fashioning of the self, and thus the awareness of the political as part of the subjects’ identity, are very 
different.   
 
93 Charlotte Morse suggests that many modern readers have been so deeply disturbed by the violence of the tale that 
they cannot accept Griselda’s exemplary constancy. Indeed, she argues this leads to literary “presentism” in which 
interpretations of the tale are unduly shaped by modern concerns (51-52).  
 
94 It is precisely this amplification that leads Muscatine to identify “the superfluity of Chaucer’s pathos over Petrarch’s” 
(193) as the defining characteristic of Chaucer’s translation of his Petrarchan source material.   
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Youre woful mooder wende stedfastly 
That crueel houndes or som foul vermyne  
Had eten yow; but God of his mercy 
And your benyngne fader tendrely 
Hath doon yow kept” — and in that same stounde 
Al sodeynly she swapte adoune to grounde. (IV. 1093-99) 
 
The passage depicts the impossible and traumatic contradictions that Griseldan 
subjectivity had to manage throughout the tale.  First, we see Griselda’s intense motherly 
love in the interjections “o tendre, o deere, o yonge,” which suggest an emotion that she 
cannot apprehend, in Petrarch’s words an “unbearable” emotion. As he translates her 
unbearable joy into dialogue, Chaucer adds psychological dimensions to Griselda.   
Griselda’s renarrates the Clerk’s Tale from a new, or rather adjusted 
perspective—one that allows Griselda to claim her own suffering.  In the previous 
instances where Walter tests Griselda, Chaucer depicts her as “noght ameved” (498).  We 
do not see the “woful mooder.”  For example, when Walter has pretended to order the 
death of her daughter Griselda responded:   
  . . . Lord, al lyth in your plesaunce. 
 My child and I, with hertely obeisaunce,  
 Been youres al, and ye mowe save or spille  
Youre owene thyng; werketh after youre wille.  (501-504) 
 
Griselda’s suffering is supplanted by Walter’s “pleasaunce.”  In a tale that emphasizes 
Walter’s anxiety regarding his will(an anxiety that drives him to exact outrageous oaths 
from his subjects and to test his wife in “merveillous” manner), Griselda’s submission to 
Walter (i.e. “werketh after youre will”) demonstrates the potentially chilling effect of the 
royal prerogative on the subject’s interiority.  Indeed, Griselda’s acceptance that Walter 
may “save or spille” echoes Arphages from Gower’s “Tale of the Three Advisors” who 
describes the absoluteness of the prerogative as the power to “save or spille.” 
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When her children are returned, Griselda unwittingly emphasizes the emptiness of 
Walter’s ‘kindness.’  Immediately, after her joyful interjections, Chaucer introduces a 
powerful possessive pronoun “o yonge children myne.”  This possessive exclamation 
punctures—even if momentarily—a tale in which Griselda repeatedly replaces her grief 
with the Marquis’s pleasaunce.  Having been kept down throughout the tale, her love and 
grief flood into these thirty-four lines.  Of course, one must not imagine that Griselda 
escapes the majestic rhetoric of kingship; after all, she cannot express her grief without 
repeatedly acknowledging the just authority of her husband.  Her agency is largely 
predicated on Walter’s ‘kindness.’  However, in a poem that represses any kind of agency 
(such that Muscatine called said it had an astringent aesthetic that could only be 
appreciated by connoisseurs), the possessive “myne,” invites readers to imagine Walter 
as excluded from the scene.  The speech, largely absent from Petrarch’s text, encourages 
a critical reading of Walter’s “gift” and the majestic paradigm that gift represents.   
In Chaucer, the “unbearable joy” gives way to a remembering her prior woe and 
at the moment of resolution Chaucer vividly recalls the cruelty of the Marquis.  In this 
retelling, Griselda reconstructs her anguish—an emotion that had been suppressed in the 
initial description of the events. Griselda does not just say that she was sad, but rather 
explains that she continuously (“stedfastly”) imagined that hounds and “foul vermyne” 
ate her children.  No matter how much we attempt to read this as a tale of Griselda’s 
spiritual constancy, this memory of her grief (though without a single accusation) 
condemns Walter.  After reminding the reader of Walter’s cruelty, Griselda thanks “God 
of his mercy” and the children's “benyngne fader” who had “kept” them.  Griselda’s 
gratitude toward God and the Marquis anticipates the moral but also highlights the 
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anxiety: Walter was a “benyngne fader” because he did not do the cruel thing to the 
children that he said he would—Walter’s kindness is an empty gift.   
The blending of love, suffering and gratitude is unbearable, which is registered by 
Griselda’s violent collapse—“she swapte adoune to grounde.”  We might register this as 
just another amplification of Petrarch’s “unbearable joy;” however, Chaucer makes sure 
we recognize that she collapses “al sodeynly” and “in that same stounde” as she praises 
Walter and conjoins his benignity with God’s mercy.  By amplifying Griselda’s suffering 
and hence the realistic pathos of the tale, the imperfect Griselda-Walter/Christian-God 
analogy collapses. Conjugal and political violence remain unresolved. Consequently, the 
reader is likely to condemn Walter and, more broadly, the majestic rhetoric signified by 
marriage demands that occlude the subject-wife’s proper political agency. Griselda’s 
words emphasize the psychological effects of power, the psychological trauma caused by 
majestic relationship between husband and wife—between Marquis and his subject.  
Walter’s decision to end his testing (“this is ynogh”), simply does not balance out 
Griselda’s 34-line emotional response when reunited with her children, children she 
thought were dead.  Not even the Clerk-narrator seems willing to accept this exemplary 
reading of the tale.  Although the Clerk says the tale should be thought of in spiritual 
terms, his envoy actually “draws attention back to the ostensibly abandoned marital 
theme, renewing the surface tension between it and the spiritual moral” (Cherniss 242).95 
After finishing his tale of “ernestful matere,” the Clerk sings a sarcastic song for the love 
of the Wife of Bath.  In his song he playfully enjoins the noble wives to “lat noon 
                                                
95 What follows develops Cherniss’ argument that the envoy demonstrates the Clerk’s own fascination with the secular 
theme of the exemplum.  Muscatine made a similar observation about the thematic conflict between the spiritual moral 
and the realistic envoy; however, he dismisses the envoy as part of the dramatic frame that has no effect on the “inner 
inspiration” announced by the Clerk at the close of his tale in the moral (192).  
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humylitee youre tonge naille” (1184) and to fire the arrows of their “crabbed eloquence” 
(1203) against their mortal husbands.  If the envoy is read as a sarcastic reversal of 
Griselda, then clearly the Clerk is still thinking about the secular relationship between 
Griselda and Walter—not just the spiritual one between Christians and God.  I would add 
that the envoy accentuates the fact that the reader ought to think of the Griselda-Walter 
relationship in terms of the discourse of sovereignty.  The Clerk’s suggestion that the 
noble wives can strengthen the “commun profit” by following Echo, who “holdeth no 
silence” (IV.1189-1194) seems out of place even as a joke.96 Unlike Petrarch’s Paduan 
and Veronese readers that ensure that we read Griselda in terms of her “signal patience 
and constancy,” Chaucer, by contrasting Griselda to these “archewyves” of the common 
profit, directs the reader back to marriage as a political representation of the subject-
sovereign relationship.     
Insofar as we imagine Clerk’s Tale as a political (in its broadest sense) allegory, 
Chaucer’s emphasis on the literal level of Walter’s cruelty disrupts the allegorical 
“modus significandi.”97  It is this fracture between, or rather fracturing of, the ideal and 
the literal that I have described as political realism.  In terms of political allegory, the 
Clerk’s Tale encourages the reader to imagine Griselda as the ideal obedient subject.  
Obedience was the theocratic cornerstone of majestic rhetoric encapsulated in Augustine: 
“obedience is both the origin and perfection of all justice in all people and rational 
                                                
96 The overly talkative wife was a common comic figure of medieval literature.  However, the use of this comic figure 
to represent the common profit seems to be Chaucer’s invention.   
 
97 Ricardian Poetry 82 “the prevailing ‘modus significandi’ in Ricardian narrative is not allegorical but literal.  Andrzej 
Wicher suggests more specifically that the prevailing mode of signification in Chaucer is allegory that is 
“disconcerted.”  
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animals”  (qtd. in Ullmann, Individual 32).98  Richard II’s chancellor, Michael de la Pole 
expounds upon this majestic obedience in his 1383 address to parliament, stressing,  
“obedience to the king was the foundation of all peace and quiet in the realm” (qtd. in 
Saul, Richard II 386).  De la Pole’s address exemplifies how Richard II fostered majestic 
rhetoric that would “raise himself above, and to distance himself from his subject” in 
order to “strengthen his claims to his subjects’ obedience” (Saul, Kingship 49).  This 
oppressive political obedience hangs over the tale.  Chaucer makes us think of Griselda’s 
marriage in relation to obedience and subjection from the moment that Walter approaches 
her: 
And doun upon hir knes she gan to falle, 
And with sad contenance she kneleth stille, 
Til she had herd what was the lordes will.   (IV. 292-94) 
 
Her “sad contenance” which will become the object of Walter’s testing was already seen 
as bound to her “lordes wille.”  Before we even get to the proposal, the relationship 
between Walter and Griselda is one of kneeling subject to standing lord.99  We will get 
another image of kneeling Griselda when she returns to Walter’s house as his servant: 
“on hir knees hire sette,/And reverently . . . him grette” (951-2).  As J. B. Severs points 
out, these depictions of the kneeling Griselda increase the political valence by 
emphasizing her “humble obedience to the will of her lord and husband” (235—emphasis 
mine).  
                                                
98 The Latin is: “[obedientia] est in hominibus et in omni rationali creatura omnis iustitiae origo atque perfectio.”  This 
common Augustinian construction of obedience and justice echoes throughout the Middle Ages.  
 
99 Severs points out that Chaucer frequently inserts a number of “gesture[s] of subjection” that were not in the original 
text (235).  As a result, the Clerk’s Tale emphasizes the majestic authority of Walter. This was perhaps shaped by the 
image of kingship projected by Richard II.  The image of the kneeling subject played an important role in Richard’s 
vision of kingship (or at least how it was perceived by chroniclers).  The Eulogium chronicler states that “it became the 
king’s practice to sit throned in state from dinner till vespers observed by all his courtiers who were expected to end the 
knee whenever his gaze fell on them” (qtd. in Saul, “Kingship” 40). 
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Walter’s majestic authority necessitates the erasure of the political model of 
kingship that Aristotle (and the Scholastic school he deeply influenced) signified by 
married love.  Aristotle described kingship in terms of “economic” relationships (i.e. in 
terms of relationships within a household): the paternal relationship represented regal 
kingship, conjugal represented political kingship and master/slave despotic. 100  The 
conjugal relationship, which is most important for our purposes, provides an analogy for 
political kingship in which the ruler is bound to charters, contract and customary law, 
much like a husband bound to certain “condiciouns and covenantes" (Giles 2.1.13-15) of 
marriage.101 Aristotle’s political tropes inform our reading Walter’s rewriting of the 
marriage covenant and his oppression of his wife.  In short, it is the political potential of 
marriage that threatens Walter. 
Chaucer may or may not have been consciously using Aristotelian metaphors for 
kingship; nonetheless, the economic language of kingship was so pervasive in the 
fourteenth century that Aristotelian political ideas informed Ricardian marriage-
sovereignty metaphors.  In fourteenth century one found this paradigm in sermons on 
“the mutuality of conjugal love,” political treatises and vernacular books on household 
management. 102  The ubiquity of the marriage-sovereignty trope helps explain why 
                                                
100 Economic refers to the relationships between different members within a household.  As Lynn Staley points out, 
economics, alongside ethics and politics, was crucial to medieval understanding of government.  Nicole Oresme, a 
French political theorist patronized by Charles V produced one book for each field (ethics, economics and politics) and 
described them as such: “ethics is about the mastery of the self, the Economics, about managing family, and the 
Politics, about establishing the science of managing groups or governing cities” (Staley, Languages 89). 
 
101 “Fo[r] the housebond shulde be above the wif and rewle here by politik rewelyng, for he schuld rewle here certeyn 
as by the lawe of wedlok and matrimoyne and by condiciouns and covenantes” (Giles 2.1.13-15).  Giles of Rome had 
considerable influence over the political thought in the court of Richard II.  For more on the conjugal model in Giles, 
see Rigby 297-98.  Blythe points out that Aquinas popularized the Aristotelian analogy.   
 
102 On the prevalence of discussing trouthe and mutuality in terms of marriage, see Emma Lipton Chapter 1.  For the 
pervasiveness of marriage as a political construct in French literature, see Lynn Staley, Languages 88-91.  She cites its 
influence on English literature arguing that Gower’s Traité pour ensampler les amantz marietz “collapses the fiction of 
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Chaucer’s marriage sequence seem so deeply invested in the language of governance—
i.e. “sovereignty,” “obeissaunce,” “trouthe,” “lordship” and “servage.”  Coming right on 
the heels of the Clerk’s Tale, for example, the Merchant, similar to the Marquis, describes 
marriage in terms of constraint and freedom, but unlike Walter he privileges the “yok” as 
“blissful:”103 
They [Bachelors] lyve but as a bryd or as a beest, 
In libertee and under noon arreest, 
Ther as a wedded man in his estaat 
Lyveth a lif blisful and ordinaat 
Under this yok of mariage ybounde.  (IV. 1281-85) 
 
If we see the Merchant’s Tale as picking up on threads of the Clerk’s Tale, then he seems 
to be accusing the unmarried Walter of a kind of bestial liberty.  More importantly, it 
praises the conjugal model of sovereignty in which the covenants and conditions of 
wedlock bind both the sovereign and subject in “a lif . . . ordinaat.”  Chaucer’s Franklin, 
on the other hand emphasizes the freedom within mutuality of “sacramental marriage:”  
That freendes everych oother moot obeye, 
If they wol longe holden compaignye.   
Love wol nat been constreyned by maistrye. 
When maistrie comth, the God of Love anon 
Beteth his wynges, and farewel, he is gon!  (V.762-6) 
 
The Franklin addresses the dangers of majestic obedience in the attempt to “holden 
compaignye” which points outward to compaignye of pilgrims that signified political 
authority itself (Wallace 2).  Marriage becomes a way of analyzing “liberty,” “maistrye” 
obedience within the different models of sovereignty.     
                                                                                                                                            
love into a praise of marriage, which is allied with the greater harmony of the created world and the communal 
harmony that emerges from the lawful containment of base desire” (347).  Similarly James Simpson has argued that 
Ricardian praise of marriage is a move from obsessive amatory love to politics (282-284). 
 
103 Of course, the marriage in the Merchant’s Tale resembles blissful ignorance more than a blissful “yok.”  However, 
this does not contradict what the Merchant says of marriage at the beginning of the tale.  The marriage problems in the 
Merchant’s Tale result from the January blindly reproducing the tyrannical crimes of Walter.   
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Unlike the Franklin’s sanguine depiction of marriage as freedom within the 
mutual obligations of matrimony, Griselda, as wife and subject to the Marquis, raises the 
specter of a constrained political model authority (a menacing version of the Merchant’s 
“lif . . .  ordinaat”) that threatens Walter.  This anxiety manifests in the Clerk’s censure of 
Walter at the beginning (“I blame hym thus” (IV.78)), in Walter’s own depiction of 
marriage as servage (IV.147) and most viscerally, through the oaths that Walter demands 
and the tests that he devises.  In his introduction of Walter, the Clerk reprimands the 
young Marquis for spending too much time thinking of his “lust present” (IV.80), a lust 
represented by his love of “hunting and hauking.”  Walter mistakenly reads this “lust 
present” as “liberte” and it is this inability to distinguish “lust” and liberty that grounds 
the political reading of the Clerk’s Tale.  Walter’s marriage-anxiety is really a concern 
with the extent of royal voluntas—the power-over that defines the royal prerogative.104   
The Marquis’ jealous protection of his will recalls Henry III reply to the demands 
of his barons: "the servant is not above his lord nor the disciple above his master . . . and I 
should not be your king, but a mere slave, if I were to bow in this way to your 
will"(Matthew of Paris II.266); or Richard’s more violent response to lords and commons 
upon their call for the dismissal of his Chancellor that “he would not dismiss so much as 
a kitchen scullion from office at their request” (qtd. in Saul, Richard II 167).105  For both 
Henry III and Richard II, any limitation upon royal power amounted to a form of slavery 
                                                
104 Michael Raby among other critics shows how the “prenuptial demands” secure Walter’s “liberte” and in fact make 
Griselda into the new object of Walter’s hunt (239).  I argue that the “liberte” that the king worries over is the potential 
of “mutual obligations” most clearly linked to the king’s ability to control his household.  
 
105 This scene provides just one of the many anecdotal examples suggesting that Richard sought to enhance the prestige 
of kingship and create a more continental model based on principles of “benign absolutism” that had gained popularity 
in France, see Staley, Languages 28-30.  
 
 242 
or bondage.  Indeed, anything that implied that royal power derived from (and thus, was 
limited by) the communitas regni threatened the Angevin theory of kingship.106  The iura 
regis, or royal prerogative, was regarded as part of the king’s legal inheritance—and the 
diminishment or loss of iura regis through a lack of heirs was an anxiety at the heart of 
majestic rhetoric.  When the people of the realm approach the Marquis, they wisely (if 
deferentially) exploit Walter’s desire to maintain his prerogative.  They convince him to 
accept the yoke of marriage by pointing out that if he does not marry then his “lyne” 
would “slake,” and he would lose his “heritage” to a “straunge successour.”107  
As a result, the Marquis, seeing their “trewe entente” (IV.149) to ensure his line, 
enters into a pact with his people, a pact that might be described as a political 
arrangement: “Wherefore of my free wyl I wol assente/ To wedde me, as soone as evere I 
may” (IV.150-1).  The language here reflects the political concessions to be found in 
Magna Carta or the Provisions of Oxford.  However, he only agrees to this political pact, 
because of his need to maintain his authority and he makes clear that he perceives 
marriage as a threat: 108   
I me rejoysed of my liberte, 
That seelde tyme is founde in mariage; 
Ther I was free, I moot been in servage.  (IV. 145-47) 
 
Chaucer added the juxtaposition of “free” with “servage” and rhymed marriage 
ominously with servage.  While one line may seem like a minor adjustment, these 
                                                
106 For more on the Angevin theory of kingship, see Holt 27ff.  
 
107 In the “Folly of Rehoboam” the young counselors to the king used a similar strategy when they warned Rehoboam 
showing mercy to his people would diminish his “riht.”  CA VII 4081ff. 
 
108 Carol Heffernan explains that this provides “a clue to the tyranny of his rule, for political theorists frequently 
accused tyrants of pursuing personal delight instead of the common good” (333).   See also Raby 237-39 and Rooney 
95.   
 243 
additions have an epigrammatic quality that allows Chaucer to reshape Petrarch’s text in 
important ways.  The hyperbolic representation of marriage as slavery demonstrates how 
Walter, because of his proprietary sense of will (or warped sense of liberty), perceives 
any kind of mutual obligation as a challenge to his free status (i.e. free as both having 
liberty and his “fre” or noble status).109   
This marriage/servage anxiety should not be confused with Harry Bailley’s comic 
frustration with his termagant-wife who comes home and “rampeth in [his] face” 
(VII.1904) nor the Merchant’s wife, who can “overmacche” the “feende” (IV.1219-20). 
Chaucer uses the character of Walter to explore the psychological dimensions of majestic 
authority—namely its overweening concern to protect dignitas regi. Thus, even Walter’s 
political pact is driven by a deep anxiety over his “heritage” rather than any legitimate 
concern for the community that petitioned him. The king’s sole interest in his “lust 
present,” an extreme and perverse form of the voluntas regi turns into the fear of servage. 
He fears the mutual obligations that marriage entails and the system of power that it 
represents.  His demands demonstrate a concern not with the loss of power to-do (i.e. go 
“hauking”) but rather the power-over (his ability to command without resistance).  This 
fear drives him to demand that the people let him choose his own wife and “neither 
grucche, ne stryve” against his choice (170), an absolute acceptance meant to repay his 
lost “libertee.”  
Moreover, he requires Griselda to swear a prenuptial vow in which she subjects 
herself unconditionally to his will: 
I seye this: be ye redy with good herte 
                                                
109 Lynn Staley has also argued that the Uprising of 1381 shaped this language.  The Marquis’ anxiety, here, seemingly 
taps into the threat to boundaries between lordship/servage caused by the 1381 Uprising (Staley 70ff.).   
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To al my lust, and that I frely may, 
As me best thynketh, do you laughe or smerte, 
And nevere ye to grucche it, nyght ne day? 
And eek whan I sey ‘ye,’ ne say nat ‘nay,’ 
Neither by word ne frownyng contenance? 
Swere this, and heere I swere oure alliance.  (IV. 351-57) 
 
We are expected to recognize the political ramifications of this passage.  As David Aers 
suggests, Chaucer analyzes “political questions concerning sovereignty and 
responsibility” (Chaucer 172) through the relationship between Walter and Griselda.   
Although this passage specifically focuses on the married couple, Griselda can be read 
more broadly to represent the Marquis’ subjects. Walter’s prenuptial demands, then, point 
to the way in which all the “characters are bound to each other irrefrangibly by political 
and spiritual dominion” (Muscatine 195).110   Most obviously, Walter’s prenuptial 
demand that, Griselda never “grucche” his will whether he makes her laugh or smart 
echoes the oath that Walter demands of his people: “agayn my choys shul neither grucche 
ne stryve” (IV.170).  Reading the tale in this light, Walter’s demands and subsequent 
violence represent the suppression (and pre-silencing) of political rhetoric. Walter’s pact 
with the people and Griselda resembles the kind of authority wielded in a political 
kingship; however, it is a pact in which the people surrender their agency. Walter does 
not control just the actions of the people but their ability to speak or even frown. The 
expectations of obedience and patience in the relationship between the Marquis and 
Griselda can be seen as a study in parvo of the subject-sovereign relationship.  
                                                
110 Griselda’s acceptance of the Marquis’ marriage proposal mirrors several sovereign-subject interactions and 
relationships throughout the Clerks tale—the depiction of the Marquis’ subjects in the opening stanzas, the promise 
made by the people to the Marquis, Janicula’s promise to the Marquis, and finally the duty owed by sergeant to the 
marquis.   
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The passage parodies the terms of the marriage covenant in which the husband 
declares: “I N. take thee N. to be my wedded wife, to have and to hold from this day 
forward for better or worse . . . and therto I plight thee my trouth.”111  Although the 
conjugal relationship was not equal (putatively because of the man’s superior reason), it 
did establish contractual obligations pertaining to both the husband and the wife, both 
plight their “trouthe.” 112 Walter’s oath deliberately assumes none of the typical 
contractual obligations of the husband.  Instead of saying that he will support her in good 
times and bad, Walter’s imperious demands (that he can make her laugh or smart as he 
thinks best) anticipate the fact that he will cause many of her “worse” times.  
Additionally, the passage empties out the authority of the marriage oath. Unlike the 
conjugal (political) rhetoric of the Franklin’s Arveragus who pledges freely that he will 
“take no maistrie/Agayn hir wyl” (V.747-8), Walter’s majestic rhetoric gives in such a 
way that it strips away the agency of the beneficiary.  Both parties “swere” oaths; 
however, Walter’s “alliance” is meaningless because his “lust” subsumes Griselda’s 
agency.  Walter’s majestic rhetoric represses a marriage “trouthe plyght” and reduces his 
subject-wife to one “wondrynge upon his word, quakynge for drede” (IV. 358).  
Alongside exploring how majestic rhetoric shapes the political selfhood, Chaucer 
uses conventions of the tyrant to represent the “weakness in power” of majestic rhetoric.  
In the Clerk’s Tale, the majestic relationship between sovereign and subject decays into 
cruel tyranny that binds both subject and sovereign.  While Walter’s hunting and hawking 
                                                
111 I have normalized the text: “I N. take the N. to my weddyd wyf to have and to holde fro this day wafort bettur for 
wurs . . . and ther to I plycht the my trouth” (Sarum Missal 146).   
 
112 Emma Lipton has showed various places where the marriage contract was used to demonstrate mutual obligations.  
She shows how Chaucer himself discusses this model of marriage in the Franklin’s Tale in political terms (Ch. 1).  
Aquinas, Lucas de Penne, and Giles of Rome advanced this view of marriage in their economic models kingship 
(Blythe 66). 
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show his tyrannical potential, this potential is a far cry from those cruelties that dominate 
the latter half of the poem. The threat of political power drives this transformation. The 
problem begins when Walter’s subjects request his marriage, a request that poses a 
double threat to his sovereignty: if Walter gets married he must presumably capitulate to 
both his subjects and accept the “yoke of marriage.”  This threat instills in Walter a need 
to probe the depth of his authority through testing his Griselda.  The connection between 
testing Griselda and Walter’s desire to experience the fullness of his authority evokes a 
political paradigm derived from Augustine’s spiritual psychology of sin.113  
The political psychology of the Clerk’s Tale, like Augustine’s theory of sin, stems 
from the idea of freedom and false freedom.  Augustine, throughout his works, frequently 
describes sin as an attempt to demonstrate one’s own liberty by imitating divine 
authority.  In the Confessions, for example, he likens the sinner to a “prisoner . . . who 
does without punishment what is not permitted” to make an “assertion of possessing a 
dim resemblance to omnipotence” (32).  Sin is the attempt to assert a God like 
omnipotence.  Early political theorists, like John of Salisbury, had already turned to this 
doctrine of false liberty to distinguish the prince from the tyrant, describing the tyrant as 
one who “ignorant of his own proper knowledge and obligatory yoke of subjection” 
foolishly seeking to imitate the authority of God “affects a sort of fictitious liberty so that 
he can live without fear and do with impunity that which he wills” (163, emphasis mine).  
Nonetheless, for John of Salisbury and many philosophical minds of the twelfth-century 
                                                
113 Augustine’s psychology of sin where a person’s reason is enslaved by a perverse will is fairly commonplace in the 
Middle Ages.  For example, Bernard of Clairvaux describes sin as perverse will in his sermons “For my will rules my 
members, denying the law of God (Rom 7:23).  And since the law of the Lord is the law of my mind, it is written, that 
“the law of God is in his heart” (Ps. 36:31), my very will is seen to be against me; and this is the greatest iniquity. 
(Sermon 82.10).  What I am interested in is how this metaphor became part of political rhetoric in the thirteenth 
century.  In this rhetoric we are not discussing about the relationship between the individual and God, but rather the 
individual and the community.  
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Renaissance, Augustinian notion of “false liberty” was still aimed at promoting regal 
self-restraint.  The king’s responsibility was directly to God.  The king’s failure to act 
morally may harm his kingdom, but the community itself plays a limited role in John’s 
political imagination.114   
In the thirteenth century, the communitas regni became increasingly important for 
ways people thought about sovereignty, and this made the political subject more visible.  
Alongside many of Chaucer’s tales, the Clerk’s Tale gives more psychological depth to 
the rigid prince/tyrant discourse and renders political subjects and their subjectivity 
visible. For example, in the Clerk’s Tale, the attempt to assert omnipotence is depicted in 
more political terms as violence directed at the community of the realm rather than 
toward God. We see a political model of kingship actively pushing back on majestic 
notions of hierarchy.  In Chaucer’s telling of the Griselda legend, Walter does not offer a 
Job-like “pure correction” (Muscatine 194).  He is too motivated.  Walter’s testing arises 
out of fear that marriage will curb his “lust” and “liberte.”  The tale’s political register 
goads us to read Walter and his pacts with the people and Griselda in political terms.  
The Marquis’s demand for abject obedience is part of the agreement between the 
king and his subjects (the people, Griselda).  However, unlike Lycurgus’s political pact 
with the people of Athens (a pact that restricts both kings and the people), Walter’s pact 
thoroughly undermines Griselda’s agency; as such it resembles the “pact” at the center of 
Ulpian’s Roman conception of sovereignty in which “the imperium of the Emperor had 
absorbed the original imperium populi Romani” (Hinsley 42). The pact between Walter 
and Griselda shows how majestic and political rhetoric are entangled.  These “pacts” are 
                                                
114 John of Salisbury lacks “any clear distinction . . . between the moral and the political; abuse of public power is 
conceived simply in terms of a breach of morality” (Dickinson 325).    
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structured like political agreements, but like the coronation charters of Henry I and II 
they are more about securing regal privilege than concession to the community. Read in 
this light, Walter represents a complex intersection of political covenant with majestic 
rhetoric underwritten by Roman conceptions of sovereignty and claims divine authority.  
While the agreement assumes a political form, the tale makes clear, through the 
utter subjection of Griselda, the majestic foundation of authority—an authority that 
diminishes the significance of the subject and the community of the realm.  In this model 
of kingship, the relationship between king and subject king as Vicar of Christ was 
considered a “corporation sole,” an authority beyond all human jurisdictions.  Although 
no theologian would suggest that a person treat a mortal like God, the relationship 
between king and subject often approximates this relationship and the exact boundaries 
are less than clear.  The imitation of the divine order was a crucial aspect of majestic 
rhetoric and, as many scholars point out, the idea that kingship, was a “reflection of a 
heavenly hierarchy” remained “widely accepted in the fourteenth century and beyond” 
(Strohm, “Form” 20).115   
Encouraging a more political reading of the Griselda material, the Clerk’s Tale 
challenges the pact between king and subject—the ground of sovereign authority.  
Through the outrageous terms of his covenant with Griselda and his cruel testing of his 
wife, Chaucer activates the conventional prince-tyrant discourse.  However, Walter, 
unlike Gower’s Cyrus or Rehoboam, is not a static representation of a tyrant.  Chaucer 
dramatizes Walter’s collapse from a Marquis “ful of honour and of curteisye” (IV.74) 
                                                
115 It is important to recognize the dominance of majestic rhetoric, but England also had a strong tradition of political 
kingship, what Pocock has referred to as the ancient constitution (Ancient Constitution 46-55).  Nigel Saul makes an 
important clarification, saying that Richard II strove for absolutist regime that was destined to fail in England, but that 
this model was alive and flourishing on the continent (“The Kingship” 37).  
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into a monstrous tyrant, a collapse driven by his anxiety to protect his prerogative.  It is 
easy to see how this may present a circumspect admonition to Richard II, but what about 
to the Chaucer’s broader audience?  I will argue that the tale, by focusing on a violent 
relationship between the subject and king, encourages the reader to rethink the majestic 
rhetoric wrapped up in the political pact, or better yet, to rethink the pact itself.  The act 
of interpretation is itself part of an emergent political consciousness.   
Walter’s need for power and his testing of this power allows Chaucer to transform 
Petrarch’s spiritual exemplum of Griseldan constancy into an anatomization of political 
power—a tale that violently undercuts the theocratic foundation of majestic power.  Like 
Augustine’s “prisoner,” the Marquis, through his extreme testing of Griselda’s obedience, 
seeks to imitate divine omnipotence and falls into a state of sin.  Walter tests his wife’s 
sadness (i.e. “constancy”) by telling his wife that he must take away her daughter, 
presumably in order to kill her.  Walter’s tempting of Griselda, aping the testing of Job or 
Abraham, seeks an obedience that is quite clearly owed to God.  This has led many critics 
to read the tale as an allegory or exemplum in which Walter is an “imperfect analogy for 
God” (Goodwin 62) as a representation of the obedience a monk owes to the abbot 
(McCall), or even that it represents the fourteenth-century concept of God’s absoluta 
potentia (Stepsis). These analogies intentionally force the reader to think about the 
Marquis as owed God-like obedience or even as a typological representation of God. 
Walter, to some degree, is a stand-in for God.  By blurring (or perhaps simply deploying 
an already blurred) theocratic and political language of sovereignty, the Clerk’s 
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alignment of Griselda with common profit and his demonization of Walter, renders the 
tension between the political and spiritual almost unbearable.116  
The Clerk constructs a psychological critique of majestic authority in his 
description of Walter’s desire to test of Griselda: 
The markys in his herte longeth so 
To tempte his wyf, hir sadnesse for to knowe, 
That he ne myghte out of his herte throwe 
This merveillous desir his wyf t’assaye; 
Nedelees, God woot, he thoghte hir for t’affraye. 
He hadde assayed hire ynogh bifore, 
And foond hire evere good; what needed it 
Hire for to tempte, and alwey moore and moore, 
Though some men preise it for a subtil wit? 
But as for me, I seye that yvele it sit 
To assaye a wyf whan that it is no nede, 
And putten hire in angwyssh and in drede. (IV 451-62) 
 
Petrarch (again erasing the political content of the tale) tells us that Walter was “seized 
with desire as wondrous as laudable.”  Petrarch, himself, rather majestically, asserts the 
legitimacy (laudability) of Walter’s desire, so the reader can focus on Griselda’s virtuous 
suffering.  The Clerk translates Petrarch’s “laudable,” as some “men preise it [Walter’s 
testing] for a subtil wit” but then he derides the testing as “yvel.”  The nature of this 
“yvel” is captured perfectly in Chaucer’s translation of “wondrous” as “merveillous.”  
The word “merveillous” denotes miraculous, supernatural and monstrous. Walter’s desire 
is merveillous because it seeks to reproduce heavenly authority (“reflect the heavenly 
hierarchy”) within a human context.  Simultaneously, Walter’s attempt to seize false 
freedom from the mutual obligations imposed by marriage (and by extension community) 
is “merveillous” because it is monstrous. 
                                                
116 Carol Heffernan discusses how Griselda and Walter represent a tension between the common profit and tyranny 
respectively (333-36). 
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The “merveillous desir”—ultimately a desire to protect the royal prerogative 
(voluntas regi)—arises out of an intensification of the “lust present” that characterizes 
Walter in the hunting scene at the beginning of the tale.  Now, however, Walter has a new 
quarry—Griselda, or to be more specific, Griselda’s interiority.  The testing is 
“merveillous” because it serves no purpose; it is, as the Clerk repeatedly emphasizes, 
“nedelees.”  The end is not the knowledge of her “sadnesse,” but rather it is the testing 
itself.  That is, he tries to squeeze out of his subject-wife’s “sadnesse” a sense of his own 
omnipotence.  This needlessness reminds us again of Augustine’s prisoner attempting to 
imitate the freedom of God.  The freedom is absolute (literally separated from) precisely 
because it is not contingent on any other entity.  The Marquis “wins” his “freedom” more 
through violence directed at the common profit (i.e. against Griselda and the marriage 
pact) than God directly.  Thus through a marriage tale, the Clerk subtly rewrites the 
Augustinian idea of sin (i.e. the imitation of divine freedom) into political terms as the 
attempt to transgress and rewrite political constraint.  Through the “nedelees” tempting of 
wife and subject, the Marquis fashions voluntas regi as a freedom from all political 
strictures of the communitas regni (as imagined by the thirteenth-century ideal of political 
kingship)—strictures represented by the mutual obligations of marriage.  
The Clerk’s Tale demonstrates how majestic rhetoric, which reflects “the 
heavenly hierarchy,” decays into an “yvel” parody of God’s order.  The Clerk’s 
description of the Marquis’ “merveillous desir” collapses into a register of compulsion: 
“his herte longeth,” “he ne myghte out of his herte throwe” and always he sought to test 
her “moore and moore.” The “moore and moore” suggests how needless evil is driven by 
an acquisitory desire that can find no rest—each “moore” drives Walter to seek 
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another.  The crucial point here is that when a king attempts to mirror God, he seeks more 
and more because he cannot mirror God’s plenitude; repetition represents an attempt to 
mimic the eternal. Chaucer shows the hardening of Walter’s desires.  In the passage 
describing his “merveillous desir,” Walter is unable to “throwe” temptation from his 
heart.  Finally, however, the Clerk depicts the Marquis as completely enslaved by his 
own will:  
But ther been folk of swich condicion  
That whan they have a certein purpos take, 
They kan nat stynte of hire entencion, 
But, right as they were bounden to that stake, 
They wol nat of that firste purpos slake. (IV.701-5) 
 
Chaucer turns Petrarch’s Valterius into a pointed attack on majestic rhetoric in which the 
will of the sovereign actually binds the sovereign.  Petrarch reduces Valterius’ crime and 
punishment by likening him to those “people, having begun a course of action will not 
desist” but rather “press on further, clinging to their plan” (Petrarch 122).  Although 
Chaucer uses similar syntax, his figurative depiction of Walter as “bounden to that stake” 
of his own will introduces a rhetoric of political psychology absent from Petrarch’s text. 
Walter does not merely “cling” to a plan, but rather he is bound to a stake, either like a 
heretic awaiting execution or like a bear tied to post as part of a hunting trap (both of 
which would have rather interesting implications for the Clerk’s Marquis).   More 
interestingly, he holds tight the reins on his “firste purpos.”  In other words, Walter 
fearing the loss of his authority is bound by his “entencion” to repeatedly test the strength 
of his will.   If one leans on Chaucer’s figurative depiction, it is possible to see an 
invocation of original sin with Walter bound to a tree holding tight to his first sin.  
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Ricardian political narratives, particularly Chaucer’s, frequently depict the 
psychology of power as interwoven with the social order by showing the complex 
mechanisms through which the will to power becomes its own prison—what Levinas 
would (in our time) call the “weakness of power.”  By testing the obedience of his 
subjects, Walter tests the royal prerogative or that absolute freedom of the king to act pro 
sua voluntate.  The Marquis thinks that his testing of Griselda demonstrates his freedom 
(his power over his subject), however the reader is aware that the Marquis is “bounden to 
the stake.”  Through his use of the political paradigm derived from the Augustinian 
model of sin, Chaucer’s reimagination of Walter shares a rhetorical space with the 
political reconstruction of kingship in the thirteenth century.  The prisoner-king is the 
critical trope of political rhetoric of the Common Enterprise as one is “in truth a king,” 
and “he is truly free if he rule rightly himself and the kingdom” (Song of Lewes 106-7). 
This trope is powerful because it allows the opposition to redefine the traditional concept 
of royal will that resides at the center of monarchy.  It suggests that when a king acts with 
no concern for the common utility, then the king is a prisoner of desire—thus, the will of 
the king is enslaved.  The prisoner-king trope allowed reformers to imagine royal power 
as limitless only in its sufficiency.  The king could act pro sua voluntate in order to 
protect the common profit.  When it exceeds the utility of communitas regni, then it is no 
longer the will of the king but an enslaved will.  Indeed, it was this principle that allowed 
reformers to install conciliar governments that seized control of sovereign power and 
claim simultaneously that they did so to protect the king’s will.  Although Chaucer does 
not go this far, his complex psychological development of Petrarch’s Valterius, a 
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psychological development fundamental to thirteenth-century resistance rhetoric, 
demonstrates Chaucer’s political orientation.   
Chaucer turns the Griselda tale into the perfect vehicle to critique majestic 
rhetoric insofar as the awkwardness between the spiritual moral and the realistic narrative 
mirrors the problem in discourse of sovereignty itself—namely the awkwardness of 
forging a symbolic connection between the obedience owed to God and that owed “unto 
mortal man.”  Griselda, as such, shows the obedience due unto God and the obedience 
that should not be given to mortal man.  While her patience towards her husband and lord 
may offer a template for Christian patience towards God, the opposite is not true. 
More importantly, in Chaucer’s hands, the Griselda-legend exposes the cruelty of 
majestic rhetoric.  Walter silences his wife, his subject and the potential political voice 
she represents.   Aside from directly and repeatedly critiquing the kind of power exerted 
by Walter as “yvel” and “nedelees,” the Clerk’s Tale challenges cosmic framework and 
interpretive strategies that support majestic authority (i.e. strategies that compare of 
derive royal authority from divine authority). That is, once we bracket the spiritual moral 
of the tale, the Clerk’s Tale on a literal level depicts and rejects the absolute obedience 
owed to a mortal lord in theocratic models of kingship. The poem’s political force 
derives from the fact that it reveals that majestic rhetoric (the literal level of the tale) does 
not mirror but rather parodies the cosmic framework; as a result the poem severs the 
allegorical and exemplary Griseldan obedience from the discourse of sovereignty.  
Instead of training the reader in Griseldan obedience, Chaucer’s Clerk’s Tale trains the 
reader to critique Walter’s demands.  It fosters, on an individual level, the development 
of political rhetoric.  In the Knight’s Tale, we examined the change of narrative 
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perspective—from arena- to first-mover rhetoric; in the Clerk’s Tale we have seen the 
development of the citizen subject; now we will investigate how Chaucer, in the Tale of 
Melibee, trains his reader in a political hermeneutic.  
 
Teaching Lord Melibee: Towards a Political Hermeneutic  
It is not accidental that the Tale of Melibee is often reduced to a tale with a 
straightforward political or spiritual message.  The narrative action of the tale takes place 
in roughly 25 lines and the ‘dialogue,’ which feels more like a florilegium, extols the 
virtue of royal mercy commonly advocated by courtiers. The poem is a fairly accurate 
translation Livre de Melibée et de Dame Prudence by Renaud de Rouen, which was itself 
a truncated translation of Liber consolationis et consilii by Albertanus of Brescia 
responding attack on the rights of Lombard communes by Frederick II.117 Chaucer’s tale 
begins with a brief description of an attack on Melibee’s house and family.  As was 
common for affronted nobility in the Middle Ages, Melibee called together a “greet 
congregacion” (VII.1003) to deliberate upon the appropriate course of action.118  
However, when he “shewed his cas” (VII.1008) his “manere of . . . speche” (VII.1009) 
made his predetermined desire for revenge apparent.  Recognizing this vengeful 
inclination, the larger part of this council drowns out any calls for peace with “Werre! 
Werre!” (VII.1036). The Tale of Melibee, not unlike the Knight’s Tale, addresses the 
imminent threat of extra-judicial private war between lords, all too common feudal 
                                                
117 For more on Albertanus of Brescia, see Witt 448-450. 
 
118 According to Kennedy manors frequently got “together with their families and affines they had to decide how to 
retaliate, whether violently legally of through an accord” (168). 
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Europe, and like the Knight’s Tale, the poem searches out a rhetoric that can restore 
community.119      
Once the council affirms Melibee’s initial desire for revenge, the tale shifts to a 
debate between him and his wife on how to respond to this attack. Melibee seems intent 
on private war, while, Prudence, befitting her name, advocates a non-violent solution.  By 
casting the debate between two characters with allegorically charged names, ‘Prudence’ 
and ‘Melibee’ (i.e. honey-drinker), the moral didacticism of the tale can seem 
overbearing.   
The debate addresses conventional issues of sovereignty associated with the 
mirror for princes’ tradition.  Prudence defends her own counsel-giving authority 
(VII.1069-1110), discusses the proper selection of councilors (1115-1198), explains how 
to make a decision based on counsel (1199-1231), analyzes and criticizes the large 
council (1241-1385), and eventually advocates that Melibee opt for magnanimous 
reconciliation with his enemies (1674-1679). After war is averted through a peace accord 
the Tale of Melibee concludes with a conventional (albeit uncomfortable) comparison 
between the Lord Melibee’s mercy and the mercy of God who is “so free and so 
merciable” (VII.18886). 
Scholars, who read Melibee as a mirror, argue that it broadly advocates princely 
patience, and many of these examine how this virtue intersects with contemporary 
issues.120  Since the political message of the tale is conventional and transparent, they 
                                                
119 While outright war was often repressed, a kind of poaching violence between neighboring landlords was common, 
see Kennedy 145-46.   
 
120 “Broadly the ethical and social problem the Melibee treats is how to diffuse the violence of a powerful man, 
allegorically by fostering self-governance within Melibee’s wounded mind, and more naturalistically by reconciling 
Melibee with his enemies” (Taylor 299).   See also Lynn Staley Johnson “Inverse;” and Ferster 89-90. 
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turn from literature to history and argue over the particular circumstances of the tale—i.e. 
for whom and for what circumstances did this advice apply in Chaucer’s world.  
Likewise, the poem has often been treated as nothing more than  “schematic anthology of 
moral commonplaces” for the medieval reader.  Indeed the tale has garnered a rather 
unfortunate reputation among some rather influential Chaucerians: Trevor Whittock 
called the tale “an enormous bore and the bane of commentators;” for C. David Benson it 
is a “clear, dull, lengthy and somewhat suffocating work” lacking in both “irony and 
stylistic virtuosity” (Benson, Chaucer’s 39) and Derek Pearsall dismisses it as “a peg on 
which to hang a vast quantity of moral discourses” (Pearsall, The Canterbury 286). Some 
critics—struck by this perceived dullness—even suggest the tale satirizes itself by 
playing a long “prank on the courtly audience” (Gardner 291).  Edward Foster has even 
claimed that the tale, which he describes as “a lump in our oatmeal” (399), was written 
with the expectation that no one would read it!  E. Talbot Donaldson usefully mis-
characterizes the problem by arguing that “the story . . . was  . . .  a very popular one in 
the Middle Ages when readers did not entirely distinguish between pleasure in literature 
and pleasure in being edified” (Donaldson 937).  
Perhaps I just like lumpy oatmeal, but I think Donaldson, who aligns edification 
with the face-value meaning of Prudence’s proverbs, disregards the complex way that the 
tale edifies through shaping the reader’s perspective: that is, he ignores the way Melibee 
creates the political reader.  The pleasure of being edified in the Melibee is in its “social 
aesthetic.”121  The critical tendency has been either to accept that Prudence’s political 
advice amounts to, what Richard Firth Green sees as, a bunch of “general and 
                                                
121 For fuller discussion of this term, see Taylor 298-322. 
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unexceptionable statements” (Green, Poets 164) or to upbraid critics, like Green, by 
arguing that these kind of discussions “eschew interpretation—assuming that a tale so 
explicitly didactic must carry its meaning on its face”122 (Patterson 107). The defenders 
of Melibee, as Patterson suggests, focus on the didactic meaning of the poem and its 
importance to the Canterbury Tales as a whole.  I agree with Donald Howard’s assertion 
that the Tale is a “major structural unit in the Canterbury Tales” that exemplifies 
Chaucer’s own political views and Green’s position insofar as the political paradigm 
advanced by the story is conventional and unexceptional (Howard 309-15).  However, I 
would suggest that this claim of the tale’s conventional sentence does not close off 
interpretation but rather it offers a critical point of departure.  
What is often lost in such moral schematics—and even in much of what Patterson 
calls “interpretive” scholarship—is that Melibee is a highly rhetorical piece primarily 
concerned with the art of persuasion.123  Both the council of Melibee and Prudence shape 
their ideas to meet the listener’s emotional state.  Prudence clearly recognizes the 
importance of kairos (καιροσ), waiting for the opportune moment to apply persuasive 
argument. Before talking to Melibee, she recalls “he is a fool that destourbeth the mooder 
to wepen in the deeth of hire child til she have wept hir fille . . . and thanne shal man 
                                                
122 This is similar to Burnley’s assessment: “there is no trace of ambiguity in Chaucer’s attitude to the Tale” Chaucer’s 
language and the Philosophical Tradition (45).   
 
123 The council’s call for “werre,” for example, seems only to reproduce (as Prudence will argue) the “cruel ire, redy to 
doon vengeaunce” indicated by the “manere” of Melibee’s speech.  Even Melibee’s name suggests that the only way of 
addressing him through honeyed speech that he will drink up.  Chaucer points to ambivalent potential of honeyed 
speech. Melibee alluding to Solomon describes Prudence’s words as “honycombes, for they yeven swetnesse to the 
soule and hoolsomnesse to the body” (VII.1113).  Later, when Prudence accusing Melibee of failing to understand his 
own guilt says that he has “ydronke so muchel hony of sweete temporeel richesses, and delices and honours of this 
world” that he has forgotten “Jhesu Crist” (VII. 1501-2) 
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doon diligence with amyable wordes” (VII.977-8).124  Like Theseus, who waits for an 
appropriate end of Athenian mourning and then rhetorically projects his own serious 
deliberation in his delivery, Prudence recognize that “amyable wordes” can only take 
hold after mourning is complete.125  Prudence’s concern for the right moment prepares 
the reader for a poem that not only provides a reasoned argument against vengeance, but 
a persuasive one. David Wallace has called the Melibee a rhetorical handbook for go-
betweens or a means of feminine intercession to alleviate masculine violence—a text that 
prepares the reader to engage a threatening sovereign power.  
I will argue that Chaucer’s Melibee does not (primarily) address Richard II, nor 
provide a handbook for addressing people like Richard II, but rather imagines the reader 
as the go-between—as the ultimate liaison between sign and signified.  Reading 
strategies are directly entwined with civic concerns of violence and peace, Melibee and 
Prudence respectively.  As such, the tale does not so much address Melibee (or his real 
world analogue), but rather it trains the reader to reject Melibee’s rigid world-view and to 
adopt a prudential hermeneutics.   
This shapes the way we discuss the genre of the Melibee.  Since the tale consists 
of a progression of seemingly self-evident quotations from ancient and biblical 
authorities, it is often characterized as a florilegium (and Fürstenspiegel) written for a 
child king.  While Fürstenspiegel and florilegium provide a useful critical terminology 
for analyzing Melibee, both can also render the tale’s most salient features invisible.  The 
Melibee, like Book VII of the Confessio Amantis, deviates from most mirrors by making 
                                                
124 The quotation is also interesting because Prudence imagines changing gender roles, a point discussed at length by 
Stephen Yeager, “Chaucer’s” 312-3. 
 
125 Theseus waits until the “al stynted is the moornyng and the teres” (I.2968) before summoning a parliament calling 
for the marriage of Palamon and Arcite. 
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the sovereign a character within the story and focusing on that character’s missteps; 
Moreover, Melibee develops the audience’s civic consciousness by emphasizing the 
practical conditions of authority that are often excluded, or at least muted, in the 
Fürstenspiegel-tradition.  Likewise, while it shares many of the characteristics of the 
florilegium genre, the narrative carefully shapes the reader’s interpretive experience. 
Rita Copeland’s analysis of rhetorical invention and medieval hermeneutics 
demonstrates that the significance of Melibee lies not in Prudence’s “unexceptionable 
statements” about kingship but rather in the interpretive strategies that she promotes. In 
Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Translation in the Middle Ages, Copeland describes 
vernacular translation as a means of appropriating cultural authority and inserting one’s 
own voice into a larger argument. Copeland argues that “for Chaucer and Gower as 
translators, the governing framework of vernacular hermeneutics is a product of a strong 
vernacular tradition in which translation develops as a powerful form of exegetical 
action” or as she argues more succinctly about Dante’s Convivio: “the public office of 
rhetoric . . . takes the form of exegesis” (183).  What is crucial is that vernacular poetry 
not only translates ancient texts but it also shapes the hermeneutic strategies of the reader.  
The vernacular poetry of Chaucer, similar to Dante, “inscribes the vernacular with the 
kind of social responsibility that rhetoric can carry” (181) Rhetorical invention is an 
exegetical or hermeneutical performance of an ancient text.   
The Tale of Melibee does not fit the criteria for her study because it is not a 
substitution for an ancient text and thereby cannot appropriate the authority of either 
classical or theological texts.  Nonetheless, the Tale demonstrates the self-conscious 
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process through which “exegetical activity” becomes “rhetorical invention.”126 Prudence 
collocates citations from ancient authorities and interprets them for her husband in an 
effort to persuade him not to take vengeance on his enemies.  She substitutes her own 
exegetical performance for the original meaning of the classical quotes.127 In short, the 
tale stages the kind of hermeneutic performance described by Copeland that  
extends or transfers rhetorical control to readers by locating the real power of  
ethical inquiry in the act of interpretation or reading and by offering his own 
exegetical performance as a kind of program for his reader (183). 
 
Melibee presents the reader with two competing hermeneutical approaches, by staging a 
debate between Melibee’s reading, which seems to be a transparent and utterly justifiable 
response to an attack on his family and Prudence’s sophisticated attempt to secure 
communal peace through reconciliation.  Both characters though deeply involved in the 
narrative events also, through their responses to the crime, figuratively act as readers of 
those events.128 The tale encourages this reading by reducing the central action, the attack 
on Melibee’s family into two short paragraphs and then providing an extensive debate 
through which these events are interpreted, including a kind of mise en abyme, in which 
Prudence applies a tropological exegesis of the crime that attempts to rewrite the meaning 
                                                
126 Copeland is interested in how translation uses rhetoric to “transfer academic institutional power” or to “assert the 
priority of vernacularity itself” 179-180.     
 
127 For example she skillfully revises Solomon’s misogynist attitude (VII.1076-79) toward women in such a way that 
the passage seems to hold no real meaning at all—except that Solomon did not know the right women.   
 
128 Stephen Yeager, along similar lines, argues that Melibee addresses reading and hermeneutical practices particularly 
“the relationship between the literary mode of moralizing allegory and contingent reading practices” (308-09).  I am 
suggesting that Melibee justifies “contingent reading practices” rather than moral absolutes that threaten the peace.  
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of the events from within. The majority of the tale is an exegesis of the truncated 
narrative action.129  
 The investigation of Chaucerian prudence must begin with two of the most 
significant changes that Chaucer made to Renaud’s text: first Chaucer increases the 
allegorical potential of the text by naming Melibee’s daughter Sophie, a name which in 
the Greek (σοφια) means wisdom; and second, although Prudence promises to restore 
Melibee’s daughter, this restoration (unlike his source texts) is conspicuously absent.  In 
short, Melibee’s ‘Wisdom’ is mortally wounded (VII.971-72) and Prudence never 
actually restores her/it.  The mortal wounding of Wisdom, and her conspicuous absence 
even at the end of the tale allows Chaucer to stage a hermeneutic performance that 
creates civic language of prudence tied to the actual conditions of power rather than 
Aristotelian-Thomistic wisdom that transcends the particular.130  The reader must make 
due with Prudence’s knowledge in lieu of Wisdom’s (i.e. Sophia).  The shift in paradigm 
is made more conspicuous because Chaucer names her immediately.  As Kathleen 
Kennedy notes this mimics the legal form.  The combination of the allegorical absence, 
this legal motif suggests an important paradigm shift (Kennedy 168). 
Before we discuss the particular rhetorical strategies that Prudence uses to 
convince Melibee, we must first understand the source of her authority within the larger 
context of prudence/wisdom relationship in both classical and Christian tradition.  Since 
                                                
129 There are several narrative events such as the gathering on manorial court, Prudence’s intercession with the 
enemies, and the eventual reconciliation scene.  However, the narrative action of these scenes is buried beneath a 
dialogue that does not advance the narrative action but deepens the ethical and political reasoning. 
 
130 Aristotle contrasts wisdom and “Political Science, or Prudence” in Nicomachean Ethics arguing that wisdom is “a 
knowledge of the most exalted objects” and prudence deals with one’s “own particular welfare” (NE VI.vii.3). For full 
discussion of the distinction, see VI.vi in its entirety.  For Aquinas’s discussion of wisdom as the ability grasp the 
fundamental truths rather than particularities, see ST IIa.IIae. 45.1 and ST Iia.Iiae.47.4, respectively. 
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an exhaustive study of prudence exceeds the scope of this work, I will limit my 
discussion primarily to three “well-known” sources that provide some context for the 
wisdom/ prudence distinction—Aristotle, Cicero and Aquinas.  The addition and notable 
absence of "Sophie" invokes classical descriptions of prudence, most notably Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero’s De Officiis, that set about defining prudence in 
contrast to wisdom, in contrast to Sophia (i.e. σοφια).  Chaucer develops Prudence in the 
absence of Wisdom allowing him to focus on the practical nature of Prudence.   
Wisdom and prudence, for Aristotle, focus on different ends—universal principles 
(speculative thinking) and actions (practical thinking), respectively (NE.VI.ii.3).  After 
describing wisdom as “both Scientific Knowledge and Intuitive Intelligence as regards 
the things of the most exalted nature” (NE.VI.vii.5), Aristotle emphasizes the difference 
between wisdom and prudence: 
it is absurd to think that Political Science or Prudence is the loftiest kind of  
knowledge [Wisdom] inasmuch as man is not the highest thing in the world . . . 
those called prudent “can discern its own particular welfare; hence even some of 
the lower animals are said to be prudent.  (NE.VI.vii.3) 
 
That is, wisdom, which discerns first principles through intuitive intelligence and 
expands on these principles through deductive and inductive reasoning of scientific 
knowlege, studies those principles that “cannot vary,” the “exalted object” that “exists of 
necessity” (NE.VI.iii2).  The object of prudence and political science, which Aristotle 
closely associates with prudence, is one’s “particular welfare.” Prudence guides ones 
response to contingent event, the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended 
by scientific knowledge (NE VI. viii.9): 
“Prudence, on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men [rather than 
exalted], and with things that can be the object of deliberation [rather than 
intuitive first principles]. For we say that to deliberate well is the most 
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characteristic function of the prudent man but no one deliberates about things that 
cannot vary nor yet about variable things that are not a means to some end, and 
that end a good attainable by action; and a good deliberator in general is a man 
who can arrive by calculation at the best of the good attainable by man. 
(NE.VI.vii.6) 
 
Since prudence considers only those matters that “can be the object of deliberation,” and 
since that “no one deliberates about things that cannot vary nor yet about variable things 
that are not a means to some end,” Aristotle limits the object of deliberation to matters of 
contingency.  One relies on prudence, then, to weigh the practical options in order to 
secure “the best of the goods attainable by man.”  Where wisdom might seek the 
universal justifications of sovereignty, prudence—ever responsive to the realities of 
power—seeks the best model of sovereignty “attainable by man.” By emphasizing the 
cosmological justifications of power, majestic rhetoric tends to occlude the practical 
application of prudence.  As Harriss has argued, the cosmic framework stood in the way 
of developing a significant Aristotelian model of political science.  The absence of 
Wisdom sidelines (without demoting) universal justifications and allows the tale to focus 
on the prudential applications central to the development of political perspective in 
Ricardian narrative.   
With Aristotle in mind, if not in front of him, Cicero makes a similar, though 
more compact distinction between “what the Greeks called σοφια and φρονησισ.”  
Cicero, who was intent on making philosophy the servant of the state, conflates the two 
terms by asserting (rather spuriously) that wisdom is primarily concerned with “the 
relations of man to man” and “safeguarding of human interests” (Cicero, De Off. 
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I.XLIII.153).131 In practical terms, Cicero elevates phronesis (prudence) to a form of 
practical wisdom equal to (if not above) Aristotelian σοφια.  The importance of Cicero’s 
analysis for the later Middle Ages is that it provided an authoritative source that aligns 
one of the cardinal virtues (indeed the primary cardinal virtue according to Aquinas) 
squarely with human interests.  Cicero’s summum bonum is the health of the polity.  The 
exegetical performance of Prudence carefully opposes the kind of majestic rhetoric 
adopted by both Richard and the Appellants and instead develops a prudential rhetoric 
aligned with thirteenth-century political constitutionalism—a rhetoric that, as J.D. 
Burnley demonstrates at length, had taken root in the imaginative literature of the 
Ricardian period. Gower’s handling of Practique in Book VII of the Confessio Amantis, 
the concept of prudence in the Ricardian period expanded beyond simple opposition to 
“ire” and “folhaste” and began to encompass a whole system of political science 
containing fields as diverse as ethics, law, government, economics and commerce.132 In 
the tale, Prudence displaces Melibee’s majestic view of the universe “by offering [her] 
own exegetical performance” of classical prudence focused on a practical view of the 
common profit.  Because of his focus on the “relations of man with man,” Cicero’s ‘new 
man’ republican rhetoric fit remarkably well with the political constitutionalism of the 
                                                
131 As his translator, William Morris, points out, Cicero, at this point in his argument, introduces a “curious fallacy” by 
introducing a fourth premise to his argument concerning wisdom that “the ‘bonds of union between gods and men and 
the relations of man to man’ are derived from wisdom.  This allows Cicero to “sidetrack wisdom” and make it reliant 
upon social instinct (Morris 156-57n.a).  David Aers suggests that the use of Cicero actually “de-Christianized” 
Melibee (76).  I would suggest that what David Aers calls a “de-Christianized” discourse is merely the rejection of the 
cosmic framework that does not take the peace of the community of into account—Prudence introduces a new 
Christian political paradigm.   
 
132 Burnley 50-55 discusses the development of a rhetoric of prudentia in the fourteenth century. “Prudence” as Burnley 
explains “is the faculty of assessing and understanding all the circumstances and consequences of any projected action, 
both deciding on its desirability and planning its execution” (51). Burnley argues that Gower’s “practique” that 
encompasses “Etique, Iconomique, and Policie” shows a development of prudence that becomes more explicit in the 
schema of Reginald Pecock’s work 50 years later in which ethics    
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thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by providing the discursive space in which political 
science—crucial to political constitutionalism—became meaningful.   
Nonetheless, Chaucer must situate his classical models of prudence within a 
larger “sacramentally organized universe,” a universe organized around the wisdom of 
revealed truth (Aers 75-7).133 While Christian thinkers had clearly absorbed the classical 
distinction between prudence and wisdom, they tended to focus on ethical questions that 
deemphasized political conditions of power.  Aquinas provides an explicitly theological 
account of prudence and wisdom by arguing that when it comes to human affairs the 
prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end:  
Wisdom is prudence to a man (Prov.10: 23). Therefore he who considers 
absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all 
called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as 
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14).”(ST I. Q1.A6) 
 
By saying the prudent man “is called wised,” Aquinas recognizes both the similarity and 
difference between wisdom and prudence. He maintains the classical model of prudence 
insofar as it operates as the hinge between universal principle and particular situation that 
enables an agent to “grasp what is pertinent and to assess what ought to be done in 
complex circumstances” (Hibbs 98); however, for Aquinas, wisdom is synonymous with 
revealed truths of scripture.  That is, prudence “looks” like wisdom to philosophers such 
as Cicero who did not have access to the divine knowledge of things.  As a result, 
prudence can only be perfect insofar as it aligns with universal principle of revealed 
wisdom. Aers points to St. Thomas Aquinas’s careful distinction between prudentia 
spiritus and prudentia carnis, reminding us that “prudence” can be used to evil ends—as 
in Aquinas’s example of the “patient robber.” By cordoning off Sophia and creating in 
                                                
133 See also Patricia 127-8, for a discussion of Prudence’s “secular pragmatism.” 
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Melibee a reader as obstinate as the Pharaoh of Exodus, the Tale of Melibee comes up 
with a way of talking about political prudence without either dissolving it into, or 
completely severing it from, a Christian model of revealed wisdom.  Chaucer does not 
elevate political rhetoric above spiritual idealism, but rather develops a prudential 
rhetoric precisely because of the intransigence of Melibee.  Prudence’s more secular 
instruction depends upon what Aquinas would call “imperfect prudence” rather than the 
vitiated form—prudentia carnis.  
Much of the scholarship concerning the Tale of Melibee asks: what kind of 
prudence does Prudence espouse?  By adjusting their emphasis between classical and 
Christian handlings of the cardinal virtue, critics have argued that the tale is a spiritual 
allegory, a Ciceronian Fürstenspiegel aimed at the common profit, or a text mired in the 
“empirical calculations” of singular advantage.  Because of Melibee’s obstinate reading 
practice, Prudence frequently oscillates between these modes of persuasion. I will 
demonstrate how Prudence’s instruction establishes a unified political rhetoric in which 
these three persuasive approaches overlap at the same moment that they disintegrate due 
to Melibee’s bad reading practice.  The Melibee views the same “ultimate end” diffracted 
as though through a kaleidoscope.  I begin with an analysis of the spiritual foundation of 
Prudence’s argument and then show how she defends reconciliation in terms of Melibee’s 
singular advantage and common profit.  It is critical to remember that Prudence’s 
arguments (unlike those we might expect Sophia to make) never achieve a kind of 
dialectical synthesis into a “single auctoritee” (Kempton 168).  Thus, while I arrange the 
argument tentatively into a discussion of the spiritual, singular and the common profit (in 
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that order), I have tried equally hard to show that these persuasive modes can never be 
neatly separated.  
The tension between prudentia spiritus and a pragmatic prudentia carnis has 
become a crux (and source of some critical play) to the tale.134   For example, Aers argues 
that Prudence deliberately “sidelines anything distinctly Christian, choosing a thoroughly 
secular pragmatism in which “Tullius” and “Salomon” provide the key guidelines” (Aers 
76).  I would argue that it is not Prudence that “sidelines” Christian models of the virtue, 
but the tale itself in which Melibee’s explicit rejection of Prudence’s Christian reasoning 
forces her to make her case in more pragmatic terms. This allows Chaucer to both elevate 
the Christian model of prudence while displacing its language of moral absolutes with a 
political rhetoric.  Prudence’s Christian argument occurs in one of the more peculiar 
moments in her discourse in which she briefly abandons her florilegium-style to deliver 
an allegorical sermon:   
Thy name is Melibee; this is to seyn, ‘a man that drynketh hony.’/ Thou hast 
ydronke so muchel hony of sweete temporeel richesses, and delices and honours 
of this world/ that thou art dronken and hast forgeten Jhesu Crist thy creatour  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Thou hast doon synne agayn oure Lord Crist,/ for certes, the three enemys of 
mankynde—that is to seyn, the flesh, the feend, and the world—/thou hast suffred 
hem entre in to thyn herte wilfully by the wyndowes of thy body,/and hast nat 
defended thyself suffisantly agayns hire assautes and hire temptaciouns, so that 
they han wounded thy soule in fyve places/ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
And in the same manere oure Lord Crist hath woold and suffred that thy three 
enemys been entred into thyn house by the wyndowes/ and han ywounded thy 
doghter in the forseyde manere. (VII.1410-3; 1418-21; 1425-6) 
 
Prudence’s allegory should be understood as a sermon aimed at both explaining God’s 
justice and shaping Melibee’s future conduct.  Using a strategy common in sermons, 
                                                
134 Lee Patterson argues that the Tale of Melibee becomes “mired in a world of relentlessly prudential 
imperatives”(Temporal 119); see also Aers “Whose Counsel.” 
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Prudence interprets the crime at the beginning of the story tropologically—so that the 
narrative can be read as a series of spiritual metaphors.   She explains that Christ allowed 
Melibee’s “three enemys” into his house “in the same manere” that Melibee’s allowed 
Flesh, Fiend and the World into his soul.  This suggests that, instead of seeking 
vengeance, Melibee should protect his spiritual home against spiritual enemies—a 
spiritual discourse that runs deep within the Christian tradition.  Aers’s suggestion, then, 
that Prudence “sidelines anything distinctly Christian” (76) ignores how her sermon 
shows how Melibee’s suffering was “ful of [God’s] justice” (1407).  
Prudence’s spiritual rhetoric aims at changing Melibee’s hermeneutic strategy. 
Her sermon reinterprets the opening paragraphs and, by transforming Melibee from 
victim into perpetrator, deflects the potential of vendetta caused by wounded honor.  
Since Melibee had “suffred” the three enemies to enter into his “herte” and not protected 
himself against their “assautes” and “temptaciouns,” his house was attacked.  Prudence 
aptly shows that Melibee’s desire for private war arises from his failure to fight against 
the traditional enemies of Christian life—the real threat of war is upstaged by the 
conventional allegory of the soul’s war found throughout Christian literature.  The 
comparison thus establishes the traditional Fürstenspiegel hinge between ethical behavior 
and the temporal world.  Melibee’s spiritual failings turn into social violence.  By making 
Melibee the primary cause, the tropological interpretation turns a narrative of revenge 
into one based on a self-improvement and Prudence’s rhetorical performance attempts to 
dislodge the inflexible honor-hermeneutics that drives Melibee to violence.  Nonetheless 
we should not confuse Prudence’s spiritual argument with the argument of revealed 
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Wisdom, precisely because she makes clear that the entire sermon is based on 
“presumpciouns and conjectynges” (1407). 
Dame Prudence’s sermon provides, for an instant, a sacred view of the events of 
the Tale of Melibee; however, Lord Melibee refuses to accept her world-view.  Aers only 
briefly alludes to this sermon, choosing instead to focus on Melibee’s intransigent 
reaction:  
at first [Melibee] seems persuaded by Prudence’s counsels about the ‘perils and 
the yveles that myghten falle’ (VII.1427-32) if he pursues revenge, but he argues 
that in general violence is legitimate and necessary.  (“Whose Virtues” 76)135  
 
For Aers, Melibee’s intransigence signals Prudence’s failure. However this reading 
ignores the fact that Prudence and the tale are also the reader’s instructor and what 
Melibee’s response really shows is that he is a bad reader.  Melibee has completely 
misunderstood her moral sentence; Prudence’s sermon does not explain the “perils” of 
revenge, but rather argues that Melibee’s sin is the primary cause of the crime.  
Melibee’s failed reading is what we might call a “teachable moment” for the 
reader, as it illustrates the danger of readings that “enclined to [our] owene desir” (1282).  
His intransigent hermeneutic of majesty is dangerously bound up with ideas of honor and 
shame—ideas that play similar role in both the Knight’s and Clerk’s Tale.136  The simple 
division of the world into good and evil at the center of majestic romance reproduces a 
system where private war frays the bonds of the communitas regni.  Unlike Prudence, 
Melibee reads events of his story in light of this rigid hermeneutic code and thus can only 
                                                
135 Aers does not make clear distinctions between Prudence, Melibee and the voice of the text as a whole. 
 
136  In the Knight’s Tale, Theseus almost allows his anger to govern him when he chances upon Palamon and Arcite’s 
unlawful duel in the grove.  Ire, often seen as the antithesis of prudence, threatens to “enslave” Theseus, to reduce his 
will to that of a “leon.”  Similarly, in the Clerk’s Tale, Walter, afraid that he is conceding power through marriage, 
makes all these ‘merveillous’ demands upon his wife.   However, instead of proving the Marquis’s freedom these 
demands only demonstrate that he is “ybounden to the stake.” 
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understand good and evil through violence and this mode of interpretation leads to his 
failure to understand her instruction. After listening to Prudence’s sermon, Melibee 
reasserts his own interpretive lens: “by the vengeance-takynge been the wikked men 
dissevered fro the goode men” and the wicked restrain themselves “whan they seen the 
punissynge and chastisynge of the trespassours” (VII.1431-2).  His rigid world 
“dissevers” good and evil without taking into account the social conditions of evil 
itself—social conditions that would imply his own culpability.  This hermeneutic 
reinforces the personal shame involved in being a victim leading him to argue that 
Fortune “shal helpe me my shame for to venge” (VII.1446).  The failure to punish the 
wicked (i.e. a failure to extract revenge) will redound on his own honor, allow his 
enemies to continue to abuse him and lead to the disintegration of the cosmological 
division between good and evil in the world.    
Melibee’s response to the Prudence’s spiritual allegory anticipates what Lee 
Patterson has called the “devastating moment” (118).  The “devastating moment” is the 
moment at the end of the tale, when Melibee, after all of Prudence’s conciliatory rhetoric, 
decides upon a merciless punishment: “I thynke and purpose me fully/ to desherite hem 
of al that evere they han and for to putte hem in exil for evere” (1834-35).  This “aporetic 
moment” at the end of the tale, according to Patterson, “subverts the pedagogical 
program that the Melibee simultaneously espouses and enacts” and makes brutally 
apparent that “Prudence’s teaching has been largely useless”  (Patterson 118).  While the 
“aporetic moment” subverts the “pedagogical program” between Melibee and Prudence, 
the real pedagogical program has always been between Prudence and the reader: Melibee 
is in fact a pedagogical prop that allows Prudence to provide alternative modes of 
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persuasion aimed at political reconciliation—alternative modes of persuasion which align 
(are coordinate) with a Christian paradigm of prudence.   
Melibee’s role as intransigent interpreter (or bad reader) allows the text to become 
a vehicle to explore a more secular model of prudence responsive to the actual power 
structure of the state: it integrates political science and narrative in ways that the cosmic 
framework tends to thwart. When she recognizes that her instruction cannot bring about 
Melibee’s spiritual salvation because he cannot grasp the spiritual concept of caritas, 
then she yields to the possibility that “over-muchel suffraunce is nat good” (VII. 1466), 
and pivots to a more brutal political pragmatism:  
“lat us now putte that ye have leve to venge yow./ I seye ye been nat of myght and 
power as now to venge yow,/for if ye wole maken comparisoun unto the myght of 
youre adversaries, ye shul fynde in manye thynges that I have shewed yow er this 
that hire condicion is bettre than youres./ And therfore seye I that it is good as 
now that ye suffre and be pacient” (VII.1477-80).  
 
Crucially, Prudence never concedes that Melibee has the right to “venge.”  She will only 
suppose or “putte” that he has “leve” in order to engage Melibee on his own terms and 
develop a practical argument that demonstrates that even if he possesses this hypothetical 
authority, he lacks the “myght and power” to execute it.137 Having hypothetically 
accepted his right to vengeance, she reminds him of “thynges that I have shewed yow er 
this:” namely that his “enemys been thre, and they han manie children, brethren, cosyns 
and oother ny kynrede” (VII.1372).  In short, Melibee cannot win.  Prudence pivots from 
the spiritual argument to the Aristotelian focus on seeking what is “attainable” (NE 
VI.vi). Instead of a moral allegory focused on Melibee’s desire for “sweete temporeel 
                                                
137 As Prudence noted earlier, Melibee might be “riche” but he “han no child but a doghter,/ ne . . . brethren, ne cosyns 
germayns, ne noon other neigh kyndrede” (VII.1365-67).  After his rejection of her spiritual advice, Prudence, invoking 
Solomon, reminds Melibee of this power differential arguing that it is “a woodnesse a man to stryve with a strenger or a 
moore myghty man than he is hymself” (VII.1480).   
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richesses, and delices, and honours of this world” (VII.1410) she must argue that he does 
not have the manpower to achieve his ends, that one should not trust fortune, that he lacks 
jurisdiction, that his wealth will not avail him, that war is too unpredictable to justify.  
That said, even as she pivots towards a more practical argument, she frequently reminds 
Melibee (and the reader) that the practical is embedded in a spiritual Wisdom (cf. 
VII.1495). 
By addressing Melibee’s singular advantage in practical terms, Prudence’s 
rhetoric embraces the aspirations and anxieties of the broader political community: it 
addresses not only lords and kings but also merchants, guildmasters, and London 
oligarchs that have the economic capital for political power without the air of nobility.  
The clearest example of this comes in Prudence’s discussion of “gaderynge of richesses” 
(VII.1575) that has often been read as a strange “digression” (Howard 313). What makes 
this discussion seem like a “digression” is that it appears to depart from Prudence’s 
“ultimate end” (i.e. the reconciliation of Melibee with his enemies).  However, this 
assumes a narrow view of the stakes: Prudence may have been a victim of Melibee’s 
enemies, but she does not want to be a victim of his vengeance.   
This peculiar turn allows Prudence to create a Ciceronian hermeneutic in which 
the desire for singular advantage turns into civic rhetoric.  She thus concedes that 
“richesses been goode to hem that han wel ygeten hem and wel konne usen hem” 
(VII.1553).  Indeed, Prudence repeatedly stresses the importance of using riches well 
(VII.1553, 1575).  The proper use of wealth, in Prudence’s terms seems to be anything 
that builds one’s political authority: through wealth a woman may choose a husband “of a 
thousand men” and that a rich man “shalt fynde a greet nombre of felawes and freendes” 
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(VII.1558).  Chaucer carefully steers away from a Franciscan demonization of wealth—
indeed some have even argued that Chaucer anticipates the Protestant work ethic.138  
Wealth properly used strengthens one’s social network.  Indeed, at this moment, when 
Prudence’s rhetoric seems most mired in “empirical calculations,” it also fits nicely 
within Christian Fürstenspiegel virtue of largesse.139  In fact, like Fürstenspiegel 
handlings of largesse, Prudence discusses the importance of not appearing chynche.  
However, Prudence approaches “largesse” primarily as a means of securing Melibee’s 
singular advantage—largesse becomes part of a resistance rhetoric, a means of fighting 
back.  
However, Melibee’s security in his own wealth threatens to culminate in social 
violence. And although he may be  “riche and myghty,” Prudence points out that “the 
dedes of batailles been aventurouse and nothyng certeyne” (VII.1668) as the “litel 
compaignye” (VII.1660) of Maccabees were able to overcome “gretter nombre” 
(VII.1658).  The social violence threatened by Melibee endangers base of his political 
power.  The crucial point to Prudence’s discussion is the danger of increasing one’s 
“owene profit to the harm of another man” (VII.1586).  All of Prudence’s arguments, 
whether against idleness, “chynchness,” or over-expenditure, focus on how to gain wealth 
to increase one’s own “name” without harming others: “For Seint Jame seith . . . by 
concord and pees the smale richesses wexen grete,/ and by debaat and discord the grete 
richesses fallen doun” (VII.1676-77).  The translation of this passage, actually authored 
                                                
138 For example,Sadlek argues that Dame Prudence describes “how riches can be gained and used. In this section labor 
is strongly linked to production and reward and not as in the person still present it simply is an antidote idleness” (212). 
 
139 For example: “he that yevith his good in tyme of nede to suche as haue nede thereto, and principally to suche as 
haue deservid it, suche a kyng is large to him silf and to his sugetis bothe, and his rewme shalle stonde in gret 
prosperite” (Secreta 7-8). 
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by Seneca, usurps the meaning of the passage by changing the phrase “great things” into 
“richesses.”  This usurpation, whether intentional or not, reveals the mechanism through 
which the Melibee blends the singular and common good.   Indeed, the spiritual 
attribution may even suggest that we should take the word “richesses” to mean something 
more like the sacred penny given to the workers of the vineyard (Matt.20).  As this 
mistranslation shows, it is crucial to recognize that Prudence’s spiritual and pragmatic 
rhetoric share a common secular end: namely the reconciliation between Melibee and his 
enemies that will bring about an end to the violence that threatens communal bonds.  
Melibee must learn to interpret his singular advantage in terms of those “greater things,” 
namely the common profit.  Thus, the Melibee offers a proto-Hobbesian view that “all 
actions are to be esteemed good or evil by their causes and usefulness in reference to the 
commonwealth” (Hobbes 58). The singular must be read “in reference to the 
commonwealth.” 
In Chaucerian Polity, David Wallace reduces this kind of argumentation to a 
purely practical handbook for subjects to deal with magnate violence in which her 
arguments remain entirely utilitarian—a “diverse” collection of rhetorical tactics aimed at 
dealing with a violent lord.  This focuses on Prudence’s arguments rather than her 
perspective (i.e. the “exegetical performance” offered as a “kind of [interpretive] 
program” for the reader).  Prudence attempts to teach Melibee “to read” the crime within 
a political context in order to dissuade him from “vengeance-takynge.” For the reader, the 
initial crime becomes a forum for competing reading practices of Melibee and Prudence.  
The Melibee develops the readers’ relationship with the political community, a 
relationship embedded in the reading process itself.  By training the reader to view 
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textuality and narrative events as they concern the both singular advantage and the polity, 
the Melibee displaces the transcendent perspective of Sophia and develops a unified civic 
consciousness—a socio-political way of reading events, in which prudential 
interpretation is not the search for an absolute truth statement but rather a constitutive 
social practice aimed at strengthening the political bonds of community. 
Thus far, I have suggested that Prudence turned sharply from a spiritual to a 
pragmatic argument in an effort to stop private war.  The pivot, more importantly, was a 
prudential response to Melibee’s failure to interpret properly.  However, her “secular 
pragmatism” is not pure power politics; it is a politics shaped by a Ciceronian 
hermeneutic in which expediency and the summum bonum of the communitas regni turn 
out to be the same thing.140  Perhaps the clearest example of this social reading practice is 
Prudence’s examination of the advice given Melibee’s “greet congregacion” (VII.1004).  
At this point, departing from the florilegium-model where the wisdom of the citation 
seemingly stands on its own, Prudence’s instruction assumes the shape of scholastic 
magister-discipulus debate in which a teacher, by carefully correcting a student’s faulty 
reading, arrives at the right meaning of the text.  In the Melibee this scholastic exercise is 
embedded within social practice.   The manorial counsel is the text and similar to the 
practical syllogism, the meaning of the text is replaced with a “reasonable” course of 
action addressing the particulars of a volatile political situation.   
The physicians’ advice ironically poses the biggest risk to the health of the polity.  
After the surgeons deliver a high-minded argument that: 
                                                
140 Ad Putter argues that medieval scholars like William of Conches suggest the ethical ideal of “honestas” ultimately 
blends into the political expedience (153-55).  The idea that ethical had practical effects (i.e. political effects) can also 
be found in the Decretals which Chaucer cited:  “by cause that the Book of Decrees seith, ‘Seelden, or with greet 
peyne, been causes ybrought to good ende whanne they been baddely bigonne” (VII.1404) 
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“Whan twey men han everich wounded oother, oon same surgien heeleth hem  
bothe;/ wherefore unto our arte it is nat pertinent to norice werre” (VII.1013-
1014),  
 
Chaucer tells us that the physicians answered:  
“in the same wise . . . save that they seyden a fewe wordes moore:/that right as 
maladies be cured be hir contraries, right so shul men warrishe werre be 
vengeaunce” (VII.1016-17)  
 
Alongside the addition of the medical doctrine of contraries, the physicians also provide a 
social interpretation of this doctrine “right so shul men warrishe werre be vengeaunce” in 
order to make clear how they apply this medical proverb to questions of justice and 
vengeance.  Chaucer humorously draws a comparison between two healing professions 
by suggesting that the physicians answered in “in the same wise” as the surgeons with 
just a few words more, when, in fact those “few words” turn the their advice into the 
opposite of the surgeons.141  Before we get to Prudence’s advice, Chaucer points to the 
role interpretation plays in the maintenance and disruption of the social fabric. 
The Tale of Melibee draws a critical distinction between social and anti-social 
modes of interpretation—Prudence and Melibee respectively.  Prudence must establish a 
critical vantage point that allows Melibee a perspective outside of the rigid interpretive 
limits of his “cruel ire” (VII.1509).  Melibee, like Walter, does not interpret signs, but 
rather the signs control him.  Prudence, on the other hand, when analyzing the advice of 
his counselors, lauds the surgeons’ advice that “aperteneth to doon to every wight honour 
and profit, and no wight for to anoye” (VII.1269).  The surgeons’ advice situates abstract 
questions of vengeance and justice in the pragmatic realm of their actual wounds caused 
to those people through the effects of war.  Their advice mirrors Prudence’s hermeneutic 
                                                
141 For an alternative reading, see Ferster who suggests this humorous turn highlights Prudence’s own wresting of the 
quotation, 95-6.  
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program of maintaining political unity—a program in which “meaning” depends upon its 
effects on the “profit” of “every wight.”  Through Prudence, interpretation becomes a 
social activity.  In fact, Prudence explicitly connects the political forum and exegetical 
practices when she refers to the physicians’ advice as a text: “touchynge the 
proposicioun” (VII.1276) of the physicians “that in maladies that oon contrarie is 
warisshed by another contrarie—/I wolde fayn knowe hou ye understonde thilke 
text”(1277-78).  By transforming the  “greet congregacion” into a text that can be 
glossed, Prudence quite literally turns the civic space into a readerly space.142  
Unlike Prudence, who reinforces the surgeons’ advice to “do no damage,” 
Melibee’s interpretive strategies are antisocial, as they never take into account those lives 
that will be lost.  In the Knight’s Tale, we have already seen how ire threatens to separate 
the king from the community by reducing his decision-making abilities to his animalistic 
will (a will more worthy of a “leon” than a prince) (I.1775).  When Prudence asks 
Melibee to interpret the physicians’ proverb, Melibee paraphrases their interpretation 
saying that “right as they han doon me a contrarie, right so sholde I doon hem another” 
(VII.1280).  The medical meaning of this line suggests that an ailment should be cured by 
its opposite—such as using fire to reduce chills.  However, Melibee, like the physicians 
themselves, ignoring the medical context, misreads the word “contrarie” as a “hostile 
act.”  Thus, Melibee reads violence into the discourse of healing—one hostile act must be 
paid by another.  Prudence rejects Melibee’s violent misprision turning it into an 
accusation of his own perverse inclinations: “Lo, lo . . . how lightly is every man enclined 
                                                
142 Prudence treating the physicians’ declaration as a text that can be appropriated to her own ends explains the “real” 
meaning of physicians’ argument (Walling 166-67).  Similarly, Prudence’s allegorical reading of the crime committed 
against Melibee allows her to transform violence against Melibee into Melibee’s moral failing.   
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to his owene desir and to his owene pleasaunce” (VII.1283).   Indeed, Prudence’s claim 
that Melibee’s reading is shaped by his desire makes even more sense when we 
remember that the physicians’ advice, itself, was shaped by the “cruel ire” apparent in 
Melibee’s own “manere of speche” (VII.1009).  Melibee’s countenance evokes the 
physicians misreading of their own discourse, and thus his “ire” creates a closed 
hermeneutic circuit around his “owene desir.” 
Melibee’s interpretive model depends upon misreading of a medical quote—a 
misreading that turns healing into injury—and this misreading leads to social violence.  
Prudence arguing that he has misread the physicians’ proverb explains that:  
wikkednesse is nat contrarie to wikkednesse, ne vengeance to vengeaunce . . . but 
they been semblable./ And therefore o vengeaunce is nat warisshed by another 
vengeaunce. . . But certes, the wordes of the phisiciens sholde been understonden 
in this wise . . . certes wikkednesse shal be warrisshed by goodnese, discord by 
accord, werre by pees, and so forth of othere thynges (VII.1284-86).   
 
Amanda Walling argues that Prudence’s reading (which she claims is counter-intuitive) 
reveals the instability of meaning in the glossatorial tradition “in which the tools of 
interpretation at times threaten to overwhelm the authorities they purport to serve” (167).  
While Prudence “overwhelm[s]” the physicians interpretation and replaces their sentence 
with her own, her hermeneutic program is not unstable. Prudence interprets the 
physicians’ words—like she does with all her biblical and classical citations—in order to 
create “accord,” “pees,” and “goodnesse”—in short to strengthen the community.  
Prudence (offering a “contrarie” to the physicians own violent wresting of the citation) 
returns the quotation to it proper medical context, and in doing so shifts the physicians’ 
violent advice back into surgeons’ healing rhetoric and, in terms of the community, 
Prudence’s rhetoric heals the wounded body politic turning “discord” into “accord.” 
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Because of Melibee’s bad reading practices, Prudence addresses the threat of 
private war from many angles by showing that it is legally unjustifiable, socially 
destructive and individually unachievable.  This multi-layered approach has led to the 
critique of Prudence as a pasta-chef courtier throwing everything against the wall in order 
to see what sticks: her willingness to “say anything” underlies the pejorative accounts of 
her “utilitarian” rhetoric as “mired in prudential saying” or nothing but a collection of 
“empirical calculations” (Patterson 118)  Daniel Kempton suggests Prudence’s “say 
anything” approach leads to a kind of logical incoherence: 
Contrary to our expectations, the diverse voices of “auctors” are not brought into 
accord among themselves, or into harmony with the single voice of “auctoritee,” 
through exegesis on the part of Prudence . . . there is no synthesis of doctrine 
through the operations of dialectic. (Kempton 268) 
 
Admittedly, as her pivot from spiritual to the brutally pragmatic reveals, Prudence’s 
rhetoric (aimed at convincing a particular person) does not dialectically resolve all the 
“diverse voices of [her] auctors” into a universal principle or a “single auctoritee.”  
However, she does synthesize each of her “diverse voices” in one “ultimate particular 
end” namely the reconciliation of Melibee with his enemies.  The logical incoherence of 
Prudence’s “diverse voices” resides in Melibee, the bad reader, who does not detect that 
the “voices” of salvation, common profit and even individual desire are, in fact fully 
integrated. The conspicuous absence of Melibee’s Sophia (σοφια) leads to the dis-
integration of these “auctoritees.”   
The lack of a “single voice of auctoritee” is not a flaw in Prudence, nor does it 
show her lack of a “sacramental view of the universe” (Aers 76).  Instead, the dis-
integration of “auctoritee” is precisely the point of the tale for two important reasons.  
First, as Prudence herself acknowledges, any “conseil that is affermed so strongly that it 
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may nat be chaunged for no condicioun that may bityde . . . is wikked” (VII.1231).  
Prudence thus associates Melibee’s rigid interpretive strategies with social violence.  It is 
precisely this hermeneutical inflexibility that makes Patterson’s “devastating moment” 
(118) not so much a single instance of misprision but a structural principle of the tale as a 
whole.  Second, the absence of Sophia (i.e. a dialectically determined universal principle) 
allows Melibee to be a vehicle for exploring a crisis of sovereignty from political angles 
and thus take into account all of the aspects of power within the Ricardian polity.  Thus, 
having divorced the Melibee from the potential spiritual resolution, Chaucer can safely 
turn back to a study of Cicero’s practical wisdom aimed at maintaining the bonds of 
community.  Like Gower’s development of prudential rhetoric in Book VII of the 
Confessio Amantis, Chaucer’s prudence opens up for narrative examination the actual 
conditions of power.  The “pleasure of reading” and “the pleasure of being edified” 
resolve into the kaleidoscope that is the Melibee.  Ultimately, Chaucer’s narrative 
embodies and molds the emergent political perspective crucial to Ricardian poetics.   
 
Chaucer and the Political Aesthetic 
Popularizing the critical idea of “Ricardian poetry” in a book of the same title, 
J.A. Burrow suggests that something new was happening in English poetry toward the 
end of the fourteenth century.  For Burrow, Ricardian poetry had a “robustness” and 
“gusto” (52) that, in the fourteenth century, was unique to England: 
The Ricardian poets were able to produce authentic narrative poetry in an age no 
longer favourable to it.  Unlike predecessors such as the author of Kynge 
Alisaunder, they had the knack of selecting bits of the mass of old approved 
storyes just those episodes they could convincingly turn to their own literary 
purposes.  (57) 
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What I have argued is this “knack” is not just chance skill, but part of the cultural 
milieu. As I demonstrated inthe nobility were aware of (and enamored by) the majestic 
ideas of kingship and lordship on the continent, but these ideas were impractical in 
England, which was accustomed to an increasingly political kingship embodied in Magna 
Carta, the Provisions of Oxford, and the Barons’ Gravamina in the Mise d’Amiens.   
In the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer finds “episodes” that fit, or could be made to fit 
into a political description of the sovereignty.  Anne Middleton has likewise argued that 
the literary transformation captured in Burrow’s “Ricardian poetry” reflects a stylistic 
turn toward the “ideal of communal responsibility” (96).  In this chapter, I have shown 
focused on how political rhetoric embedded in the literary project—as “public poetry” or 
the poetics of disenchantment—is rooted in and structurally entangled with majestic 
rhetoric.  The “authenticity” of Ricardian narrative derives from a “literary purpose” 
shaped by the act of creating a perspective capable of speaking to/for a political 
community which “for all intents and purposes formed under Henry III” (Dunbabin 482), 
a perspective that found new validity under the senility of Edward III and the minority of 
Richard II.  
Discussions of Chaucer’s political thought are complicated due to the absence of 
nearly any explicit topical references, a complication compounded by the shifting 
political attitudes of his narrators within the Canterbury Tales.  His political statements 
must then be drawn out tales, which are themselves “old approved storyes” that would 
hardly have been considered revolutionary.  Moreover, his handling of these conventional 
stories has none of the political allegory that we see in works like Absalom and 
Achitophel, or even the limited degree of political allusion in the Faerie Queene.   As a 
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result, some critics like Judith Ferster look for political commentary “camouflaged” by 
the profound “dullness” of the well-worn maxims of the Fürstenspiegel-tradition, while 
other suggest that Chaucer is deliberately cagey. 143   This complication, though often 
overstated, is not irrelevant.  Although there was considerable political violence in 
Ricardian England, although Chaucer was a member of parliament and a justice of the 
peace, and although he had close ties with Ricardian and Lancastrian factions, his poetry 
is vague when describing policy or machinations of governance; indeed, at first glance, 
Chaucer’s poetry does, as Ferster suggest, seem to fit the political sensibility of the 
Fürstenspiegel-genre that treated governance simply as a matter of ethical self-regulation: 
an ethical king created peace and stability in the realm and conversely political crises 
were caused by moral failure. 144  A literary idea where narrative outcomes depend upon 
moral actions divorced from circumstance is neatly captured in the fifteenth-century The 
Life of St. George:  
so ought your lyfe/ be clennest from offence, 
and shyne in vertue/ above youre subiectes all. 
A vycyous prynce/ is as a plage mortall 
And foule example/ to all his comonte.  (St. George 1305-8) 
 
As such, it is understandable that a historian such as G.L. Harriss would characterize the 
“literary model of governance” as one in which “there was no awareness of a science of 
politics, of where power was located, whence it was derived, how it was apportioned, 
through whom it was channeled” (Harriss 12-13).  Since the existence of a “political 
community” takes shape in the thirteenth century, it would be reasonable that we would 
                                                
143 Ferster explicitly asks: “why would these works be s hard to connect to their social and political contexts?”  For 
Ferster, the answer lies in authorial circumspection that buried political commentary beneath conventional wisdom 
literature.  The literary critic (really a historian) must show how these maxims seem to articulate particular political 
positions.  
 
144 For a useful summary of the “Literary Model of Governance”, see G.L. Harriss pages 6-13. 
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begin to detect the emergence of this community in the “literary model” of Ricardian 
poets.  
It is because a definitive language of politics did not exist in English, that I have 
located the political more in the historical development of a political perspective than in 
some “camouflaged” intervention in topical factional politics.  What should be clear by 
now is that insofar as we might imagine political ideas as relating to a particular policy or 
mechanism of governance, there is very little Chaucer’s oeuvre—even in the most 
didactic works like Melibee—that allows us to fit him comfortably into a traditional 
history of political ideas with Giles of Rome or John of Salisbury.  Chaucer’s poetry does 
not represent the political content of the Provisions of Oxford or Mise d’Amiens; and the 
attempts to explain Chaucer’s poetry as a response to political events (from the Uprising 
to the Merciless Parliament) has always led to statements made on ambivalent and 
selective evidence.  The Provisions and the Mise are political responses to the anxieties 
of sovereignty; Ricardian poetry registers these anxieties through narrative invention.  
Chaucer’s political realism, based on prudential reason, challenged the cosmology of 
majesty and shaped and was shaped by a nascent ‘secular’ science that rivals, rather than 
nests into, the cosmic framework. Chaucer frequently narrates the fraying of those 
“fundamental cultural conceptions . . . whose axiomatic grip on the men’s minds” had 
repressed the political model of sovereignty (Anderson 40). 
Of course, Ricardian poetry continues to make the conventional allusions to the 
king’s divine authority characteristic of majestic rhetoric.  However in the Canterbury 
Tales, we see the development of a political perspective that forces us to reevaluate these 
conventional statements—a perspective far more responsive and dependent upon the 
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needs of the communitas regni.  Although communitas-rhetoric was always notionally 
present in the “literary model of governance,” it did not significantly contribute to the 
“science of politics.”  In Chaucer and Gower, this political rhetoric expanded to meet the 
needs of a developing administrative ethos and a fledgling political community.  The 
primary feature of this rhetoric was its acknowledgement of and responsiveness to the 
needs of the community.  In short, Ricardian poetry begins to imagine sovereignty more 
in terms of a social rather than a cosmic order.  This social order develops, tensely, 
alongside royal superioritas that thrived on the continent, particularly in the court of 
Edward the Black in Aquitaine where Richard II and many of his courtiers were groomed 
(Dunbabin 490).  
In this chapter, I have provided a more nuanced account of the “literary model of 
governance;” a model that demonstrates how Ricardian poetry, beginning to respond to 
the actual conditions of power, tended to diminish the significance of the cosmic 
framework.  In particular we have seen how Ricardian literature, reacting to new 
pressures within the discourse of sovereignty expands prudential rhetoric, acknowledges 
the condition of power, and demystifies the cosmic kingship.  What I have been calling 
the ‘political realism’ of Chaucer does not depend solely—or even primarily—on the 
contingent forces of history, but rather the way these forces begin to shape narrative of 
architecture of Chaucer and Gower.  The Knight’s Tale, for example, begins to imagine 
kingship and hierarchy as a resistance to the chaotic forces of history rather than a 
reflection of a cosmic order; the Clerk’s Tale cultivates the political perspective of the 
citizen-subject, qua reader, who can and should critique royal superioritas.   And, most 
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obviously, the Tale of Melibee fleshes out a prudential rhetoric based on the actual 
conditions of power. 
I have demonstrated that Chaucer’s ability to select and turn “bits of the old 
approved storyes” to his own “literary purpose” was in fact part of a broader rhetorical 
shift occurring within the discourse of sovereignty.  To this end, I have made use of 
Pierre Macherey’s description of literature as a “caricature of ideology.”  For him, the 
literary text “imitates everyday language which is the language of ideology” and by 
“mingling the real uses of language in an endless confrontation, it concludes by revealing 
their truth.”  The truth is the “gaps of ideology” (what Bakhtin would characterize as the 
necessary incompleteness of the monologism of ideology”) that give ideology its 
“contours” and allow you access to it “from within.”  As Chaucer imagines the political 
power far more responsive to the broader political community (working within political 
ideology), he produces a narrative that exposes the gap between cosmology and political 
realism at the same time (or perhaps because) he tries to bridge this gap.    
In an effort to bring the emerging function of political rhetoric into relief, let me 
conclude with a comparison between Alain de Lille’s Anticlaudianus and Chaucer’s 
Melibee between literary production in the twelfth and fourteenth century respectively.  
Alain, writing for, and as part of, a “very small courtly elite” (Simpson 292) had 
“unbounded confidence in the young king’s [Phillip II’s] power, given that he sees the 
world wholly from the point of view of its ruler” (Simpson 296).  Chaucer’s aesthetic 
arises from the ethos of the civil servant of the Crown.  The portrayal of prudence—a 
virtue that became the cornerstone of political rhetoric in the fourteenth century—by the 
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two authors is illuminating.  Alain de Lille describes Phronesis (Greek for Prudence)  
“entering God’s realm:” 
The brightness dazzled her eyes and the impact of the strange objects benumbed 
her mind.  Faced with them her vision failed and her mind within was darkened.  
Thus, drowsiness overcame the alert mind of Phronesis and false sleep weighed it 
down . . . When the queen could not by any means eradicate the harmful stupor 
and restore full powers of mind, she brought with prayers her own sister to come 
to Phronesis’s aid, drive out the numbness completely, bring back her power of 
mind and force it to return.  This sister, dwelling in the realms of the powers 
above, examines the depths of heaven and, to the exclusion of all else, clings to 
the innermost recesses of God. 145 (Book VI; p. 166) 
 
Chaucer describes Prudence giving advice to a man who not only lacks access to divine 
wisdom: 
For al be it so that ye be myghty and riche, certes ye ne been but allone,/ for certes 
ye ne han no child but a doghter,/ ne ye ne han brethren, ne cosyns germayns, no 
noo oother neigh kyndrede,/ wherefore that youre enemys for drede sholde stinte 
to plede with yow or to destroye your persone./  Ye knowen also that your 
richesses mooten been dispended in diverse parties,/ and whan that every wight 
hath his part, they ne wollen taken but litel reward to venge thy deeth (VII.1366-
71). 
 
These passages capture what I have depicted as a shift from majestic rhetoric of the 
“small courtly elite” loyal to the person of the king and political rhetoric of the civil 
servant loyal to Crown. More importantly, these passages allow us to see how these 
conditions of literary production map onto the mode of literary expression, in this case 
allegory: that is, we can see how majestic rhetoric conveniently maps onto the tenor and 
vehicle of the allegory.   
The two texts create disparate portrayals of the function of Prudence, what might 
be seen as the tenor of the allegorical figure Phronesis/Prudence.  In Anticlaudianus, 
Phronesis is part of a metaphysical discourse on the universe and man’s role in it.  She is 
                                                
145 Translation from Sheridan, James J. Anticlaudianus; or The Good and Perfect Man. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1973.  
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part of a hierarchy of knowledge that bridges man to the “realm of god” with the aid of 
Theology and Faith (the two sisters who aid her in the passage above). Alain’s allegory 
depends upon the connection forged between nature and the cosmos in Prudence’s 
ascension to heaven.  Her pleas bring about the creation of the perfect man, who not 
surprisingly—according to most literary critics—is a thinly veiled allusion to King 
Phillip II of France.  The vertical motion of the poem’s action (i.e. Prudence’s ascension 
and Faith’s descent to rescue Prudence) produces the earthly hierarchy—through the 
creation of the perfect man who will defeat the forces of Allecto.  Aside from invoking its 
importance to the perfect man, Alain only hints at the function of phronesis in practical 
worldly affairs.  We have a rhetoric as perfectly sculpted as Theseus’s “noble theatre,” 
indeed a rhetoric similarly aimed at the containment of chaos (i.e. Allecto).  However, 
unlike Chaucer, Alain confidently suggests that the moral virtue of his hero provides the 
coercive force necessary to overcome the historical forces of chaos.   
Unlike Alain’s cosmic validation of Philip II, and the Fürstenspiegel-model of 
sovereign power, Chaucer, in the Tale of Melibee exposes the nuts and bolts of earthly 
power.  Prudence reminds Melibee that one can only maintain sovereignty through 
developing a powerful network of alliance.  Whether Melibee has a right to vengeance or 
not, the reality is that he lacks the affinity (brethren, cosyns germayns, or kyndrede 
neigh) to assert his will against his three foes.  Likewise, she carefully analyzes the 
relationship between money and power, identifying one of the problems facing merchant 
oligarchs namely that economic power still did not guarantee the coercive force to protect 
one’s interests or secure one’s will. While these three foes allegorically represent Flesh, 
World and Satan, Prudence’s advice will blur their allegorical function.  The tension 
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between allegorical and political realism (also a feature of the Clerk’s Tale) allows 
Chaucer to anatomize the nature of sovereign authority.  
More importantly, we see how the poet’s allegorical vehicle encourages a 
particular hermeneutics. In Alain’s cosmological allegory, we see that Phronesis is the 
‘natural’ faculty of man most capable of ascending to heaven.  Riding the chariot 
fashioned by the Seven Liberal Arts she has arrived at God’s realm.  At this point, Alain 
makes the reader aware of the limits of this earthly faculty.  She is blinded and faints at 
the sight of things that the earthly mind cannot grasp.  The only thing that can drive out 
the “numbness” and “bring back her power of mind” is Faith.  Alain’s point is clear: 
Prudence can begin to bridge the gulf between heaven and earth, but to “examine the 
depths of heaven” she must submit to faith.  This submission is not just the tenor; it 
models the interpretive scheme necessary to read the Anticlaudianus.  The vertical 
motion of the poem’s action—Prudence’s ascension and Faith’s rescue of Prudence—
creates a model of knowledge that mimics the neo-Platonic celestial hierarchy of pseudo-
Dionysius in which God’s light (knowledge) descends through a hierarchy of angels 
becoming increasingly occluded at each tier.  The occluded quality makes the light 
suitable to the eyes of those among the lower echelon of the hierarchy.  Thus, when 
Phronesis oversteps her bounds (i.e. transgresses the hierarchy), she is blinded by light.  
For Alain de Lille knowledge (and the “Good and Perfect Man”) depends upon the proper 
ordering of one’s internal faculties, here the submission of practical wisdom to faith.  
Like majestic rhetoric, the celestial hierarchy anchors the meaning, authority and limits of 
Alain’s vehicle—his allegory depends upon what might be called the cosmic vehicle.   
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In the Tale of Melibee, Prudence represents the faculty to bring about the best 
possible result to worldly affairs; and as such the allegorical representation of Prudence 
(the vehicle) is articulated more in relation to a social, rather than cosmic, frame.  
Pointing to the need for strong affinities and the relative weakness of wealth (by itself), 
Chaucer’s Prudence represents effective relationships between members of nobility.  As 
the center shifts from the “Good and Perfect” king toward community, prudential rhetoric 
(synonymous with political rhetoric) arises out of the practical effect of the action.  As 
allegory becomes more analytical, the vehicle, Prudence as wife and advisor, cannot be 
separated from the specific conditions that she engages; she resists taxonomic 
descriptions and seemingly steps out of the allegory.   
Obviously, a single comparative exercise is not enough to make definitive claims 
about either the twelfth or fourteenth century; nonetheless it is suggestive of a link 
between narrative architecture and the organization of sovereign power.  I have tried to 
demonstrate that the difference between Alain and Chaucer is embedded in Chaucer's 
text: the failure of Theseus’s arena or the critique of Walter stand over and against the 
"semiotics of power" represented in Anticlaudianus.  The conceptual shift in narrative is 
intimately wound up in the development of the institutional body of the Crown that 
reoriented the relationship between subject and sovereign and made the communitas 
regni the foundation of sovereign power.  In a sense, what I am arguing is that the 
distance between Chaucer and Alain’s account of Prudence is the thirteenth century.  
This brief comparison to Alain de Lille’s Anticlaudianus illuminates those “gaps 
of ideology” that Chaucer’s poetry renders visible—those places where the fiction cannot 
mask the “determinate disorder” that shapes it. The embarrassment of authority is 
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repeatedly thematized and never resolved in the Canterbury Tales.  The "gaps of 
ideology" are not just linguistic.  Macherey's descriptions of "literary production" 
assume, but hardly analyze, the real way that the text constitutes and is constituted by 
textual coalitions.  In other words, the gap between cosmic kingship and communitas-
rhetoric manifests in actual struggle between two visions of power: one (Alain's) 
controlled by elite barons surrounding a king, the other (Chaucer's) by expanded coalition 
that consists of the upper echelon of society (gentry, esquires, merchants).  
The political rhetoric of this latter group can be characterized as the 
administrative ethos of the gentleman bureaucrat, a rhetoric born out of the articulation of 
the nobility and this 'gentleman' class amidst the 'constitutional' conflicts of the thirteenth 
century.   The Fürstenspiegel-rhetoric associated the health of the realm with the ethics of 
the king and the obedience of his subjects: "the king is imagined as the very epicentre of 
health in the natural and political realms" (Simpson 277).  This majestic cosmology was 
still alive in both England and on the continent, and central to Richard II's own regal 
aspirations.  The poetry of Chaucer points toward a shift from "personal king" and the 
kind of elite coalition it embodied, toward the sacred obligation of the king to the 
common profit (often referred to as “high minded secularism”), an obligation at the heart 
of a new political theology that began to separate king and Crown.  More importantly, for 
Chaucer this new emphasis involved the creation of a new subjectivity, one capable of 
imagining, like Ralph de Neville, that one might act against the decision of the king in 
order to protect the Crown.  Chaucer, of course, did not have to see himself as a 
“constitutionalist” to write as he did.  He did not have to think he was writing a new for 
the gentleman-bureaucrat.  I prefer to think of Chaucer being aware of the relationship 
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between power and language, and I think there is good evidence for this awareness; 
however, even if he was not explicitly reworking the language of sovereignty, Chaucer 
was, nonetheless, deeply shaped by the emergent political rhetoric.  This new emphasis 
involved the creation of a new subjectivity and political perspective—the invention of a 
“robust” Ricardian narrative that addressed the pressures of time, cosmology and 




A RETROSPECTIVE: THE COMMUNITY OF THE REALM AND THE AESTHETIC 
OF NATION 
The central contention of this study has been that the political innovation of the 
thirteenth century, described as a “great turning point in medieval political thought” 
(Canning 341) and the genesis of a “conscious political opposition” (Chrimes 70), bred 
an anxiety in the discourse of sovereignty and that this anxiety manifests in Ricardian 
poetry.  Indeed it was this anxiety that generated, to some extent, the characteristic 
“robustness” and “gusto” of Ricardian narrative.1  In short, the literary aesthetic of the 
fourteenth century addresses the political transformations of the thirteenth.  This has been 
examined obliquely by those who have read Ricardian poetry in light of topical events—
usually as informed by either the factional politics of the Merciless Parliament or the 
Uprising of 1381.2  Examining the quarrel between magnates and Richard II, these 
studies naturally touch upon the political anxiety unleashed by the thirteenth century.  
These same studies, however, tend to read Chaucer and Gower as adherents of particular 
factions and thus turn their poetry into politics. By imagining these poets as the inheritors 
of thirteenth-century political innovation, I demonstrate how Ricardian poets create a 
civic mentality for an emergent community.   
There is already a large body of scholarship investigating how the Confessio 
Amantis and the Canterbury Tales participate in creating the aesthetic of an “emergent 
                                                
1 Burrow described Ricardian narrative poetry as having a  “robustness” and “gusto” (52) that, in the fourteenth 
century, was unique to England. 
 
2 For example, Lynn Arner shows how Gower and Chaucer’s poetry contains the violent energy of the 1381 uprising; 
Kurt Olsson and Judith Ferster read Book VII of the Confessio Amantis in light of the Merciless Parliament; Lynn 
Staley, in “Inverse Counsel,” focuses on the relation between Melibee and factional politics during the reign of Richard 
II.   
 294 
English community” (Knapp 156).  The tendency has been to either examine how 
fourteenth-century social conditions induced Chaucer or Gower to create their own 
imagined community or alternatively, to examine how these poets fit in with the general 
theories of nation, particularly “the imagined community” of Benedict Anderson.  These 
approaches underestimate the particular political history of the English community.  For 
example, Anderson argued that the birth of nation could only happen after “three 
fundamental cultural conceptions, [i.e. a sacred privileged language, cosmic warrant of 
the royal prerogative, and the devaluation of causal history] . . . had lost their axiomatic 
grip” on the pre-national mind (Anderson 40). I have tried to show that these cultural 
conceptions were already under assault in the political imaginary of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. While print capitalism (as Anderson supposed) may have ushered in 
the final collapse of these “cultural conceptions,” the imagined construct of the 
communitas regni and the political rhetoric of Ricardian poets were already loosening the 
“axiomatic grip” of these ideas.    
The “community” central to the political imagination of Chaucer and Gower had 
already changed from a “vague untechnical colloquialism” to a legitimate source of 
authority over the course of two centuries.  By focusing less on imagined communities 
and more on imagining community, I have used Anderson’s theory as an heuristic to 
describe the historical emergence of the political imaginary in the thirteenth century.  The 
communitas regni that emerged from the Second Barons’ War, established new lines of 
cooperation aimed at reshaping laws, the administrative machine, and ultimately the 
definition of sovereignty.  The political imaginary born out of this new source of 
authority was both dependent on and struggling to free itself from those “cultural 
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conceptions” that reproduced a majestic arrangement of power.  In the thirteenth century, 
an emergent political rhetoric established new descriptions of legitimacy that created 
lines of cooperation between magnates and vavasours.  Ricardian poetry arises out of this 
rhetorical situation.  The political aesthetic of Chaucer and Gower, as such, is both held 
by and prying free of these epistemic limits on the prenational discourse of sovereignty. 
The narrative architecture of their works cannot be separated from the political 
anxiety that the “emergent English community” no longer fits comfortably into older 
narrative paradigms. It was this discomfiture that inspired Gower and Chaucer to develop 
a literary style that Charles Muscatine identified as fourteenth-century “realism.”  
However, for Muscatine, realism (amongst English poets at least) was found primarily in 
the works of Chaucer and Langland.3  Imagining realism on a spectrum, I have argued 
that Gower’s desublimation of the Fürstenspiegel tradition participates in a broader 
literary movement towards political realism. I have expanded Muscatine’s description of 
Ricardian “realism” in order to show how new ways of imagining kings and communities 
in the thirteenth century led to new ways of imagining time and space in the fourteenth 
century.  
I have made very few direct comparisons between the two poets who are the 
subject of this work.  While Chaucer and Gower are dramatically different, while 
Chaucer can be considered an “anomaly” just by the sheer number of voices and genres 
that he blends together in the Canterbury Tales, the purpose of my work has been to 
show how both poets are working within and shaping a common English political 
tradition. Imagining Chaucer as an unprecedented “anomaly” has led to a number of 
                                                
3 Muscatine had a very narrow application of the term realism suggesting that, among English poets, Chaucer was an 
anomaly and “only Langland is comparable to him in realism” (244).   
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crucial investigations on the source of Chaucer’s innovation.  What I have added to this 
conversation is how Chaucer and Gower adapt their source material to create an aesthetic 
uniquely fitted to the anxieties of the English political tradition—how they recreate the 
voice of classics, the Bible, or Italian humanists within an English political space. 
 Gower revises the Fürstenspiegel from a genre reproducing majestic assumptions 
about cosmology and kingship into a genre capable of expressing new institutional 
relationships between king and community.  Refusing to stretch his hand toward heaven 
(CA I.1), Gower can describe the political universe without recourse to the cosmic 
framework, which, consequently, makes political “causal history” possible.  He does not 
write an allegorical narrative that effortlessly blends authority and ethics, but instead 
makes the secular legal idea of trouthe into the centerpiece of sovereign legitimacy.  In 
his first tale of Book 7, Gower makes this clear by substituting the pagan myth (“Tale of 
Alceste”) about the bond of marriage for a description of truth as God.  This legal trouthe 
becomes overtly political in Gower’s “Tale of Lycurgus” in which the sovereign is 
represented as bound to the community of the realm through its laws.  While the ethical 
message is still undeniably there (good guys are rewarded and bad guys punished), the 
political and contingent world assumes center stage and morality plays out through 
political mechanisms. The ethical outcome allows Gower to explore the political 
mechanisms.  By diminishing the importance of the cosmic framework and bringing 
contingent reality into the spotlight, Gower’s poetry deploys a kind of political realism 
absent from the romance and Fürstenspiegel traditions.   
Gower’s emphasis on political mechanisms creates a new narrative perspective, 
but his ethics always anchor that perspective.  The validity of the perspective itself is 
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never questioned.  In the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer rarely (if ever) provides this kind of 
secure perspective. Instead, we repeatedly encounter the collapse of those “official” 
perspectives that “serve the function of ordering the social world and of legitimating that 
order” (Bourdieu 34).  Indeed, in the opening tale the Knight narrates the collapse of 
majesty and the rise of a contingent political order.  Chaucer’s frequent narration of this 
collapse informs Muscatine’s apocalyptic description of Chaucer as “holding together 
and seeing in relationship to each other of the wide range of values . . . which had once 
made up the richness and poise of medieval civilization, and were now already making 
for its break-up” (247).  The “holding together” represents a political authority no longer 
grounded securely in the cosmic framework; and the break-up was not so much in the 
future Renaissance, but in the development of an emergent political community.  
For Chaucer, the problem of sovereign authority redounds on his literary 
authority; instead of anchoring authority, he repeatedly depicts the moment of crisis—a 
moment where the secure transcendental order falls, leaving behind a frail contingent 
order.  The tales focus on the relationship between hermeneutics and politics at these 
moments of crisis.  They examine how to read when the official grammar vanishes.  
While people have, I believe rightly, suggested that Chaucer is a bit cagey about his 
specific political views, his repeated depiction of the fall of a stable sign system aligns 
with a political view of the universe based on prudential rhetoric.  To suggest that 
Chaucer’s writing is deeply influenced by political rhetoric is not to associate him with 
royalist or Appellant factions, but rather to acknowledge that Chaucer understood the 
political character inherent in the practice of reading.  
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Ricardian poets invented (i.e. uncovered, created) a vernacular authority at a 
moment of crisis; they invented a political aesthetic rising out of and elevating the 
emergent English community.  Much like Theseus, the reader can no longer trust the text 
to be anchored by a cosmic authority, and the secular word (of the political world) at best 
resists Saturnine forces.  One can, like the Parson, speak of absolute ethical truths; 
however, these truths as Lady Philosophy herself admits, cannot be used to create a stable 
government in the hurly-burly of the political world in which most of Chaucer’s 
characters live.  Broadly, I have suggested that Ricardian poetry makes more sense if we 
understand it as part of the creative project of the English community—a project that 
would reshape politics, literature, historiography and countless other fields as it came into 
being.  Specifically, I have shown how Chaucer’s and Gower’s poetry shapes and is 
shaped by their relationship to a uniquely English tradition of sovereignty. 
I would like to conclude by looking ahead to the sixteenth century, where the 
English community, once a site of conflict, became, under the banner of “nation,” a 
source of cultural capital and authority. The critical conversation around nation, as 
Andrew Escobedo points out, is complicated by the fact that “scholars of modernity” 
believe that “national consciousness” hardly existed at all in the sixteenth century, while 
medieval scholars tend to think that nationalism in the sixteenth century was old news 
(Escobedo 10-11).4  Instead of engaging in these terminological quarrels, I focus on a 
particular difference between medieval and Renaissance depictions of community—a 
difference between a community that limited regal authority and one that gave the 
                                                
4 I tend to agree with McEachern that national consciousness began to take shape in medieval England and “to assume 
that, because early modern England was a monarchy, its ideologies of order were inimical to expressions of social unity 
is as naive as to assume that the reigning democratic myth of twenieth century America . . . guarantees either social 
equality or unanimity"  (McEachern 19). 
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monarch access to nearly unlimited cultural capital to control her subjects—an aesthetic 
of the community of the realm and aesthetic of nation respectively.  
Introducing The Faerie Queene allows me to emphasize the role of cosmology 
and historical time in the political imaginary and to highlight the differences and 
continuities between late medieval idea of communitas regni and Early Modern 
nationalism.  By marking the distance between Spenserian and Ricardian poetry, we can 
recognize the unique way in which medieval poets understood the political community. 
By concluding with Spenser, I hope to examine this relationship in two directions at 
once—to see how Chaucer and Gower inform our modern sensibility and how the 
medieval political imaginary was a unique response to particular conditions.   
 
Spenser’s Aesthetic of Nation 
Reading Spenser side-by-side with Chaucer, one is tempted to agree with 
Muscatine’s assertion that Spenser “emulates him [Chaucer] only faintly” (245).  This is 
largely true because Spenser drew heavily on the Italian epic romance tradition of Ariosto 
and Tasso, which was laden with the kind of chivalric romance critiqued by Chaucer and 
Gower.  However, what Spenser would have encountered in Chaucer, and perhaps 
Gower, is the presence of a vernacular authority and hermeneutics carved out of cosmic 
framework.    
Edmund Spenser’s epic romance, published in two installments in 1590 (Books I-
III) and 1596 (Books IV-VI), registers the continuation of political upheaval that began 
“in the period that joins the fifteenth and sixteenth century” described by Michel Foucault 
in Dits et Ecrits as the 
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explosive moment which brought into being Protestantism, the formation of the 
great nations, the constitution of authoritative monarchies . . . all of this led to a 
sort of rearrangement of the way in which people were governed, both in terms of 
their individual relationships and in terms of their social and political conduct.  
(qtd. in Pieters 60) 
 
In England, this “rearrangement of the way in which people were governed” assumed its 
most violent expression during the reign of Henry VIII.  Henry strengthened the idea of 
the king's divine authority by separating the Church of England from the Catholic Church 
with the declaration of supremacy (1534) and subsequently dissolving English 
monasteries (in 1536 and 1539).  As a result, the king's court became the center of 
spiritual and temporal power. 
At its core, this “explosive moment” shaped and was shaped by the question at the 
center of my argument: "what authorized the power of the sovereignty?" I cannot, in the 
space of this conclusion, begin to describe the historical change in political authority 
ushered in by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, but I do hope to uncover how the “constitution 
of authoritative monarchies,” which required the validation of the active political life 
itself, shaped Spenserian romance. Spenser’s “historicall fiction” participates in a larger 
historiographical movement providing increasingly secular accounts of history aimed at 
validating the Tudor dynasty.5  Indeed two of Spenser's most fanciful and powerful 
inventions, Gloriana's court and her city of Cleopolis, elevate sovereign authority by 
investing subjects (knights/gentlemen) with historical purpose.  Through this, we see an 
aesthetic that pivots from the cosmic history of the Church towards a historiography 
through which “Christian states gradually reappropriated the control of collective 
memory by favoring the birth of a historical narrative centered on the princes’ 
                                                
5 For a discussion of changing attitudes towards history as part of a larger discourse of nation, see Escobedo 5-15. 
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governments and military deeds” (Burguière 249).  In telling the stories of “prince’s 
governments and military deeds,” Spenser invests secular history with a significance 
represented by the cult of fame and establishes the sovereign as the head of economy of 
fame.  
However, historical narrative still had to push back on the tendency to diminish 
political time, which had been central to majestic models of authority in the past.  The 
political imaginary was still strongly influenced by a historical Augustinianism in which 
“the condition of all men living in the Sixth Age, whose historical life hears meaning 
resolutely unavailable to them and for whom the translations of secular history articulate 
a meaningless pattern of ceaseless rise and fall” (Patterson 97).6  The cosmological 
diminishment of “historical life” and “secular history” lessens the importance of the 
active life and the political present.  Many theologians, historians, and poets in the Early 
Modern period implicitly challenged this model; however, the need to challenge it 
showed its continued presence.  The anxiety over the “meaning” of one’s “historical life” 
takes a particularly Protestant shape in Richard Hooker’s Learned Discourse of the 
Justification of Faith, when, expounding upon the inability of man to achieve his own 
salvation, he asserts, “the best things we do have somewhat in them to be pardoned. How 
then can we do anything meritorious and worthy to be rewarded?” (4).  While Hooker 
ultimately affirms the importance of the active life, the anxiety regarding the significance 
of “historical life” and “secular history” still haunts sixteenth century thought and, as we 
                                                
6 In Chapter II, I argue that this development of historiography is connected to the new political alliances forming in the 
thirteenth century, which elevates the political coalition building rhetoric above the majestic rhetoric aimed at 
consolidation and reproduction of the power structure.  
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will see, the production of secular history faced many of the challenges it did at the close 
of the fourteenth century.   
Registering the increased strength of the political community, Ricardian poets 
began to give literary voice to an emergent political time and it is this emergent political 
time that informs Spenser’s aesthetic of nation.7  This aesthetic arises out of and responds 
to a similar dynamic that informs political realism of Ricardian literature—namely, the 
validation of the political imaginary through the attenuation of the political and cosmic 
framework.  We saw how Gower expanded the idea of trouthe from a feudal obligation to 
a broader and innate obligation to the law of the land, the ancient constitution that bound 
monarch and subject alike.  Spenser retains the expansiveness of this trouthe (an 
expansiveness necessary to create an “imagined community”), but he does not imagine a 
community that restrains the prerogative. He focuses on the aspirational rather than legal 
authority of the community.  This aspirational force is represented by the romance quest, 
which is linked directly to the earthly court of Gloriana.  Redcrosse begins as a young 
man “falling before the Queen of Faeries” and seeking “a boone . . . that hee might haue 
atchieuement of any adventure, which during that feaste should happen” (“Letter to 
Raleigh” 717).  
The court of Gloriana and the romance genre itself becomes a vehicle to explore 
the aspirational authority of a nation, a fictive space to address concerns of legitimacy 
and allegiance.  In his tale on Holiness, Spenser obsesses over questions of political 
allegiance; indeed, at one point, Redcrosse’s insidious allegiance to the enchantress 
Duessa (a symbol of the false authority of the Catholic Church) threatens to sidetrack the 
                                                
7 I use the term “aesthetic of nation” because the word “nation,” “nationalism” and “nation-ness” are “cultural artefacts 
of a particular kind” and must be understood as having “come into historical being” (Anderson 13).   
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entire quest.  In a country where the queen claimed to be the head of the Church of 
England, it is not surprising that holiness cannot be disassociated from politics.  Spenser 
initially describes the central quest of Book I as motivated by a political obligation and a 
desire for glory:   
Vpon a great aduenture he was bond, 
That greatest Gloriana to him gaue, 
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faery lond, 
To winne him worshippe, and her grace to haue 
Which of all earthly thinges he most did craue; 
And euer as he rode his hart did earne, 
To proue his puissance in battell braue  
Vpon his foe, and his new force to learn; 
Vpon his foe, a Dragon horrible and stearne. (FQ I.i.3.1-9) 
 
The description of Redcrosse’s allegiance to the “greatest Glorious Queene” seems like 
standard romance fare: he is bound to the queen by vow, he craves her grace above “all 
earthly thinges,” and he hopes to prove his courage “in battell braue.”  However, in line 
five, Spenser, by emphasizing the earthly nature of the allegiance between Redcrosse and 
Gloriana, highlights a critical anxiety of Book One—namely a recognition that the bond 
between queen and knight was part of an economy of “earthly thinges.”   
Crucially, Spenser acknowledges the intersection of political authority and 
cosmology that shapes Book One.  Redcrosse’s “great adventure” is defined by the need 
to validate this fame-economy by justifying virtuous earthly glory (Gr. kleos), and the 
romance genre itself.  Spenser explicitly addresses the significance of “historical life” and 
“secular history” in cantos IX and X. Redcrosse’s encounters with Despair (Canto IX) 
and his vision of New Jerusalem (Canto X) force him, in different ways, to reevaluate the 
glory of “puissance in battell” and the significance of Gloriana’s Cleopolis.  By analyzing 
these scenes, I will briefly point to some ways that The Faerie Queene manifests and 
 304 
exalts the vernacular authority carved out by Ricardian poets in order to elevate the 
significance of nation and its history. 
Using a chivalric register replete with “great aduenture[s],” “puissance in battell 
braue,” and boons distributed by Gloriana, Spenser imagines the active life as a quest for 
“earthly immortality through fame” (Rathborne 17). Carol Kaske even suggests that 
Spenser’s “high ranking of fame among Christian values was unparalleled in Renaissance 
literature” (134).  Admittedly Spenser celebrates chivalric fame in The Faerie Queene; 
however, in order to understand the political work that the cult of fame performs, we 
must recognize how he radically distinguishes the knightly virtues of romance from the 
workings of salvation. Spenser can only reintroduce the “cult of fame” because he has 
acknowledged its insignificance in relation to the City of God, New Jerusalem.  The 
chivalric obligation to Gloriana’s Cleopolis (read the quest for virtuous fame) plays an 
important role in Fairyland precisely because it gives the knight the purpose and direction 
needed to face the insignificance of their “historical life.”  In Canto IX, Despair 
challenges the value of Redcrosse’s chivalric career: 
All those great battels, which thou boasts to win, 
Through strife, and blood-shed and auengement, 
Now praysd, hereafter deare thou shalt repent: 
For life must life, and blood must blood repay.  (FQ.I.ix.43.3-6) 
 
Despair’s redescription of the hero quest as a sin-narrative inappropriately undervalues 
life as pure vanity.  This life-denying attitude toward the world contradicts the Protestant 
belief, as expounded by Hooker, that “the first degree of goodness is that general 
perfection which all things do seek, in desiring the continuance of their being” (119).   
Redcrosse, confronted by this depiction of “all [his] great battels” as moments 
that he will “deare…repent,” almost succumbs to Despair: “At laste resolv’d to worke his 
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finall smart,/ He lifted up his hand, that backe againe did start” (FQ I.ix.51.8-9).  He is 
only saved by the sudden intervention of Una: 
Out of his hand she snatcht the cursed knife, 
And threw it to the ground, enraged rife 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Is this the battaille, which thou vauntst to fight 
  With that fire-mouthed Dragon, horrible and bright. (FQ.I.ix.52.4-5; 8-9) 
 
Daniel Moss argues that this scene allegorically represents  “fallen man’s utter incapacity 
to secure his own salvation” (74) because Redcrosse is saved by an external agent.  
However, after Una saves Redcrosse, she immediately reminds him of his sworn duty to 
fight the dragon that plagues her parent’s homeland.  While stanza 52 emphasizes the 
inability of man to “secure his own salvation,” it also re-establishes the hero quest as the 
driving force of the narrative: “Is this the battaille, which thou vauntst to fight.”  By 
bringing salvation and the hero quest into close quarters, Spenser emphasizes both the 
insufficiency of the hero quest and its necessity in a fallen world. Redcrosse’s 
commitments to Una and Gloriana provide an alternative narrative that allows Redcrosse 
to continue living—indeed requires him to continue living.  Gloriana’s Cleopolis 
becomes the providential ordering principle of political time through which the quest for 
virtuous fame is fundamental to the desire for the “continuance of being.”   The life-
affirming obligation to court of Gloriana, which saves Redcrosse from despair, is the 
foundation of Spenser’s aesthetic of nation.  
In Canto X, Spenser explicitly carves out the providential role of the nation and 
political time by demonstrating the role of earthly fame against the more exalted context 
of heavenly salvation.  The conflict between these two perspectives is depicted spatially.   
When Contemplation, a hermit, shows Redcrosse the divine city of New Jerusalem, the 
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knight inappropriately compares it to the earthly city of Cleopolis in order to understand 
the perfection of the divine city.  Spenser uses these two cities in order to identify and 
disentangle the virtues of the religious sphere from the secular sphere.  This 
disentanglement, however, does not free the knight from earthly concerns, but rather 
dramatizes the difficulty of living a life that is both holy and active.  Nonetheless, it is 
Contemplation that orders the knight to return to the active sphere:  “ne maist thou yitt/ 
Forgoe that royal maides bequeathed care” (FQ I.x.63.6-7).  Like Una in the Cave of 
Despair, Contemplation reminds Redcrosse of his sworne quest—his “maides bequeathed 
care.”  Contemplation acknowledges the importance of the active life represented by the 
romance quest. 
The two cities represent competing visions of authority.  His depiction of New 
Jerusalem, however, so far exceeds the virtues of the earthly city that it threatens to 
eclipse the value of human life altogether.  In fact, after seeing New Jerusalem, 
Redcrosse begs Contemplation, “O let me not . . . then turne againe/ Backe to the world, 
whose ioyes so fruitlesse are” (FQ. I.x.63.1-2).  Unlike Despair, Contemplation provides 
Redcrosse with a vision of the ultimate joy.  Ironically, however, Redcrosse’s impulse to 
leave the earthly world of Cleopolis parallels his suicidal urge in the Cave of Despair.  
The glimpse of the salvation narrative, of the eternal time outside of the romance, 
transforms the “maides bequeathed care” into fruitless joys of life.  The implication is 
clear—the struggles of life, contrasted with the importance of salvation, are meaningless.  
Spenser acknowledges this threat, but through the comparison of the two cities, separates 
the two spheres and lends dignity to “historical life” within the fallen context.   
Spenser’s idealistic depiction of New Jerusalem naturally tempts Redcrosse and 
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the reader to see the fallen world through a gloomy lens.  After tempting the reader to 
adopt this gloomy perspective of the earthly city, The Faerie Queene, through the 
character of Contemplation, upbraids both Redcrosse and the reader for assuming this 
erroneous perspective.  Contemplation then identifies the appropriate attitude towards 
each city; however, before I can identify the appropriate attitude, it is important to 
examine each city on its own terms.   
After an abbreviated physical description of New Jerusalem’s “wals and 
towres…builded high and strong/Of perle and precious stone,” Spenser focuses our 
attention towards the inhabitants who: 
…descend 
 From highest heuen, in gladsome companee, 
And with great ioy into that Citty wend, 
As commonly as frend does with his frend” (FQ I.x.56.2-5) 
 
Spenser’s description of the angels revises a biblical account of Jacob’s ladder.  Instead 
of describing the angels as merely  “ascending and descending on it” (Gen 28:12), 
Spenser depicts them moving in “gladsome companee…as frend does with his frend.” 
This slight adjustment emphasizes the importance of friendship and equality over 
hierarchy in an ideal world.  When juxtaposed against the narrative of knights competing 
for external honors, the “Citty” built on ideal friendship renders the sanctity of the honor 
code problematic. 
Moreover, Spenser describes God’s governance in maternal terms, where all the 
inhabitants or “Saints” are “More dear vnto their God, then younglings to their dam” (FQ 
I.x.57.9). 8  Because of this unconditional love the ruler performs the greatest service for 
                                                
8 Of course, through this God/mother metaphor, Spenser also makes a not-so-subtle connection between God and 
Elizabeth, who had frequently made use of maternal language to express her unconditional love of her subjects.  This 
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the citizens by purging them “from sinful guilt/ With pretious blood, which cruelly was 
spilt” (FQ I.x.57.4-5).  The description contrasts with the “blood-shed and auengement” 
that defines the romance quest; the heavenly city highlights the shortcomings of 
Cleopolis—the city where reformation often requires the “sword.”9 
Against this vision of friendship, unconditional love, and equality amongst the 
saints of New Jerusalem, the description of Cleopolis, for all its glory, appears “mired” in 
earthly ‘virtue’.  However, if we read the description of New Jerusalem as a critique of 
Cleopolis, we have failed to understand Spenser’s strategic use of the incommensurability 
of the two cities.  Spenser dramatizes this possible misreading. Redcrosse attempts to 
grasp this vision of the unfallen world through the unhappy comparison of New 
Jerusalem to the most exalted earthly city, Cleopolis: “For this great Citty that does far 
surpass,/ And this bright Angels towre quite dims that towre of glas” (FQ I.x.58.8-9).  
The attenuation of the political world and the cosmic framework, Cleopolis and New 
Jerusalem respectively, serves a purpose similar to what we have seen in both Chaucer 
and Gower.  However, in The Faerie Queene, the incommensurability between the two 
cities does not create insignificance, but rather calls into being a new political 
hermeneutic that allows the knight to navigate the fallen world.  Spenser effectively 
brackets off the eternal city and focuses on how to live in the temporal world, a world 
where hierarchy and glory are necessary precisely because Cleopolis is not New 
Jerusalem.  
                                                                                                                                            
allows Spenser to both separate Cleopolis from New Jerusalem and draw them closer together simultaneously. 
 
9 As Greenblatt argues, “Spenser’s knights live in the profound conviction that there is a moral task set for themselves 
by the virtue of the power of Gloriana” (179).  The “virtuous violence” of Spenser’s knights fits his political attitude 
towards reforming Ireland “even by the sword” (View of the Present State of Modern Ireland).  For an extended 
discussion of Spenser’s advocacy virtuous violence and Ireland, see Greenblatt 184-88. 
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Spenser explicitly thematizes the importance of earthly glory and the role of the 
state when Contemplation, himself, immediately qualifies Redcrosse’s interpretation:  
Most trew, then said, the holy aged man; 
Yet is Cleopolis for earthly frame, 
The fairest peece, that eie beholden can”  (FQ I.x.59.1-3)   
 
Contemplation warns Redcrosse that the contemplative life does not allow one to escape 
the “great battells” of the active life—those battles explicitly connected with service to 
queen.  Hamilton glosses the phrase “for earthly frame” as “considered as an earthly 
structure,” presumably to suggest that the two cities are being compared structurally.  Yet 
in the sixteenth century the word “frame” alternatively means “Advantage, benefit, 
profit” or “an established order or system esp. government” (OED).  In this sense, 
Contemplation acknowledges, simultaneously, that Cleopolis provides the greatest, 
“fairest” benefit and is itself the “fairest” order of governance in an earthly context (i.e. 
“that eie beholden can”). 
This “fairest” system of governance, however, relies upon a dubious ideal, namely 
that of “fame.”  In his portrayal of the earthly city of Cleopolis (literally City of fame), 
Spenser restores an overtly chivalric and hierarchical register.  When Contemplation 
describes Cleopolis, the language of the romance genre floods back into the text, and the 
words “noble,” “couett,” “fame,” “soueraigne,” “glory” and “guerdon” appear over the 
course of the 68-word description.  Contemplation makes us distinctly aware that 
Cleopolis is governed by a code of honor and just deserts where it 
 well beseemes all knights of noble name, 
 That couett in th’immortall booke of fame 
 To be eternized, that same to haunt, 
And doen their seruice to that soueraigne Dame (FQ I.x.59. 4-7) 
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Instead of New Jerusalem’s “glad companee,” Cleopolis is populated by “knights of 
noble name” that “couett” eternal fame; and, instead of the unconditional and sacrificial 
love of the mother-God, the “soueraigne Dame” demands “seruice” from her citizens.  
The knights are driven because they “couett in th’immortall booke of fame/To be 
eternized.” The word “couett” is suggestive of the darker possibilities of the fame 
economy.  Indeed, Spenser uses the word “covet” three times to describe the nature of 
allegorical figures of the Seven Deadly Sins in Canto IV. 
The chivalric register of Despair, the incommensurability of New Jerusalem and 
Cleopolis and words like “couett” and “fame” show Spenser’s awareness of the fragility 
of earthly order; and with a simple shift in emphasis, this language describes the antitype 
of Cleopolis, the House of Pride in which there sat: 
 A mayden Queene, that shone as Titans ray, 
 In glistring gold, and perelesse pretious stone; 
 Yet her bright blazing beautie did assay 
 To dim the brightnesse of her glorious throne   
As enuying her selfe, that too exceeding shone. (I.iv.8.5-8) 
 
In the court of Lucifera, a language of pride and envy replace the language of fame.  The 
descriptions of Lucifera’s blazing beautie that she uses to project her authority point to 
her illegitimacy.  She is a parody of authority whose majestic gestures turn into puns.  
The comparison to the “Titans ray,” which most obviously alludes to the sun, is also 
suggestive of “the proud, rebellious offspring of the earth, a symbol of pride” (Hamilton 
64n.).  Likewise the word “perelesse,” or peerless, also emphasizes that Lucifera does not 
possess the heavenly pearl, salvation.  Thus, her “peerlessness” is both pearl-less and 
perilous.  The majestic language asserting her authority makes visible the absence of this 
authority. Most significantly, Lucifera, envying the throne, attempts to dim its brightness 
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with her own “blazing beautie.” As a result, the queen and the throne (i.e. the symbol of 
the sovereign’s office) are torn asunder.  The House of Pride makes the embarrassment of 
authority visible.   
Spenser both renders this embarrassment visible and, somewhat magisterially, 
ignores it.  Just as Spenser affirms Lucifera’s evil by putting her at the head of a pageant 
of the Seven Deadly Sins, he unequivocally asserts Gloriana’s justice and legitimacy. 
Indeed, the illegitimacy of Lucifera’s proud authority necessitates and justifies the 
authority Gloriana. The justification of Gloriana’s court, much like the rhetoric of 
Fürstenspiegel, depends upon the tautology behind presumptive reasoning—where the 
goodness of her authority “can be inferred from the fact of its preservation” (Pocock 15). 
As such, Spenser’s grand allegory dedicated to Elizabeth I fits in with what might be 
called majestic rhetoric.  Spenser confronts the embarrassment of authority with 
“possibility of achieving a just, coherent, stable identity anchored in the ardent worship 
of power” (Greenblatt 179).  While I think the word “worship,” ineptly conflates New 
Jerusalem and Cleopolis, Stephen Greenblatt, I think rightly argues that the English 
nation symbolized by the court of Gloriana allows for the creation of a “stable identity” 
within political time.  Majesty creates an economy of fame (i.e. the book of fame in 
Cleopolis).  Thus Spenser collapses the distance between majesty and political potential 
of the community of the realm.  The attenuation of political and majestic rhetoric central 
to Ricardian aesthetic is absorbed into a majestic rhetoric that confers added significance 
onto historical life and secular history: a majestic language of nation justifies the violence 
of Redcrosse as an obligation to Cleopolis.  
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It is through romance quest and the cult of fame that Spenser adds a new majestic 
dimension to political time. Kaske argues that Redcrosse’s “contract with the Faerie 
Queene…must itself symbolize that problematic hold which Cleopolis has on him; at any 
rate it is not particularly associated with charity, only with fame” (138).  In Kaske’s 
terms, the “problematic hold” of Cleopolis represents Redcrosse’s moral deficiencies.  It 
is not accidental that Spenser scholars, like Kaske, repeatedly uncover a “subversive 
Spenser” in the Faerie Queene.  The poem confidently asserts the  “conviction” in “a 
moral task” grounded by “virtue of the power of Gloriana,” but by situating majestic 
authority within political time, Spenser stridently acknowledges the anxiety of authority.  
While I find Greenblatt’s argument that Spenser justifies “the power of Gloriana” more 
convincing that Kaske’s suggestion that Spenser critiques the “problematic hold” of 
fame, I think both arguments unnecessarily flatten the Faerie Queene.  The poem, I 
would argue, narrates the ideological struggle to make “the power of Gloriana” have 
virtuous meaning at a moment when “the cult of fame” would be marked with suspicion.   
Redcrosse must fight against Error, and Orgoglio (pride) and Sans Foy 
(faithlessness), but the most complex threat is from the possibility that “the power of 
Gloriana” has no cosmological warrant.  The possibility that work of Cleopolis is without 
value.  Contemplation acknowledges that New Jerusalem “does far surpas” Cleopolis, but 
simultaneously advises the knight to return to the earthly world: 
…when thou famous victory hast wonne, 
And high emongst all knights hast hong thy shield, 
Thenceforth the suitt of earthly conquest shonne, 
And wash thy hands from guilt of bloody field  (I.x.60.5-8) 
 
Redcrosse Knight must win the highest honours before he can shun “earthly conquest.”  
Crucially, “earthly conquest” (i.e. virtuous violence) represents both an obligation and a 
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guilt that he must “wash” away.  The “bloody field” is the site of “guilt” and “famous 
victory;” it is guilt and necessity.  Since the knight is bound to the earth both by vows and 
more importantly by his earthly body, he must still live within the fame framework of 
Cleopolis.  In order to ensure the good governance of his actions, he must serve the 
“soueraigne Dame.” In this way, New Jerusalem and Cleopolis cannot be read as 
traditional foils, but represent different ways of living that are dependent upon separate 
ontological foundations.  Since New Jerusalem stands outside both our world and our 
nature, we are thrown back upon the works of history, on the productions of Cleopolis to 
discover models for righteous action.  
 
Reading the Communitas Regni from Spenser’s Faeryland 
Clearly a short exploration of Book One of the Faerie Queene cannot begin to 
account for the complex idea of nation (or even Spenser’s aesthetic of nation); however, 
looking towards this discourse allows me to contextualize the literary transformations 
arising from the development of the political consciousness in the thirteenth century. 
While the idea of the communitas regni is obsolete, we are still engaged in conversations 
around nation and nationalism; thus, our understanding of political imaginary of Chaucer 
and Gower is almost inevitably shaped by these modern ideas.  Instead of summarizing 
my argument, I hope that my brief foray into Spenser’s aesthetic of nation provides a lens 
through which we can see more clearly the familiar and alien in the poetry of Gower and 
Chaucer.  
By comparing Gower and Chaucer with Spenser, we see how the Ricardian 
political imaginary, which produced and embodied the communitas regni, engendered 
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and differed from the aesthetic of nation.  While each of these poets registered the 
relationship between historical narrative and the political power, in Spenser alone do we 
see the process through which Tudor poets “reappropriated the control of collective 
memory” (Burguière 249) in the interests of the state.  There is no more obvious symbol 
for this “reappropriation” than Cleopolis and the court of Gloriana.  This city offers 
knights the opportunity to strive for earthly fame and have their names inscribed “in 
th’immortall booke of fame” by doing “their seruice to that souereign Dame.”  History, 
and more importantly, the opportunity to meaningfully participate in this history becomes 
a source of cultural capital.     
However, historical time was the imaginative labor of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries—an imaginative labor cutting across discourse of politics, law, 
theology, poetry and many other discursive fields that I could not cover in the span of this 
book.  The poets and political innovations are part of a struggle to bring about a language 
capable of transforming “a vague untechnical colloquialism” into “a clearly defined and 
precise constitutional term (Treharne Simon 223), a language that gave authority and thus 
meaningful existence to the community of the realm.  Quentin Skinner suggests that “the 
clearest sign that a society has entered into the self-conscious possession of a new 
concept is . . . that a new vocabulary comes to be generated, in terms of which the 
concept is then articulated and discussed” (x). The language surrounding Cleopolis 
demonstrates that “self-conscious” understanding of that new vocabulary. Chaucer and 
Gower, on the other hand, represent a poetic of disentanglement, a poetic that labors to 
wrest the political imaginary from a discourse dominated by majestic rhetoric.   
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Both the Confessio Amantis and the Canterbury Tales (in their own ways) 
participate in the disentanglement of political hermeneutics, causal time, and meaningful 
sense of the “common profit” from the cosmic framework.  Just as the Common 
Enterprise increased the conventional force of the communitas regni, “The Tale of the 
Three Advisors,” “Lycurgus,” and “The Folly of Rehoboam” displaced cosmic narratives 
and put community at the center of the literary project.  Through this displacement, 
Gower creates a new Fürstenspiegel that emphasizes political obligations, reshapes 
traditional values of kingship, revises the discourse of sovereignty and creates a historical 
space for “science of politics” (Simpson 273).  Similarly, Chaucer not only displaces the 
cosmic framework, but he also thematizes the conflict between majestic and political 
order, which was a product of the late thirteenth century. The political perspective (a 
provisional perspective, at best) arises from the rejection of majestic rhetoric—a rejection 
of arena-rhetoric in the Knight’s Tale, of Walter in the Clerk’s Tale, and of Melibean 
intransigence in Melibee.   
Spenser’s construction of Gloriana’s Cleopolis adapts and responds to those 
aspects of the political imaginary (i.e. hermeneutics, narrative architecture and sign 
theory) necessary for the “birth of a historical narrative” (Burguière 249). Like Gower, 
Spenser does not overstretch the earthly limits of Gloriana's court, "the fairest peece that 
earthly eie beholden can" (emphasis mine). The ontological foundation of the state 
requires an explicit acknowledgement of its distance from New Jerusalem.  Moreover, the 
overall structure of Spenser’s compilation of books, with each book dedicated to specific 
virtues of a gentleman, resembles Gower’s Confessio Amantis both in its confessional 
division and its focus on increasingly secular political virtues.  However, Spenser, unlike 
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Chaucer or Gower, produces a new majestic rhetoric that asserts the unlimited socio-
political authority of the queen.  Despite the distance between Cleopolis and New 
Jerusalem, the court of Gloriana has historical import and is the source of cultural capital.  
The virtues of Spenser’s gentleman, unlike Gower’s education of Amans, center on 
winning fame not limiting authority.  In an aesthetic struggle over language and modes of 
meaning, Spenser’s Faerie Queene draws the earthly community and its ancient 
constitutionalism back under the yoke of majesty. 
By placing Ricardian poetry in dialogue with Spenserian nationalism, I have tried 
to demonstrate how the political imaginary of Chaucer and Gower, grounded in the 
conceptual idea of the communitas regni, focuses on limits of authority.  The difference is 
clearly illustrated in Lord Melibee, who recognizing his own weakness, attempts to create 
cultural capital out of these limits.  The Tale of Melibee concludes with Melibee’s 
magnanimous Christ-like gesture of forgiveness of his three enemies: 
Al be it so that of youre pride and heigh presumpcioun and folie, and of youre 
necligence and unkonnynge,/ ye have mysborn yow and trespassed unto me. Yet 
for as muche as I see and biholde youre grete humylitee/ and that ye been sory and 
repentant of youre giltes,/ it constreyneth me to doon yow grace and mercy./  
Wherefore I receyve yow to my grace/ and foyeve yow outrely alle the offenses, 
injuries, and wronges that ye have doon agayn me and myne,/ to this effect and to 
this ende, that God of his endelees mercy/ wole at the tyme of oure diynge 
foryeven us oure giltes.  (VII. 1876-84) 
 
The conclusion encourages the reader to compare Melibee’s forgiveness of his enemies, 
with the “endelees mercy” of God.  However, as Lee Patterson has shown, the mercy of 
Melibee stems from a pragmatic realization that he does not have the power to actually 
bring about the vengeance he desired. Patterson has called this the “devastating moment” 
(118) because he reads it as the failure of Prudence and the Fürstenspiegel genre. What I 
have suggested is this pragmatic realization is the painful birth of the political 
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consciousness.  While the political world is still part of the cosmic framework (insofar as 
nothing escapes Providence), neither Melibee nor Prudence, for that matter, have access 
to the certitudes of the cosmic framework.  
Despite the differences between the individual tales of the Canterbury-bound 
pilgrims, and despite the even larger gap between the those tales and the exempla of 
Genius in the Confessio Amantis, the Canterbury Tales and the Confessio Amantis often 
speak to the same anxiety of sovereignty reverberating from thirteenth-century political 
innovation.  They imagine an authority “holding together” sovereign authority in the face 
of the collapse of majestic model of sovereignty (a collapse of the Angevin ‘vis et 
voluntas’ worldview that Richard tried to resurrect at the end of the fourteenth century); 
they foster an emerging political imaginary for an emerging community of the realm.  
Political authority is constructed out of Amans recognition that fin amour love is 
impossible; it is constructed out Theseus’s realization that his “noble theatre” lacks real 
authority.  That is, by foreclosing access to the language of Providence as a justification 
for the royal will, Ricardian poetry shaped a provisional mode of meaning that fostered 
the "communal and historical bond" (Middleton 97) which was vital to the common 
profit.10 
The reader frequently encounters the apparent gulf between cosmic and secular 
authority, between eternal time and a world seemingly governed by mutability; they 
encounter the political as a space governed by the inaccessible laws of Providence.  It is 
not a denial of God’s role in history, as much as the recognition of man’s inability to 
understand that role.  It is no accident that a sense of resignation pervades their tales—a 
                                                
10 Middleton describes the creation of an emotion common love that was focused not on private relationships, but rather 
on social relationships and as such it "was turned toward public expression" (96).   
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resignation to the unknown. Whether we look at the more heroic acceptance of 
limitations (i.e. Griselda or Alceste) or the more dejected acceptance of limits (i.e. 
Theseus, Melibee and Amans), a sense of resignation in the face of a cosmic order 
"making for its break-up" (Muscatine 247) haunts the Ricardian political imaginary.  And 
yet, it is precisely this voice that, holding together a provisional order and speaking 
against the collapse, eloquently captures how the struggle to create meaning is the 
struggle to create community. 
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